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C et ouvrage est le resultat d'une collaboration importante entre1'Institut d'etudes canadiennes, de 1'Universite d'Ottawa et le
Conseil international des etudes canadiennes (CIEC), un organisme
qui represente vingt associations nationales et plurinationales d'e-
tudes canadiennes de partout dans le monde. La conference sur « La
distinction canadienne au tournant du XXIe siecle », qui s'est tenue a
1'Universite d'Ottawa en mai 2000, a attire des chercheurs canadiens et
etrangers de marque qui representaient toute une gamme de disci-
plines et d'approches differentes et contrastees du theme choisi. Les
articles que vous trouverez reunis dans ce livre sont donc le resultat
d'un dialogue particulier, et qui tombe tout a fait a point, sur ce qui a
ete et ce qui est sans doute appele a demeurer specifiquement cana-
dien au Canada.
On a invite les auteurs qui ont collabore a cet ouvrage a envisager
tant le passe que 1'avenir dans leurs discussions et analyses du carac-
tere specifique de la societe, de la culture et de la politique
canadiennes. En consequence, les lecteurs constateront que les con-
textes ou s'inscrit ce dialogue savant relevent de 1'histoire autant que
des preoccupations de notre epoque. En cette ere de mondialisation et
d'elaboration d'une vision de plus en plus mondiale des problemes
internationaux, la question de la specificite canadienne exige que l'on
porte une attention renouvelee aux traits distincts et a des aspects par-
ticuliers de la vie canadienne qui continuent de definir le Canada
comme un espace politique et culturel a nul autre pareil. Par ailleurs,
notre theme se prete egalement a plusieurs analyses comparatives
penetrantes et particulierement revelatrices du point de vue des cana-
dianistes etrangers. Tant la conference de mai 2000 que les textes
reunis ici temoignent du vif interet qui anime les chercheurs canadiens
et etrangers lorsqu'ils parlent du Canada et de la place toute partic-
uliere qu'il occupe en Amerique du Nord et dans le monde.
Karen L. Gould
presidente du CIEC, 1999-2001
Doyenne du McMicken College of Arts and Sciences
University of Cincinnati
Preface
T his volume is the result of an important collaboration between theInstitute of Canadian Studies at the University of Ottawa and the
International Council for Canadian Studies, an organization that repre-
sents twenty national and multi-national associations of Canadian
Studies around the world. Held at the University of Ottawa, the May
2000 conference on 'The Canadian Distinctiveness into the XXIst
Century" attracted the participation of leading Canadian and interna-
tional scholars from a variety of disciplines whose approaches to the
topic were wide-ranging. The essays assembled here are therefore the
fruits of a particular and especially timely dialogue about what has
been and is likely to remain uniquely Canadian in Canada.
Contributors to this volume have been asked to look backward as
well as forward in their discussion and analysis of the distinctive char-
acter of Canadian society, culture, and politics. As a result, readers will
find that the contexts for this scholarly dialogue are historical as well
as contemporary. In an era of globalization and increasingly global
perspectives on international issues, the subject of Canadian distinc-
tiveness calls for renewed attentiveness to the distinguishing features
and particular aspects of Canadian life that continue to define Canada
as a unique political and cultural space. At the same time, our topic
also lends itself to a number of comparative analyses that are insight-
ful and particularly revealing for international Canadianists. Both the
May 2000 conference and the volume of essays collected here mark the
keen interest that Canadian and international scholars share in the
subject of Canada and its special place in North America and in the
world.
Karen L. Gould
President of the ICCS, 1999-2001
Dean of McMicken College of Arts and Sciences
University of Cincinnati
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INTRODUCTION
Perspectives sur la distinction
canadienne au tournant du XXIe siecle
Chad Gaffield
Quels sont les origines, le statut actuel et les perspectives de la dis-tinction canadienne au tournant du vingt et unieme siecle? C'est
cette question complexe qui a preoccupe les conferenciers de renom-
mee internationale et les delegues de douzaines de pays reunis lors
d'une conference de trois jours du 18 au 20 mai 2000. Cet evenement
du millenaire fut organise par le Conseil international des etudes
canadiennes et 1'Institut d'etudes canadiennes de l'Universite
d'Ottawa. La conference « La distinction canadienne au tournant du
XXIe siecle » a explore les dynamiques cles du present et du passe du
Canada afin de fournir des perspectives pertinentes sur 1'avenir de
celui-ci. Le fruit de cette conference fut une discussion intense toujours
penetrante et stimulante, tout en etant a la fois rassurante,
derangeante, encourageante, decourageante, visionnaire, pragma-
tique, optimiste et pessimiste.
Puis vint le 11 septembre 2001. Au moment ou nous nous appre-
tions a publier les actes de la conference, la destruction des tours
jumelles du World Trade Center a New York a remis en question la
pertinence a long terme de ces textes. Si le monde etait change a tout
jamais, comme on semblait le croire, ne devions-nous pas demander
aux auteurs de reviser leurs perspectives ? Ou ferions-nous mieux de
renoncer tout simplement a la publication des resultats de la con-
ference si ces analyses et ces idees n'etaient plus pertinentes dans un
monde d'apres le 11 septembre?
Un an apres la tragedie du 11 septembre, il est possible d'elaborer
une perspective sur la signification de cette journee. Meme s'il faudra
plusieurs annees avant de connaitre son importance a long terme, de
nombreux analystes croient en 1'importance de situer tous les evene-
ments courants, qu'ils provoquent ou non des cataclysmes, dans un
Perspectives on the Canadian
Distinctiveness into the XXIst Century
Chad Gaffield
W hat are the origins, current status, and prospects for the distinc-tiveness of Canada into the twenty-first century? This infinitely
complex question was at the heart of a three-day conference that
brought together internationally-acclaimed speakers and delegates
from dozens of countries from May 18 to 20,2000. Organized as a mil-
lennium event by the International Council for Canadian Studies and
the Institute of Canadian Studies at the University of Ottawa, the con-
ference, "The Canadian Distinctiveness into the XXIst Century,"
probed the key dynamics of Canada's past and present in order to pro-
vide timely perspectives on the future. The result was an intense and
profound discussion that was consistently insightful and stimulating,
as well as being, at various times, reassuring, disturbing, encouraging,
discouraging, visionary, pragmatic, optimistic, and pessimistic.
And then came 11 September 2001. Just as we were ready to pub-
lish the revised conference papers, the destruction of the twin towers
of the World Trade Center in New York City caused us to wonder
about the continued relevance of these papers. If the world were really
fundamentally changed as so often claimed, should we not ask all the
authors to reconsider their perspectives? Or, perhaps, we should sim-
ply abandon the plan to publish the results of the conference if indeed
the analyses and insights no longer had currency in the post-9/11
world.
One year after the 11 September tragedy, some perspective on the
meaning of this day is possible, and although its long-term importance
will not be known for many years, an increasing number of analysts
are now insisting on the need to situate all current events, no matter
how cataclysmic, within larger contexts across space and time.
Moreover, these analysts are emphasizing that 11 September exposed
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contexte plus large dans 1'espace et le temps. De plus, ces analystes
maintiennent que le 11 septembre a expose I'importance de deux con-
siderations, jusque-la ignorees, comme facteurs determinants du vingt
et unieme siecle : 1'etat-nation et les valeurs culturelles. En effet, pour
une grande partie du vingtieme siecle, il semblait que la mondialisa-
tion remettait en question 1'importance de 1'etat-nation et que
1'urbanisation, les entreprises multinationales et d'autres formes de
liens et d'organisations avaient tot fait d'amoindrir la pertinence d'en-
tites politiques comme le Canada. De meme, la poussee de la
mondialisation semblait relever de 1'economie et de la technologic
plutot que de la culture. Les valeurs, les priorites et 1'histoire etaient
considerees, tout au plus, comme des epiphenomenes, voire comme
etant detachees des phenomenes portant a consequence.
Un an apres le 11 septembre, toutefois, personne ne doute de la
pertinence de 1'etat-nation ni de I'importance des valeurs culturelles. II
est egalement evident que nous n'aurions jamais du douter de la per-
tinence a long terme des contributions exceptionnelles faites en
mai 2000 pour mieux comprendre le Canada a 1'aube d'une ere nou-
velle. Ces analyses justes ont mis 1'accent sur la culture et la nature du
Canada comme juridiction politique au sein de laquelle un change-
ment profond s'opere. L'importance des chapitres qui suivent s'est
done accrue au lieu de s'affaiblir avec le temps.
La premiere partie rapproche les idees innovatrices des trois con-
ferenciers de marque, c'est-a-dire John Ralston Saul, Jocelyn
Letourneau et Margaret Atwood. Chacun s'est attarde aux questions
cles de la distinction canadienne dans une perspective historique et
contemporaine. Ce sont leurs visions du Canada au debut d'une ere
nouvelle qui sont a la base des chapitres suivants ou quatre themes
majeurs sont abordes. Dans la deuxieme partie intitulee « Individus,
collectives et Etat », Gilles Paquet et Susan D. Phillips presentent des
analyses du developpement historique du Canada afin d'aborder
d'une nouvelle fac,on les questions de gouvernance et des relations
entre 1'Etat et la societe civile au vingt et unieme siecle. Denis Lacorne
et Alan C. Cairns, pour leur part, donnent un contexte a la diversite de
la societe canadienne dans des perspectives comparatives, longitudi-
nales et critiques. Dans la troisieme partie, W. Michael Wilson,
Monique Begin et Maya Dutt examinent « Le caractere de la societe
canadienne » du point de vue des cultures d'affaires, des cultures
sociales et politiques et de diverses cultures litteraires. Le lien entre ces
cultures forme le theme de la quatrieme partie, « Culture, identite et
Introduction
the critical character of two considerations that previously had been
increasingly dismissed as determining factors for the twenty-first cen-
tury: the nation-state and cultural values. Indeed, for much of the later
twentieth century, it had been argued that globalization was under-
mining the importance of the nation-state, and that with the rise of
cities, multinational businesses, and other forms of connection and
organization, the relevance of political entities such as Canada was
declining rapidly. Similarly, the driving forces of this globalization
were often said to be economic and technological rather than cultural.
Questions of values, priorities, and, in fact, of history were often con-
sidered epiphenomenal at best and, perhaps, completely detached
from those of real consequence.
One year after 9/11, however, no one is doubting that the nation-
state is still relevant or that cultural values are fundamentally
important. And it is clear that we should never have doubted for a
minute the enduring relevance of the outstanding contributions made
in May 2000 to understanding Canada at the dawn of a new era. These
penetrating analyses emphasize both culture and the nature of Canada
as a political jurisdiction within which complex change is now under-
way. The urgency of the following chapters has thus increased rather
than diminished with the passage of time.
Part One brings together the innovative and profound insights of
the conference's three keynote speakers, John Ralston Saul, Jocelyn
Letourneau, and Margaret Atwood, each of whom focuses on central
questions of Canadian distinctiveness from both historical and con-
temporary perspectives. Their visions of Canada on the eve of a new
era provide the foundation for the following chapters that address
four major themes. In the next section entitled, "Individuals,
Collectivities, and the State," Gilles Paquet and Susan D. Phillips offer
analyses of Canada's historical development in order to propose new
ways of thinking about questions of governance and state-civil society
relationships in the twenty-first century while Denis Lacorne and Alan
C. Cairns contextualize Canadian society's diversity in comparative,
longitudinal, and critical perspectives. In Part Three, W. Michael
Wilson, Monique Begin, and Maya Dutt examine "The Texture of
Canadian Society" in terms of business cultures, social and political
cultures, and diverse literary cultures. The connections between these
cultures are the focus of the theme of Part Four, "Culture, Identity, and
the Market" which is analyzed by C. Michael Hall in the context of
tourism; by Shirley L. Thomson with reference to Canada's cultural
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marche ». Ce theme est analyse par C. Michael Hall dans le contexte
du tourisme, Shirley L. Thomson quant a la politique culturelle du
Canada, Jean-Louis Roy dans le contexte des forces Internationales et
Maria Teresa Gutierrez-Haces quant a la « diplomatic de citoyennete ».
La cinquieme partie confronte directement le contexte international
instable du Canada sous le theme « Le role du Canada sur la scene
internationale au vingt et unieme siecle ». Dans cette section, Donna
Winslow etudie la securite mondiale dans la perspective de 1'armee
canadienne, tandis qu'Huguette Labelle examine les preoccupations
quant a la qualite de vie de tous les peuples par rapport au role inter-
national qui reviendra au Canada. Dans les derniers chapitres, Terry
Cook explore la signification des techniques de 1'information et des
communications en vue d'une voix canadienne distincte, alors que
Jean Laponce et Lorna Irvine s'interessent a 1'avenir dans la perspec-
tive des tendances societaires, des metaphores et des cartes litteraires.
Pris dans leur ensemble, les chapitres de ce livre rejettent toute
notion de fatalite relative au Canada, qu'elle soit historique ou future.
Les analyses s'interessent plutot au fait que, quel que soit leur vecu,
passe ou present, qu'ils soient ou non victimes, les individus, les
groupes et les collectivites sont en mesure de jouer un role significatif
dans la construction de leur destinee et de celle du Canada. De plus,
les auteurs mettent systematiquement 1'accent sur 1'importance de la
culture, de la creativite, de rimagination, de meme que des forces du
marche et des changements technologiques. Leurs interpretations
s'eloignent du determinisme, economique ou autre, pour rejoindre
une interrogation plus complexe qui explore les liens et non-liens entre
ce qui est dit et ce qui est fait, entre les idees et les comportements,
entre la pensee et Faction, entre 1'intellectuel et le materiel. Enfin, ces
auteurs presument qu'il est necessaire de se concentrer sur 1'avenir a
partir d'une perspective qui englobe le passe et le present. Cette
approche suppose non seulement la reconnaissance et 1'analyse de la
complexite de la realite canadienne, mais aussi 1'examen de 1'ensemble
des qualites en perpetuelle mutation qui ont defini le Canada a travers
son histoire, mais qui ne sont pas necessairement toutes appropriees a
la vie au vingt et unieme siecle.
En interrogeant la distinction canadienne, les auteurs identifient a
maintes reprises les questions cles portant sur 1'equilibre existant entre
les diverses forces en rapport competitif. Us ont souvent recours aux
termes « complexite », « contingence », « ambiguite », « inclusion »,
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policy; by Jean-Louis Roy in terms of international forces; and by
Maria Teresa Gutierrez-Races with respect to "citizenship diplo-
macy." Part Five then directly confronts Canada's changing
international context under the theme, "The Place of Canada in the
World of the XXIst Century." In this section, Donna Winslow
addresses the question of global security from the perspective of the
Canadian military and Huguette Labelle explores concerns about the
quality of life of all peoples in terms of Canada's expected interna-
tional role. In the concluding chapters, Terry Cook probes the meaning
of information technologies and communications for a distinct
Canadian voice while Jean Laponce and Lorna Irvine peer into the
future from the vantage points of current societal trends and literary
metaphors and maps.
Taken together, the chapters of this book reject any notions of
inevitability about Canada, either historically or for the future. Rather,
the analyses focus on agency, on the idea that however much victim-
ization has occurred and occurs now, individuals, groups, and
collectivities can in fact play a meaningful role in determining their
own destinies, and indeed, the destiny of Canada. Second, the authors
consistently emphasize the importance of culture, of creativity, of
imagination, as well as of market forces and technological change.
Their interpretations back away from concepts of determinism, either
economic or otherwise, to embrace a more complex interrogation in
which they explore the connections and disconnections between what
is said and what is done, between ideas and behaviour, between
thought and action, between the intellectual and the material. Third,
these authors assume that it is necessary to focus on the future from
the perspective of the past and the present. This approach calls not
only for recognition and analysis of the complexity of the Canadian
reality, but also for examination of the changing constellation of qual-
ities that have defined Canada historically, and that may or may not be
appropriate as we move forward into the twenty-first century.
In addressing the question of Canadian distinctiveness, the
authors repeatedly identify key questions of balance, of equilibrium,
in the context of competing forces. They frequently use such words as
"complexity", "contingency", "ambiguity", "inclusivity", "chaos",
"coherence", "identities", "contradictions", and "continuities" - all of
which have become familiar in international debate not only in the
social sciences and humanities but across all disciplines.
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« chaos », « coherence », « identites », « contradictions » et « continu-
ite ». Ces termes sont d'usage courant dans les debats internationaux
non seulement en sciences sociales et humaines, mais dans toutes les
disciplines.
C'est dans ce contexte que Jocelyn Letourneau fait reference a la
complexite delicate des mobiles de 1'artiste Alexander Calder. Meme si
celui-ci est ne a la fin du dix-neuvieme siecle, sa vie et ses interets s'ap-
pliquent bien a nos reflexions sur le vingt et unieme siecle. De fait, c'est
par sa formation en genie mecanique que Calder a fait le lien entre les
arts et les sciences avant de devenir Tun des sculpteurs les plus inno-
vateurs de son temps. Ses mobiles sont d'ailleurs le resultat de son
interet pour les constructions qui se modifient gracieusement en
reponse a des stimuli externes. Certains contesteront 1'idee que 1'ceu-
vre d'un Americain puisse refleter de fac.on metaphorique la
dynamique canadienne, tandis que d'autres verront que les caracteris-
tiques des mobiles de Calder sont pertinentes a plusieurs aspects de la
societe canadienne contemporaine.
Que des exemples comme les mobiles d'Alexander Calder soient
vus ou non comme des images utiles au moment ou nous aliens de 1'a-
vant dans le vingt et unieme siecle, les discussions de la conference
accentuent le fait que des changements complexes ont fini par carac-
teriser la realite canadienne. Dans leur ensemble, les diverses
presentations ont insiste sur 1'espoir et la prudence qui doivent
entourer ces changements. Avant tout, les conferenciers ont mis en
evidence que le veritable defi n'est plus simplement de se connaitre
soi-meme en tant que Canadien, mais plutot de mettre en pratique
cette connaissance de maniere a creer une societe meilleure et plus
juste, et ce dans le contexte international en evolution ou se situe « le
monde d'apres le 11 septembre ».
It is in this context that Jocelyn Letourneau refers to the delicate
complexity of artist Alexander Calder's mobiles. Even though Calder
was born at the end of the nineteenth century, his life and interests
may serve us well in thinking about the twenty-first century. Indeed,
before becoming one of the more innovative sculptors of his time,
Calder was to bridge the arts and sciences through his education as a
mechanical engineer. Similarly, his mobiles resulted from his interest
in creating constructions that shift and change gracefully in response
to new external pressures. The idea that the art of an American is able
to capture metaphorically the Canadian dynamic will undoubtedly be
contested by some while others will agree that the characteristics of
Calder's mobiles do, indeed, seem relevant to many aspects of con-
temporary Canadian society.
Whether or not examples such as Calder's mobiles will be seen to
be useful images as we move forward in the twenty-first century, the
discussions at the conference emphasized that profound and complex
changes have come to characterize the Canadian reality. Taken
together, the various presentations emphasized that these changes
called for both hope and caution. Above all, the speakers stressed that
the challenge is no longer simply to know ourselves as Canadians, but
rather to use this knowledge to create a healthier and more just society
in a rapidly changing international context within which the 'changed
world' after 9/11 must be situated.
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The Inclusive Shape of Complexity
John Ralston Saul
A T THIS TIME, ALL OF US - JUST ABOUT EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD,especially in democracies or countries where the free market pre-
vails - are victims of what could be called the Tristan and Isolde
syndrome. What is the Tristan and Isolde syndrome? It is what has
been taught in schools of economics for about 25 years. It says that if
we all drink a magic potion - a love potion - we will suddenly lose our
sense of responsibility as citizens, and it will be replaced by inevitable,
passionate, romantic forces that will determine the direction of the
world. This sense of responsibility will also be replaced by the domi-
nance of what is called 'self-interest/ The French term is less
descriptive: amour propre, or interet personnel. Prince Hassan has sug-
gested narcissisme economique, which is an interesting translation.
This syndrome has lasted for a quarter century. But we have been
seeing the beginning of a change of direction over the past two years
or so. In various places around the globe, we sense that the magic
potion has worn off a little bit. People no longer really believe in
inevitable forces.
They are beginning to remember the fact that while self-interest is
necessary, absolutely necessary, it is too mediocre a concept to guide a
civilization. And embrace inevitable forces? That is far too romantic,
too emotional an idea for citizens who, over the past 2,500 years, have
become accustomed to feeling responsible for their actions and the
directions of their society.
This does not mean that because we taught Tristan and Isolde in
schools of economics for a quarter century, we are now going to lapse
into the opposite - idiotic protectionism or whatever. It does not
mean that the nation-state of the 19th century will return. Or that it
must return. I hope that it will not. That kind of nation-state has
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already given us two world wars. This is not the time to revisit all of
that again.
But it does mean that the great syndrome of inevitability will not
appear either. And that we are looking for something between the two,
a kind of reasonable globalization where citizens in nation-states will
play a very important role. After all, you can't say in the same text, as
many people do, 'Thank God democracy won ten years ago, democ-
racy won throughout the world," and then three sentences later, "how
wonderful, the nation-state is dead." Because democracy was created
and exists only within nation-states. Therefore, if nation-states are
dead, democracy is dead, because we have not done what is necessary
to transfer democracy to other regional or global levels.
So at this time, individuals and citizens just about everywhere in
the West are looking for ways to become involved, or rather to become
re-involved, in the debates on the major questions of the day - all
kinds of major questions. The way we see ourselves as citizens, in
whatever territory or country we may live, is therefore very important;
the way we see ourselves within our civilization, the way we see other
citizens in other civilizations. Carlos Fuentes said: [in translation]
"Culture comes before the nation, and culture can organize itself in
many ways." And you know that when Carlos Fuentes uses the word
culture - rather in the same way as Robin Blaser of British Columbia
when he said that "poetry comes first" - we are not talking about cul-
ture in the strict sense of the term, but culture in the sense of great
concepts of civilization. This is what comes first in a nation. Not inter-
ests, but how citizens see themselves, that is, culture.
And I will add two things that must be repeated again and again
in order to understand a country, countries, nations, peoples. First, as
many other people have said, history is the past moving through the
present into the future. It does not consist of three chapters or periods.
It is a single event. Second, nations, countries, peoples do not really
change that much over time. In our civilizations we have deep memo-
ries. And I use the word "memories" in its broadest sense - those
memories that exist at many levels. Over time, those memories are lost
and then, curiously, from out of nowhere, they are rediscovered, often
5, 50, 100, 200 years later. It is amazing how deep are the memories
that exist in human cultures, memories which are often there, hidden,
slumbering, asleep, but which will always resurface. The memories of
civilizations are not wiped out. They will always appear in different or
similar combinations, new or old interpretations, or a combination of
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both. It is interesting to note - the Ambassador of France is here, and I
believe he will agree with me - that the peoples of Europe, we could
say the states or nations of Europe, are in the process of rebuilding
themselves, of finding themselves once again within a framework that
they previously used in another way, more or less during the Middle
Ages. And this is a compliment. They are rediscovering the continent,
the continental concept as it existed before the advent of the nation-
state in the 18th and 19th centuries. But they are rediscovering the
Middle Ages, with the advantages and without the disadvantages of
the late 19th century and the 20th century.
They are memories that are constantly acting within civilizations.
In these memories, there are, however, key moments, events, crises
that signal changes, that slightly alter the direction of various devel-
opments, that fix memories or certain interpretations of memories. I do
not believe that there are that many "wild cards" in history. They turn
up from time to time, but not as often as people say. Today, we talk as
if, I don't know, e-mail is something that carne at us out of nowhere
and will change our history. In twenty years, we will surely laugh at
this kind of small, amusing event, this small technology.
As for key events, aren't there two kinds - the worst and the best?
Half a century ago, we murdered seven million Jews. That was a key
moment in the history of the West. In our memory, it changed every-
thing, but at the same time it is part of the catastrophic continuation of
a certain part of our memory. There are also some extremely positive
events. It is incredible that these two things can coexist. But experi-
enced memory and real memory make up real experience.
I want to talk to you a little bit about some of these moments in
Canada's past and also in the present and future. They are tools we
have right now for discussion and for change.
Let me begin with the questions of murder or political death.
Whenever I mention this subject, I'm amazed by the reaction. There is
either an embarrassed silence, or a look of surprise, as if to say, 'why
would you think that was important?', or 'what possible importance
could that have?' or 'what's that got to do with the characteristics of a
civilization?'
Confederation represents an artificial kick-off date, but let's use it.
Since 1867 this country has killed in the course of internal political
strife, in various ways, by hanging, battle, riots and so on, depending
on how you do the numbers, approximately 85 people. With all due
respect to other cultures, many of whom may be represented here
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today, this is an extremely unusual characteristic for a nation-state. At
this moment, in New York, there's an enormous discussion going on
about the fact that 3,000 American blacks were lynched, in the late 19th
century and the 20th century. That's just one form of political murder
for one group. There have also been various riots during which hun-
dreds of blacks were killed. And, as I said, that is only one category of
citizen. Think of the British in Ireland and the deaths over the last
quarter century alone. The French in Corsica and in the Basque region.
The Spanish and the Basques. And so on and so on and so on.
This country is constructed with all the elements which should
have led to internal violence in the late 19th and 20th centuries - reli-
gions which oppose each other, racial, cultural groups which in other
places opposed each other, enormous differences of richness and
poverty. All of those things elsewhere led automatically to violence in
the 19th century nation-state. Somehow, we avoided the worst of it in
Canada. I don't think it's because we're more intelligent or nicer. I
think it has to do with all sorts of circumstances which shape society
and events - distance, the North, marginality, poverty. Of course,
some choices have been made; there have been some clever moments.
But you know, one shouldn't take credit for these things. And of
course we must not forget all the catastrophic things that happened. I
could spend the entire morning listing them. The stupid things. The
scandalous things. The people whose lives we have ruined. In spite of
this, the casualties have only crept up to about eighty-five, and we can
name them all. It's an astonishing thing to say that in 133 years we can
actually name everybody who has died as a result of civil strife.
My feeling is that if you want to understand a nation-state, you
begin by asking: "How many of its own citizens has it killed?" Then
you can move on to other matters - Were good paintings painted?
Very good paintings? Is there wonderful architecture? In other words,
you begin not with glory but with modesty. And modesty means
believing that you don't have the right to kill your own citizens.
I believe very strongly that the key historic moment, when it was
decided formally that we would go down this relatively non-violent
road (because it was not automatic), came on the 27th of April 1849, two
days after the elite of Canada burnt down our Parliament Buildings
because they didn't want to lose power (I am grossly simplifying the
way it's normally taught but I think it's an accurate interpretation.)
They came out of their houses in Montreal, burnt down the Parliament
Buildings, and then tried to stone the Governor General and assassinate
The Inclusive Shape of Complexity 17
the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Just a minor event. We
tend not to talk about it. Two days later, on the 27th, in the midst of
ongoing civil disorder, the Cabinet met. This was at a time when,
throughout Europe and the United States, there was enormous disorder
in the streets, cavalry was charging down main avenues everywhere on
a regular basis, opening fire to clear the streets. And they were not sim-
ply firing on working class citizens, they were firing on the middle class
and the upper middle class and the minor aristocracy, many of whom
were the leaders of the reform movements of the day.
The Canadian Cabinet met on the 27th and decided to justify their
non-violent actions over the preceding thirty-six hours and, as it turns
out, to justify their non-violent actions of the next several months.
When I say decided, I mean consciously, intellectually, decided to
adopt an extremely unusual approach. There it is, carefully transcribed
in the Cabinet minutes, which to my astonishment I've never seen
quoted in any book of Canadian history. I just don't know why. This is
the sort of document which indicates the trajectory of a very unusual
civilization. It contains such phrases as: "the proper mode of preserv-
ing order is by strengthening the civil authorities." This is a remarkable
statement for a government to make in the middle of the 19th century;
this is not what the British Government was doing at that time; in fact,
the British Government sent angry messages over the next few months
to the Prime Minister through the Governor, furious that he had not
sent troops into the streets in order to do what was done in London,
which was to shoot down the people who were causing trouble. It's
very interesting to go back and read that correspondence. The great
western historian W. L. Morton said that "the Canadian leaders had
decided not to answer defiance with defiance but to have moderate
combat shame arrogant violence."
What they had done was introduce a clear notion of how any gov-
ernment should behave in a constituted Canadian nation-state. What I
am suggesting is that our present constitution was actually born
between 1848 and 1849, and that afterwards we fiddled with it as we
went along. Indeed we continue to fiddle with it. What do I mean?
Well, each civilization defines how it will imagine citizenship. They
conceive of a notion which encapsulates their society. Our notion was
built around restraint. In other words, restraint was the element which
would allow a place as complicated and as unusual as this to survive
the catastrophes which were striking the nation-states of Europe and
our neighbour to the South.
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Our relatively successful addiction to restraint is tied to a shared
sense of ourselves as a profoundly egalitarian civilization, one could
say a profoundly middle class civilization. It doesn't really matter
what the class is if everybody imagines themselves belonging to it. The
concept of this structure is that as many people as possible should
belong to that single group, in our case, the middle class.
You will find these egalitarian assumptions built into the funda-
mental structures of this NOT new country. This old country.
I keep saying ours is an old country in the hope that ministerial
speech writers will notice and drop their almost automatic use of that
terrible phrase: "in this new country where all is possible." The truth is
we are in an old country where a certain number of things are possible
precisely because we have at least 400 years of experience of working
together here; at least 400 years of operating inside what I would call
the fundamental triangle, the fundamental three-part foundation of the
country: the Aboriginals, the Francophones, and the Anglophones. If
you convert that triangle into modern terms, it means that long before
anybody conceived of Upper or Lower Canada or the Dominion of
Canada, this place was already functioning as a society of minorities.
There has never been a majority in this country. It has always been a
country made up of minorities. Even the concept of English Canada is
a preposterous idea because it was essentially Scottish and Irish. And
when you look at the Loyalists, who are usually thought of as English
Loyalists, you discover that the percentage of English was very small.
There were probably as many if not more Germans. And there were
Jews, a sizeable group of blacks, large groups of Irish and Scots and so
on. So from the very beginning, the reality of even the English minor-
ity was an unusual grouping of smaller minorities.
Think of the country in architectural terms: a foundation of three
pillars, Aboriginal, Francophone, and Anglophone, cemented together
if you like by the Metis - which is in a sense the only original thing the
three groups did together, to our great and good fortune. Why good
fortune? Because the Metis were absolutely key in the shaping of enor-
mous parts of the country. They settled, through their military
victories, a large part of the southern border of the Prairies for exam-
ple. And then we constructed on top of that triangular foundation,
floor after floor after floor after floor, of additional minorities from
around the world.
I'll come back to this architectural image in a moment. But first, I
want to point out that the idea that multiculturalism was invented by
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the Trudeau government - the classic view - is false. This was a mul-
ticultural country from the seventeenth century on and has never been
anything except a multicultural country. Even if you go back and look
at the way in which they conceived a mythological view of
Confederation in 1867, you'll see that in their own minds, even if they
were trying to wipe out the essential memory of the Aboriginal role,
they were nevertheless talking about four major groups, not two major
groups. Perhaps the word "multicultural" has been too intensely
defined over the last few decades to be recuperated for general histor-
ical use. Well then, let's say that Canada has been a country of
minorities since the 17th century.
A further point: What I'm describing when I speak of egalitarian-
ism, a minority-based culture and an architectural structure is a very
unusual model for a nation-state. A non-monolithic model. Anybody
who's here from Europe, or the United States, would agree that the
18th/19th century concept of a nation-state was at its heart monolithic,
centralizing, designed to remove, for all sorts of reasons, the power of
the barons and the regions. One of the basic assumptions was that a
nation-state could only be properly administered by the centre if the
civilization was reduced to a single language and if all dialects were
eliminated. Often these languages marked for elimination were first
denigrated as dialects in order to make such linguistic cleansing seem
less shocking.
The result was a mono-linguistic dictatorship of the centre.
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, until the Second World War,
almost all Western nation-states were constructed around that model.
That's what built the United States, which is a profoundly 18th and 19th
century European monolithic nation.
You could argue that the United States is not monolithic. On the
ground that is true. But its conception, its religious texts - the
Declaration of Independence, Constitution, Bill of Rights - its
mythology are all profoundly monolithic. As an imagined place, it is
monolithic. And the way in which it does things is monolithic.
What I'm saying is that in the middle of the nineteenth century, in
this marginal, northern, poor, second- or third-rate little group of
colonies, which gradually became Canada, we were already in the pro-
cess of inventing a new concept, an incredibly post-modern concept -
almost by mistake - as a way of living together, as a way of dealing
with the impossibility of anybody dominating. We - or rather our pre-
decessors - invented a new kind of nation-state. You could call it a
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country of minorities. You could call it a decentralized country or, as
I've often said, a country based on complexity. You can call it anything
you want, but the point is it was a rejection, from the 1840s on, of the
dominance of the 18th/19th century idea of the monolithic nation-state.
All of our subsequent problems - those which have overwhelmed us
from time to time over the last 150 years, as they do in every country 
can be attributed to attempts by our elites to import ideologies from
Europe. That is, by virtue of their own insecurities, they attempted to
impose on this country 18th and 19th century European ideas of the
monolithic nation-state. This resulted in unpleasantness, violence, dis-
cord. In each case the people eventually found a way to restrain their
elites, either by throwing them out or by convincing them that com-
plexity, slowness, a lack of clear priorities, obscurity, wasting time, all
of these, are essential elements in the success of this country. And that
glorious, romantic, heroic leadership may fit just fine into a monolithic
nation-state, but it doesn't work here.
Now let me come back to the idea of an architectural image as the
best way to describe our civilization. I've thought about this for years.
Somehow we have slipped once again into a European approach, a
sort of linear view of how the country was created and evolved. This
begins with the Manichean idea of two founding peoples. The two are
simply the monolithic idea divided into two halves. Immediately, in a
world obsessed by measurement - more often than not, artificial mea-
surement - this approach provokes the question - well, how many o
each? What are the numbers? Who has the power? How does it all add
up statistically? In other words, this is a linear view which leads to a
monolithic view. It is a very social science-like view of society. But
Canada is not a linear, rational, European monolithic country. It never
has been. Which is why I feel an architectural approach is more appro-
priate, more accurate, being multi-dimensional, spatial. And this
country is essentially spatial.
This is an approach which allows us to understand the central
role of Francophones without obsessing over birth rates. It also
allows us to re-imagine the reality of the Aboriginal role without
becoming obsessed by population statistics. This is not, as some cyn-
ical people have said whenever I or other people bring this up, an
attempt to reintroduce a romantic idea of the past. Nor is it political
correctness in any way, shape or form. Remember, out of 400 years of
Canadian history - that is since the meeting of the three groups - the
first 250 years were dominated by the Aboriginals or they had equal
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power. Then, for approximately 100 years the European immigrants
reneged on their treaty obligations or a large part of them. Then over
the last 50 odd years, we have begun trying to act like civilized peo-
ple again and have begun putting back together the original
arrangements. Slowly but surely we've been re-remembering that
original triangular foundation.
This last year has been one of the most exciting for a very long
time because with the creation of Nunavut and with the Nisga'a
Treaty we have managed, in a brand new way, to introduce into what
appear to be Western-oriented legal structures two examples of totally
non-linear legal and administrative thought. Both Nunavut and
Nisga'a are spatial inventions which do not respond to easy questions
about the linear nature of power. And that is good. That is very true to
the nature of this place.
Let me go a step further. People often say we have British parlia-
mentary democracy. Well, we don't. Our parliament doesn't work
anything like the British parliament. It bears little resemblance to that
parliament apart from the names of the roles. The way in which it actu-
ally works, the way in which it is conceived is not at all British. We talk
about having Anglo-Saxon law or English law and the Civil Code. The
reality is that our legal codes are a mix of the two as well as being
deeply influenced by our first 250 years, that is, by our experience with
the Aboriginals. Our social models, even our negotiating models, for
example our approach toward constitutional questions, come out of
that first 250 years of experience. Even the fact that we invented peace-
keeping and have become experts in it is a reminder of the fact that
there is another method, and that method in many ways comes out of
those first 250 years.
Let me just go back for a second to the idea of egalitarianism. I'm
going to quote you one paragraph from Louis LaFontaine's Address
to the Electors of Terrebonne, which I quote in every single speech I
give, and I'm going to keep on quoting it until people start quoting it
back to me.
Because for me this is perhaps the central phrase in the imagining
of what Canada would become: [in translation] "To prevent us from
enjoying it, the social equality that forms the distinctive character of
both the people of Upper Canada and those of Lower Canada would
have to be destroyed. Because this social equality must necessarily
lead to our political freedom. There can be no privileged caste in
Canada outside and above the mass of its people."
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This is not a speech by a young student filled with idealism. This
is the fundamental declaration of policy from the future first demo-
cratic Prime Minister of Canada who, with Robert Baldwin, would set
the direction of the country. It isn't surprising that LaFontaine,
Baldwin, Macdonald, Cartier, Tupper, McGee, Howe were all
obsessed by things such as public education. And their approach
toward education did not come out of the British and French tradi-
tions. They consciously went and looked for public and egalitarian
approaches. They found the basis for Canadian public education in
Prussia, Holland, Switzerland, and New York. And the first seeds of
our universal health system lie in the egalitarian idea which was for-
mally put in place by Louis LaFontaine.
I'm perfectly conscious of the fact that a percentage of our elites
have never accepted this interpretation of Canada. After all, as I men-
tioned before, they began their explanation of themselves by burning
down the Parliament Buildings in 1849. Theirs was and remains the
point of view of the classic colonial elite which believes that reality
exists elsewhere. Not here. An essay which might help you to under-
stand their point of view is V.S. Naipaul's "The Return of Eva Peron."
In his description of what went wrong in Argentina, I think you'll find
many echoes of the Canadian situation and of the choices by which we
are constantly faced. Let me summarize the argument which they
reject. This is an old civilization constructed upon a non-linear, tripar-
tite foundation. This is a minority-based intellectual idea, the opposite
of a monolithic society, and has been for 150 years. Canada was the
model of the European Union 100 years before anybody thought about
the modern idea of Europe.
Let me finish with a few details.
First of all, there is the concept of rivers. In most classic nation-
states, including the monolithic nineteenth century nation-state, a
river was and is a barrier, a border. It was where wars ended. It was
where you separated people. One of the fascinating things about
Canada is that rivers have never been barriers. As Harold Innis and
many others have explained, rivers were the highways leading to the
centre of the country. Until very recently, they were the mode of trans-
portation. They were replaced by other modes of transportation such
as railways and now high technology. In our history, rivers were like
the hinges of a door - meaning "a joint consisting of two interlocking
pieces of metal connected by a common axis around which one or both
pieces can turn freely." What is bizarre in Canada's case is that this
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joint turns in both directions. You can be here in a city, Ottawa, that is
a classic example of this idea of a hinge, a river as a hinge in a civi-
lization where, in fact, there are many interlocking pieces turning
around one other. This is completely different from the idea of a river
as a border.
My second small idea is that, in general, the idea of civilization is
taught, especially in the Western tradition, in the following way: it
began with nomads - hunters and gatherers - the hunter-gatherer soci-
ety. And with 'progress' we turned into an agricultural society, and
eventually became sedentary. Today, therefore, we have completed this
process of 'progress/ because we are urban, sedentary people. I have
heard this taught worldwide. It was progress, wasn't it? The Western
idea of progress. I would say that, here, with our three foundations, with
our architectural structure, with the untameable nature of most of our
territory (90 per cent of our territory is untameable in the
European/American sense), we have produced a civilization where
there is constant tension between movement; you could say nomads or
hunter-gatherers or whatever you like, but between movement on one
side and sedentarism on the other. Our civilization is therefore built on
constant tension between these two things. Any analyst who tries, for
example, to describe our novels as products of the first, second, or third
stage sadly misunderstands and misconstrues the reality of a civiliza-
tion. It is permanently founded on this tension between movement and
sedentarism. Canada functions as a tension. That is what is interesting.
A third idea: It's not surprising that out of this permanent tension
came a school of philosophy. You could call it the Toronto School or
the Canadian School, founded by the greatest thinker we have had,
Harold Innis. Innis was the first to conceive many of the modern ideas
on communications, which were then picked up and developed by
people like Marshall McLuhan or, in a completely different way, by
Northrop Frye, or in a completely different way by George Woodcock,
or in a way by the young Pierre Trudeau when he wrote about balance
- his essays on equilibrium were extremely interesting - or by Fernand
Dumont or George Grant. Fernand Dumont and George Grant are two
very interesting thinkers to put side by side. They were both important
thinkers, but they were held back by their attachments to certain ear-
lier European religious ideas, which prevented them from fulfilling
their intelligence in the way Innis did. What all of them demonstrated
- Innis, McLuhan, Frye, Trudeau, Grant, Dumont -1 could add Glenn
Gould - is that in this civilization communications is the central theme,
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communications at every level, even at the most abstract and theoreti-
cal levels. Memory is a key element in that concept of communications.
Memory has a very important role, here perhaps more important than
elsewhere because of the need to communicate. The discussion around
the tools of communication, of movement, has always been with us
and is still with us. This is in part because of the constant tension
between movement and the sedentary. As a result, throughout this
century, we have played a central role in the evolution of the philoso-
phy of communications.
I might add that you can tell the country is in crisis when we forget
the centrality of communications at every level of our being from the
purely philosophical, to the plastic arts, music and the written word;
from our mythologies to our practical life. You can tell the country is in
crisis when it costs more to fly from Toronto/Montreal to Vancouver
than it does from Toronto/Montreal to London/Paris. There you can
see, in a very basic sort of way, that Canadians have lost the sense of
how absolutely essential the nature of communications is to a place like
this. It shows that we have forgotten what Innis said: "that economics
must derive its laws from the history of the place rather than deriving
the place from a set of all-purpose laws formulated elsewhere."
What have I said so far? This has been a civilization of minorities
from the beginning; a three-dimensional, architectural structure; pro-
foundly non-monolithic from the beginning: therefore, outside of the
classic American/European nation-state structure even in the mid-19th
century; the first of the post-modern nation-states; an old civilization
with four centuries of stable evolution inside its complexity; a place
where rivers - and therefore other forms of communication - are no
borders but hinges; a model which does not 'progress' from movement
to sedentarism, but is built on the tension between the two; a civiliza-
tion which thinks in terms of communications and fails to the extent
that it ignores the central role of communications; a poor, northern,
marginal society which has intellectually constructed its prosperity
through an idea of inclusive egalitarianism. A civilization the very
essence of which is its complexity.
All of these ideas are tied in some way to the idea of a spatial non-
linear non-rational civilization. The opposite of rational is
non-rational, not irrational. A spatial idea of civilization is not in any
way, shape or form a European/American concept. This is the least
European democracy in the world. When I say European, I am refer-
ring to the 18th century model of the nation-state. This is the most
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American state in North America. There are only two of us, and the
other one is profoundly European.
I'd like to finish with a thought which relates to language.
Canadians are extremely comfortable with our own idea of our com-
plexity. Many people in politics, business and academia would like to
have a clear view of the place. They would be more comfortable if
Canada conformed to a normal model. But Canadians are very com-
fortable with being incomprehensible by these standards. In a curious
way, we know that one of our strongest suits is that half the time the
outsiders don't really understand what we're doing. It's a sign of great
self-confidence that we can live with this complexity and that we can
live on several levels at once. We can be several things at once.
Of course language - or rather, languages -is key to this complex-
ity. Anybody who knows me knows that I believe very strongly in the
central role, for example, of the two national languages in Canada.
One of our most successful innovations over the last twenty-five years
has been the creation of immersion schooling which now educates
317,000 kids, Anglophones in Francophone schools. This would be the
equivalent of Germany having about 800,000 kids in French schools, or
France about 700,000 kids in German schools. A revolutionary innova-
tion. This and other linguistic innovations are absolutely essential.
But it's also very important not to see our society only through the
structures of language. If you do, you are slipping back into the limits
of the international structure of English and French. What is the inter-
national structure of those languages if not that of the old empires,
British, French, American? I'm not criticizing those places per se. But
why would we want to lead ourselves back into total dependence on
a structure which we didn't put in place ourselves, which could only
in the end be defined elsewhere as having a meaning; a meaning cen-
tred on the ex-empire. Besides, these are structures in which we can't
help, whether in English or French, but play a very small role. Such
dependence would lead us back into a structure which has built-in
assumptions about the monolithic nation-state, about the denial of
complexity, about the elimination of minority cultures. Dependence
on a monolithic linguistic structure involves a de facto denial of our
geographical marginality in the North.
I say this because I know that in some places where Canadian cul-
ture is taught, the central way of coming at it is through the language
stream or the linguistic stream. And I think that that is not the right
way to go about it, because it deforms the interpretation of what we
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really are. I think it's very important for all of us to be looking for com-
parisons. Not those which eliminate the linguistic line, but which
complement or counterbalance the linguistic line. Otherwise we won't
be able to understand our own mythologies.
When we look at Scandinavia, at Latin America, at Middle Europe,
at Russia, we find many elements which have a great deal more to do
with us, with the reality of how we live in this place, than an approach
through linguistics could offer. You find in some of those civilizations a
certain sense of melancholy which is not characteristic of either
American or Western European cultures. You find a celebration of the
provincial - this is very important to us. I always remember Robertson
Davies saying to me, not long before his death, that one of the greatest
things about his life, one of the things that made him happiest, was to
know that he came from the provinces. It was a great strength for a
writer. Historically, many of the great writers do not come from the cen-
tre. It gives us and these other civilizations a great sense of contrast and
difference within society. It's something to celebrate, not something to
be embarrassed about. What else? Well you find a sense of nature, out
of control, uncontrollable whether it's in Canada, in Northern Europe,
or in Latin America. Magic realism is one of the greatest themes of Latin
American literature, set in an abiding preoccupation with the nature of
time and of historical times. You find the curious contradictions which
come from living on the uncontrolled margins of Western democratic
civilization. You find countries and civilizations which are able to
accept the idea of solitude as a positive, not a negative. As Glenn Gould
put it: "the value of life comes from solitude."
What am I saying? I said that the very nature of Canada is com-
plexity. When you go to Montreal - what do you find? A trilingual
city. That is to say, language is key, but language cannot necessarily
say everything. A European politician visiting Canada said not long
ago that all the Francophones in the world, as such, have converging
views of the world. That is an interesting idea: people who speak the
same language share a set of ethics. It reminds me of the nineteenth
century English politicians who used to talk about the duty of empire;
it also reminds me of the old joke about the American who says he is
happy to be a Christian because the Bible was written in English.
We do not share values because we speak English or French. We
share values because our societies are similar. Experience. The situa-
tion. History. Geopolitics. Values. Climates. Geographies. Political
systems. Attitudes toward violence. And so on and so on. There may
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also be a language to share. Maybe not. But why think that it is impor-
tant to share other things if we share a language? I believe that it is
important instead to look for differences within the same languages
and similarities outside languages. It is extremely important to think
that major differences are possible within the same language, that with
effort we will find real, philosophical, political, historical, cultural
equivalences, friendships, beyond our own linguistic communities.
In Latin America in particular, I find that there are opportunities
for absolutely extraordinary intellectual comparisons. Australia is an
example of a country where one of Canada's languages is spoken. But
that is rather an accident, luck. Elsewhere, there are enormous differ-
ences within English and French. People who speak English may come
from a democratic environment, just as they may come from a dicta-
torship. They therefore have very different "real language content." I
believe that by finding a balance between the strength that differences
within languages give us - languages without centres, languages that
are real everywhere they exist - and the strength that similarities out-
side languages give us, we can find a kind of international modus
vivendi that Canadians can adopt.




C EUX ET CELLES QUI SE VOIENT CONFIER LE MANDAT DE PENSER LECanada au tournant du vingt et unieme siecle ont une tendance,
normale je crois, a mettre 1'accent sur ces problemes et questions qui
sont au cceur des preoccupations immediates des gens et de 1'actualite.
C'est ainsi que Ton fait grand etat des impasses constitutionnelles
et du tarissement de 1'esprit et de la pratique democratiques qui mar-
quent la vie politique au Canada. De meme, on ne cesse de revenir sur
la panoplie des problemes d'ordre societal vecus au pays a 1'ere de la
mondialisation, le plus important de ces problemes etant sans conteste
celui de la fragmentation tendancielle de la societe canadienne en des
« mondes » bien caracterises, celui des « gagnants » et celui des « per-
dants », celui des « zones fortes » et celui des « zones faibles », celui des
« migrants haut de gamme » et celui des « classes enracinees », etc.1.
Loin de moi 1'idee de nier ou meme de minimiser 1'ampleur et la
portee de ces ecueils sur lesquels vient souvent s'echouer la gouver-
nance canadienne, echouements qui constituent autant de naufrages,
petits ou grands, qui assombrissent le futur du pays.
II est une question cependant sur laquelle on insiste un peu moins,
une question qui renvoie pourtant a Tun des plus grands defis du
Canada a 1'aube du vingt et unieme siecle, et c'est celle, pour le pays,
de passer a 1'avenir.
Passer a 1'avenir est ce genre de formule ambivalente que j'aime
bien, a 1'instar par exemple de « Penser le Quebec dans le paysage
canadien2 » ou de « Je me souviens d'ou je m'en vais » ou encore de
Ce texte doit etre lu comme un essai d'exploration metahistorique et non pas
comme le fruit d'une entreprise de recherche methodique. L'article garde essen-
tiellement sa forme de presentation orale.
30 Jocelyn Letourneau
« Honorer ses ancetres, c'est se responsabiliser devant 1'avenir3 ». Ces
formules contiennent en effet une part d'ambiguite, done de fluidite,
de souplesse, d'ouverture et d'adaptabilite qui, pour moi, ne renvoie
absolument pas a de 1'hesitation, a du cafouillage ou a de 1'incertitude,
mais bien plutot a une disposition sereine, de la part de ceux qui les
utilisent ou les trouvent fecondes, pour affronter 1'enigme perenne du
politique. Cette enigme, de mon point de vue, n'est autre que celle
d'accueillir la complexite de la vie, y compris sa dimension conflic-
tuelle, dans un esprit de mediation, et ce, en s'ouvrant a la possibilite
de penser 1'impensable jusqu'a soutenir parfois le paradoxe.
On a souvent defini la politique comme etant 1'art du possible.
Voici une vue plutot demissionnaire de 1'activite supreme du genre
humain. Pour ma part, j'associe bien davantage la politique a 1'art de
negocier 1'impossible, une finalite qui exige, de la part de ceux et celles
qui exercent cette responsabilite, des vertus et qualites exceptionnelles.
Or, le defi de passer a 1'avenir est 1'une des facettes cardinales de
la politique.
II n'est jamais simple en effet d'articuler sur un mode porteur le
souvenir au devenir de telle maniere que les descendants puissent
aspirer a une vie degagee des lourdeurs du passe sans pour cela renier
1'heritage des anciens. A plus d'un titre, cette difficulte d'un arrimage
heureux du passe a 1'avenir est Fun des murs sur lesquels vient se briser
toute possibilite de renovation des representations symboliques du
Canada, renovation dont on pourrait s'attendre qu'elle contribue a la
recuperation generate du pays dans un sens avantageux pour 1'avenir.
A 1'heure actuelle, c'est comme si 1'espace politique du Canada
etait sous 1'emprise de trois grands groupements par reference dont
deux voulaient, pour se refonder, se rappeler a eux-memes dans leurs
seules offenses subies (les francophones et les autochtones) alors que
1'autre, pour se refonder tout autant et le pays avec lui apparemment,
desirait user des pouvoirs delivrants de 1'oubli (les anglophones).
Or, a cet egard, mon opinion est pour une fois univoque: ni le rap-
pel imperissable de ce qui fut, ni la pratique de 1'oubli, comme modes
du souvenir, ne constituent, pour les contemporains desireux d'etablir
un rapport satisfaisant avec le passe et le futur, un moyen qui se revele
fecond.
Aussi peut-on dire que, du point de vue des conditions pour
passer a 1'avenir, les Canadiens semblent en ce moment empetres dans
une impasse dont le denouement tarde a se manifester.
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Faut-il desesperer d'y arriver? Je ne crois pas. Pourrait-on penser
qu'il se trouve, dans 1'experience historique canadienne, un capital
memoriel et factuel par le rappel et les ressources duquel il serait pos-
sible de depasser les insuffisances, les apories parfois, des
representations actuelles du pays? J'estime que oui.
II m'apparait en effet que 1'aventure canadienne est une histoire
pleine de blessures, certes, mais de possibilites aussi. II me semble de
meme que 1'aventure canadienne est une histoire d'ambivalences et de
dissonances, ce qui, et j'y reviendrai, est une caracteristique globale-
ment positive de 1'anteriorite du pays de meme qu'un fonds, une dot
considerable, pour passer a I'avenir.
C'est en effet dans 1'ambiguite de ces blessures et possibilites, de
ces ambivalences et dissonances, que s'est eleve le Canada, fragile et
fort tout a la fois, c'est-a-dire cherchant continuellement sa voie mais
ouvert, pour cette raison precisement, a differentes problematiques lui
permettant de se recuperer dans des raccords politiques rendant pos-
sible son evolution vers d'autres horizons.
Les mots pour dire le pays
Les mots employes sont importants. Dans un essai recent sur les mots
et sur le monde, Alberto Manguel rappelait avec pertinence que les
mots donnent a 1'experience sa forme, offrent a la vie la possibilite de
vetir sa nudite 4.
Or quels sont ces mots qui decrivent et revelent le plus justement
le Canada ?
N'attendez pas de moi que je vous parle du pays en vous peignant
la beaute du soleil naissant sur 1'Atlantique et chatouillant la cote cana-
dienne de ses premiers rayons matinaux. N'esperez pas non plus que
je chante ce pays en vous racontant la joie de marcher dans les feuilles
d'automne, a Quebec, par une journee sans vent et presque pluvieuse;
en vous rappelant a quel point Ton se sent ecrase par le ciel des
Prairies; ou en vous relatant la plenitude ressentie par une traversee
des Rocheuses sur la musique de Mahler. Pareilles images et sensa-
tions ressortent d'experiences personnelles qui temoignent d'un
rapport singulier a la nature universelle, pas au pays. Pareilles images
ne sauraient nullement exprimer ce qui me semble etre au cceur de
Fa venture historique canadienne.
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II est des mots plus subtils, moins racoleurs et moins faux par con-
sequent, pour dire le Canada. Ces mots ne sont pas tres excitants,
surtout pour des politiciens, parfois des intellectuels, qui sont en quete
de visions simples, univoques, tranchees, assurees, voire joviales, pour
vendre ou penser le pays.
J'ai plus tot mentionne quelques-uns de ces mots par lesquels, me
semble-t-il, Ton peut rendre compte de 1'experience historique cana-
dienne. Ces mots sont ceux d'ambivalence et de dissonance, de
blessure et de possibilite, de raccord et de recuperation. Je pourrais
rajouter ceux de tensions et de frictions, de tiraillements et d'inter-
dependance contrainte, d'ambiguite et de paradoxe.
II s'agit de mots qui, au lieu de decrire le Canada sous Tangle d'un
corps structure, puissant, symetrique et stable, bref comme on aime bien
qu'un pays soit habituellement presente ou montre, le rendent dans ses
mouvances approximatives, dans ses tatonnements perpetuels, dans ses
indispositions continuelles par rapport a lui-meme, dans ses equilibres
instables et dans ses proximites distantes; autant de caracteristiques, on
Tavouera, qui portent en elles 1'idee generale de fluidite, idee qui s'ac-
corde mal avec 1'essence supposee des nations et des Etats, laquelle est
reputee exprimer une propriete originelle immuable.
Or, sans verser dans les exces du postmodernisme qui veut, selon
la vulgate consacree, qu'il n'y ait de realite que textuelle ou coulante,
je ne suis pas personnellement partisan de ces visions anhistoriques et
teleologiques des nations selon lesquelles il y aurait, a Torigine des
touts constitues, une graine contenant en germe 1'avenir de ce qui ne
pouvait pas ne pas etre ou de ce qui aurait du etre mais qui a ete
empeche ou reste inaccompli5.
Pour me representer le Canada dans le mouvement incessant de
son ordre ou de son desordre, c'est comme on veut, j'aime bien ima-
giner le pays sur le mode des fameuses structures mobiles inventees
par Alexander Calder, structures dont les elements palpables, en conti-
nuel balancement les uns par rapport aux autres, les uns avec les
autres et les uns centre les autres, produisent une sorte de composition
dissonante de figures reelles et virtuelles ou 1'harmonie est toujours en
construction.
Cette expression, composition dissonante, me semble particuliere-
ment juste pour rendre et offrir 1'experience historique canadienne
dans sa complexite irreductible.
On sait ce qu'est une dissonance : en composition musicale, la dis-
sonance renvoie a Tintervalle incongru et desagreable entre deux sons
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qui appelle une resolution par un accord harmonique. Paradoxe
interessant, la dissonance comprend aussi les notes responsables d'un
tel rearrangement melodieux. En d'autres termes, la dissonance est
tout a la fois la reunion deplaisante de sons et 1'accord consolant cet
effet contrariant ou ennuyeux.
L'image de la dissonance est utile pour aborder le cas du Canada
qui, tout en generant continuellement des conflits, sait precisement se
recuperer grace aux frictions et tensions qui scandent sa mouvance.
A maints egards, en effet, 1'experience canadienne fut et reste
1'expression de tensions et de frictions incessantes entre forces cen-
tripetes et forces centrifuges, tantot partenaires et tantot antagoniques,
tantot complementaires et tantot contradictoires. Elle fut aussi et
demeure encore, par le jeu reflechi et tatonnant d'acteurs en concurrence,
1'expression d'un depassement de ces tensions et frictions dans des rac-
cords rendant possible le passage a un ou a d'autres etats politiques.
Particularite interessante mais en meme temps frustrante pour
bien des observateurs, s'ils se veulent enchainements par rapport a un
ou a des etats politiques anterieurs, ces raccords ne furent jamais, et ne
sont toujours pas resolution definitive de 1'equation canadienne,
laquelle ne comporte pas un seul denominateur commun mais
plusieurs denominateurs conjoints parmi lesquels, assurement et de
maniere incontournable, il y a le Quebec6.
C'est ainsi qu'en pratique le Canada evolue entre les possibilites
continuelles que lui offrent ses acteurs en cherchant a depasser ses dis-
sonances constitutives, celles qui decoulent de sa dualite structurelle
en particulier, et 1'aporie sur laquelle vient s'echouer toute tentative de
resorber ces dissonances en chantant le pays sur le mode de 1'har-
monie ou de 1'unite nationale.
Autrement dit, la possibilite du Canada reside precisement dans
1'accueil des tensions et frictions qui lui sont constitutives et dans leur
transformation en compromis provisoires, compromis ne levant toute-
fois jamais la perspective des oppositions et des conflits animant
1'evolution du pays.
La se love, je pense, la singularite canadienne. Une singularite qui
n'est la manifestation d'aucun essentialisme transcendantal, mais qui
precede de 1'histoire et se comprend par elle; une singularite a la
donne globalement heureuse plutot que malheureuse, mais qui n'est
pas sans accroc; une singularite dont la memoire est cependant fai-
blissante dans 1'imaginaire de la classe politique et intellectuelle qui
gouverne et inspire actuellement le pays.
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II est une consequence politique qu'il faut tirer de pareille vision
de 1'aventure historique canadienne. C'est que toute tentative qui vise
a en finir avec la dissonance structurelle et structurante du pays en
fixant une fois pour toutes son evolution dans des matrices inva-
riables, une telle tentative, dis-je, est la fac.on la plus probante de
diminuer les possibilites d'avenir pour le Canada7.
Une ambigu'ite f econde
A plus d'un egard, 1'experience historique canadienne fut et reste
largement marquee du sceau de 1'ambiguite. J'entends par la que, pour
des raisons tenant a 1'histoire et non pas a une essence premiere, 1'elan,
la trajectoire et la dynamique du pays n'ont jamais ete univoques. Je
parle ainsi non pour reprendre a mon compte le paradigme encore a la
mode, mais date comme concept metahistorique fondant une vision
d'avenir du Canada, des identites limitees, parcellisees et atomisees -
ce que certains continuent de traduire, dans le langage courant, par la
formule vieillie de « mosai'que canadienne ».
Je dis que 1'experience historique canadienne fut ambigue parce
que les episodes catalyseurs du devenir canadien ont toujours
debouche sur 1'ambivalence plutot que sur 1'univocite, c'est-a-dire sur
une certaine infinitude, ouverture et imprecision de destin plutot que
sur une inflexibilite de parcours. Cela est vrai de 1759, de 1837-38, de
1840, de 1867, voire de 1982.
En d'autres termes, malgre bien des tentatives en ce sens de la part
de petits et de grands acteurs et penseurs, il n'a jamais ete possible de
focaliser le devenir du pays sur 1'axe des ordonnees d'un seul principe
structurant. De meme, il n'a jamais ete possible de separer 1'avenir du
pays de son passe, c'est-a-dire de refonder le Canada en faisant fi des
presences anterieures qui 1'avaient fac,onne. II n'a jamais ete possible
non plus d'imposer aux habitants du pays une seule pratique et vision
du Canada, ni d'ailleurs d'eliminer ou de faire abstraction de la
volonte des groupements constitutifs du pays de s'affirmer coute que
coute, avec et contre les autres groupements, dans le pay sage canadien.
On aurait tort de voir dans rambigu'ite canadienne la manifesta-
tion d'une faillite « nationale », celle d'une incapacite a etre
collectivement ou celle d'une digression deplorable de destin par rap-
port a 1'ideal type de 1'Etat-nation. Dans mon esprit, rambigu'ite de
1'experience historique canadienne n'est pas 1'expression d'une
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impuissance a imposer un projet integrateur. Elle est un parcours qu'il
faut reconnaitre et assumer, une trajectoire dont il faut exploiter les
ressources pour activer la suite des choses. A plus d'un titre et a
maintes occasions, 1'ambiguite constitutive de 1'experience historique
canadienne s'est en effet revelee porteuse d'avenir pour le pays dans
la mesure ou elle est apparue, simultanement, comme le mode de
condensation des blessures et comme le mode d'expression des possi-
bilites formant depuis toujours la matiere du passe du Canada.
Autrement dit, plutot que de deboucher sur 1'equivoque
paralysante ou de favoriser 1'hegemonie d'un seul pouvoir domina-
teur, I'ambiguite canadienne a rendu possible et sanctionne en meme
temps, 1'expression des contraires. II ne s'agit pas de voir dans cette
situation la preuve d'une tolerance ou d'une aptitude a la conciliation
uniques au monde de la part des habitants du Canada les uns envers
les autres. Pour etre juste, cette tolerance et cette aptitude apparente a
la conciliation ont ete maintes fois dementies par les faits. L'ambiguite
canadienne decoule plutot de ce qu'aucun pouvoir latent ou constitue
a 1'interieur de cet espace d'interrelations sociales et politiques qu'on
appelle le Canada n'a pu imposer sa seule raison aux pouvoirs concur-
rents, bien que de nombreuses asymetries de reciprocite se soient
manifestoes entre ces pouvoirs s'exprimant, se rencontrant et se dis-
putant dans 1'arene publique.
Si ma vision des choses est exacte, I'ambiguite d'etres du Canada
temoignerait done tout a la fois de la perennite des tensions marquant
1'experience canadienne et de 1'incapacite manifeste des pouvoirs
dominants d'imposer leur logique politique jusqu'au bout, et ce, par
suite de la determination inebranlable de forces concurrentes a s'affir-
mer et a s'epanouir, c'est-a-dire a etre et a obtenir reconnaissance au
cceur de 1'espace politique institue du pays.
On ne saurait en aucun cas minimiser 1'importance de ces forces
concurrentes dans la destinee canadienne. A maints egards, on pour-
rait d'ailleurs soutenir que le Canada s'est historiquement forge
comme un ensemble de paris perdus par la raison intransigeante des
pouvoirs dominants ou des majorites contre 1'insistance des acteurs ou
des minorites a perdurer dans le temps en ne cessant jamais de s'affir-
mer et en cherchant a faire avec la realite des choses et celle des autres
plutot que de la refuser ou de s'exiler dans des lieux d'etre exigus.
Raconter 1'histoire de cette insistance a s'affirmer, a perdurer et a
s'ouvrir a 1'autre et a 1'ailleurs, c'est precisement se donner les moyens
de reconnaitre le potentiel de recuperation propre a 1'experience cana-
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dienne. C'est s'attaquer de front a 1'operation de transformation des
blessures en possibilites. C'est penetrer au coeur de ce qui a fait la sin-
gularite canadienne hier et de ce qui pourrait peut-etre la reconduire
demain.
Une memoire d'avenir
La question qui est au coeur de mon propos depuis le debut est au fond
la suivante : quelle memoire, quelle histoire d'avenir pour le Canada?
En d'autres termes, quel recit qui rende et offre le plus justement pos-
sible 1'experience historique canadienne du double point de vue
inseparable de la science et du politique, et ce, dans la conscience de
demain ?
On comprendra que je refuse d'endosser ces recits hypocrites qui
subliment la realite passee de 1'experience canadienne pour faire bete-
ment du Canada le « meilleur pays du monde » et ce, depuis toujours.
Je repete ce qui est lapalissade eculee : le role de 1'historien n'est pas
d'occulter la matiere de 1'histoire, mais de faire face a 1'ayant-ete dans
un souci eleve de rigueur scientifique et d'ethique memorielle8. Or, je
1'ai dit, 1'experience historique canadienne est faite de blessures que
Ton ne peut pas taire. La marginalisation tantot deliberee tantot
involontaire, en partie reussie et en partie avortee du fait franc.ais, du
fait autochtone et du fait metis, dans 1'operation de construction de
1'Etat-nation canadien et de canadianisation du pays compte parmi
1'une de ces blessures qui, a 1'evidence, n'arrive pas a se cicatriser. II
s'agit, je pense, d'une donnee imprescriptible de 1'experience his-
torique canadienne. Cela dit, et j'y reviendrai, on ne peut pas vivre
exclusivement dans 1'hypothese ou dans 1'hypotheque du passe.
Force est d'admettre par ailleurs que je ne suis pas partisan non
plus de ces entreprises de reconstitution historique qui, insistant sur la
puissance structurante de 1'idee et de la pratique de la cooperation dans
1'experience historique canadienne, diminuent par la, necessairement,
la puissance tout autant decisive de 1'idee et de la pratique de 1'affir-
mation de soi, et done du conflit identitaire, dans la destinee du pays.
De mon point de vue, il n'est pas possible de faire 1'histoire du
Canada en ne mettant 1'accent que sur les consonances et les conver-
gences qui ont marque le passe du pays.
Pour ne prendre qu'un exemple, significatif toutefois, la lutte des
Canadiens franqais hier, et celle des Quebecois francophones main-
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tenant, pour inscrire leur historicite, leur identite et leur devenir dans
la problematique canadienne, est tout aussi importante que leurs tenta-
tives et operations continuelles de conciliation et de collaboration avec
les autres habitants du Canada pour batir et rebatir le pays.
Autrement dit, 1'histoire du Canada n'est pas raccomplissement
de 1'unite dans la diversite ni la victoire des forces de la cooperation
sur celles de la discordance. Cette histoire est celle de dissonances tou-
jours reconduites et produisant, par le jeu et les decisions avises et
impromptus d'acteurs cherchant a vivre avec et contre la complexite
du monde, des voies de passage vers demain, voies de passage, toute-
fois, jamais parfaites et toujours partielles.
L'^quilibre du Canada - c'est, me semble-t-il, ce qui ressort princi-
palement de son passe - est celui de ses desequilibres et asymetries
continuellement contestees, negociees et finalement accueillies, de gre
ou de force, par la majorite des decideurs, de meme que par la popu-
lation, et ce, pour qu'advienne nolens volens un avenir.
Voila pourquoi il me semble que la meilleure histoire qui soit du
Canada est celle qui, tout en n'obliterant pas la realite et la gravite des
blessures causees, insiste sur les possibilites qu'ont su donner au pays
ces habitants et decideurs qui, plutot que de refuser ou de contrarier
les dissonances constitutives de 1'experience historique canadienne, les
ont regues et traduites politiquement, par esprit visionnaire ou par la
force des choses, c'est selon, mais en creant ipso facto un mouvement
favorable a 1'apparition de consonances provisoires.
L'experience canadienne comme parcours de possibilites : void
une representation du pays qui me semble historiquement juste par
rapport au passe et politiquement porteuse pour Favenir; une
representation qui, sans nier les malheurs survenus hier dans le pays,
n'y consume pourtant pas 1'horizon de demain; une representation
qui amene les habitants du pays non pas a se rappeler seulement ou
oublier uniquement, mais, de maniere paradoxalement heureuse - et
j'insiste sur cette formule - a se souvenir d'ou ils s'en vont.
Un concept cle : celui de canadianite
Pour penser et qualifier la dimension la plus feconde de I'experience
historique canadienne, j'ai, dans d'autres textes et notamment dans
celui que j'ai fait paraitre dans les pages du journal Le Devoir a 1'ete
19999, propose le concept de canadianite, concept que je distingue de
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celui de canadianisation, voire de canadiennete10. Inutile de dire que
cette initiative, audacieuse pour un intellectuel quebecois, voire pour
un intellectuel tout court, m'a valu bien des reproches11.
En usant du concept de canadianite, mon objectif n'a pourtant
jarnais ete - et n'est toujours pas, du reste - de fonder une vision
radieuse ou naive du pays. II faut par ailleurs mal me connaitre pour
penser que, employ ant pareil concept, j'aie cherche a me faire artisan
organique d'une cause, celle de la promotion du Canada, et ce, au
detriment de la reconnaissance d'une identite quebecoise distincte.
En tant qu'intellectuel, je crois qu'il importe d'etre sincere envers
ceux a qui l'on s'adresse. Personnellement, j'avouerai n'avoir qu'une
patrie : celle de la pensee responsable, de la demarche ethique et de la
conscience aigue du monde. Et j'admettrai avoir une ambition unique:
celle de chercher, en n'etant jamais epuise ni desespere par 1'echec, ces
mots qui rendent aussi justement que possible le passe et 1'offrent en
heritage aux descendants.
En usant du concept de canadianite, mon intention etait de penser
1'experience canadienne, au coeur de laquelle n'a jamais cesse d'etre
1'aventure quebecoise, sous l'angle tout a la fois valide, valable et
souhaitable d'une histoire de dissonances, c'est-a-dire d'une histoire
de blessures et de possibilites.
Mon but etait egalement de m'inserer au coeur des tensions et
ambiguites porteuses sur lesquelles s'est eleve le pays en les accueil-
lant plutot qu'en les condamnant ou les decriant, en les revelant plutot
qu'en les subsumant, les distillant ou les omettant.
Usant du concept de canadianite, mon objectif etait encore
d'ouvrir un espace argumentatif et interpretatif ou 1'experience cana-
dienne n'etait pas restituee a 1'aune du mantra de la conciliation ou de
1'inhibition, mais dans ses reciprocites asymetriques et ses equilibres
oscillants, dans ses maillages discordants et ses dissonances struc-
turantes, dans ses convergences dissidentes et ses dissidences
convergentes, dans ses interdependances instables et dans la tendre
(in)difference reciproque de ses habitants... - pour reprendre le reper-
toire d'oxymorons employes plus tot et y ajouter.
Contrairement a bien des observateurs de la scene canadienne qui
refusent de s'ouvrir aux possibilites du paradoxe, c'est au coeur de
cette fragilite d'etres du Canada - qui est possiblement 1'expression
d'une vigueur insoupconnee - que je percois et trouve la realite his-
torique du pays, si ce n'est son utopie, en tout cas son indeniable force
de recuperation.
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On comprendra dans ce contexte qu'un projet comme celui de la
souverainete-partenariat ne me surprend pas ni ne m'importune.
J'interprete en effet pareil projet comme un part pour I'avenir du pays
et non pas con tre le futur du Canada12. La souverainete-partenariat,
entendue comme elle Test par la majorite de ses supporteurs quebe-
cois, c'est-a-dire comme un moyen de relancer et d'actualiser
1'experience canadienne sur la base de ses specificites regionales, est
Tune de ces ambiguites propres a 1'aventure du pays qui ont fonde sa
destinee jusqu'a maintenant.
Etonnant comme perspective? C'est que penser 1'impensable
exige d'adopter des postures d'observation et des positions interpreta-
tives non conventionnelles. Pour revenir aux sculptures d'Alexander
Calder, n'est-ce pas le paradoxe non aporetique de ces mobiles que de
ne pas se laisser pieger dans 1'espace circonscrit par le trace des
formes et des figures composant la structure morphologique des
oeuvres ?
En termes moins « academico-poetiques » peut-etre, il est bien
possible que, pour saisir le sens d'une oeuvre de Calder, il faille
1'observer en ayant la tete en bas, en se faisant soi-meme element
mobile au sein de la sculpture, en fumant du cannabis et en s'eclatant
dans des orgies... de mots, ou en decretant tout simplement qu'il s'agit
la d'une oeuvre sans bon sens et que c'est dans ce caractere apparem-
ment insense de 1'oeuvre que se loge son sens le plus heureux.
Je nous le demande : est-il toujours necessaire d'imposer un sens
definitif, fixe ou force a ce qui s'offre au monde dans une certaine
ambiguite d'etres? Est-il par exemple obligatoire d'enchasser les
Canadiens dans un seul meta-mantra, de focaliser leur donne sur un
seul plan identitaire pour les rendre heureux et les sauver de leur
derive apparente dans une veine impensee, et des lors reputee inimag-
inable, de 1'experience nationale?
Approfondir la singularite canadienne
A mon avis, il est, en ce qui a trait a I'avenir du Canada, une question
plus importante que n'importe quelle autre. Je la formule de maniere
un peu innocente, sans vouloir donner par la 1'impression d'etre
inconscient par rapport aux problemes qui marquent le pays. Cette
question est la suivante : vaut-il la peine, en depit de toutes les
blessures qui en ont marque et scande le parcours, de poursuivre
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1'experience historique qui s'est deroulee au sein de cet espace d'inter-
relations sociales et politiques qu'on appelle le Canada?
Si la reponse a cette question est negative, le debat est clos. Dans
la mesure ou 1'experience historique canadienne serait celle d'un echec
sur le plan economique, social et politique, la persistance du Canada
n'aurait de sens que par rapport a la perpetuation de pouvoirs sec-
taires. II serait evidemment absurde d'encourager semblable destin.
Si la reponse a la question de poursuivre 1'experience historique
s'etant deroulee au Canada est globalement positive, le defi qui s'offre
des lors aux heritiers de cette experience, c'est-a-dire a nous, consiste
a enrichir le parcours anterieur balise par les anciens et, pour ce qui est
des blessures, a les reconnaitre lucidement dans toutes leurs dimen-
sions et extensions en ayant pour objectif de les transformer en
possibilites pour 1'avenir.
Selon cette perspective, ni le souvenir imperissable des malheurs
d'hier ni 1'avenir delivre des heritages du passe ne sauraient constituer
de voies de passage pour ouvrir a demain. Ce passage serait plutot
perce, opere, pratique sur la base d'une reconnaissance et d'une dis-
tance critique des contemporains a 1'egard de 1'action des ancetres, et
ce, dans la conscience du bonheur des descendants.
Au fond, le defi des habitants du Canada n'est pas de preserver le
pays coute que coute. A plusieurs egards, j'ai pourtant 1'impression
que c'est cette quete aveugle d'un Canada a edifier et a maintenir
envers et centre tous qui anime un grand nombre de decideurs et
d'acteurs a 1'heure actuelle. Pour eux, le label Canada est pratiquement
devenu une fin en soi, Yalpha et Yomega de la grandeur indiscutable
d'un Etat pourvu d'une population servant d'abord a pretexter son
existence et a nourrir sa cause. C'est comme si la declaration du
« meilleur pays du monde » etait devenue la declamation axiomatique
du Canada en meme temps que la formule magique dedouanant les
acteurs du pays de leurs errances passees, presentes et prochaines.
Or, mon sentiment est que Ton ne devrait jamais vivre ni mourir
ni lutter pour la face, pour le nom, ou pour 1'honneur d'un pays.
L'embleme d'un pays n'est pas grand-chose. C'est le « contenu » de ce
pays, soit son histoire, sa problematique et ses gens qui sont tout. La
difference entre 1'amour du pays et 1'amour des gens est immense.
L'amour du pays entraine en effet 1'obstination, la fermeture et
1'intransigeance alors que 1'amour des gens appelle le compromis,
1'ouverture et le discernement.
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Dans ce contexte, le defi qui est le notre, tout en etant fort difficile
a realiser, est on ne peut plus clair a definir: il s'agit, tablant sur ce que
fut jusqu'ici 1'experience historique canadienne, soit un parcours mar-
que par les ambiguites et les ambivalences, d'ecarter les discours et
representations entetees du pays qui visent a imposer de 1'univocite la
ou il ne peut y avoir que de la diversite, tant sur le plan de la represen-
tation symbolique du Canada que sur le plan du mode de
gouvernance le plus souhaitable pour orchestrer les dissonances du
pays.
Cette diversite, qui n'a jamais cesse de s'exprimer, voire de
s'imposer, a defaut d'etre reconnue au diapason de ses volontes et pre-
tentions, est ce qui est au cceur de la problematique canadienne. Elle
est aussi ce qui fait la specificite du pays.
Je ne parle evidemment pas de cette diversite a la mode dans les
cercles intellectuels de bon aloi ou Ton tend a donner, des collectivites,
une image les presentant sous Tangle de la multiplicity des singula-
rites individuelles les composant. On le constate pourtant de plus en
plus, la politique de la reconnaissance tous azimuts a ses limites et pro-
duit ses effets pervers sur le plan politique.
Je ne parle pas non plus de cette diversite que, au Canada, on
appelle multiculturalite et qui a constitue, admettons-le, une tentative
avortee pour sortir le pays de sa donnee historique centrale en le refon-
dant dans une idee deshistoricisee de canadiennete.
Je parle de cette diversite structurelle et structurante du pays,
diversite indepassee jusqu'a maintenant et peut-etre indepassable bien
qu'en travail sur elle-meme, et qui renvoie a 1'existence de trois grands
groupements par reference, vivant en situation d'interdependance
contrainte dans un espace institue de proximite distante, soit le
Canada.
Ces trois grands groupements par reference, qui peuplent et for-
ment des mondes en tension et en reciprocite les uns avec et contre les
autres, se definissent certes par rapport a des dynamismes d'ordre lin-
guistico-culturels que rendent bien les concepts d'anglicite, de francite,
et d'autochtonite. Mais ces groupements se definissent aussi de plus
en plus par rapport a des dynamismes d'ordre politique, civique et
identitaire, voire territoriaux, qui renforcent plutot qu'ils ne gomment,
par exemple, la distinction historique qui n'a jamais cesse d'exister
entre le Quebec, d'une part, et les autres provinces du Canada et le
gouvernement federal, d'autre part.
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Si bien qu'au tournant du vingt et unieme siecle, et ce, malgre la
volonte de bien des decideurs et acteurs d'empecher cette mouvance
apparemment nefaste au pays, le Canada evolue empiriquement dans
le sens d'une dualisation accentuee de son « corps » et dans le sens
aussi de 1'apparition de deux « majorites » effectives en son sein,
« majorites » continuellement confrontees a 1'existence d'un troisieme
groupement constitue et revendicateur de ses specificites et de ses
droits, a savoir les autochtones.
Reconnaissant la presence irreductible et indefectible de ces trois
groupements, d'une part, et de ces dynamismes structurants de duali-
sation, d'autre part, dans le paysage canadien, que faire pour
permettre au pays de passer a 1'avenir?
En evitant de justifier cette proposition par une argumentation qui
risquerait d'etre fort longue13, je dirai que le defi actuel des habitants
du Canada est d'accueillir 1'autochtonite et la quebecite dans une idee
genereuse et imaginative de canadianite, et ce, sans chercher a noyer
ces identites fortes dans une espece de canadiennete homogeneisante
et sans chercher non plus a les enrober dans le novlangue de la recti-
tude politique de maniere a les liquider comme probleme et a les
reifier comme monument d'apotheose a un passe revolu.
Pour ne prendre qu'un exemple, il m'apparait ridicule que Ton
veuille a posteriori, et sous le coup du remords universel fleurissant a
une epoque ou, d'evidence, toutes les collectivites se font pardon a
elles-memes dans un etalage de contrition vaporeuse, il m'apparait
ridicule, dis-je, de vouloir considerer les autochtones comme etant les
« Premiers Canadiens » alors meme que le pays s'est eleve sur leur
relegation dans les marges de son parcours.
S'agissant des autochtones, le defi qui est le notre n'est pas de les
reinscrire artificiellement dans une histoire embellie et suave du pays
ou chaque communaute aurait sa vitrine specifique au Musee cana-
dien des civilisations. Sur le plan historiographique, ce defi est plutot
de reconnaitre les blessures qui ont ete infligees aux autochtones dans
le temps14. Sur le plan politique, le defi est d'inscrire 1'autochtonite
comme dimension structurante de la canadianite, c'est-a-dire d'inserer
la presence et 1'identite autochtones au cceur des dynamismes poli-
tiques et de la mouvance actuelle du pays - pays dont les autochtones,
de leur cote, ne peuvent eliminer ni la presence ni la pregnance dans
toute vision de leur devenir15.
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En clair, ce qui doit etre au centre des preoccupations des habi-
tants actuels du Canada, ce n'est pas de rapailler 1'emblematique du
pays, mais d'approfondir sa problematique.
De la perspective dans la prospective
Mon pari comme intellectuel est de croire qu'il existe, dans 1'expe-
rience presente du Canada, un espace de possibilite pour amenager un
futur viable au pays, et ce, sans qu'il soit necessaire de repudier, d'ou-
blier ou de desassumer le passe canadien.
La fuite en avant, il est utile de le rappeler, n'est pas la marque
d'un dialogue fructueux avec les ancetres. Elle n'est pas non plus le
temoignage d'une attitude responsable a 1'egard des heritiers.
II est au pays trop de decideurs et d'acteurs desabuses ou demis-
sionnaires devant le defi cardinal du politique de transformer les
problemes en projets. II est egalement trop de decideurs et d'acteurs
determines a imposer leur solution tranchee a un pays dont 1'expe-
rience est irreductible a 1'univocite.
Tout le propos de ce texte a consiste a rappeler a quel point le
pays s'etait construit, avec et contre 1'ambition de ses decideurs et
acteurs, dans une ambiguite d'etres qui transpirait de ses dissonances
inextinguibles.
Si, pour nombre d'habitants du pays, le moyen de passer a I'avenir
est a 1'evidence de se souvenir d'ou ils s'en vont, c'est-a-dire de prati-
quer 1'histoire dans un rapport de reconnaissance et de distance avec
les ancetres, celui de plusieurs autres habitants du Canada est sans nul
doute de cheminer en considerant le passe comme une dot et non pas
comme un fardeau, c'est-a-dire d'assumer ce qui, dans le passe du
pays, a fait sa distinction la plus porteuse pour I'avenir, ce que
j'appelle pour ma part canadianite - mais le terme choisi a ici bien peu
d'importance par rapport a 1'idee qu'il recouvre.
On ne saurait dans tous les cas hypothequer I'avenir par un sur-
croit de memoire ni renier le passe par un exces d'oubli. Entre le passe
et 1'avenir, il peut en effet y avoir, a 1'occasion, confluences qui soient
fecondes pour le present. C'est un truisme de le rappeler : la perspec-
tive est solidaire de la prospective.
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Survival Then and Now
Margaret Atwood*
I WAS IN ENGLAND RECENTLY GIVING SOME LECTURES, AND I WASasked, "Do you identify as a woman or as a Canadian?" This is a
new sort of question because it contains the phrase "identify as,"
which not so long ago would have been incomprehensible.
"Well, to tell the truth," I replied, "I identify as a writer. That is
what I am - a writer - and what I do is writing. The other things are
features that can be used to modify the basic model - think of it as Mr.
and Mrs. Potato Head, in which the basic potato is "writer" and the
other things - female, Canadian, short, of a certain age - can be stuck
onto it, like the plastic lips and ears and so forth in the Potato Family
do-it-yourself kit."
My young questioner was not entirely satisfied - she wanted there
to be something intrinsic to my gender or my nationality that had
caused these reams of marked-up paper to issue from me - so I tried a
syllogism. "All women writers are women," I said, "but not all women
are writers. And the same goes for Canadians." She was still not mol-
lified, so I resorted to a cheap trick. "Let's face it," I said. "If the poster
announcing the lectures had claimed simply, 'Woman to speak/ or
even 'Canadian to speak/ would you have come to listen? I doubt it."
Everyone laughed, so I suspected I was right.
I started thinking about writing quite a few years before I started
thinking about gendering or nationalizing; and so it is with most writ-
ers. They are writers first, just as a person running a race is a racer first.
And whatever I have had to say about the state of being a Canadian, a
woman, a short person with curly hair, etc., has always been predi-
* Elements of this presentation appeared in an article published in 1 July 1999 issue
of Maclean's, entitled "Survival, Now and Then."
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cated on this primar)^ fact - my membership in that country without
borders or passport or government, the centre of which is every writer
and every reader and the circumference of which is as far as you can
imagine; a country which has its own history and its own aristocracy,
but which is neither a monarchy where some reign by virtue of birth,
nor a dystopia where all citizens must be exactly the same, but is
instead the republic of letters, where desire is the key to the gateway,
and where all who wish may enter.
That having been said, we may now go on to consider what I may
call the tectonics of Canadian writing - those places where the fault
lines are situated and the friction occurs. More specifically, I would
like to tell you how I came to write a rather controversial book called
Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature, back in the early 70s,
when a conference like this would have been unthinkable. It was con-
troversial partly because many people at the time of its publication
denied that there was any such thing as Canadian literature, at all,
period.
The English writer Wyndam Lewis, sitting out World War 2 in
Toronto, was asked by a wealthy matron where he was living. "Jarvis
Street," he told her. "Mr. Lewis," she said, "That is not a very fashion-
able address!" "Madam," he replied, "Toronto is not a very fashionable
address." Nor was it then.
The poet Earle Birney, writing in 1939 - a piece entitled,
"Canadians Can Read - But Do They?" - said that if you entered the
average literate home in Canada at that time, you'd be likely to find
only three books in it - the Bible, a collected Shakespeare, and The
Rubaiyat of Omar Khyyam. The novelist Morley Callaghan, writing in
1938, said that a young Canadian writer should cut his teeth in
American magazines and then seek an American publisher, as the
chances of making a living in Canada by writing were nil. They
decreased to less than nil during the war, due to paper shortages, and
right after the war things were much the same. In 1949, Gwethalyn
Graham, who'd published what would now be called an international
success - a novel entitled Earth and High Heaven - criticized the awful
distribution and high prices of books in Canada, and said that was
why most people read only magazines. And, with some very slight
improvements, that's the way things still were when I began to write,
in the late fifties.
I wrote and published Survival in 1972. It ignited a ferocious
debate and became, as they say, a runaway bestseller. This was a shock
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to everyone, including me. Canadian writing, interesting! Among the
bulk of Canadian readers at that time such writing was largely
unknown, except for Stephen Leacock, and among the cognoscenti it
was frequently treated as a dreary joke, an oxymoron, a big yawn, or
the hole in a non-existent doughnut.
At the beginning of the 60s, sales of poetry books had numbered
in the hundreds, and a novel was doing well if it hit a thousand copies.
There were signs of change. Public readings were beginning, at first in
coffee-houses, then at universities, but only for poetry. In 1961 there
was a total of five Canadian novels published in the country, in
English, for the entire year. Mordecai Richler's first novel, published
in England, sold two copies in Canada, or so the rumour goes. But
over that decade, things changed rapidly. The Canada Council began
its grants to individual writers in 1965. In Quebec, the Quiet
Revolution had generated an outburst of literary activity; in the ROC
(the Rest Of Canada), many poets had emerged, more novelists and
short-story writers were becoming known, and Expo '67, the World's
Fair, held in Montreal, created a fresh national self-confidence.
Audiences had been building steadily, and by 1972 there was a criti-
cal mass of readers who wanted to hear more; and thus, through a
combination of good luck, good timing, and good reviews, Survival
became an "overnight publishing sensation," and I myself became an
instant sacred monster. "Now you're a target," Farley Mowat said to
me, "and they will shoot at you."
How prescient he was. Who could have suspected that this mod-
est cultural artifact would have got so thoroughly up the noses of my
elders and betters? If the book had sold the 3,000 copies initially pro-
jected, nobody would have bothered their heads much about it, but in
the first year alone it sold ten times that number, and suddenly Canlit
was everybody's business. The few dedicated academic souls who had
cultivated this neglected pumpkin patch over the meagre years were
affronted because a mere chit of a girl had appropriated a pumpkin
they regarded as theirs, and the rest were affronted because I had
obnoxiously pointed out that there was in fact a pumpkin to appro-
priate. Even now, after twenty-seven years, some Jack or Jackess
emerges with seasonal regularity to take one more crack at moi, the
supposed Giant, in a never-ending game of Let Us Now Blame
Famous Women. You get to feel like the mechanical duck at the fun-
fair shooting gallery, though no one has won the oversized panda yet,
because I still seem to be quacking.
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Over the years, I've been accused of just about everything, from
bourgeois superstition to communist rabble-rousing to not being
Marshall McLuhan. (I would have liked to have been Marshall
McLuhan, but he seemed to have the job pretty much cornered.) Yet
when I was writing this book - or rather when I was putting it
together, for it was more an act of synthesis than one of authorship,
and drew on the ideas of many besides myself -1 attached no particu-
lar importance to it. I was, after all, a poet and novelist, wasn't I? I did
not consider myself a real critic - just a kind of bake-sale muffin lady,
doing a little cottage-industry fund-raising in a worthy cause.
The worthy cause was The House of Anansi Press, a small literary
publisher formed in 1966 by writers Dennis Lee and David Godfrey as
a response to the dearth of publishing opportunities for new writing at
that time. Anansi had already made quite a few waves by 1971, when
Dennis, an old college friend, button-hooked me onto its board. So
there we were one grey November day, a tiny, intrepid, overworked,
underpaid band, glumly contemplating the balance sheet, which
showed an alarming amount of red ink. Publishing Rule Number One
is that it's hard to keep small literary publishers afloat unless you have
the equivalent of gardening books to support them.
To pay the bills, Anansi had begun a line of user-friendly self-help
guides, the precursors to those popular Dummies books, which had
done moderately well: Law Law Law, by Clayton Ruby and Paul
Copeland, which set forth how to disinherit your relatives, avoid
being bled dry by your estranged spouse, and so forth; and VD, one
of the first venereal disease books, which explained about unwanted
goo and warts and such, though AIDS was still a decade into the
future.
Thus was born Survival. As I'd travelled the country's byways,
giving poetry readings and toting cardboard boxes of my own books
to sell afterwards because often enough there was no bookstore, the
absence of views on the subject of Canadian literature was spectacular.
The two questions I was asked most frequently about it by audience
members were "Is there any?" and, "Supposing there is, isn't it just a
second-rate copy of real literature, which comes from England and the
United States?" In Australia they called this attitude the Cultural
Cringe; in Canada it was the Colonial Mentality. In both - and in many
smaller countries around the world, as it turned out - it was part of a
tendency to believe that the Great Good Place was, culturally speak-
ing, elsewhere.
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Through no fault of my own, I happened to be doing a one-year
teaching stint at York University. Canadian Literature formed part of
the course-load, so I'd had to come up with some easily-grasped
approaches to it. Previous thinkers on the subject had been pithy
enough, but few in number: there was not exactly a wealth of exist-
ing lore.
Back to the Anansi board meeting. "Hey, I know," I cried, in my
Mickey Roonyish way. "Let's do a VD of Canadian Literature!" What
I meant, I explained, was a sort of handbook for the average reader -
for all those people I'd met on my tours who'd wanted to read more of
this Canadian literature stuff but didn't know where to start. Such a
book would not be for academics. It would have no footnotes, and
would not employ the phrase "on the other hand," or at least not
much. It would also contain lists of other books that people could actu-
ally go into a bookstore and buy. This was a fairly revolutionary
concept, because most Canlit of the past was, at that time, out of print,
and that of the present was kept well hidden at the back of the store,
in among the Beautiful Canadiana fall foliage calendars.
We now take it for granted that Canadian literature exists as a cat-
egory - we seem to spend our time squabbling about its sub-categories,
and its sub-sub-categories and its sub-sub-sub categories, and about
some mythical weapon or religious leader called The Canon - but this
proposition was not always self-evident. To have any excuse for being,
the kind of book I had in mind in 1972 would have to prove several
points. First, that, yes, there was a Canadian literature - that such a
thing did indeed exist. (This turned out to be a radical proposition at
the time, and was disputed by many when the book appeared.)
Second, that this body of work was not just a shoddy version of
English or American, or, in the case of Francophone books, of French
literature, but that it had different preoccupations that were specific to
its own history and geography and geopolitics. This too was a radical
proposition at the time, although common sense ought to have indi-
cated th? t it was, well, just common sense: if you were a rocky, watery
northern country, cool in climate, large in expanse, small but diverse
in population, multilingual from the very beginning, and with a huge
aggressive neighbour to the south, why wouldn't you have concerns
that varied from those of the huge aggressive neighbour? Or indeed
from those of the crowded, history-packed, tight little island, recently
but no longer an imperial power, that had once ruled the waves? Well,
you'd think they'd be different, wouldn't you? To justify the teaching
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of Canadian literature as such, you'd still have to start from the same
axioms: i) it exists, and ii) it's distinct.
Back, again, to the Anansi board meeting. The desperate will try
anything, so the board agreed that this idea of mine should be given a
whirl. Over the next four or five months, after I'd finished my day job,
I wrote away at the proposed book, and as I finished each section
Dennis Lee edited it, and under Dennis's pencil the book grew from
the proposed hundred-page handbook to a length - for the main text
- of 246 pages. It also took on a more coherent shape and direction. Th
book's subtitle - A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature - meant that
we were aiming, not at an all-inclusive cross-indexed survey such as
the 1,199-page Oxford Companion to Canadian Literature - which of
course did not exist then - nor at a series of studies of this author or
that, nor at a collection of New-critical close readings or explications du
texte, or even at some deconstructionist presto-chango. (Not that this
latter had yet been invented.) Instead we were doing the sort of thing
that art historian Nicholas Pevsner had done in The Englishness of
English Art, or that the American literary critics Perry Miller and Leslie
Fiedler were doing in their examinations of American literature: the
identification of a series of characteristics and leitmotifs, and a com-
parison of the varying treatments of them in different national and
cultural environments.
For example: money as a sign of divine grace or providence is pre-
sent in the American tradition from the Puritans through Benjamin
Franklin through Moby-Dick through Henry James through The Great
Gatsby. The theme is treated now seriously, now cynically, now tragi-
cally, now ironically, just as a leitmotif in a symphony may be played
in different keys and in different tempos. It varies as time unrolls and
circumstances change, of course: the eighteenth century is not the
twentieth. Yet the leitmotif persists as a dominating concern - a per-
sistent cultural obsession, if you like.
The persistent cultural obsession of Canadian literature, said
Survival, was survival. In actual life, and in both the Anglophone and
the Francophone sectors, this concern is often enough a factor of the
weather, as when the ice storm cuts off the electrical power. La sur-
vivance has long been an overt theme in Quebec political life, currently
manifesting itself as anxiety about the survival of French. In the ROC,
it's more like a nervous tic: what'cher gonner do when Free Trade
trashes your ability to control your water supply, or when your gov-
ernment says that the magazines from the huge, aggressive neighbour
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to the south are the same as yours really, or whether, in the next
Quebec referendum, that part of the country will no longer be that part
of the country? And so on and so forth.
Survival therefore began with this dominant note. It then postu-
lated a number of other motifs in Canadian literature - motifs that
either did not exist at all in one of the literatures with which they were
being compared (for instance, there are almost no so-called "Red
Indians" in English novels), or did exist, but were not handled in the
same way. The Canadian "immigrant story," from fleeing Loyalists, to
Scots kicked off their land, to starving potato-famine Irish, to Jews flee-
ing pogroms in the early twentieth Century, to Latvians emigrating
after WW2, to Austin Clarke's Barbadians, to the economic refugees of
the 70s and 80s, tends to be very different when told in the United
States: none of their stories is likely to say that the immigrants were
really trying to get into Canada but ended up in the United States faut
de mieux. Canada has rarely been the Promised Land, except for those
fleeing slavery via the Underground Railway. About the closest we've
come to that idea is the title of Wayne Johnson's 1998 novel, The Colony
of Unrequited Dreams.
The tradition identified in Survival was not a bundle of uplifting
Pollyanna cheer: quite the reverse. Canlit, at least up until 1970, was on
balance a somewhat dour concoction. Some critics who couldn't read
- a widespread occupational hazard, it seems - thought I was some-
how advocating this state of affairs. Au contraire: if my book has
attitude, it's more like you are here, you really do exist and this is where, so
pull up your socks and quit whining. As Alice Munro says, "Do what you
want and live with the consequences." Or as Survival itself says in its
last chapter, "Having bleak ground under your feet is better than hav-
ing no ground at all... a tradition doesn't necessarily exist to bury you:
it can also be used as material for new departures."
Many things have happened in the twenty-eight years since
Survival was published. In politics, the Quebec cliff-hanger and the
U.S. domination and the environmental degeneration and the loss of
national control brought about by Free Trade have become, not the
tentative warning notes they were in Survival, but everyday realities.
In literary criticism, Regionalism, Feminism, Deconstructionism,
Political Correctness, Appropriation of Voice, and Identity Politics
have all swept across the scene, leaving their traces. Mordecai Richler's
well-known jest, "world-famous in Canada," has ceased to be such a
laugh - many Canadian writers are now world-famous, period, inso-
far as writers can be considered famous. "Postmodern" - in the 70s a
cutting-edge literary adjective - is now used if at all to describe kicky
little handbags. Survival, the book, seemed quainter and more out-of-
date as these various years went by, and as - incidentally - some of it
wishes were granted and some of its predictions were realized. Yet its
central concerns remain with us, and must still be confronted. Are
Canadians really all that different from anybody else? If so, how? And
is that how something worth exploring and - possibly - preserving? In
1972, Survival concluded with two questions: Have we survived? And if
so, what happens after Survival? We're still posing the same questions.
People often ask me what I would change about Survival if I were
writing it today. The obvious answer is that I wouldn't write it today
because I wouldn't need to. The thing I set out to prove has been
proven beyond a doubt: no one would seriously argue, any more, that
there is no Canadian literature. The other answer is that I wouldn't be
able to, not only because of my own hardening brain but because the
quantity, range and diversity of books now published would defeat
any such effort.
In Canadian culture, however, there's always a negative. At pre-
sent we have cuts to grants, threats to magazines, publishers in peril
through withdrawal of funding, writers struggling with the effects
upon their royalties of book-chain deep discounting, and so forth.
Have we survived?
But this is Canada, land of contrasts. Indeed it is Canada, land of
rugs: no sooner has a rug been placed beneath the nation's artistic feet
than it is pulled out, but no sooner has it been pulled out in one place
than it is inserted in another. Last year, in an astonishing but gratify-
ing development, Quebec announced that the first $15,000 of income
from copyrights - from songs to books to computer software - will
now be tax exempt. (By no great coincidence, $15,000 is roughly the
average income from writing in this country.) Will there be unforeseen
consequences? Will Quebec become the Ireland of Canada, tax haven
for writers, and the Prague of Europe, the latest chic destination? Will
every young, mean and lean creator from all over the country stam-
pede to Montreal, where the rent is cheap and the edible food ditto, so
that they can actually have a hope of earning a living from their work?
Experience has shown that where bohemia goes, real estate devel-
opment is sure to follow. First the artists, then the cafes, then the
designers, then the lawyers. M. Bouchard must know this: he's been
called many things, but rarely stupid. Could it be that this crafty tax
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move will revitalize downtown Montreal, which for some years has
been bleeding at every pore? And revitalize it by means of - choc, hor-
reurl - Anglophone Canadian writers! - who will stream there in their
thousands, incongruous exiles from the Rest Of Canada? Meanwhile,
there are serious plans afoot to have Toronto separate, not from
Canada, but from Ontario, and seek status as the eleventh province.
Why not? Toronto has to do something. Those of us who live in that
reviled city are treated as cash cows, pariahs and serfs, while being
denied the power of our own votes. Why is that? Could it be because
Toronto is now - it's official - the most multicultural city in the world?
All M. Bouchard has to do is extend his tax largesse to the pub-
lishing industry, and Montreal may once again become the vital centre
of Anglophone Canadian literary activity - insofar as such existed -
that it was from the twenties to the fifties. Not perhaps what M.
Bouchard had in mind - more like his worst nightmare, really. But in
that case, the twenty-first century answer to the question posed in
Survival may be both bizarre and deeply ironic:
Have we survived?
Yes. But only in Quebec.
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Toward a Baroque Governance in
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Gilles Paquet*
Our natural mode is therefore not compromise
but 'irony' - the inescapable response
to the presence and pressures of opposites in tension.
Irony is the key to our identity.
Malcolm Ross (1954)
C ANADA MUST MEET THE TEST OF LIVING WITH THREE FUNDAMENTALchallenges of twenty-first century society: complexity, new forms
of collaboration, and citizen engagement. The new information and
communication technologies, and the greater connectedness they have
generated, constitute only one of the families of forces - albeit an impor-
tant one - that has increased the level of relevant complexity, uncer-
tainty, and turbulence in the Canadian system. Over the last thirty
years, Canada has also become, partly by design and partly due to cir-
cumstances, dramatically more demographically variegated, culturally
diverse, socially diversified, and politically complicated. Canada has
also evolved into a country of citizens who are better informed and bet-
ter able to express their dissent; better equipped to assert their multiple
identities and to demand participation in governing their affairs. As a
result, the co-ordination problems that Canada has confronted and has
had to resolve have become increasingly daunting.
This quantum of additional variety and complexity has been
denied or downplayed significantly by ideologues from the left and
the right - ces terribles simplificateurs whose purpose is to propose a flat-
earth view of reality in order to rationalize the choice of "the solution"
The assistance of Anne Burgess and Danna Campbell and the comments of Robin
Higham have been most helpful.
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(more state intervention, lower taxes, etc.) they are propounding.
These calls by solutionists for univocal responses, whether the solution
is meant to rely on the powers of the invisible hand of the market or of
the hidden - or hiding - hand of government, have only compounded
the difficulties.
Fortunately, ordinary Canadians have been more pragmatic.
Acknowledging the greater variety in the environment as incontourn-
able, they have built on this premise a more pluralistic set of reactions
better able to deal with that diversity. In other words, they have
embraced the old Ashby law of requisite variety (Ashby 1970). Such an
approach has required more of a bottom-up, muddling-through, dis-
tributed, and collaborative governance - one based on the more or less
successful efforts of co-ordinating a large number of actors and partic-
ipants - in lieu of the simple top-down, hierarchical process of gov-
erning that was in good currency in earlier and less complex times.
This paper proceeds through four stages. Firstly, it defines
Canadian distinctiveness as habitus characterized by irony and brico-
lage. Secondly, it explains why Canada has been rather slow in adapt-
ing its governance to cope with the challenges of its disconcerted,
learning socio-economy. Thirdly, it suggests that repairs for the many
different forms of disconcertion here noted require a more vibrant
bricolage communautaire - dealing with disconcertion differently from
place to place, using different assets, skills, and capabilities, and doing
so in a low key. Fourthly, it illustrates, through vignettes of what is
happening on three construction sites, how the Canadian governance
system of the twenty-first century is evolving.
From Bonding to Loose Intermediation
While much has been written about the decline of social cohesion and
the transformation of Canadian sociality over the last few decades
(Helliwell 1996; Paquet 1996,1997a, 1998), most of it has been couched
in terms of the erosion of the old social capital bonding, once so good
at undergirding reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity (Coleman 1988;
Putnam 2000). This erosion of the superglue of family, church, com-
munity, hierarchies, etc., can be ascribed to the fact that these institu-
tions were not nimble enough to fit the requirements of the new,
knowledge-based learning economy. Much less work has been done,
however, on what would appear to be required to construct a new
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sociality, one based on much weaker ties and more loosely-coupled
networks (Granovetter 1973; Paquet 1999a).
In Canada, the transition from bonding to loose coupling has been
less smooth and rapid than it should have been because of a significant
resistance to this sort of virage by a portion of the federal elites. This
has led to the mounting of a vigorous counter-argument in favour of
'bridging social capital' - the need to maintain a fairly high degree of
centralization in order to bolster redistribution and thereby save the
country from falling apart. This has been presented as "the Canadian
way" (Paquet 1995a; Chretien 2000).
Fueling this rear-guard action has been the degree of diffraction of
Canadian society, generated by its greater complexity and heterogene-
ity and the demand for greater citizen participation. It was wrongly
presumed by Pierre Elliott Trudeau (among other leaders in Canada)
that a response to these challenges could be found in overarching prin-
ciples, abstract norms, or grand designs and narratives. One of the
most prominent of these intellectual devices has been the focus on
human rights and the judiciarization of governance via charters,
courts, commissions, etc. This has acted as an extraordinary support
for a more centralized and hierarchical system. Such schemes, how-
ever are most often intellectually disingenuous, practically unhelpful,
and perhaps even dangerous for democracy.
More recently, attempts have been made in Canada to hide such
centralizing schemes behind efforts at 'branding' Canada - a language
falling halfway between the lingoes of business and rodeo - or efforts
at creating new devices aimed at 'bridging' divisions. These novel ways
of redistributing income and wealth across regions, social groups, and
organizations seek to equalize their circumstances and thereby reduce
social tensions and envy. Many people involved in public discourse
now even declare these redistributive schemes to be the social cement
that binds Canadians and constitutes their "distinctiveness."
But distinctiveness is a matter neither of branding nor bridging.
Distinctiveness connotes a dynamic habitus or maniere d'etre whereas
branding refers to static 'markers' and 'identifiers.' As for the seem-
ingly innocuous language of bridging "across big divisions in a soci-
ety" or "across what are potentially big fractures in a society between
rich and poor, between language groups," - the language used by the
Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science, and Technology
(Canada 1999) - this is an equally misleading way of trivializing a
maniere d'etre by reducing it to fiscal plumbing.
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Bonding, with its exclusiveness, is an echo of the traditional soci-
ety; it does not fit the realities of modern Canada. Nor does bridging,
with its emphasis on mechanical, redistributive schemes. Though cir-
cumstances would appear to call for looser and more temporary cou-
pling - cohabitation avec commutation (i.e., a system in which anyone can
claim or deny attachment) - these weak ties can nonetheless provide
much strength (Granovetter 1973; Guillaume 1999; Putnam 2000). This
last statement is the paradoxical result of a number of reflections on
Canadian perplexities generated by Canada's experience in creating a
new "multiculture" (Paquet 1999d: chap. 7; Iyer 2000: Part 4).
Fortunately, these subtleties have not been lost on Canadian citi-
zens. Their response qua citizens - both to the new circumstances and
to the 'magnificent' efforts to deal with them grandiosely - has been
much irony vis-a-vis grand schemes and a plea for bricolage, first and
foremost to effect the needed repair to the institutional order.
The drift from bonding to loose intermediation has, however, been
slowed down by various efforts to impose either-or choices on
Canadians when the new realities confronting them called for choices
of the 'more-or-less' variety - less centralization, more subsidiarity in
the name of efficiency, etc. The drift has also been slowed by redis-
tributive bridging schemes when better insurance schemes were
required to facilitate risk-taking and to ease transition in a high-risk
society. As a result, Canadians have, over the last decades, defined
their distinctiveness almost despite their leaders. In fact, they have
been quite effective at it. It is worthy of note that this distinctiveness as
habitus has been characterized by expressions such as "a passion for
bronze" (Valaskakis 1990) or "slow adrenaline" (Iyer 2000).
At times, the rejection of grand schemes by the majority of
Canadians has been deplored as occasions manquees. But Canadians,
with their hefty dose of tolerance and apathy, are ironistes, "never
quite able to take themselves seriously because [they arel always
aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to
change," and they spend much time worrying about the possibility of
having been initiated into the wrong tribe and taught to play the
wrong language game (Rorty 1989:73-75). Thus Canadians prefer
understatement, irony, and self-mockery in their rhetoric and they
most certainly resist being "branded" like cattle or "bridged" in a crip-
pling way in the face of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000). They also
prefer to practise a sort of pragmatism and ad hoc bricolage and to gam-
ble on a combination of plural, partial, and limited identities, even
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though this often actually increases the distances between groups of
Canadians. This, then, is the Canadian distinctiveness.
Malcolm Ross put it very aptly almost fifty years ago when he said
that "we are inescapably, and almost from the first... the people of the
second thought. To remain a people at all, we have had to think before
we speak, even to think before we think. Our characteristic prudence
is ... this necessity for taking second thought" (Ross 1954, ix). In 2000,
an outside observer (Iyer 2000) has come to almost the same conclu-
sion, using almost the same words.
This pragmatic liberalism, couched in a prudent pluralistic and
ironic language, has often led to discourses that are difficult for out-
siders to decode and understand. Canadians will often pretend igno-
rance and a willingness to learn from others for the sake of making the
others' errors conspicuous through adroit questioning. They will even
slide into a manner of discourse in which what is literally said is meant
to express its opposite.
Canada as a Disconcerted Learning Socio-economy
The transition from an industrial age to a knowledge-based economy of
the last few decades has revealed a separation between the world of
physical objects and the world of ideas. These two worlds live accord-
ing to quite different rules. The world of physical objects, characterized
by scarcity and diminishing returns, focuses mainly on allocative effi-
ciency in a static world. The world of ideas is essentially scarcity-free,
inhabited by increasing returns, and focused on Schumpeterian effi-
ciency - i.e. the discontinuities in the knowledge base over time and in
the dynamic learning ability of the new evolving arrangements these
entail (Boisot 1995). Canada is still deeply-rooted in the old economy; it
is, however, shifting more and more toward a world dominated by the
logic of the new learning economy.
The Learning Socio-economy
In the new economy, individuals, firms, regions, and national
economies seeking success have come to depend upon their capacity
to learn to a much greater extent than ever before. In such a context,
responsive or passive flexibility cannot suffice. What is required is
innovative flexibility - learning and not simply adapting (Killick 1995).
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The emergence of the learning economy has transformed both the
division of labour in Canada and the Canadian social fabric. In the
industrial world a technical division of labour based on hyper-special-
ization was efficient; such travail en miettes did not promote learning.
In order for learning to proceed, one must build on conversations,
communities of interpretation, and communities of practice.
Specialization must proceed to a greater extent on the basis of craft or
competencies. To effect this requires a cognitive division of labour
(Moati et Mouhoud 1994) - a division of labour based on learning
blocks (innovation systems, skill-based production fragments, etc.) -
that entails a very different mode of co-ordination.
In the old system, co-ordination meant standardization and eco-
nomic integration was a way to effect standardization. As a result,
hierarchical co-ordination prospered. But in the new system, where
the challenge is to harmonize the capacity to learn and to progress
together, the organization (private, public, or civic) must focus on its
core competencies, consciously recognizing that it operates in an
ecosystem and must mobilize its community of allies (Moore 1996).
The challenge to foster collective learning calls for the develop-
ment among all the stakeholders of a much more horizontal, looser co-
ordination. And since relationships with stakeholders (suppliers, cus-
tomers, partners, etc.) cannot be built on simple market relations
(because these may not: promote efficient co-learning), networks of rela-
tional exchanges have emerged. In such arrangements, long-term rela-
tions based on trust are negotiated. Forms of co-operation that would
never have otherwise materialized evolve as a result of the emerging,
important, positive feedback and self-reinforcing mechanisms - each
generated by external economies or neighbourhood effects - and
learning curves yielding increasing returns (Goldberg 1989).
These dynamic processes, involving the interrelationships of
groups of actors, generate a variety of conventions of identity and partic-
ipation among these different agents. Proximity (in the different senses
of that word - spatial, technological, social, etc.) plays a not insignifi-
cant role in the learning process. Co-learning entails co-evolution in an
ecosystem that evolves by finding ways to "charter" cross-functional
teams from which no important power players are left out and, if fea-
sible, in which "all major players have some stake in the success of the
strategy" (Moore 1998:177; Arthur 1994; Krugman 1996; Durlauf 1998).
Such are the trends as Canada drifts into the twenty-first century.
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Slouching Toward the Learning Economy
These challenges facing Canada are well known. Yet little in the pre-
sent structure and functioning of the Canadian economy, be it in the
private, public, or civic sectors, would appear to indicate that Canada
is progressing as well as it might in this transition.
As a matter of fact, while Canada does score well in terms of cer-
tain indicators in international comparisons, when other indicators are
used (gross domestic product per capita, Tobin's measure of economic
welfare, the so-called Genuine Progress Indicator, or Fordham's index
of social health), Canada's relative performance seems to be deterio-
rating (Paquet 1997b). This deterioration is also reflected in the relative
measures of productivity growth, in the coefficient of attraction of for-
eign capital by Canada, and so on.
One broad hypothesis has been suggested to explain the loss of
ground by the Canadian political socio-economy: the general failure of
the Canadian system not only to adjust its governance to the new
requirements of the learning economy but also to abandon its anti-
quated, hierarchical, and confrontational governance structures.
According to this diagnosis, the Canadian socio-economy is suffering
from disconcertion. That is, there is a disconnection between its gover-
nance and its circumstances (Baumard 1996) which, because it has not
been noticed, has not been repaired. Indeed, as R.D. Laing would have
put it, Canadians have failed to notice that they have failed to notice
this discrepancy.
Many observers have noted that the Canadian socio-economy
remains marred by important cleavages and torn by adversarial sys-
tems (federal-provincial, public-private, labour-management, small
firm against small firm, etc.) that have prevented it from developing
into an effective learning economy (Valaskakis 1990). Indeed, the
major conclusion of a recent study by the Public Policy Forum is that
the most important source of Canada's relatively lacklustre perfor-
mance on the productivity front is the lack of a culture of co-operation,
especially between government and business (Public Policy Forum
1993). Burelle (1995) has shown clearly that the federal-provincial
quagmire is not far behind as the major source of friction that prevents
the development of an effective co-ordination/governance system.
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States as Catalysts
Some have argued, quite rightly, that tension and disconcertion may
not be all bad. They can serve as a fount of novelty and a source of
enhanced learning. Indeed, heterogeneity and somewhat weaker
interpersonal ties - less groupthink - may yield more innovation than
a very homogeneous order. But excessively confrontational patterns of
interaction do slow down learning. Thus, the central challenge is
ensuring the requisite flexibility of the institutional system so as to
bring "the skills, experience and knowledge of different people, orga-
nizations and government agencies together, and get them to interact
in new ways" (Johnson 1992:43). But this requires an important social
capital of trust. In Canada, the social capital needed for such co-oper-
ation is eroding.
The World Values Surveys provides a very rough gauge of the
evolution, over the past few decades, of the degree of interpersonal
trust and associative behaviour. Despite the jelly-like character of the
available data, some important trends have emerged:
1) the degree of confidence and trust in one's neighbours has
remained higher in Canada than in the United States;
2) a significant erosion of social capital has occurred in the United
States;
3) the gap between the two countries has declined, meaning a
more rapid decline in Canada than in the United States; and
4) the decline of trust and associative behaviour has been even
more rapid in French Canada than in the rest of Canada over
the post-Quiet Revolution period (Paquet 1996,1997a; Helliwell
1996).
Given this significant, relative erosion of the social capital of trust
in Canada (and even more in Quebec), one should not be surprised by
the failure of various initiatives, a la Gerald Tremblay, to stimulate net-
works or industrial clusters in Quebec. The requisite social glue was
not there and there is little evidence that public policies have been at
work to develop the requisite new type of social capital that would
allow learning networks to thrive (Paquet 1999a).
The state has to rethink its action in the learning economy. As
Dalum et al. suggest (1992), this means intervening to improve the
means to learn (education and training systems), the incentive to learn
(government programs supporting co-operation projects and net-
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works), the capability to learn (promoting organizations supporting
interactive learning - more decentralized organizations), the access to
relevant knowledge (through relationships between agents and sources
of knowledge, both through infrastructure and mediating structures),
and lastly, fostering the requisite amount of remembering and forgetting
(acting to preserve competencies and capabilities but also helping
groups to move ahead and to let go of older ways). This, in turn,
requires a well-aligned nexus of relations, networks, and regimes.
States can be important catalysts in constructing the new "loose
intermediation" social capital in several ways, such as improving rela-
tionships here, fostering networks there, and developing more or less
encompassing formal or informal regimes in other places. This is the
central role of what some have called the catalytic state or the resurgent
state (Lind 1992; Drezner 1998). Currently, this catalytic action is not
too vibrant. Canadian governments appear to remain characterized
both by a certain centralizing mindset and by a chronic neglect of gov-
ernance issues (Paquet 1995a; Canada 2000). This does not mean that
the Canadian governance system is not evolving nor that it is not
inventing innovative ways to meet the present challenges (Paquet
1999b). But fiscal imperatives do seem to have mesmerized our gov-
ernments to such an extent in the last decade that those in a position to
act as a catalyst have missed key opportunities (program review, for
instance) to effect the sort of repairs to the governance system that
might have gone a long way toward providing the Canadian political
socio-economy with the non-centralized guidance regime it requires
(Paquet and Roy 1995; Paquet and Shepherd 1996).
If one had to characterize Canada retroactively, one might
describe it as: 1) a disconcerted socio-economy caught in a tectonic
transition between an old, somewhat centralized, political economy
and a new, somewhat more decentralized and subsidiarity-driven one,
and 2) experiencing a relative lull in its socio-economic performance
and a mild form of midlife identity crisis. Moreover, in the face of
these circumstances, Canadians are perplexed yet believe not only that
1) there is no simple fix to their predicament and, 2) their "passion for
bronze" (Valaskakis 1990) - in other words their belief that le mieux est
I'ennemi du bien - may not be such a bad thing after all.
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New Capabilities and Bricolage Communautaire
There are times when the evolution of the institutional order is such
that one can really speak of a change of kind and not simply a change
of degree. Such a tectonic but silent change has been under way in
Canada over the last few decades (Paquet 1999c). To cope with an ever
more turbulent global environment, Canadian organizations have had
to evolve and to learn to use their environment more and more strate-
gically, in much the same way that the real surfer catches the big wave.
Managers in the private, public, and civic sectors have had to
exploit not only favourable environmental circumstances but also the
full complement of imagination and resourcefulness of each team
player. They had to become team leaders of a variety of task force-type
projects, quasi-entrepreneurs capable of cautious suboptimizing in the
face of turbulent environments (Paquet 1996-7,1998,1999d). This dual
sort of challenge has pressed public, private, and civic organizations to
design lighter, more horizontal, and modular structures, to create net-
works and informal clanlike rapports, and to develop new rules for the
game. In general, this has generated some pressure for non-centraliza-
tion, for an expropriation of the power to steer that was once held by
the top managers.
Distributed Governance
As globalization proceeds, international economic integration
increases and the component parts of the system become more numer-
ous, the central driving force is the pressure to organize for faster
learning and more innovation, and this occurs when the actors, con-
fronted with different local realities, are empowered to take decisions
on the spot. In this way, international integration has led to some ero-
sion of the relevance of the nation-state - globalization has led to local-
ization of decision-making, to the dispersion of power, and to a more
distributed governance process.
These new, modularized organizations cannot impose their views
on their clients or members. Indeed, there has been a significant
decline in deference to authority in all sectors. To compete effectively,
firms, in much the same way as state or civic organizations, must con-
sult: they are moving toward a greater use of the distributed intelli-
gence and ingenuity of their members. A good example is Linux. The
strategic organization is becoming a broker, an animateur, and, in this
network, a consultative and participative mode obtains among firms,
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states, and communities. The reason for this is that the best learning
experience appears to be effected through flexible, intersectoral teams,
woven by moral contracts and reciprocal obligations negotiated in the
context of evolving partnerships (Paquet 1992, 1994a, 1995b, 1996-7,
1997c).
This entails a major qualitative change. It introduces the network
paradigm within the governance process (Cooke and Morgan 1993;
Castells 1996, 1997, 1998). This paradigm not only dominates the
transactions of the civic sector, but permeates the operations of both
the state and market sectors. The network is not, as is usually assumed,
a mixed form of organization existing halfway along a continuum
ranging from market to hierarchy. Rather, it is a generic name for a
third type of arrangement, built on very different integrating mecha-
nisms: networks are consensus/inducement-oriented organizations
and institutions (Kumon 1992; Amin and Thrift 1995; Acs, de la Mothe,
and Paquet 1996).
Three Learning Capabilities: Relations, Networks, Regimes
In the best of all possible worlds, learning relationships, networks, and
regimes would materialize organically as a response to the need for
nimbleness in the face of accelerating change, and would become a
new form of co-ordination capable of promoting and fostering effec-
tive learning in a society of flows, where commutation is omnipresent.
Moreover, in such a world, when linkages among actors can be modi-
fied and interrupted at any time, culture would become an important
bond that would make these networks and regimes operative and
effective at collective learning.
Culture refers to those unwritten values and principles that gen-
erate a relatively high level of co-ordination, at low cost, by bestowing
identity and membership through stories of flexible generality about
events of practice that act as repositories of accumulated wisdom. The
evolution of these stories constitutes collective learning: a way to inter-
pret conflicting and often confusing data and serves as a social con-
struction of a community.
De Geus uses an analogy from evolutionary biology both to explain
the foundations and different stages of such collective learning and to
identify the loci for action in correcting learning failures. He addresses
the ability of individuals to move around and to be exposed to differ-
ent challenges (new relations), the capacity of individuals to invent new
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ways to cope creatively in the face of new circumstances (new net-
works), and the process of communicating these new ways from the
individual to the entire community (new regimes) (de Geus 1997).
First, as noted earlier, a certain heterogeneity is an important
source of learning since a community composed of identical individu-
als with similar histories or experiences is less likely to extract much
new insight from a given environment. However, there must be a suf-
ficient degree of trust to sustain learning. This in turn requires a 'cul-
tural' basis of differences that members recognize and share
(Drummond 1981-82). The cultural basis of heterogeneity and trust,
the mastery of weak ties (i.e., the capacity to build strong relations on
weak ties) - these are all obviously dimensions that can be nurtured
and represent a critical capability (Laurent and Paquet 1998).
Second, learning is not about the transmission of abstract knowl-
edge from one person's head to another's. It is about the "embodied
ability to behave as community members." It is fostered by contacts
with the outside, by facilitating access to and membership in the com-
munity of practice. Trust is at the core of the fabric of such networks
and communities of practice that transform "labourers into members,"
an employment contract into a membership contract (Handy 1995).
Third, belonging is one of the most powerful agents of mobilization.
Therefore, what is required is an important "moral" component to the
new membership contract, to make it less contractual and more rela-
tional. This new refurbished moral contract is "a network of civic engage-
ment ... which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration
... and broaden the participants' sense of self ... enhancing the partici-
pants' 'taste' for collective benefits" (Putnam 1995). These loose arrange-
ments, or regimes, require a certain degree of interaction and proximity;
both of these are important features of the learning process.
Relations, networks, and regimes constitute layers of capability in
the process of governance. They evolve as the Canadian socio-econ-
omy is transubstantiated. But many observers believe that this is hap-
pening neither fast enough nor in a sufficiently integrated way: the
process is evolving lentement et par morceau. As a result, the emerging
governance process resembles a patchwork quilt, becoming evermore
complex as the environment evolves from placid (Type 1) to turbulent
(Type 4) (Emery and Trist 1965).
In our new high-risk and turbulent environment, strategic, hier-
archical management is no longer sufficient. We need to develop
capacities for collaborative action in managing large scale reorganiza-
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tions and structural changes at the macro level. The ground is in
motion; acting independently may not only compromise effectiveness
but may even make things worse and amplify disintegrative tenden-
cies. What is required is collective action by dissimilar organizations
whose fates are, basically, positively correlated. This requires trust-
enhancing mechanisms such as stronger relationships, networks, and
regimes.
Metcalfe (1998:28) has synthesized these sorts of predicaments
and the challenges underpinning them, in a catastrophe theory type
graph depicting the major aspects of the issue in three dimensions: the
degree of complexity of the environment, the quality of manage-
ment/governance capacities, and the level of governance effective-
ness. He shows that as complexity increases (from Type 3 to 4), man-
agement capacities must improve to avoid the disintegration of the
system. If these capacities already exist, they must be brought into use;
if they do not exist, they must be developed. If they do not exist and
no development effort is made, or if the capacity-building is inade-
quate, disintegration ensues.
Deficits on the Capabilities Front
The decline of trust and the erosion of social capital are easy to docu-
ment. So too is the weakening pattern of networks that defines the old
Canada, as well as the consequent relative unhelpfulness of the gover-
nance structures. This situation has not been improved by the
Canadian tradition of self-doubt which is so difficult to shake off.
And yet, as Jan Morris would put it (quoted in Iyer 2000:122),
while Toronto is "a capital of the unabsolute," it is also an extraordi-
nary, successful experiment in multiculturalism and one of the most
peaceful cities of its size in North America. Organically, Canada
appears to be able to distill a way of life capable of accommodating
this growing diversity and to do it somewhat unconsciously. This does
not necessarily provide the basis for a satisfactory strategy for
improvement in other realms; it simply indicates a general direction
for action. The only apparently desirable approach then, is to encour-
age Canadians to use those local processes as catalysts to improve the
situation on all three fronts: trust relations, networks, and regimes.
On the civil society front, repairs are needed to help to generate
new forms of loose solidarity at the very time that diversity is growing
exponentially and shared values appear to have diminished. Boutique
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multiculturalism and the reliance on symbolic recognition devices do
not appear to be satisfactory strategies (Fish 1999). Nevertheless, since
Canadians are hypersensitive to any form of intolerance, such new
weak ties cannot be constructed on a basis of a retribalization that car-
ries with it any sort of exclusion.
On the political front, we in Canada now live in a world of plural,
limited, and partial identities in which multiple citizenships are com-
mon currency. A rethinking of the notion of citizenship is necessary to
accommodate these new realities (Paquet 1989, 1994b). We must also
reconsider the existing political structures and modify them to permit
a greater decentralization in order to provide maximum leverage for
the strategic/catalytic state (Lind 1992; Paquet 1996-97).
On the economic front, the development of a stronger basis for
stakeholder capitalism and the transformation of the property-rights
regime is needed. That will require a shift from the absolute property
rights doctrine of the English-speaking legal tradition, wherein share-
holders own absolutely all the enterprise, and the formality of market
contracting, toward a pluralistic and more encompassing view of
property rights and a greater reliance on relational, trust-based, and
moral contracts (Paquet and Roy 2000).
Assets, Skills, and Styles behind These Capabilities
To ascertain what might be required to improve the present situation
in the private, public, and civic sectors, one must look behind these
capabilities, probing into the assets, skills, and styles of co-ordination
that currently underpin governance capabilities and shape the
Canadian habitus.
First, in order to create and maintain these capabilities (relationships,
networks, and regimes), there are certain requirements. These include a
mix of 1) rights and authorities enshrined in rules; 2) resources (i.e., an
array of assets such as money, time, information, and facilities made
available both to individuals and institutions; 3) competencies and
knowledge (i.e., education, training, experience, and expertise) and 4)
organizational capital (i.e., the capacity to mobilize attention and to make
effective use of the first three types of resources) (March and Olsen 1995).
Second, Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus (1997) have shown that the
engines of entrepreneurship (private sector), democratic action (public
sphere), and cultivation of solidarity (civil society) are quite similar.
They are based on a particular skill that Spinosa, et al. call "history-
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making," that can be decomposed into three sub-skills: 1) acts of artic-
ulation - attempts at definition de situation or new ways to make sense
of the situation; 2) acts of cross-appropriation - to bring new practices
into a context that would not naturally generate them; and 3) acts of
reconfiguration - to reframe the whole perception of the way of life.
Such individual actions are necessary but insufficient - either to gen-
erate new capabilities or to trigger the required bricolage in the differ-
ent worlds. As Putnam (2000) puts it, the renewal of the stock of social
capital (relationships, networks, and regimes) is a task that requires
the mobilization of communities. This in turn means that we must be
able to ensure that these actions resonate with communities of inter-
pretation and practice - what Spinosa et al. call "worlds."
Third, there is no way one can hope to transform these 'worlds' (in
the private, public, and civic spheres) unless one can first disclose
these 'worlds' (in the sense we use when we speak of the 'world of
business' or the 'world of medicine'). By 'world/ we mean a "totality
of interrelated pieces of equipment, each used to carry out a specific
task, such as hammering a nail. These tasks are undertaken to achieve
certain purposes, such as building a house. This activity enables those
performing it to have identities, such as being a carpenter." Finally,
one may refer to the way in which this world is organized and co-
ordinated as its style (Spinosa et al. 1997:17-19).
Articulation, cross-appropriation, and reconfiguration constitute
kinds of style changes (making explicit what was implicit or lost, gain-
ing wider horizons, reframing). In a turbulent environment, the styles
of the different worlds are modified as are also the very nature of the
equipment, tasks, and identities. This transforms not only the organi-
zational capital but also the rest of the asset base of the system, stimu-
lating a different degree of re-articulation and reconfiguration and
enriching the possibilities of cross-appropriation.
The distinctiveness of the Canadian system is this ensemble of com-
ponents: the way the Canadian system adopts certain patterns of assets
and skills, distills capabilities, and constitutes its particular sort of world.
This dynamic has been synthesized in the graph below. It depicts
the Canadian political socio-economy as an 'instituted process/ char-
acterized by a particular amalgam of assets, adroitly used and
enriched by political, economic, and civic entrepreneurs, through skill-
ful articulation, cross-appropriation, and reframing activities. These
are then woven into a fabric of relations, networks, and regimes defin-
ing the distinctive habitus of Canada as a complex adaptive system.
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Such a complex world is disclosed by the examination of its equip-
ment, tasks, and identities, which are organized and co-ordinated in a
particular way with a particular style. Modification of the structure of
assets, skills, and capabilities is echoed in a transformation of the
Canadian world; such a transformation exerts a reverse impact on the
pattern of assets, skills, and capabilities.
It is quite tempting to highlight one dimension or aspect of this nexus
of forces and to suggest that it has a defining impact on the whole
structure. Many commentators have elevated certain patterns of rights
to this role; others have suggested that the whole system revolves
around certain identities. In fact, this misses the central point: that this
broad ranging canvas has an overall dynamic, the sort of dynamic that
underpins all social systems. In the words of Donald Schon, a social
system "contains structure, technology and theory. The structure is the
set of roles and relations among individual members. The theory con-
sists of the views held within the social system about its purposes, its
operations, its environment, and its future. Both reflect, and in turn
influence, the prevailing technology of the system. These dimensions
all hang together, so that any change in one produces change in the
others" (Schon 1971).
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What defines the "Canadian way" is the transversal manner in
which these assets, skills, and capabilities are integrated into a social
technology; how they constitute an interpretative scheme and a styl-
ization of the world; and how they translate into co-ordinating gover-
nance structures and schemes of intervention. Such schemes are
inspired by a root framework, but take different forms hie et nunc,
because the circumstances call for ad hoc action. Indeed, as was men-
tioned earlier, this is the very nature of the Canadian style.
One may observe the "Canadian way" at work in various spheres
- in key cauldrons where Canadian distinctiveness is being shaped
(schools, workplaces, cities, arts and culture, politics and government,
etc.). Each of these loci is a laboratory in which Canada has tackled,
with greater or lesser success, the challenges of complexity, collabora-
tion, and citizen engagement in designing an ensemble of assets, skills,
and capabilities that gives shape to the Canadian habitus.
While no such local vignettes can pretend to exhaust the Canadian
distinctiveness, they may act as powerful revelateurs not only of the
nature of this distinctly Canadian maniere de voir et de faire but also of
some features of this distinctiveness that may be en emergence. Such
illustrations are useful in understanding the ways in which the
Canadian style may serve the country less effectively than it should
and in disclosing where catalytic action might be required as a matter
of priority.
But what may be most fundamental to the characterization of the
Canadian style is the notion that Canada is the "capital of the unabso-
lute;" that Canadians are uncomfortable with any form of distinctive-
ness that excludes. This, in turn, generates a phenomenal degree of tol-
erance for diversity, and a robust rejection of any form of embrigade-
ment that binds.
In certain circumstances, aloofness may become complacency,
irony may lead to denial, tolerance to diffraction, openness to the ero-
sion of the differences between the outside and the inside, and politi-
cal correctness to greater social distance between groups. This partic-
ular maniere de voir et d'etre is not without a dark side that has some-




Three loci have been chosen to illustrate this Canadian distinctiveness
en acte: workplace and enterprise, education and health, and the
national multilogue about patriotism and social cohesion.
Workplace and Enterprise
Lately, Canada's productivity growth has been relatively lacklustre.
This is linked to co-ordination failures in the workplace and enterprise
and to a lack of effective co-ordination among the different sectors
(private, public, and civic). Yet there is a systematic denial of the seri-
ousness of this situation. Moreover, feats of analytics attempt to
demonstrate that, despite the stagnation of the material standard of
living of Canadians, everything is all right with our total well-being.
Canadians have an uncanny capacity to occlude their macro-orga-
nizational problems. John Porter (1965) had considerable difficulty in
persuading the equality-conscious Canadian population of the 1960s
that Canada was a vertical mosaic of classes and elites. In the same
way, in the face of ample evidence, Canadians currently are in denial
that the Canadian governance apparatus is marred by hierarchy and
confrontations. They also do not see that this situation translates into
a relative lag in adopting new technologies, an immense lag in the pro-
ductivity of our service sector, and a certain slowness in its capacity to
transform.
Many of these difficulties result from a misalignment of Canada's
structural capital: its systems (processes and outputs), structure (the
arrangement of responsibilities and accountabilities among the stake-
holders), strategy (the goals of organizations and the ways sought to
achieve them), and culture (the sum of individual opinions, shared
mindsets, values, and norms within the organizations) (Saint-Onge
1996:13). The major barrier to good performance is the misalignment
among these four elements and, in particular, the disconnections
between strategy and culture.
In Canada, the 'culture' in which both enterprise and workplace
are embedded and which also shapes them, is problematic: 1) the
framework of corporate law is dominated by the shadow of the share-
holders and does not provide much place for stakeholders (de la
Mothe and Paquet 1996) and, 2) the culture of the workplace (which is
a significant source of social capital) is not a culture of learning and
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innovation, and is not geared to taking full advantage of alliances,
partnerships, and network externalities (de la Mothe and Paquet 1997).
While in dozens of U.S. states, corporate law allows boards of direc-
tors to allocate portions of the net operating surplus to stakeholders
other than the shareholders (through amenities, better conditions, etc.),
in Canada, any shareholder has the power to sue the board if it were to
adopt such a policy. This considerably cramps the style of the board in
generating the requisite commitment of these other stakeholders.
The same sort of dysfunction can be seen in the workplace, where
a discourse of confrontation is still prevalent, along with the centrality
of job action as a method of conflict resolution. As a result, the sort of
collaborative governance that might ensure better dynamic
(Schumpeterian) performance fails to materialize. This has resulted in
Canada's relatively poor showing in a number of areas in comparison
to other countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development.
And yet the rhetoric of competition and confrontation continues to
prevail at stage front, while new forms of co-operation, partnering,
and joint venturing materialize every day en catimini in all sorts of
quarters throughout the land. So it is not that there is no progress,
rather that the progress is local and informal (as it should be), but
without the benefit of a supporting infrastructure.
This is the Canadian way!
Education and Health
Canada spends immense resources on both education and healthcare.
Both these systems are national icons and a source of national pride.
This explains Canadians' sense of accomplishment with Canada's gold
medal in the United Nations international ranking of nations in terms
of 'human development.'
But Canadians also turn a blind eye to the critical signs of dysfunc-
tion to which experts - in Canada and elsewhere - point in both our
educational and healthcare systems. Gross lapses in efficiency and
effectiveness, counterproductive silo-type organizations, confronta-
tional policy developments entailing important blind spots, no voice or
role for the users, and so on - are all factors acknowledged by experts
(Keating 1995; Angus and Begin 2000; World Health Organization
2000) yet are deliberately suppressed in public debates in Canada.
There is an amazing chasm, for instance, between the grim reality that
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Canada spends 50 per cent more per capita on healthcare than the
United Kingdom does with results that are inferior to theirs and the
public display of sacramental denial that there might be any need for
repairs in the governance of Canada's 'superior' healthcare system.
This has led to much damning of the two-tiered American system in
both education and health. And yet all this occurs with many winks and
nods acknowledging some degree of disarray in both Canadian sys-
tems. What is resented is radical, in-your-face criticism of the Canadian
systems. This is regarded as most unhelpful (if not unpatriotic) and as
likely to discourage action a petits pas meant to repair those systems.
As an example, young Canadians spend significantly fewer days
in class each year than their colleagues in other advanced countries; a
recent report suggested that up to 40 per cent of high school students
in Ottawa were dysfunctional as learners (Keating 1995:82); our com-
mitment to life-long learning is minimal; the resources dedicated to
formal workforce development and training remain a fraction of the
sums spent by Canada's industrialized competitors in Europe and
Asia (one-third of Germany's commitment and one tenth of Japan's
commitment). And the same critical diagnosis might be made about
our healthcare system - a highly chaotic system that generates indices
of morbidity and mortality well above what one might expect and at
quite a high cost (Angus and Begin 2000).
Obviously, in the face of suppressed criticism, a major overhaul of
both systems is most unlikely. What is more likely will be a magnifi-
cent and uncompromising rhetorical defense of the status quo, with a
concomitant selection, by certain establishments, of particular reforms,
selected piecemeal and somewhat covertly implemented in a quasi-
underground approach. Any radical challenge will continue to be
denounced as a betrayal of Canada's 'perfect' institutions. This is the
way 'universality' was assassinated in Canada: piecemeal, covertly,
without a national debate, while on the hustings the political classes
pretended that they were staunchly defending it.
This might explain what Harold Innis meant when he said "a
social scientist in Canada can only survive by virtue of a sense of
humour" (quoted in Neill 1972:93).
National Multilogue about Patriotism and Social Cohesion
As global integration proceeds, the nation-state is transformed. Its ter-
ritoriality becomes problematic to the extent that its borders become
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porous. Its sovereignty begins to become unbundled and this leads the
citizen to re-assess what belonging means. The problem of belonging
echoes the new situation where Canadians increasingly find them-
selves of mixed origins and authority is dispersed in a multiplicity of
sites. A multiplicity of allegiances ensues. Thus, while citizens have
traditionally associated their main loyalty with the nation-state, the
state has lost its privileged position as the main anchor of belonging as
non-territorial modes of organization become increasingly important
(Elkins 1995:74-75).
New principles of social cohesion are en emergence. We know that
they are likely both to evolve at the local level and to echo a non-cen-
tralizing philosophy, but the timing of the actual moment of tipping
into a new sociality continues to be largely unpredictable.
Not all observers agree on the reality of this tectonic change. Many
continue both to believe that 'bridging capital' was the basis of the
Canadian 'social glue' that bound us together in the past and to build
arguments that it should remain the central adhesive in the years to
come.
This is the position of the Senate Standing Committee on Social
Affairs, Science, and Technology (Canada 1999) which has suggested
that the three pillars on which the sense of social cohesion of
Canadians rested, in the post-World War II era, were: the federal pro-
grams of redistribution of income; the shared-costs programs through
which the federal government provided federal grants to support
health care, post-secondary education, and social assistance; and the
grants system to equalize the average quality of public services
throughout the country. Thus the Committee suggests that nothing
short of a new wave of federal institutions can provide the requisite
degree of security to Canadians through redistribution.
This is the central theme used by those who argue that medicare is
what makes Canada hang together and that anything that threatens
the present interregional process of money laundering is bound to put
the Canadian edifice in peril
This 'bridging social capital' interpretation may be nothing more
than a slogan in order to aid rationalizing compulsive centralism
(because it is necessary for redistribution). It has been propounded,
however, by certain groups in English Canada as a founding national
myth. The same people who defend this view of income and wealth
redistribution as supplying the essential Canadian social glue have
also found evidence of a latent demand for such glue, not to mention
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evidence of latent patriotism in the Molson beer commercial "My
name is Joe and I am Canadian." This is surprising.
Indeed, in such a bizarre piece, Canadians are viewed as a people
who defiantly harbour limited and multiple identities, all of which are
characterized, almost in the same breath, as both crassly opportunistic
(in defining themselves through some federal-provincial fiscal plumb-
ing arrangement) and naively sentimental.
There is another interpretation, one rooted in our national irony
and our taste for bricolage.
Medicare is a prime example of a popular federal redistributive
scheme. It is a collectively expensive scheme in which healthcare is
presented to the population as a free good, through the hiding hand of
the state. It is hardly surprising that the population is favourably dis-
posed toward such a scheme. The fact that elected officials have
wished to be seen as providers of a valuable free good is also hardly
surprising. This manufactured win-win situation (in which the popu-
lation pretends that it receives free and universal healthcare and the
politicians pretend that they provide that care for free) is, at best,
sleight of hand. But only in government-sponsored polls or political
harangues does this ever get confused with national identity and citi-
zenship.
In the real world of healthcare, Canadians live by the principle
that it is unhelpful to rock the boat. Bricolage, nevertheless, has already
begun to effect the required repairs to the system through appropria-
tion of whatever techniques appear to be most effective, including
those emerging from the United States. This movement of silent
reform will slowly replace the existing emphasis on redistribution
(which is costly and ineffective) with more effective and cheaper
insurance schemes (Mandel 1996). The same may be said about edu-
cation: the staunch defense of our public education system has never
been stronger than at the very moment when Canada is sotto voce cre-
ating both private schools and universities galore.
Canadian distinctiveness does not, therefore, lie with the safety
net. And, because the safety net is under strain, this may be good
news. Rather, Canadian distinctiveness rests with Canadian ability to
master weak ties; with Canadian capacity to build on loose, casual
social connections; and with Canadian facility to elaborate a modus
vivendi of heterogeneous and diverse groups. Hence, the leitmotiv is
likely to be appropriate insurance for our high-risk society, rather than
income and wealth redistribution.
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This emphasis on weak ties in the new social arrangements reminds
one of Schopenhauer's parable about porcupines: in the cold of winter,
these creatures find ways to come close enough to bring each other
some warmth, but not close enough to hurt each other. This means a
new form of civic engagement, one that should not be confused with the
sort of social cohesion and pacification that is supposed to ensue from
massive redistribution of income and wealth (Paquet 2000).
As for the success of recent commercials about 'Canadianness:' it
is an interesting illustration of Canadians' general taste for self-depre-
cation and irony. The success of the Molson commercial is less evi-
dence of suppressed patriotism than evidence of our immense taste for
an ironic view of ourselves, for self-mockery. This is the same expla-
nation for the popularity of La petite vie or This Hour Has 22 Minutes.
Conclusion
Let us clearly restate our main point. Canadian distinctiveness is not a
set of static and arrested traits, but a certain habitus - that is, a certain
set of propensities or proclivities which becomes the dominant logic in
the face of challenges and pressures. This dynamic 'reacticjue' defines
the characteristics of the socio-economic system in its dual process of
adapting to its environment and adopting (i.e., bestowing a greater
probability of success on) certain types of behaviour by actors or orga-
nizations in the system. This is what we mean when we refer to the
'Canadian world/ a distinctive world rooted in special equipment
(physical, organizational, legal, etc.), tasks, and identities - all inte-
grated into a certain style. This dynamic is in turn anchored in an inte-
grated ensemble of assets, skills, and capabilities which are also
evolving as a result of pressures both from the external environment
and from the evolving internal 'Canadian world' itself.
It is not possible to define this dynamic Canadian distinctiveness
in all its complexity in a few paragraphs. But one can identify the main
features of the worldview underpinning it and the ways in which this
distinctiveness has crystallized in reaction to anomalies and pressures
in different sites.
Our hypothesis is that this habitus has been characterized by irony
plus bricolage - that is, a certain denial and disingenuousness at the
rhetorical level and a certain ad hoc characteristic at the level of prac-
tice. This approach, by avoiding grand narratives and grand designs,
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generates an aloofness de ban aloi at the level of discourse, as well as the
sort of practicality in action that is capable of generating piecemeal
reform in a country that is relatively averse to change.
One major benefit of this approach - devoid of ideology, except
perhaps for some latent, soft egalitarianism - is that it dedramatizes
even the most ambitious endeavours, making adjustment appear less
painful than it really is. Some side malefits of this vision-less approach
are that it enables Canadians to avoid fully participating in a number
of major modern debates (the appropriate mix of liberalism, democ-
racy, and republicanism; centralization vs. decentralization; egalitari-
anism vs. subsidiarity; redistribution vs. insurance, etc.) and to surf
over change during major periods of transformation without a full
awareness of the depth of the reforms underway, or even an adequate
appreciation of the auxiliary precautions that might be required.
The other essays in this work illustrate very well the canonical
Canadian capacity for ironic denial and ad hocery. In all cases (the pol-
icy vis-a-vis Aboriginals, the multiculturalist strategy, and the ways in
which Canadians deal with the emergence of an ever more important
civic sector), evidence can be found to support my hypothesis.
Yet it should not be presumed that Canadian distinctiveness is
somewhat "arrested." Indeed, ours is a form of "dynamic irony" (Ross
1954:xii), with the institutional order an emergent phenomenon.
Though it is adaptable, evolvable, resilient, boundless, and it breeds of
novelty, our distinctiveness is also non-optimal, uncontrollable, unpre-
dictable, and fundamentally not understandable (Kelly 1994:22-23).
This explains why the discourses about social transformation of the
institutional order are so vague and non-committal (Drucker 1994). We
have to be ironic because we must be satisfied with observing the
"emergent properties" of the new order as they materialize.
In the transition period to the new millenium, we may expect a
strong affirmation of "limited identities," considerable disconnection,
and challenges to most of the rigid and centralized institutions. There
will also be a growing tendency for the emergent order to become
anchored at the meso-level and to be couched in informal rules of the
game agreed to by persons who share a "web of trust." One may even
expect that, at some point, key signposts or standards will mutate - the
minting and issuing of currency, for instance. The main challenge will
not be to master the switch from one dominant logic to another but
rather to learn to cope with multiple dominant logics and, therefore,
with concurrent, distributed, institutional orders (Paquet 1995b, 1997d).
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The new so-called co-ordination en chantier will loosely intermedi-
ate the spectral and distributed network world generated by the infor-
mation age. In the network age, fluidity is the foundation of dynamism
and survival where institutional stability imposes constraints on rela-
tional fluidity. Many predict the emergence of an "imperial age" rem-
iniscent of the Roman empire under Hadrian, where the "institutional
order" will aspire to being no more than a loose web of agreements
that ensures compatibility among open networks (Guehenno 1993;
Paquet 1994b). A baroque governance!
Obviously, this is not an ideal situation. But the optimal may not
be the ideal either. There is much to be deplored about the Canadian
way degenerating into denial and complacency and revealing a vul-
nerability to lethargy. Such a method of governing Canada will be
costly in the long run. But there is also much to be said for a country
that has decided not to take itself too seriously; one that takes to heart
the counsel of John Maynard Keynes to economists: avoid dealing
with big problems, emulate the dentists, and deal with the small holes
(Gordon 1975).
For those who welcome more passion, I suggest the cure of an
afternoon at a soccer game in Rome. There, they can experience pas-
sion about trivia: armed guards body-searching those coming into the
stadium, vigilantly guarding the safety of the visiting team's music
band, and ready for the most gratuitous violence at any time.
Meanwhile, back in our aloof country, one can find on the editorial
page of the national newspaper - The Globe & Mail of 15 June 2000 - an
editorial not calling the population to arms, but one entitled "a call to
irony."
Qui dit mieux!
On another occasion, in 1999 (Paquet 1999a), I suggested, rather
modestly, that when constructing the requisite new sociality in keep-
ing with the Canadian/Quebec "spirit" - and Quebec's spirit is much
more akin to the Canadian spirit than Quebecers like to admit - it
might not be unreasonable to start with tact and civility. Many
ridiculed such a modest start. It looked too much like a celebration of
a Band-Aid solution: "solving a problem with a minimum amount of
effort and time and cost" (Gladwell 2000:256).
This sort of approach always generates disdain in Canada - at
least at the rhetorical level - for it conveys a sense of dogged and indis-
criminate effort. This is missing the point. It is really meant to connote
the most effective way of responding to the central challenge - finding
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ways to partition big, intractable problems into small, tractable ones.
This is why the Canadian way is une foule de petites choses.
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Evolving State - Civil Society
Relationships: The Beginning of a
New Era?
Susan D. Phillips
T HE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR AND THE STATEis undergoing fundamental change in Canada, as elsewhere. This
is a result of a transformation in both the nature of governance and the
character of the voluntary sector. Financial exigencies and neo-liberal
preferences for a smaller state have propelled radical restructuring
which has resulted in the downloading of services and dramatic cut-
backs to program funding. Public sector restructuring has not been
driven by financial concerns alone, however. It also reflects a transition
from a paradigm of 'government' - of government departments uni-
laterally setting policy and producing services - to one of 'governance'
in which governments work collaboratively and horizontally with
other governments and with voluntary and private sector partners.
Related to this, governments of both the left and right are taking a
renewed interest in active citizenship, manifest by their attempts to
encourage volunteerism and promote social cohesion. The result has
been a realization on the part of governments that they need the vol-
untary sector more than ever, not only as partners in service delivery,
but in building social capital and a strong civil society. At the same
time, the voluntary sector has been rapidly evolving from a model
based on charity to one based on civil society - that is, from a model
premised on helping those less fortunate to one in which communities
have the resources and are empowered to represent and help them-
selves. This has sparked the emergence of much stronger national
leadership aimed at providing strategic direction to the sector and the
demand for new policy tools and citizen engagement processes.
As a result, considerable innovation is taking place worldwide in
regulatory reform and in the development of new institutions, frame-
work agreements, and other mechanisms for building and sustaining
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more constructive relationships between governments and the volun-
tary sector.1 Canada, too, has initiated sweeping reform aimed at
increasing the capacity of the voluntary sector and at building better
relationships to allow the sector to fulfil its unique roles in civil society
and as a governing partner. The first concrete action toward imple-
menting such reform came in early June 2000 with the federal
government's announcement of the Voluntary Sector Initiative, a
framework policy supported by almost $95 million over five years and
a novel Joint Table process for its implementation. The magnitude and
implications of this unfolding change should not be underestimated.
Not only will the product of this reform have a major impact on both
government and the sector, but the innovative process of collaboration
used to produce a strategy for change has already begun to reshape
how the federal government works with the sector.
Canada has a strong tradition of volunteerism and a vibrant and
diverse voluntary sector of more than 175,000 organizations.2 So, why
does the existing relationship between the voluntary sector and the
federal government need to change at all? What would it take to cre-
ate a strong and enduring relationship, one designed to carry both the
voluntary sector and government well into the twenty-first century?
Does the federal government's Voluntary Sector Initiative go far
enough in creating this kind of relationship? This paper analyzes both
the process that led to the announcement of the federal government's
Voluntary Sector Initiative and its content. I begin by presenting a con-
ceptual framework for understanding relationships between the
voluntary sector and the state. Next, I explore how this relationship
has evolved over the years in Canada and outline its primary defi-
ciencies. In the third section, Canada's experiment in relationship
reform is examined with a view to understanding the agenda setting
and change process. I conclude by arguing that the Voluntary Sector
Initiative is a vital first step, but that it faces some distinctively
Canadian contradictions that need to be resolved.
Conceptualizing Voluntary Sector-State Relationships
Relationships between the state and the voluntary sector are necessar-
ily complex. They vary enormously across countries and over time,
either because they evolve in response to changing circumstances or
because they are consciously redesigned. The specific configurations
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of such a relationship depend on both the nature of government's
interests and institutions for structuring expectations and interaction
with voluntary organizations, and on the structure and capacity of the
voluntary sector.
To varying degrees and in different ways, five distinct dimensions
are part of all government-voluntary sector relationships:
1) PUBLIC POLICY ADVOCACY AND DIALOGUE: Above all, voluntary
organizations represent citizens. In this role, they advocate,
uninvited, on behalf of their constituencies. But, they are also fre-
quently encouraged by governments to participate in dialogue
around public policy issues that affect their communities and in
which they have expertise. A relationship also affords, to vary-
ing degrees, mutual understanding about the nature of the
relationship itself: it provides an opportunity for both govern-
ment and the voluntary sector to understand better the
challenges and limitations of the other and to determine,
through dialogue, common interests and goals.
2) ACCOUNTABILITY: A relationship entails for both sides a require-
ment to explain and accept responsibility for carrying out
assigned mandates in light of agreed upon expectations.3
3) SUPPORT: To varying degrees, a relationship contributes to the
development of capacity in the voluntary sector and comple-
ments the resources and infrastructure of government. Capacity
can be defined as "the human and financial resources, technol-
ogy, skills, knowledge and understanding required to permit
organizations to do their work and fulfil what is expected of
them by stakeholders."4
4) TRANSPARENCY: In addition to promotion of appropriate conduct
and acceptance of responsibility, a sector-state relationship
should provide an opportunity for the public to ascertain
whether both sides have lived up to commitments made and to
understand how, and how well, the relationship is working.
Transparency helps to ensure that the relationship is perceived as
legitimate - by the sector, by government, and by the public at
large.
5) SERVICE DELIVERY: The final dimension of a relationship is the
provision of services to citizens, whether on contract, in part-
nership, or in the absence of government.
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In addition to recognizing the multidimensionality of the relation-
ship, it is important to note that relationships between the sector and
the state occur at different levels - at the micro, meso or macro levels.
The micro level involves one-on-one interaction - an individual
department with a particular voluntary organization on a specific pol-
icy or programme issue. The meso level delimits relationships
between a government department(s) and a subsector or constituency
of groups, such as the many organizations representing the disability
community or international development. The macro level, involving
government as an entity dealing with the voluntary sector as a sector,
is just beginning to emerge in many countries. In most cases, macro
level relationships have been historically underdeveloped or non-exis-
tent, so that principles and broad frameworks need to be established
as a first step. Although the meso and micro levels may be where orga-
nizations and governments live the relationship on a daily basis, the
focus of this paper is on the macro level, which in policy terms is the
contemporary challenge for both the sector and the state.
The Voluntary Sector-State Relationship in Canada
In the past decade or so, the voluntary-state sector relationship in
Canada has undergone two deliberate transformations. The first,
which began in the late 1980s, was an attempt to impose greater regu-
lation on the sector and was prompted by neo-liberal restructuring of
the state and a rise in populist ideas about democracy. The second
transition which began in 1997 and is still in progress, is intended to
create a more constructive, balanced relationship.
Constructing a Relationship
The Canadian government first began a direct relationship with the
voluntary sector in the early 1900s, a period when churches and char-
ities largely controlled welfare, health, and education services. Small
grants were given to a few charitable organizations, such as the
Canadian Lung Association and the Victorian Order of Nurses, to buy
supplies and provide services, especially to vulnerable populations,
that governments of the time could not reach.5 The relationship
expanded considerably in the 1940s when the federal government rec-
ognized the potential of voluntary organizations in nation building
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and in constructing a distinctively Canadian citizenship regime. At the
time, Canada was developing its own legal framework and adminis-
trative practices by which its citizens would be Canadians, in terms of
both legislation and identity, not merely British subjects. During the
war years, when that legal concept and those desired practices of citi-
zenship were being formulated, concerns about the loyalty of citizens,
particularly immigrants from the combatant countries, predominated.
These concerns laid the groundwork for a citizenship training pro-
gramme housed in the federal Department of the Secretary of State.6 It
was felt that citizenship could be learned and practised through par-
ticipation in voluntary organizations. In addition, collective action was
seen as a way for the disadvantaged to help themselves and to achieve
equality. The federal government, recognizing that it had a responsi-
bility to support collective action to "help groups weld together
individuals in a common community cognizant of its duty to support
responsible, democratic government," provided funding to voluntary
organizations for programmes related to citizenship.7
During the postwar years, concerns about loyalty gave way to con-
cerns about constructing a Canadian identity - which is not surprising
given the growing force of both Quebec nationalism and economic
Canadian nationalism. In the 1970s, operational funding to voluntary
organizations engaged in promoting particular aspects of Canadian
identity was expanded and institutionalized with programmes that
funded official minority language associations, women, multicultural
communities, Aboriginal political organizations, and (in the 1980s) dis-
abled persons. At the meso level, operational departments cultivated
relationships with their own constituencies by offering operational and
project support for organizations, thereby supporting environmental
groups and health and welfare organizations, to name but a few.
In addition to its role in enhancing the support dimension of the
relationship, the federal government established institutionalized
mechanisms for facilitating policy dialogue with voluntary organiza-
tions. This was done in two ways. First, the federal government
developed a practice of holding consultations on major policy initia-
tives in which citizen groups were not only invited to participate but
were also given research and intervenor funding to do so effectively.
Even around the annual budget process, a traditionally secretive affair
in parliamentary systems, the minister of Finance held sectoral meet-
ings with leaders of social policy, anti-poverty, and women's groups,
as well as with business leaders. The second way of enhancing policy
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dialogue centred on including representatives of social constituencies
within the state. During the 1980s the size of the federal Cabinet grew
to over 40 as a result of the creation of ministers responsible for
women, multiculturalism, seniors, and youth, among others.
Although no single minister was responsible for the voluntary sector
per se, many of its key subsectors were represented at the Cabinet table.
The regulatory dimension of the relationship, also laid down during
this period, was attached almost exclusively to the use of the tax system
as a means of indirect support for the sector. In 1967, the Income Tax Act
was amended to allow deductions for charitable donations and to pro-
vide for the tax exempt status of registered charitable organizations.8 In
addition to enhancing incentives for individuals to donate, these new
provisions of the tax system created the first comprehensive, national
system of registration and supervision of Canada's charities. In
exchange for the ability to issue tax deductible receipts, qualified orga-
nizations were required to register, report annually, and adhere to
certain restrictions on their financial, operational, and political activities.
The result of this process of nation building, combined with the
construction of a regulatory framework around the tax system, has
been to assign responsibility for the voluntary sector-state relationship
to the national state. This is ironic given that, as appropriate to all civil
matters, jurisdiction over voluntary organizations actually rests with
provincial governments. Although provincial governments have
extensive contacts with voluntary organizations in the context of ser-
vice delivery in a wide variety of areas, the federal government has
claimed the dominant role in the relationship with the voluntary sec-
tor through use of its spending power and control over the national tax
system. The stance of most provincial governments to the voluntary
sector has been non-interventionist - indeed, some might say,
benignly neglectful.9 Even Quebec, which operates under the civil
code of law and maintains its own tax system (and thus requires sep-
arate registration for charities), has been largely laissez-faire in
regulating the sector, although it is naturally the focal point for the
relationship in most other respects.10
Deconstructing the Relationship
The supportive elements of the long-standing relationship between
the federal government and the voluntary sector were largely disman-
tled in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the rise of
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neo-liberalism and populism. The inherent balance, by which the state
recognized both a benefit from and a responsibility to the sector, was
reduced to a government-dominated contracting and regulatory
regime. Calls for even more regulation marked this transition. A phi-
losophy of neo-liberalism that emphasized a smaller state and
competitive markets characterized both the Mulroney Conservatives,
in power from 1984 to 1993, and the first mandate of the Chretien
Liberals. When neo-liberalism met the very real financial pressures for
deficit reduction, the results were significant cutbacks in government
spending, particularly to social programs, and a choice by the federal
government to get out of many areas of activity not considered 'core
business,' by downloading or offloading to the private and voluntary
sectors. Financial assistance to voluntary organizations was cut dra-
matically, sometimes as much as 50 to 100 per cent in a single year,
often without warning. The groups that were hardest hit were advo-
cacy and umbrella organizations - those not directly engaged in
service delivery. Where financial support remained, project or contract
funding usually replaced operational support, thus forcing voluntary
organizations to seek out projects to support their daily operations,
sometimes diverting them from their core missions, and generally
speeding up the tempo of the "dance of contract management."11 As
the federal government cut intergovernmental transfers and down-
loaded costs onto provincial governments, they, in turn, downloaded
to municipalities and voluntary organizations. Although Ottawa was
usually blamed, many provincial governments had strong neo-liberal
ideas of their own and were delighted to shrink the size of the provin-
cial state. For example, in many service areas, such as homecare, which
had been provided almost exclusively by the voluntary sector, private
sector competition was deliberately introduced by some provincial
governments; consequently, private sector firms saw the opportunities
in these new 'markets' and began to go head-to-head with voluntary
sector providers, often driving the latter out.12
Restructuring of the voluntary sector-state relationship was not
just about money, however. The rise of populist ideas reinforced a
backlash against voluntary organizations engaged in public policy
debates because populism saw no need for intermediaries in the rela-
tionship between citizen and elected official. The notion of the 1940s
that organizations were grounds for citizenship training was antithet-
ical to a populist politician of the 1990s. In particular, one backbench
member of Parliament, John Bryden, became a vocal critic of the lack
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of accountability and efficiency of voluntary organizations and, on the
basis of his own analysis of annual tax returns of selected voluntary
organizations, released a series of reports that called for much stronger
regulation. The motive underlying these criticisms, by his own admis-
sion, was a concern that parliamentarians were in competition with
civil society groups to be heard. Although Bryden did not succeed in
creating a cadre of supporters among the Liberal party, his work cap-
tured the attention of the media whose members had long ignored the
sector, but who now recognized the potential for scandal. The
response from government was to add more auditors to Revenue
Canada staff and to order the review of executive salaries in the sector
by a parliamentary committee (which found no evidence to support
Bryden's claim of exorbitant staff salaries and quickly lost interest in
pursuing the issue). At the same time, Revenue Canada apparently
became more conservative in its decisions to register new charities and
more vigilant in policing the advocacy activities of registered organi-
zations, particularly smaller groups.
Two other developments in the early 1990s caused significant
deterioration in the public dialogue aspect of the voluntary
sector-state relationship. The first was that consultation processes
were deliberately redesigned to focus on representation by individu-
als participating as individual citizens, rather than by organized
groups of citizens. Sectoral consultations were replaced by multi-
stakeholder sessions, which may have enhanced cross-sectoral
learning but diluted the voice of the voluntary sector. Sector advocates
within the state were also removed by a major organizational restruc-
turing beginning in 1993 that jettisoned many of the representatives of
social interests from the Cabinet and abolished government advisory
councils, such as the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of
Women.13 By the mid-1990s, not only was it harder for the voluntary
sector to be represented within the state, but it was more difficult to
make representation to the state. The cumulative effect of these
changes was that the credibility of the voluntary sector was purposely
undermined, as it became painted with the derogatory brush of 'spe-
cial interest groups.' In spite of this, opinion polls show that public
trust in the voluntary sector has remained high.14
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The Need for Change
This downloading and state restructuring, laid on a tax-based regula-
tory system largely unreformed since its establishment in the late
1960s, have generated a number of serious problems in each of the five
dimensions of the sector - state relationship. Here, we examine the cur-
rent strengths and basic weaknesses in each aspect of the relationship
with a view to demonstrating the need for particular kinds of reform.
PUBLIC POLICY DIALOGUE
Policy advocacy by voluntary organizations has become unduly
restricted, although many parliamentarians and public servants prob-
ably still feel it is not restricted enough. Government regulates
advocacy activity in two ways: by controlling which kinds of organi-
zations are permitted to register as 'charities' and thereby be able to
issue tax receipts for donations and by regulating the advocacy activi-
ties of registered organizations. Canada, which uses a common law
definition of charities (emanating from the Elizabethan Statute of
Charitable Uses, 1601), has one of the most restrictive systems of regis-
tration among developed countries, notably more restrictive than the
US or the UK.15 In the US, as in many other countries, the definition of
'charity' is expanded beyond the traditional common law interpreta-
tion by the specification in the tax code of a number of additional
categories of organizations that qualify for registration. The UK has
expanded and kept the common law definition of charity appropri-
ately flexible by institutional means: acting in its quasi-judicial
capacity, the Charity Commission of England and Wales annually
hears hundreds of cases about the kinds of purposes that ought to be
considered charitable, so the existing definition is continually open to
renewal. In contrast, Canadian groups that are denied registration by
the tax agency must take their case to the Federal Court of Appeal - a
very expensive court of first instance. Hence, only about twenty cases
have ever proceeded through the courts and only one has reached the
Supreme Court.16 As a result, groups engaged in educating about
environmental protection, promoting multiculturalism or harmo-
nious race relations, and supporting patriotism (including better
relations between Anglophones and Francophones) are excluded
from registration in Canada, but not in the US or UK. Although the
evidence is sketchy, this limited interpretation of the common law is
probably most detrimental to multicultural communities that
s
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approach philanthropy and community help in different ways than
other communities.
Once registered, political activity is limited to an arbitrary level,
defined in a manner that the tax system can regulate. The current rule
is that resources spent on political activity cannot exceed 10 per cent of
the total of an organization's resources in any given year. The definition
of political is vague, but refers to a broad band of activity between par-
tisan (which is banned completely) and consultation invited by
governments (which is unfettered). In the atmosphere of the 1990s, the
application of the '10 per cent' rule reinforced perceptions that the fed-
eral government wished to curtail advocacy by critics of state
restructuring. In addition, apparently stricter enforcement of the rule
during this period by Revenue Canada, now the Canada Customs and
Revenue Agency (CCRA), contributed to a sense of unfairness in the
regulatory system: that small, newer groups are treated differently than
large, traditional charities. For instance, while the large and respected
Canadian Cancer Society might get away with an anti-smoking cam-
paign, small and more vocal groups, such as the Non-Smokers Rights
Association, might be (and, indeed, have been) audited for similar
political activities.17 The problem was compounded by timing, since
the restrictions on advocacy came at the very time when voluntary
organizations felt a growing responsibility to speak out against the
impact of social program cuts and other effects of state restructuring.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability in the voluntary sector necessarily involves both self-
and government regulation, given the public trust held by the sector.
The Canadian system has deficiencies in both. On the one hand, self-
regulation at a broad sector or sub-sector level has been
underdeveloped. This is a result of the historical absence of strong
cross-sectoral national or provincial organizations and of sector-based
watchdog agencies (such as the National Charities Information Bureau
in the United States). This is starting to change, however, with the
leadership role assumed by the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy
which is mobilizing sector-wide voluntary compliance with its Code
of Ethical Fundraising and Financial Management, and by other inter-
mediary organizations with requirements for member accreditation.
On the other hand, the governmental regulatory system is simul-
taneously cumbersome and disappointing.18 The disappointment
stems from the inherent contradiction in tying the regulatory regime
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so closely to the Income Tax Act, 1985. As a recent review of Canadian
charity law notes, "The dominant legislative motive, naturally, has
been either to protect the public treasury against abuse and fraud, or
to 'subsidize' the sector through 'tax expenditures.' The integrity and
efficiency of the sector, although important to these objectives, remain
only instrumental goals."19 The CCRA, as first and foremost a tax col-
lection agency, can neither regulate the sector effectively nor equip it
with the tools to govern and regulate itself successfully.
The framework is cumbersome in several ways. The first is a prod-
uct of its uniformity, which means that all registered organizations,
from the small group run entirely by volunteers to the largest univer-
sity or teaching hospital in the country, must annually report exactly
the same information. Not surprisingly, most of the problems related
to failure to report or inaccuracies in reporting encountered by the
Charities Directorate of the CCRA emanate from very small organiza-
tions in which the volunteer treasurer did not fully understand or have
the time to fill out the thirteen-page form. The only sanction for non-
compliance or for failure to report that is available to the CCRA is
de-registration. To paraphrase Marilyn Taylor, this uses a sledgeham-
mer to crack a walnut,20 Thus, it comes as no surprise that very few
organizations are ever fully sanctioned.
A second problem is that the regulatory guidelines are vague, or
simply unhelpful, in several areas. This applies particularly to the
regulations governing business activities that do not provide ade-
quate guidance to voluntary organizations in shaping their own
conduct at a time when business activity is increasingly undertaken in
a desperate search for new sources of revenue. Finally, the regulatory
regime has been increasingly politicized - or, at least, perceived to be
politicized. Due to the limited resources assigned to the CCRA
Charities Directorate, audits in recent years have been done rarely at
random, and only on a complaints basis. This has created a growing
unease that those organizations that are overly critical of government
policy or disliked by certain politicians are more likely to be the tar-
get of investigation.
TRANSPARENCY
Transparency has also suffered as a result of the nature of the regula-
tor. As a tax department, the CCRA operates under rules of
confidentiality that extend to its Charities Directorate. Consequently,
neither the applications for registration, nor the reasons for approval
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or rejection of such applications, nor (until recently) other information
about an organization's annual return are made public. Thus, the pub-
lic has no easily accessible, reliable, independent source of information
about the sector as a whole or about a specific organization that may
be soliciting donations. The list of registered charities, however, is now
available on the CCRA website - a major step forward in providing a
basic measure of transparency.
SUPPORT
As outlined above, support entails not only assistance with 'hard'
infrastructure, such as funding, human resources, and technology, but
also shared understanding and knowledge. By the 1990s, the sector
had reached a crisis of capacity. Support in the form of financial assis-
tance had been severely cut back and, since the sector was poorly
understood, there was never a significant transfer of human resources
or other expertise between governments and voluntary organizations.
And by this time, understanding and shared expectations were at an
all-time low because many Canadian governments presumed that vol-
untary organizations could and would simply pick up the load
resulting from cuts in government programming.
To a large extent, the lacuna of support and understanding stems
from institutional design. In contrast to both the UK and the US, the
Canadian relationship lacks institutional support for capacity building
and for better self-governance within the sector. There is no federal or
provincial equivalent to the Charity Commission of England and
Wales which, as an arms-length government body, backed by legisla-
tion, both regulates and supports the sector. Nor does the tax
department play the intrusive but instructive role of the US Internal
Revenue Service which uses its expertise to educate as well as super-
vise the sector. Although the CCRA often attempts to be supportive as
well as act as a watchdog, many organizations are reluctant to ask for
assistance or information for fear of being bitten by an auditor.
Moreover, the Charities Directorate is so limited in resources that there
are few opportunities to be proactively helpful in providing good gov-
ernance tools. Moreover, without another voice at the Cabinet table,
the needs of the sector were being largely overlooked by the federal
government.
One aspect of support that is of particular importance to voluntary
organizations is funding. Most voluntary organizations have been
detrimentally affected by the public sector restructuring of the past
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decade. The result has been that voluntary organizations face a triple
whammy. First, having seen their government funding cut substan-
tially and their core funding withdrawn in favour of short-term project
funding, they are left with fewer resources and less ability to under-
take long-term planning due to the uncertainty of funding. Second, as
governments cut or withdrew from the provision of many services,
client demand for services provided by voluntary organizations has
increased. Third, because the entire sector is facing the same funding
dilemma, competition for funds has increased, making it more diffi-
cult to diversify sources of funding. From the sector's perspective, the
issues that must be addressed are not simply or even primarily about
levels of funding, but the need for stable, multi-year funding commit-
ments in order to facilitate planning; for recognition of the costs of
administration and evaluation that are associated with projects and
contracts; and for consistency of practices across departments.
SERVICE DELIVERY
By the mid-1990s, the Canadian sector was under extreme pressure to
provide more services with fewer resources. Most organizations have
responded as best they could by searching out new funding sources,
recruiting more volunteers, and cutting operational costs in ever more
innovative ways. For example, they moved to cheaper spaces, shared
administrative, back-office functions with other organizations, and
even merged. In some cases, however, programmes have had to be cut,
certain clients left unserved or, in extreme cases, organizations
allowed to go under.21 At the same time, voluntary organizations have
come under pressure by government and other funders - themselves
faced with difficult choices and scarce funds - to undertake outcome-
based performance evaluation of their work. Although many
organizations see evaluation as inherently useful, they often lack the
resources, time and expertise to conduct effectively such evaluations.
The point is that issues of service delivery are intimately linked to
capacity-building and to dialogue with governments.
Despite mounting problems in the sector-state relationship, the
Liberal government had neither a clear diagnosis nor specific reme-
dies. It did see, however, that an increasingly strained relationship
The Process of Change
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with the voluntary sector would make smaller government and new
forms of horizontal governance difficult to sustain in the long run. Not
only was government relying on the sector more than ever to deliver
services that had been offloaded, but it needed the sector's ideas and
expertise as a substitute for the internal policy capacity that had been
cut so dramatically in the early 1990s. Like so many governments of
both the right and left, the Chretien Liberals felt the need to express a
fuzzy, warm feeling about the inherent value of the voluntary sector
and to make promises that the sector would be an equal partner. The
first positive step was taken in the 1996 (and repeated in the 1997) bud-
get: the tax provisions for charitable donations were improved as a
result of very effective lobbying by the sector. The important bench-
mark for the sector, however, was the 1997 election. In its election
platform, published as the policy book popularly known as Red Book 2,
the federal Liberals committed to building a stronger voluntary sector
and, in particular, to enhancing its capacity. The significance of this
event lay in the commitment itself, not in the content. Indeed, the Red
Book promises were vague and the Liberals probably had few, if any,
concrete ideas about how to fulfil them. In a sense, this was fortunate
for the voluntary sector as it created an opportunity for it to sketch in
some specifics, which it did not hesitate to do.
The structure, resources, and leadership of the voluntary sector
are as important in shaping the nature of the relationship with the
state as are the institutions of government. In the Canadian context,
the structure of the sector reflects the federal system: local organiza-
tions are generally organized into regional or provincial bodies, and
those provincial units into national umbrella organizations. Although
this generally facilitates the exercise of a voice simultaneously at the
provincial and national levels, organization is by subsector (eg., child-
care, homecare, parks and wilderness groups, and so on). What has
been missing in Canada is a strong cross-sectoral organization at the
national level, equivalent to the Independent Sector in the United
States or to the National Council of Voluntary Organizations in
England, to speak for the sector more or less as a whole. Recognizing
this gap and the need for national leadership in the face of the extreme
pressures created by government restructuring, a group of key sector
leaders came together in 1995 to form a loose association, without legal
organizational form, called the Voluntary Sector Roundtable. With
funding from the J.W. McConnell Family Foundation, the Voluntary
Sector Roundtable identified four priorities for its work over the next
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few years, one of which was enhancing accountability. Although polls
indicated that the Canadian public still had a high level of trust in the
voluntary sector, the Voluntary Sector Roundtable understood clearly
that without enduring public trust, the financial foundation, volunteer
support, and programme credibility of the sector would be in serious
peril. Concerns about maintaining public confidence were heightened
in the mid-1990s. Not only was the climate permeated with calls for
more regulation, but the backlash from American scandals had been
imported and a major, homegrown scandal over the conduct of the
Canadian Red Cross in handling the country's blood system had
emerged. If the sector had not coalesced in this critical period and
undertaken a major initiative in changing the nature of the sector-state
relationship, it is very probable that the federal government's electoral
promises would have remained empty ones for lack of ideas or it
would have caved in to the calls for much greater regulation.
As the Voluntary Sector Roundtable knew, it would have
appeared extraordinarily self-serving for it to undertake the task of
investigating accountability in the sector, particularly if it concluded,
'no problem.' The Voluntary Sector Roundtable therefore chose to
appoint an arms-length panel of experts to research the issues, consult
with Canadians, and report back with specific recommendations to
improve accountability and governance in the sector. The panel,
loosely modelled after the Deakin Commission on the Future of the
Voluntary Sector in England, would give legitimacy through distance,
while nonetheless allowing the sector to maintain ownership of the
process.22 Possibly for the first time, the Canadian voluntary sector, as
a sector, was doing something very public for its own good. Shortly
after, the federal government initiated its own process, first internally,
then collaboratively, with the sector to determine how to meet its elec-
toral commitments. In content, both drew extensively on the
recommendations made by the Panel on Accountability and
Governance of the Voluntary Sector Roundtable.
The Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector
The Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector,
launched by the Voluntary Sector Roundtable in October 1997, was
given a mandate to produce a discussion paper for consultation in
eight months and a final report at the beginning of 1999.23 The
Voluntary Sector Roundtable carefully chose the six panel members to
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bring not only knowledge of the sector, but expertise in business and
government as well, and, in the Canadian style, to include members
from different parts of the country and, coincidentally, with quite dif-
ferent political views or affiliations.24 The choice of Ed Broadbent to
chair the Panel gave it instant visibility and its nickname. All members
of the Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary
Sector, including the chair, served as volunteers; none were token par-
ticipants; all chose to be actively involved in crafting the discussion
paper and in leading public consultations.
Unquestionably, many observers, including some members of the
Voluntary Sector Roundtable, believed at first that the panel would
stick primarily to the narrower aspects of accountability - board gov-
ernance, ethical fundraising, and management - that are internal to the
sector. But the Panel on Accountability and Governance in the
Voluntary Sector chose to interpret its mandate broadly, to encompass
relations with government and the corporate sector and saw its work
as an opportunity to reshape the neo-liberal/populist discourse that
had portrayed the sector as little more than a collection of special inter-
est groups. In addition, the panel stapled the idea of capacity building
to that of enhancing governance and accountability: the idea that gov-
ernments have some responsibility toward the sector if it is to fulfil its
potential as the "third pillar of society," to use the language of Red Book
2. Thus the mandate, as interpreted by the panel, was to reshape rela-
tionships in fundamental ways, not simply to tinker with
intra-organizational mechanisms of accountability. Sometimes in the
public policy process, 'ripeness' is all. Luckily for the Panel, its time
was ripe. Not only did the sector galvanize around the work of the
Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector, but
the federal government had to figure out how to meet its Red Book pol-
icy commitments and was thus open to new ideas.
The work of the Panel on Accountability and Governance in the
Voluntary Sector was organized as three tasks: research, consultation,
and reporting. The first stage of its work involved research into exist-
ing practices and models of accountability. These included not only
best practices within the sector, but also an examination of the regula-
tory and relationship models of many other countries, particularly
England, where the Charity Commission represented a more cus-
tomer-service model of regulation and where the Deakin Commission
had laid out many of the issues, and the United States, where sector
self-regulation and state supervision are much more extensive. The
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recommendations of the panel reflect the cross-Atlantic influence and
the explicit rejection of the American model as inappropriate to the
Canadian context.
The result of this research was an interim discussion paper,
released in May 1998, that formed the basis for an engagement pro-
cess involving roundtable meetings in fifteen centres across the
country, an online questionnaire, and the opportunity to submit
briefs, of which more than 100 were received. The intention was not
only to gather information from voluntary organizations across the
country, but to leave a 'footprint' of heightened local interest and
mobilization around issues of accountability.25 All of this information
was synthesized into a final report, entitled Building on Strength:
Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada's Voluntary Sector,
released in early February 1999.
The Joint Table Process
In mid-1998, the federal government began its own internal process for
determining how it would fulfill its electoral commitments. The mul-
tidepartmental committee of senior officials that was formed made
rather slow progress, as do so many of these committees. Its work was
advanced by the creation of a secretariat, the Voluntary Sector Task
Force, which has full-time staff and is housed in the Privy Council
Office, giving it considerable stature. Since the task force was formu-
lating its own recommendations to Cabinet at the very time that the
Broadbent Panel report was released, it was considerably influenced
by the panel's recommendations. To its credit, the federal government
recognized that the issues were complex, that the way ahead was a
major social experiment inasmuch as no model could simply be
imported from another country, and that process mattered. Instead of
moving forward unilaterally, the federal government established a
joint process with equal participation by the voluntary sector.
This process took the form of three 'Joint Tables,' created in
March 1999 (still served by the Voluntary Sector Task Force) that
focused on: building a new relationship, strengthening capacity, and
improving the regulatory framework. This was a unique experiment.
The tables functioned in a truly collaborative manner in that each was
co-chaired by a representative from the sector and by a senior public
servant, and the membership (of about twelve per table) was chosen in
equal proportion by each partner. In this, the Voluntary Sector
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Roundtable chose wisely and convinced good people representing
national, regional, and local perspectives and experience to partici-
pate. The Joint Table process marks the beginning of a new
relationship whose success largely depends on two critical factors. The
first is the trust that developed through joint ownership of the process
and open, candid discussions. The second is that the politicians were
involved early on when about twenty ministers met with members of
the Joint Tables soon after the tables were formed and again later to
discuss preliminary recommendations. For all three tables, the process
was a learning experience both for the voluntary sector members and
public servants - not simply in terms of the issues, but also in terms of
the culture of the other sector.26
The Joint Tables worked within a very short time frame, a mere six
months from beginning to end. The short time period was due both to
a desire to move recommendations forward to Cabinet for the fall of
1999 so that any budget implications could be included for the next fis-
cal year, and to a realization that the tables could work on the issues
for years and still leave many things unresolved, given the complexity
of the task. In mid-September 1999, a single report was released that
synthesized the recommendations of the three tables. The fact that this
report was publicly released is itself a significant change in govern-
ment procedure: normally such a report would have been viewed as
advice to Cabinet and kept secret, at least until ministers had had a
chance to consider it.
A Shared Blueprint for Action
The diagnosis of the difficulties in the existing voluntary sector-state
relationship and the recommendations for its renewal made by
Broadbent's external panel of experts and by the sector and govern-
ment representatives at the Joint Tables are nearly identical. This
suggests that the nature of the problems are obvious and that there is
considerable consensus on the solutions.
As a starting point, both reviews stressed the importance of capac-
ity building in the voluntary sector if it is to realize its potential and
both identify similar responsibilities for the federal government in
helping to build this capacity. These measures include enhancing skills
development, possibly through secondments to voluntary organiza-
tions; assisting with information management and technology (IM-IT);
and clarifying government funding policies. Concerning the last issue,
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the triumph for the sector members of the Joint Capacity Table was
that they convinced the government officials that the table had to
address financial issues, despite the preliminary reluctance of the offi-
cials to do so. It took some reiteration to make it clear that the sector
was not saying simply, "give us more money," but were concerned
with the way money flows (e.g., project/contract vs. operational; short
term vs. long term), considering it critical. In addition, as part of its
options for creating an 'enabling environment/ the Joint Tables recom-
mended creating a task force to study funding, a new initiative on
volunteerism, and increasing knowledge about the sector both by
stimulating research and creating a satellite account related to the eco-
nomic value of the sector as a subset of the Statistics Canada system of
national data gathering.
A second task related directly to building a new voluntary sec-
tor-state relationship. On this matter, both the Broadbent Panel and
the Joint Tables argued that a relationship needs to evolve and sug-
gested a number of institutional and procedural mechanisms to
encourage it to evolve in a strategic manner. Perhaps the most visible
and symbolic of these was the development of an 'accord/ modelled
after the British compacts, between government and the sector. In
addition, both supported the ideas of creating a ministry responsible
for the sector or some other permanent political voice at the Cabinet
table and establishing an ongoing administrative secretariat.
Third, the need for institutional change emerged as a shared pri-
ority. The Broadbent Panel was in favour of developing a new
institution to oversee and support the sector from two perspectives.
First, the Panel argued that one of the best ways to enhance account-
ability in the sector is through a process of self-accreditation closely
coupled with public transparency. Organizations should report annu-
ally on a number of key aspects of their work and this information
should be easily accessible by the public, thus providing the reporting
organizations with an incentive to provide accurate information (of
course, there remained the need for some direct government regula-
tion as well). The second argument stemmed from a recognition that
most of the organizations in the sector are very small, run entirely by
volunteers. As a result, many of the problems of non-compliance
encountered by the CCRA are a result of lack of knowledge or capac-
ity, not intent. The CCRA, as the main institution of the state for
interaction with the broad diversity of the sector, is neither transpar-
ent nor capable of supporting organizations to build better practices
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related to governance and accountability. The panel proposed a new
Voluntary Sector Commission, a variant of the Charity Commission of
England and Wales, to supplement the more narrowly regulatory
functions of the CCRA. The Joint Regulatory Table concurred with the
importance of institutional change and proposed three alternative
models for an oversight agency - an enhanced Charities Directorate of
the CCRA; an advisory body; and a quasi-judicial commission - that
should be developed further through broader consultation.27
Fourth, the need to expand access to the tax system by a broader
range of public benefit organizations was emphasized as an essential
aspect of capacity building and of creating an enabling environment.
Since governments increasingly expect communities to assume greater
responsibility for their own well-being, it is essential to equip these
communities with the appropriate policy tools to attract supporters
and donors. A tax incentive is one way of doing so. Both reviews pro-
posed a mechanism for gaining greater access to the tax system
through the development of a list of public benefit organizations that
are 'deemed' to be charities for purposes of the tax system, much the
same way as national arts service organizations and amateur athletic
associations are currently granted the same status as common law
charities under the Income Tax Act, 1985.28 Opposition to this idea came
from both the Department of Finance which feared that it would be
costly in lost taxes arid from Cabinet which saw it as stirring up con-
troversy without much immediate political gain.29
The government's ability to determine which organizations get
access to the tax system is one way in which it limits the advocacy and
political activity of voluntary organizations. The second way it does so
is by placing direct limits on such activities by registered organiza-
tions. Both reports affirmed the legitimacy of public policy advocacy
by voluntary organizations, including those registered as charities,
although the Joint Tables went further than the Broadbent Panel in
their recommendations related to creating space for such activity.
Indeed, the Regulatory Table considered this to be one of the most
pressing issues of all.30 The underlying problem is that governments
have always seen advocacy as illegitimate because its connection to
the charitable mission is not appreciated; in reality, advocacy occurs in
the context of educating and informing on matters related to the cen-
tral mission and can thus be considered a public benefit. In addition,
there is a double standard in how the federal government treats advo-
cacy by the charitable and the private sector. While advocacy by
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registered charities is severely limited by the '10 percent' rule, busi-
nesses are allowed to write off the cost of lobbying against their
income, thereby potentially reducing the amount paid in taxes.
Although neither the panel nor the members of the Joint Tables sug-
gested permitting unlimited or partisan advocacy activity by
registered organizations, both argued in favour of more permissive
regulations.
Finally, significant regulatory reform was understood to be essen-
tial by both reviews in providing an appropriate, facilitating
environment that would enable the voluntary sector to do what it does
best and provide a foundation for a more constructive relationship.
This includes limiting the enormous burden of personal liability borne
by directors of voluntary organizations that is, according to at least
anecdotal reports, starting to discourage professionals and other vol-
unteers from sitting on boards of directors.31 Although this falls
partly within provincial jurisdiction, the federal government could
play an important role as convenor or leader of a review of directors'
liability. Other proposed regulatory reforms focused on: simplifying
reporting requirements, especially for small organizations; introduc-
ing intermediate sanctions short of deregistration for non-compliance
with CCRA regulations; and providing better guidelines for related
business activities.
The Voluntary Sector Initiative
The federal government's initial response to the work of the Joint
Tables was made in early June 2000. It announced the Voluntary Sector
Initiative to institutionalize an ongoing joint process and provide $94.6
million in funding for a package of reforms. In terms of process, the
Voluntary Sector Initiative is enormously complex, with the bulk of
the work of elaboration of details and implementation directed by six
Joint Tables modelled directly after the 1999 experiment, assisted by a
Joint Co-ordinating Committee that manages cross-cutting matters
related to consultation and communications strategies.32 A reference
group of eight senior ministers has been formalized to provide politi-
cal leadership, with a core group of assistant deputy ministers
working as an executive committee constituted to provide strategic
direction within the public service (a counterpart steering committee
of Voluntary Sector Roundtable members provides direction on the
voluntary sector side). Within government, the Voluntary Sector Task
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Force in the Privy Council Office continues to provide staff support,
and a similar secretariat has been funded by the Voluntary Sector
Initiative to provide support for voluntary sector participation. The
Tables were thus designed to lead the biggest engagement process that
has ever been undertaken with a broad diversity of the sector, from the
national to grassroots level.
In terms of content, the government has taken an important step
toward establishing a more constructive and balanced relationship
with the sector, generally following the advice of the Joint Tables.
These reforms include:
• development of an accord between the federal government and
the voluntary sector;
• support of almost $10 million for celebration of the
International Year of Volunteers; and development of an ongo-
ing initiative to promote volunteerism;
• various capacity building measures, including skills develop-
ment, research, and increased knowledge of the sector; a
Satellite Account within the System of National Accounts on
the economic value of voluntary activity; routinization on a
three-year cycle of the National Survey of Giving, Volunteering,
and Participation; and policy internships and academic fellow-
ships;
• assistance with IM-IT to promote both connectivity to the
Internet and better online tools; and
• some regulatory reform and increased transparency including
greater public access to the information on charities filed annu-
ally with the CCRA; a simplified tax form for registered
charities with annual incomes under $100,000; and the intro-
duction of clearer guidelines on the conduct of related business
activities.
In addition, further study is being undertaken regarding the design of
a new oversight institution, funding policies, directors' liability, inter-
mediate sanctions, and a less expensive appeals process for those
organizations refused registration by the CCRA.
This initiative is clearly a major step by the federal government
toward building a more positive relationship with Canada's voluntary
sector. Its significance should in no way be diminished. To date, how-
ever, the initiative does not address the top priorities of either the
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Broadbent Panel or the Joint Tables. There is no commitment to insti-
tutional change; no mention of expanding access to the tax system; no
significant regulatory reform regarding public policy advocacy; nor
joint discussion of funding regimes. There is much to be said for care-
ful analysis before launching a major policy or institutional change.
But in this case, a necessary element of social experimentation will be
involved: no amount of study will work out beforehand all the kinks
in the implementation of a new regulatory commission or of new
approaches to advocacy - inevitably, a certain degree of ongoing tin-
kering will be required.
The innovative process of genuine collaboration that characterizes
the Joint Tables has already increased trust between federal public
servants and sector leaders. But it also raises expectations that real
change is possible and that the government is interested in pursuing
such change. The federal government has too much at stake to allow
reform on the top priorities to be stalled indefinitely or, worse, aban-
doned on the so far unconvincing premise that it would be too
expensive.
Conclusion:
Canadian Distinctiveness, Distinctive Contradictions
The reasons why and the way in which the relationship between the
federal government and the voluntary sector is being reshaped shares
much with other developed countries. Many of the same issues are on
the agendas of other countries, and some of the same instruments,
such as accords, are being tried out in a variety of jurisdictions. In
many respects, however, the reform process of the Voluntary Sector
Initiative is distinctively Canadian and, as a result, has generated a
number of contradictions that will need to be resolved before a more
constructive relationship can truly come into being. Not surprisingly,
these distinctive patterns and their attendant contradictions reflect
age-old tensions in the Canadian political system - the role of the state,
the complexities of federalism, and the nature of democracy.
One intriguing characteristic of the contemporary interest in
building a stronger, more engaged civil society is that the reform pro-
cess looks largely to the state to achieve this. In Canada, in contrast to
the US for example, social movements and the voluntary sector have
long looked to the state not only to provide legitimacy as part of a cit-
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izenship regime, but also to offer financial and other types of sup-
port.33 This state-centred approach is partly a matter of philosophy -
that the state remains a relevant and central institution despite less
public trust and confidence - but it is also practical. In the absence of
a strong philanthropic community or corporate support for the volun-
tary sector, the resources for capacity building are not going to emerge
spontaneously from other sources. The underlying contradiction is
that, although the federal government has accepted a responsibility for
capacity building, it is caught between a neo-liberal and an enabling
model of the state. This is evidenced by its unwillingness to review
funding regimes in a joint manner as part of the Voluntary Sector
Initiative. To some degree, this unwillingness reflects a reluctance to
get locked into operational funding for certain categories of groups -
that is, to begin another version of the abandoned Secretary of State
programmes, thus tying up resources and privileging the recognition
of some groups over others. The dilemma, however, is that the current
funding regime,'with its inherent uncertainty caused by short-term
project funding, limits the ability of voluntary organizations to under-
take strategic planning - one of the major barriers to strengthening
capacity in the sector. To be clear, voluntary sector leaders are not sim-
ply asking for more money but for more effective, stable funding
regimes. If governments are truly interested in enhancing the capacity
of the sector to fulfil its potential, funding regimes will eventually
need to be addressed.
A second, characteristically Canadian feature is that the weight of
state-voluntary sector relationship-building has been borne primarily
by the national state, even though the regulation of the voluntary sec-
tor is constitutionally provincial jurisdiction. A particularly Canadian
twist to this relationship-building is its link to promoting national
unity, from the federal perspective. By building stronger, more direct
relationships with citizens, the federal government hopes to increase
its visibility and credibility, both of which have been diminished as
direct transfers to individuals have given way to indirect transfers
through provinces and tax credits. One intended benefit of a stronger
relationship with more active citizens and voluntary organizations is
that it may provide a welcome foil to provincial interests in times of
difficult federal-provincial relations. The federal initiative derives its
legitimacy not only from the fact that the federal government does
have a direct relationship with voluntary organizations and citizens,
but from the fact that it became the de facto regulator through a chari-
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table registration system tied to the national tax system. The contra-
diction is that, for fear of stepping on provincial jurisdiction, the
federal government will be neither eager to wear its acquired role of
regulator in an obvious manner, nor to get on with the vital need to
reform regulatory institutions, either on its own or in collaboration
with the provinces.
The final, distinctively Canadian aspect is that the reconstruction
of a new and stronger relationship between the federal government
and the voluntary sector is caught between two different models of
democracy. These can be characterized as traditional representative
democracy that focuses on elected officials as the primary vehicle for
representing and responding to the views of constituents, and partici-
patory democracy that puts a premium on engagement and
participation of citizens between elections, whether representing
themselves directly or participating through their civic organiza-
tions.34 Caught between these two approaches to democracy, the
Voluntary Sector Initiative faces a contradiction. Though an explicit
goal is to encourage active citizenship, the federal government has so
far been unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of or permit greater
public policy advocacy by citizen groups if they receive a public ben-
efit through the tax system as registered charities. It has also curtailed
any discussion of expansion of access to official registration for com-
munity organizations that may be more likely to engage in advocacy.
This concern over advocacy by registered charities is a Canadian quirk
and is simply not an issue in other countries that are engaged in simi-
lar processes of renewing sector-state relationships.35 It is both a
fiction and a danger to cleave to traditional models of representative
democracy in a era in which more collaborative governance and a
stronger, civil society-based model of the voluntary sector are needed
and encouraged.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Voluntary Sector
Initiative may well mark the beginning of a new era between the fed-
eral government and the voluntary sector. The federal government's
reluctance to move forward on the top priorities identified by both the
Broadbent Panel and the Joint Tables, however, suggests that it still
has difficulty working out some peculiarly Canadian contradictions. It
appears to be stuck on the old image of the sector as primarily a ser-
vice provider, rather than as a community builder. Perhaps, in the
ongoing Joint Tables, movement toward addressing the key aspects of
a renewed relationship will be forthcoming. Until this happens, a gen-
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uine partnership, able to accommodate both more collaborative forms
of governance and more active civil society will not be complete.
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L A CHOSE EST SUFFISAMMENT RARE POUR ETRE SOULIGNEE : UNFrangais qui a une opinion favorable du multiculturalisme, et pas
n'importe quel Frangais, le premier ministre Lionel Jospin, lors d'une
visite officielle a Ottawa, en decembre 1998 - pensant peut-etre flatter
ses notes - vanta les merites du multiculturalisme canadien. Ce
faisant, il creait un malentendu pour les futurs interlocuteurs qu'il
devait rencontrer quelques jours plus tard au siege du Gouvernement
du Quebec1. Lionel Jospin n'avait pas saisi qu'au Canada, il y a multi-
culturalisme et multiculturalisme, et que la conception federale n'etait
pas compatible avec la conception quebecoise d'une singularite ethno-
politico-culturelle qui ne devait, a aucun prix, etre noyee dans un vaste
ensemble pluriel. Jospin ne connaissait pas 1'histoire du multicultura-
lisme canadien; il ne savait pas que, du point de vue quebecois, la
conception moderne du « multiculturalisme » tuait son ancetre, le
« biculturalisme anglo-quebecois ».
La notion de multiculturalisme n'est pas, malgre les apparences,
une categoric universelle. Les variantes du multiculturalisme franc.ais,
americain, canadien, ne peuvent etre comprises que si elles sont remises
en leur contexte. Penser le multiculturalisme en contexte, c'est d'abord
penser aux « formes primitives » du multiculturalisme, c'est-a-dire a ce
qui exprimait une pluralite de cultures ou une difference culturelle,
avant meme que le mot soit invente et popularise par les medias.
Concretement, aux Etats-Unis, cela veut dire penser la tolerance
religieuse et le pluralisme culturel; au Canada, cela signifie penser le
biculturalisme et le federalisme; en France, la chose est nettement plus
delicate, car il y a la une difficulte intrinseque de notre histoire poli-
tique. On a du mal a raisonner en termes multiculturels, parce que le
« multiculturalisme » releve de 1'impensable politique.
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Je m'explique : notre tradition centraliste, anti-pluraliste, est liee
au triomphe de 1'absolutisme monarchique, c'est-a-dire a la destruc-
tion des regions autonomes, du pouvoir des villes, des communes et
des parlements provinciaux. La Revolution, dans sa phase jacobine,
exagerait encore plus ces tendances en abolissant les privileges et en
effac,ant de la carte de la France les vieilles provinces. La Revolution
otait toute legitimite a la notion de pluralisme en ideologisant son
contenu : desormais « le pluralisme n'etait pensable que sous les cate-
gories infamantes du privilege et de 1'interet2 ». La decentralisation, le
partage de la souverainete, le federalisme etaient done des notions
contraires a 1'esprit jacobin, au point meme de constituer un « crime »
inedit, le « crime de federalisme ». Voila ce que disait Robespierre, a
propos de ses adversaires girondins :
[...] Nos accusateurs voulaient nous donner un gouvernement
etranger a nos moeurs, etranger a nos principes d'egalite; nous avons
soup^onne qu'on voulait faire de la Republique franqaise un amas de
Republiques federatives qui seraient sans cesse la proie des guerres
civiles3.
Une impossibilite franchise : penser le multiculturalisme
Revenons a 1'epoque moderne, au voyage de notre premier ministre
au Canada. Qu'on ne s'y trompe pas, 1'objet d'admiration, pour Jospin,
etait le « multiculturalisme des autres »; il n'etait pas question pour lui
de defendre un type universel d'identite multiculturelle dont la France
serait le modele. Et comment l'aurait-il pu? Car la France etait, jusqu'a
une periode recente, le pays refractaire par excellence aux idees multi-
culturelles. La conception franchise de 1'identite nationale reste
eminemment rousseauiste, centraliste, unitaire, jacobine. Notre
Constitution et nos juges constitutionnels nous interdisent de penser la
pluralite des peuples constitutifs de la nation frangaise. Nos socio-
logues, et je parle des meilleurs, ne pouvaient, jusqu'a une date
recente, concevoir une France qui soit autre chose qu'une commu-
naute abstraite de citoyens, tous egaux devant la loi, tous capables de
transcender leurs « appartenances particulieres », tous « arraches » a
leurs identites d'origine par un acte de pure volonte politique4.
Dominique Schnapper, dans La communaute des citoyens, ecrivait ainsi,
en 1994 : « C'est I'effort d'arrachement aux identites et aux apparte-
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nances vecues comme naturelles par 1'abstraction de la citoyennete qui
caracterise en propre le projet national. II existe une seule idee de la
nation5. »
La nation, dans cette perspective, serait done politiquement et cul-
turellement neutre. On est loin des conceptions tayloriennes de la
nation, fondees sur le refus de la neutralite culturelle de 1'Etat, sur
I'authentification d'une pluralite de cultures, et surtout sur la reconnais-
sance que ces cultures doivent s'epanouir pleinement, car elles
exprimeraient, chacune a leur fac.on, des valeurs ou des merites egaux.
L'ideal franc,ais de 1'integration republicaine, quelles qu'en soient les
variantes, s'oppose a 1'ideal taylorien d'une « politique de la dif-
ference » fondee sur la denonciation de « toutes les discriminations »
et le refus de « toute citoyennete de seconde classe6 ».
En France, derriere le discours savant des sociologues, se profile un
autre discours plus simpliste et reductionniste: le «jacobinisme reflexe »
de nos intellectuels et de nos hommes politiques qui restent persuades
que la France est vraiment une Republique une et indivisible et qui ne peu-
vent concevoir le multiculturalisme comme autre chose qu'un complot
visant a 1'eclatement de la societe franchise, une survivance sournoise
du « crime federaliste », jadis denonce par les Jacobins.
Les exemples abondent. Us expriment parfois des considerations
philosophiques et plus souvent des peurs, des craintes, des anxietes
liees a un autre phenomene qui n'a rien a voir avec notre passe jacobin,
a savoir la decouverte que la France est, comme les Etats-Unis ou le
Canada, un pays d'immigres. II faut ici rappeler que la France a tou-
jours ete un pays d'immigres, puisqu'environ un Franc,ais sur cinq a au
moins un grand-parent qui n'est pas ne en France. Mais peu de
Francois le savent : c'est dire la force des courants assimilationnistes
dans notre imaginaire national.
Ainsi, 1'essayiste et journaliste Christian Jelen, le fils d'un modeste
artisan polonais immigre a Paris, qui devait son ascension sociale a son
seul merite et aux vertus du systeme d'enseignement public franc.ais,
s'inquietait en 1997 des dangers d'un multiculturalisme importe des
Etats-Unis et mal adapte aux besoins de la France moderne. II
denon^ait, dans un pamphlet provocateur, la « regression multicul-
turelle », et la « lugubre perspective d'une societe fragmentee en
groupes ethniques » qui ne pourrait, a terme, que defaire « le lien
national », pour aboutir, peut-etre, a « la mort de la Republique7 ».
La denonciation du multiculturalisme n'est pas, en France, un
phenomene qui se limiterait a la droite de 1'echiquier politique. A
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droite, on craint le multiculturalisme, parce qu'on voit en lui un cheval
de Troie : une philosophie perverse qui donnerait trop de pouvoir aux
immigres, a commencer par les Nord-Africains, qui seraient, si Ton en
croit les partisans du Front National, « inassimilables ». La critique de
1'extreme droite n'est pas surprenante: elle correspond a la persistance
des vieux schemas de pensee racistes herites de Gobineau, de Barres,
et de Maurras. La critique de la gauche est plus etonnante; elle merite
une explication.
Les critiques de gauche proviennent de trois groupes differents :
de 1'intelligentsia ultra jacobine - represented par des politiques
comme Jean-Pierre Chevenement ou encore Regis Debray - des
enseignants de 1'ecole publique et enfin de certains groupes ou ecoles
sociologiques. Le premier courant est illustre dans un petit livre de
Debray intitule La Republique enseignee a ma fille. Dans cet opuscule,
Debray exprime une forte inquietude vis-a-vis de ce debat multicul-
turel qui nous vient d'Amerique, et il se demande si la transposition
du debat en France ne risque pas, « exactement comme en Amerique »,
de detruire notre vie publique en y introduisant de dangereuses « pas-
sions identitaires8 ».
Plus interessante, parce que plus originale, est la demarche des
partisans d'une ecole republicaine renovee. Pour ceux-ci, la nouvelle
mode de la pedagogie multiculturelle n'est qu'une regression
democratique qui s'inspire, pas toujours consciemment, des pires pon-
cifs de la pensee contre-revolutionnaire d'un Burke, d'un Bonald ou
d'un Maistre. Maistre, rappelons-le, etait radicalement refractaire a
1'esprit des lumieres, et 1'humanisme universel n'etait pour lui qu'une
absurdite philosophique :
II n'y a point d'homme dans le monde. J'ai vu, dans ma vie, des
Franqais, des Italiens, des Russes, etc.; je sais meme grace a
Montesquieu, qu'on peut etre persan; mais quant a l'homme, je
declare ne 1'avoir rencontre de ma vie; s'il existe, c'est bien a mon
insu9.
Or le role de 1'educateur est d'enseigner les « valeurs communes » de
la Republique. L'ecole n'est pas seulement un lieu de savoir et d'acqui-
sition des connaissances, c'est aussi un instrument de promotion
social10. La pedagogie multiculturelle est denoncee en des termes qui
rappellent les ecrits de Neil Bissoondath au Canada11. Ainsi Alain
Pierrot denonce cette curieuse methode d'apprentissage de la lecture
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utilisee dans certaines ecoles de 1'Est parisien, qui consistait a inviter
des percussionnistes africains dans les classes de lecture, pour motiver
les eleves, sous pretexte que ce qui etait « bon pour 1'identite » etait
necessairement utile a la maitrise de 1'alphabet12.
D'autres educateurs, comme le philosophe Pierre Statius, denon-
cerent le Centre d'Analyse et d'Intervention Sociologiques (CADIS) -
1'equipe sociologique fondee par Alain Touraine et dirigee par Michel
Wieviorka - en accusant ses membres de « reprendre et de transposer
en France le debat anglo-saxon sur le multiculturalisme », tout en pre-
tendant qu'il s'agirait la d'un « nouvel age de la modernite13 ». Or
qu'est-ce que la modernite selon Statius? C'est 1'idee de citoyennete
heritee de la philosophie des lumieres, - une citoyennete desincarnee
qui se fonde sur « la possibilite d'une communication rationnelle entre
les hommes » et qui pose « I'unite, au moins en droit, de 1'humanite,
par opposition a la barbarie qui, quelque forme qu'elle prenne, revient
toujours a penser 1'humanite comme essentiellement divisee (que ce
soit en classes, ou meme en cultures heterogenes)14 ». Les grands mots
sont laches : les partisans d'une sociologie multiculturelle ne seraient
que des barbares.
Enfin, Pierre Bourdieu et son disciple Loic Wacquant ont
developpe un discours critique original qui denonce les trois
sophismes du multiculturalisme:
1) Le « groupisme », c'est-a-dire la « reification de divisions
sociales privilegiees canonisees par la bureaucratic etatique »;
2) Le « populisme », qui remplace 1'analyse des structures de pou-
voir par la « celebration de la culture des domines », elevee au
rang de « proto-theorie en acte »;
3) Le « moralisme », qui conduit a ignorer les realites socio-
economiques et a disserter ad infinitum sur la « reconnaissance
des identites », alors que la « triste realite » se situe a un tout
autre niveau : seulement un jeune sur dix issu d'une famille
pauvre (un menage gagnant moins de 15000 dollars US)
accedera a 1'universite, centre 94 pour cent des jeunes issus de
families disposant d'un revenu egal ou superieur a 100000 dol-
lars US.
L'enjeu, en definitive, selon Bourdieu et Wacquant, n'est ni « eth-
nique », comme on le pretend, ni limite au « microcosme universitaire »
et a la question « de la reconnaissance des cultures marginalisees par
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les canons academiques ». II est d'une autre nature : il renvoie a
l'« exclusion continuee des Noirs », tout en masquant la banqueroute
du systeme americain d'enseignement public. La « triste realite » est
fondamentalement sociologique dans le sens le plus classique du
terme : celle de 1'accroissement des inegalites de classe. Dans cette
perspective, le multiculturalisme est tout sauf un concept universel. II
ne serait que la manifestation specifique du drame americain - celui de
la discrimination raciale, des inegalites de classes et des inegalites
d'acces au « capital culturel des classes superieures15 ».
Derriere le debat des educateurs et des sociologues se profile une
forte tradition jacobine admirablement pensee et theorisee par les
juges constitutionnels franqais. L'exemple du « statut de la Corse », tel
qu'il fut traite en 1991 par le Conseil Constitutionnel est revelateur. Le
point de depart est une loi qui pretend innover a peu de frais en affir-
mant, pour satisfaire les revendications des nationalistes corses, que le
« peuple corse » est une « composante du peuple frangais », et qu'il
merite un traitement territorial particulier de la part de 1'Etat central.
Cette redefinition des composantes du peuple franc.ais est inacceptable
pour les juges frangais, parce que contraire a la Constitution et a la
Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789. « Le peuple
de France », affirment-ils, est « une categoric unitaire insusceptible de
toute division16 ».
Les juges du Conseil Constitutionnel legitimaient 1'argument qui
leur avait ete presente par les deputes requerants, en ces termes d'un
jacobinisme irreprochable :
Admettre la consecration legislative du peuple corse c'est admettre a
plus ou moins breve echeance celle de 'peuple reunionnais', de
'peuple martiniquais', de 'peuple canaque', etc. Or, ceci est directe-
ment contraire a 1'article 2 de la Constitution qui interdit toute
distinction a raison de 1'origine ou de la race. Comment, en effet, dis-
tinguer le peuple corse des autres composantes du peuple franc.ais,
sinon par 1'origine ethnique? Si le gouvernement a d'autres criteres,
qu'il les donne17.
Le Conseil Constitutionnel n'a done pas pris le risque d'ouvrir la boite
de Pandore.
A defaut de s'affirmer comme un « peuple » autonome, les Corses
peuvent-ils pratiquer leur langue comme ils 1'entendent? Les juges du
Conseil Constitutionnel donnent ici une reponse positive puisqu'ils
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acceptent 1'article 53 de la loi qui prevoit « 1'insertion dans le temps
scolaire de 1'enseignement de la langue et de la culture corses ». Us pre-
cisent bien que « cet enseignement n'est pas contraire au principe
d'egalite des lors qu'il ne revet pas un caractere obligatoire18 ». La
langue corse a done statut de langue a option, comme le latin, 1'anglais,
ou 1'espagnol.
Mais cet encouragement au pluralisme culturel est tenu. II n'est en
effet pas question que les Corses (ou les Basques et les Bretons)
utilisent leur langue dans leurs rapports avec les fonctionnaires de
1'Etat central et les juges des tribunaux locaux. La langue de la
Republique reste bien le franc,ais (art. 2 de la Constitution), et la signa-
ture proposee par le premier ministre, de la Charte europeenne des
langues regionales ou minoritaires n'est pas, selon les juges, conforme a la
Constitution franchise. Celle-ci, precisent-ils dans une decision de
1999, defend le « principe d'unicite du peuple franqais »; elle interdit,
par consequent, que « soient reconnus des droits collectifs a quelque
groupe que ce soit, defini par une communaute d'origine, de culture,
de langue ou de croyance ». La Charte europeenne des langues
regionales, concluent les juges, est contraire a la Constitution
puisqu'elle « confere des droits specifiques a des 'groupes' de locu-
teurs de langues regionales ou minoritaires, a 1'interieur de 'territoires'
dans lesquels ces langues sont pratiquees ». La Charte « porte [done]
atteinte aux principes constitutionnels d'indivisibilite de la
Republique, d'egalite devant la loi et d'unicite du peuple frangais19 ».
Le biculturalisme canadien
Existe-t-il un multiculturalisme canadien avant la creation d'une poli-
tique multiculturelle federate? La reponse est oui, a 1'evidence. Mais il
s'agit d'une forme particuliere de multiculturalisme propre au Canada
et qui a pour nom « biculturalisme ». II n'est pas necessaire de relire les
ecrits de Henri Bourassa pour saisir la nature d'un Canada « binaire »,
compose de deux nations fondatrices. II suffit de se reporter au rapport
preliminaire a la mise en place de la Commission royale sur le bilinguisme
et le biculturalisme pour comprendre 1'importance et la persistance
d'une telle conception : la Commission devait preciser les etapes qui
permettraient de « developper la Confederation canadienne sur la base
d'un partenariat egal entre les deux races fondatrices ». Un tel projet
etait difficilement acceptable pour une nouvelle generation d'immi-
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gres qui se sentait exclue du pacte fondateur et qui concevait le
Canada comme une nation d'immigres, a I'image des Etats-Unis. C'est
pourquoi, sans doute, les critiques les plus vives centre les recom-
mandations formulees par la « B and B Commission » furent exprimees
par les representants de groupes ethniques peu nombreux, mais bien
structures et politiquement actifs. Je pense en particulier aux viru-
lentes critiques emises par deux Ukrainiens, le senateur Paul Yuzyk et
Jaroslav Bohdan Rudnyckyj - membre de la Commission royale et
directeur du Departement d'etudes slaves de 1'Universite du
Manitoba20. C'est dans ce contexte critique que se developpe la
philosophie multiculturelle des federalistes. Manifestement, le multi-
culturalisme defendu par Pierre Trudeau au debut des annees 1970
menac.ait le point de vue des nationalistes quebecois; il faisait du
Quebec une province comme les autres. Le bilinguisme officiel n'etait
qu'un moyen habile de deplacer les enjeux et les allegeances pour faire
oublier aux Quebecois 1'importance d'une tradition authentiquement
biculturelle. Le multiculturalisme federal s'inscrivait done dans un
projet plus large de destruction creatrice et de recomposition de la
nation canadienne21.
Mais la realite canadienne est plus complexe qu'il apparait au pre-
mier abord, et il n'est plus possible d'affirmer aujourd'hui, quoiqu'en
pense Louise Beaudoin, que les nationalistes quebecois sont refrac-
taires aux idees multiculturelles22. II y a bien, au Quebec, un « nouveau
nationalisme » qui donne toute sa place a la pluralite des apparte-
nances et des cultures des nouveaux immigres et qui recuse par la
meme les tendances autoritaires et ethnocentriques du « vieux nationa-
lisme23 ». Lionel Jospin n'avait done pas tout a fait tort de vanter les
merites du multiculturalisme, mais que savait-il a 1'epoque du nou-
veau nationalisme quebecois ?
Le pluralisme culturel des Etats-Unis
Le federalisme americain et I'habitude americaine de s'imaginer
comme une « nation de plusieurs peuples » facilitent h 1'evidence 1'ac-
ceptation d'une pensee multiculturelle. Penser le multiculturalisme
americain, c'est d'abord se referer a ses « formes primitives », avant
rneme 1'usage du mot. Elles sont nombreuses, a commencer par la tra-
dition anglo-hollandaise de la tolerance religieuse, sur laquelle John
Rawls a ecrit quelques bonnes pages dans Liberalisme politique ainsi que
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dans son fameux article consacre a la notion de « overlapping consen-
sus ». Mais la definition la plus interessante d'un « multiculturalisme
d'avant la lettre » est sans doute celle du « pluralisme culturel », ima-
ginee en 1924 par Horace Kallen, un disciple de William James, et un
ami et contemporain de John Dewey24.
Le « pluralisme culturel » conc,u par Kallen est eminemment pole-
mique. L'auteur de la formule s'inscrit en faux centre une autre
tradition americaine : celle du « melting-pot », inventee, ou plutot
popularisee (car il s'agit d'une vieille metaphore industrielle), par un
ecrivain anglais - Israel Zangwill - qui re"digea, pour un public exclu-
sivement americain, une piece de theatre intitulee The Melting-Pot.
L'immense succes de cette piece symbolisait le triomphe des idees
assimilationnistes. Et pourtant la piece rut tres vite 1'objet de critiques
acerbes de la part de critiques litteraires qui 1'estimaient trop « facile »,
et d'essayistes qui s'inquietaient des effets nocifs d'une assimilation
trop rapide sur les nouveaux immigrants. Kallen offre la plus interes-
sante des critiques d'une americanisation trop rapide. Son argument
est etonnamment moderne car il repose sur la denonciation de ce qui
est deja une forme de globalisation mondiale : la culture de masse, le
rouleau compresseur de la societe de consommation, tels qu'ils pre-
naient naissance sous ses yeux entre 1915 et 1924. Le grand danger
pour Kallen etait 1'uniformite culturelle, c'est-a-dire une culture
« americanisee », fondee sur le plus petit commun denominateur des
connaissances humaines; une culture dominee par 1'emergence d'une
nouvelle presse « grand public » cherchant le scandale et la facilite
pour mieux vendre ses titres. II y avait done un immense danger : 1'u-
tilisation par la presse des idees racistes a la mode - a commencer par
celles d'un Ku Klux Klan en pleine resurgence.
Kallen est le premier temoin critique d'une massification de la cul-
ture americaine. II exprime une vraie nostalgie pour ces nombreux
journaux d'immigres allemands, polonais, juifs et cetera, qui preser-
vaient avec talent des pans entiers de la culture europeenne. Et il
deplore, au moment de 1'engagement americain dans la Premiere
Guerre mondiale, le fait que les etrangers, et surtout les immigres alle-
mands, doivent oublier leur langue pour eviter 1'accusation
d'anti-patriotisme. C'est 1'epoque des grandes campagnes d'american-
isation, de la recherche de cet etre artificiel, eminemment controlable :
l'« Americain a cent pour cent ». Tout cela, Kallen le deplore. Pour
expliquer sa conception de la nation americaine, il a recours a des
metaphores musicales : la polyphonie, par opposition au plain chant, ou
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encore Yorchestration d'une symphonie ou chaque instrument preserve
son timbre, sa sonorite, sa personnalite. C'est bien ainsi qu'il voit
1'Amerique : une immense orchestration des peuples immigres, une
grandiose polyphonie. Mais sa polyphonie n'exclut pas une forte
allegeance a un systeme politique preexistant, celui de la Constitution
federale de 1787. Kallen souhaite que les Etats-Unis, cette « federation
de cultures nationales », maintiennent une veritable « veneration »
pour le systeme cree de toutes pieces par les delegues de la
Convention de Philadelphie25. Le seul, le vrai danger, pour lui, est le
conformisme anglo-saxon et son excroissance monstrueuse : le dar-
winisme social et sa transposition populiste au sein du KKK. Le
citoyen americain est done place devant une dramatique alternative. II
lui faut choisir, affirme Kallen, entre « la Kultur Klux Klan et le plu-
ralisme culturel26 ».
Conclusion : La Corse n'est pas (encore) le Quebec
J'ai raisonne jusqu'ici en amont en proposant de m'interroger sur les
« formes primitives du multiculturalisme » pour mieux comprendre la
portee de ce concept polysemique, les usages, et les malentendus
auxquels il a donne lieu. Or c'est bien en France qu'existe la difficulte
la plus grande : notre incapacite a concevoir les conditions de possi-
bilite d'un vrai multiculturalisme, notre gene a penser le
multiculturalisme, et notre tendance a ne pas comprendre ce qu'il sig-
nifie en Amerique du Nord. Et pourtant les mentalites franchises ne
sont pas aussi jacobines ni aussi rigides qu'il apparait au premier
abord. Le debat sur la Corse de 1'ete 2000 est un bon revelateur des
changements de mentalite qui pointent a 1'horizon de notre univers
politique.
En effet, des evenements recents - la mise en place du processus
dit « de Matignon » - sur 1'initiative du premier ministre, Lionel
Jospin, laissent entendre que le vieux jacobinisme franqais est mori-
bond. Le processus de Matignon correspond a 1'elaboration d'un
projet de loi sur la Corse, qui fut soumis par le Gouvernement et
accepte par 1'Assemblee de Corse le 28 juillet 2000. Ce projet devait
etre soumis pour adoption au Parlement frangais au debut de 1'hiver
2001. Le processus a ceci de remarquable : pour la premiere fois dans
1'histoire de la Republique, il permet a une region franchise (la Corse)
de disposer d'une part de la souverainete nationale. II met en place un
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processus evolutif qui donne le droit a 1'Assemblee de Corse d'experi-
menter avec la loi Rationale pour la modifier, si necessaire, afin de
tenir compte des particularites socio-economiques de la Corse. Or,
« modifier une loi », c'est une fac.on modeste, certes, mais neanmoins
reelle de « faire la loi ». Que dit en effet le texte de Matignon? II pro-
pose que le Parlement national donne « a la collectivite territoriale de
la Corse la possibilite de deroger par ses deliberations a certaines disposi-
tions legislatives, dans des conditions que le Parlement definirait ». Ces
« derogations », ou encore ces « experimentations », seraient jugees par
le Parlement avant d'etre generalisees dans une periode plus lointaine
qui necessitera une revision de la Constitution en 200427.
Ces propositions novatrices firent scandale au point de provoquer
la demission du ministre de 1'Interieur, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, au
nom des principes memes du jacobinisme dont ce dernier s'auto-
proclamait le meilleur des gardiens. Chevenement justifiait ainsi sa
position dans un entretien au journal Le Monde, peu de temps avant sa
demission :
Venons-en au fond : depuis la Revolution franchise, la Republique
s'est definie par le regne de la loi, votee par le Parlement et devant
laquelle tous les citoyens, sans distinction d'origine, sont places en
position d'egalite. A partir du moment ou la France deviendrait une
sorte de patchwork, juxtaposant des lois corses, franc-comtoises,
savoyardes, basques, berrichonnes, bretonnes, alsaciennes, nous
serions revenus a 1'Ancien Regime. La Republique n'est pas, dans
notre histoire, une parenthese a refermer28.
Les gardiens de la Republique ont aujourd'hui perdu la bataille, et le
processus de Matignon suit son cours. Or ce processus ne met pas
seulement en place une politique de devolution legislative; il innove
dans un autre domaine, lui aussi sans precedent en France, puisqu'il
propose pour la Corse une nouvelle politique linguistique. Le projet de
reforme annonce ainsi que « 1'enseignement de la langue corse pren-
dra place dans 1'horaire scolaire normal des ecoles maternelles et
primaires et pourra ainsi etre suivi par tous les eleves sauf volonte
contraire des parents29 ». Apprendre le corse, dans cette optique, n'est
plus choisir une matiere a option, comme le prevoyait la loi sur le
statut de la Corse de 1991. C'est une ardente obligation30.
II reste que la Corse n'est pas le Quebec et que le peuple corse est
toujours constitutionnellement prive du droit de s'eriger en « peuple ».
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Mais disposer du pouvoir de « modifier » des lois, c'est deja posseder
une part de la souverainete. L'evolution politique en cours est done
riche d'enseignements; elle signale la fin de ce que j'appelais la « diffi-
culte franchise » a penser le multiculturalisme.
Lionel Jospin n'avait sans doute pas saisi la vraie nature du multi-
culturalisme canadien, lorsqu'il visita ce pays en 1998. Mais il
poursuivit manifestement sa reflexion au point d'inscrire une proble-
matique multiculturelle au cceur du processus de Matignon. Y a-t-il
pour lui un bon modele etranger du multiculturalisme? II est sans
doute trop tot pour repondre. La France n'est pas encore un pays
federal meme si elle avance timidement dans cette direction. L'utopie
jospinienne est celle d'une Republique qui serait capable de « con-
juguer unite et diversite31 ». La phrase est nouvelle dans le vocabulaire
politique franqais. Elle est familiere aux habitants du Nouveau Monde,
puisqu'il s'agit au fond de la traduction franchise d'une vieille devise
latine empruntee a un poeme de Virgile (Moretum) et erigee depuis
plus de deux siecles en devise officielle des Etats-Unis : £ Pluribus
Unum32. C'est ainsi, a coups de reformes graduelles et de petites
phrases, que 1'on met fin en France au fetichisme de la Republique une
et indivisible.
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Aboriginal Peoples in the Twenty-first
Century: A Plea for Realism
Alan C. Cairns
I DO NOT EXPECT THE ARGUMENTS IN THIS PAPER, ESPECIALLY THOSE INthe last half, to convince all who read or heard this presentation. In
fact, if I fail to convince you, I may have succeeded in the much more
important task of contributing to a discussion. The Aboriginal policy
field has too many converts and too few discussions in which we lis-
ten to each other. Converts and discussion have an uneasy
relationship: basically, each is the other's most feared opponent. At the
turn of the century, converts and ideologies can look after themselves;
discussion, however, needs help. Hence the following pages.
This paper has a single objective - to clarify the debate about how
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples are to live together in the
future. We cannot be successfully forward-looking, however, without
understanding the past that has shaped us. The first half of the paper,
accordingly, focusing as it does largely on the last half of the century,
establishes how we got to 'now/ Now is defined as the post-1969
White Paper (Canada 1969) era, in which, I argue, there are two roads
to the future - the self-government route based on Aboriginal nations
and the urban route.
This is the era of Aboriginal nationalism; of Oka; of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP); of major advances by
Aboriginal peoples in the Constitution Act, 1982; of a huge increase in
the number of Aboriginal post-secondary graduates; of the dramatic
growth of the urban Aboriginal population; of the dawning recogni-
tion that Aboriginal communities, especially First Nations, are not
going to disappear as believers in assimilation once thought; of the
birth of Nunavut (1999); and of many other developments, most of
which would have been inconceivable fifty years ago. This back-
ground underlines the reality that ours is a new era - that indeed we
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are creating a new Canada - and that we desperately need more
understanding if we are to avoid major policy errors.
Of the many issues needing attention, I have selected the coexis-
tence of the two roads to the future mentioned above. The last half of
the paper, grandiosely subheaded "a plea for realism," tries to disen-
tangle the issues posed by this apparent choice, to stick-handle
through the claims of both the advocates and opponents of each route.
I conclude that the debate is poorly conducted and that both roads will
be with us for the foreseeable future. We need more information and
analysis and less ideology if we are to make progress in one of the
most politicized and conflict-filled policy areas on our agenda. (The
paper focuses disproportionately on status Indians because neither
Inuit nor Metis [with only eight small settlements in northern Albertal
confront the choice between the urban and the self-government route
to the same degree.)
From Paternalism to Aboriginal Nationalism
No dialogue between Indians and the federal government preceded
the release of that government's 1969 White Paper which proposed
ending the separate status of Indian people and their assimilation into
Canadian society. This act of paternalism was repudiated by the orga-
nized opposition of Indian peoples, led by the Indian Chiefs of Alberta
(Indian Chiefs of Alberta 1970). The subsequent withdrawal of the
White Paper was more than the defeat of a particular policy initiative.
The historic federal policy of assimilation was in ruins. Since then, it
has been generally assumed that Indian communities would survive
as such - that they would have a distinct, ongoing communal existence
in Canada (Weaver 1990). Thirty years after the White Paper's defeat,
Canadians are still grappling with that new reality.
Since then, the federal government has lost or given up its leader-
ship role. Initially, it appeared that the policy of assimilation had been
cast in the dustbin of discarded experiments. For the first decade after
the White Paper's withdrawal, the relevant actors repositioned them-
selves behind the vague consensus that assimilation, at least as a
conscious policy, was dead, and that the emerging policy question was
how Indian peoples - as peoples - or, as the terminology evolved, as
nations - should be fitted into the Canadian constitutional order. In
the period leading up to the Constitution Act, 1982, Inuit and Metis
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emerged and made independent claims for recognition and self-
government. This foreshadowed the new constitutional category
"Aboriginal Peoples of Canada," defined in the Constitution Act, 1982,
s. 35(2), as including Indian, Inuit, and Metis.
Increasingly, initiatives in the broad field of Aboriginal policy
came from Aboriginal organizations, particularly the National Indian
Brotherhood, later renamed the Assembly of First Nations, which
spoke for the legal status Indian population living on reserves. Its
voice, and that of other Aboriginal organizations, was strengthened by
a fortuitous convergence of factors.
The federal government policy of funding the major Aboriginal
organizations - which commenced in the early 1970s, on the premise
that the poverty, small populations, and geographical diffusion of
Aboriginal peoples would otherwise marginalize them in democratic
politics - gave them not only a voice but ultimately a unique status
among the claimants for government attention. They quickly came to
be much more than the standard interest group speaking for a partic-
ular clientele or cause. As the major Aboriginal associations acquired
confidence, they decisively distanced themselves from the proliferat-
ing ethnic associations which represented the ethnocultural
communities gathered under the official policy of multiculturalism.
They represented not ethnic minorities, but nations.
The nation label gained sustenance from the opening up of the
Constitution in response to Francophone nationalism in Quebec, par-
ticularly following the victory of the Parti Quebecois in the 1976
provincial election. This placed the question of Canada's future on the
bargaining table. What kind of people were Canadians? What revised
institutional arrangements and constitutional reforms were appropri-
ate for a country increasingly separated from Europe, with an
immigration policy that was transforming the face of major metropoli-
tan centres, one that confronted a Quebec nationalist challenge to its
very survival, and one with indigenous peoples no longer willing to
accept their marginalization? The opening up of the Constitution was
quickly seen as providing an arena in which Aboriginal peoples could
advance their claims for recognition, self-government, and an end to
their stigmatized marginalization.
Trudeau's assertion "Everything is up for grabs" was a direct
response to a reinvigorated, assertive Quebec nationalism. Aboriginal
peoples successfully inserted themselves into constitutional politics
and made major gains in the Constitution Act, 1982. Simultaneously,
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their self-description as nations gathered momentum. The National
Indian Brotherhood renamed itself the Assembly of First Nations. The
1983 Penner Committee, with its ringing advocacy of self-government
for Indian peoples in its report, systematically employed the term
nation in a clear response to the messages of Indian spokespersons
who appeared before it (Canada 1983). The language of nationalism
clearly added symbolic legitimacy to claims for recognition and spe-
cial treatment.
This was evident in the four Aboriginal constitutional conferences,
1983 to 1987 (Schwartz 1986), primarily focusing on the inherent right
of self-government. The conferences gave additional proof of, and
stimulus to, the emerging distinct status of Aboriginal peoples.
Aboriginal associations participated almost as bargaining equals of the
federal and provincial governments on the other side of the table.
Their goal was to carve out a separate category of constitutional space
for the implementation of the inherent right of self-government. No
other interest group that flourished in democratic, pluralistic politics,
whether representing women, disabled persons, Italian Canadians, or
others, were given similar recognition.
The rhetoric surrounding the concept of nation became the stan-
dard terminology used to identify Aboriginal peoples. Indians became
'First Nations' in a clear attempt to gain historical priority and a
stronger legitimacy than that of the two founding nations of French
and English newcomers. The Metis also employed the self-identifying,
status-raising label of nation as, to a lesser extent, did the Inuit.
Perhaps, however, the most decisive indication of the status-enhan-
cing capacity of the nation terminology was the dramatic diffusion of
such self-labelling among Indian bands themselves. By 1999, about 30
per cent of over 600 Indian bands had added nation to their official
name. Most of them had populations well under one thousand people
(Canada 1985,1990,1999).
The language of nationalism changes the nature of Aboriginal pol-
icy discussions. The term nation easily, almost automatically, leads to
a justification for an ongoing future existence, and therefore for the
policy tools to achieve that goal. Nation attracts the supportive atten-
tion of prominent political theorists - Will Kymlicka, Sam LaSelva,
Charles Taylor, Jim Tully - in a way that the term 'villages' would not.
They add a certain philosophical legitimacy to Aboriginal nationalism
and to the consequences that logically attach to that labelling. Nation,
inevitably and desirably in the eyes of its proponents, stresses an inter-
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nal within-group solidarity, while stressing the 'otherness' of the non-
Aboriginal majority.
This otherness is reinforced by the widespread employment of the
language of colonialism to describe the history of Aboriginal/non-
Aboriginal relations from which an escape is sought. The colonial
analogy is a dramatic reminder that the relation of indigenous people
to the Canadian majority from the last half of the nineteenth century to
the present has always been massively influenced by international
trends - particularly the world of empire and of its ending. In the for-
mer, when a handful of European states ruled much of humanity, the
wardship status of Indian peoples - their marginalization - their sub-
jection to the demands of a majority confident of its own cultural
superiority - did not have to be argued in terms of first principles - it
was simply assumed. Canadian rule over indigenous peoples - most
dramatically in the case of status Indians - was simply a spillover from
the larger world of empire outside Canada.
The implicit international support in the imperial era for wardship
for Indians, for their exclusion from the franchise until 1960, for leav-
ing Inuit (then Eskimo) isolated and forgotten, and for the
marginalization of the Metis, evaporated when empire ended. When
the British left India, the French handed over power in Senegal, the
Dutch lost control of Indonesia, and the Portuguese finally succumbed
to exhaustion and retreated from Angola and Mozambique, the mes-
sage flowing across Canadian borders no longer justified hierarchy
with Aboriginal peoples at the base, whether hierarchy was conceived
in cultural or racial terms.
The international system was no longer a club of white states. The
Commonwealth - now a multicultural, multiracial association - con-
trasted dramatically with the older view of the white dominions as
Britain overseas. The United Nations was transformed into a multira-
cial institution, with European states in a minority, after the collapse of
European empires and the emergence of more than a hundred new
states. The United Nations launched a crusade against colonialism and
racism that inevitably challenged the legitimacy of white leadership
over indigenous peoples in settler colonies - even if that leadership
was dressed up in the language of trusteeship and guardianship.
We can argue, therefore, that the emergence of Aboriginal nation-
alism was overdetermined. It fed on the opening up of the Canadian
Constitution; on the demise of European empires and the subsequent
transformations in the international system; on the funding of
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Aboriginal associations by the federal government; on the defeat of the
White Paper; and on the contagious, world-wide diffusion of national-
ism among indigenous peoples. The simultaneous emergence of
indigenous nationalism in Australia (Aborigines) and New Zealand
(Maori) as well as in Canada, underlines the international forces at
work. Those wishing to understand Aboriginal nationalism in Canada,
accordingly, must look outward beyond domestic, within-Canada
causes to embrace changes in the international environment. To look
inwardly only at our domestic selves blinds us to the fact that indige-
nous peoples around the globe learn and borrow from each other.
There is, in other words, an indigenous international.
The colonial analogy drawn from the international arena and the
widespread diffusion of the label nation were appropriate yet, at the
same time, potentially misleading. Colonialism was clearly a reason-
able description of the system of alien rule and the displacement of
Indian peoples onto reserves, thought of as schools for their civiliza-
tion. It was somewhat less appropriate for Inuit and Metis, in that they
were not subject to a separate administrative system, nor subjected to
the same degree of cultural assault as Indians. On the other hand, they
too were marginalized, defined as backward, and not considered to be
full, ordinary citizens.
Colonialism, however, is also misleading. The end of colonialism
in yesterday's world of the demise of the European empires resulted
in independence. The new flag of a new country was raised, and the
international community acquired a new member. The ending of colo-
nialism in Canada, however, does not usher in independence but
requires a rapprochement with the majority - the working out of
arrangements that combine self-government where land-based
Aboriginal communities exist with membership in the Canadian com-
munity of citizens. Colonialism focuses attention on the self-rule
dimension, but it positively deflects attention from the rapprochement
dimension, which requires a positive collaboration with yesterday's
oppressor. Therefore, it contributes to a misunderstanding of the
requirements of a workable reconciliation.
Nation is also Janus-faced. It is status-raising for those who
employ it. It speaks to a positive sense of belonging and to a people's
desire for a continuing future existence. For peoples whose difference
has been reinforced by their treatment by the majority society, the
attribution of nation is a logical if not inevitable response to their situ-
ation, especially for land-based communities. The term nation,
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however, can be misleading. Nation is a potent word that presupposes
population sizes and self-government capacities that are beyond small
populations of several hundred or several thousand people. The
accompanying nation-to-nation theme, the key concept in the analysis
of the RCAP report (Canada 1996), also misleads as it inevitably con-
jures up an image of Canada as an international system. It suggests
autonomous, discrete actors bargaining the terms of their separate
coexistence. If, however, "within Canada" means anything, the reality
is that a part is rearranging its relationship with the whole of which it
is a part. In other words, when federal and provincial governments are
bargaining their future relations with an Aboriginal nation in a land-
claims/self-government negotiation for example, the members of the
latter group are also and simultaneously represented as citizens by the
federal and provincial governments. If this is not so, the whole system
of voting and elections in federal and provincial politics and the
receipt of standard federal and provincial services are based on a mis-
understanding - an assertion that would find minimal support.
It is possible, and perhaps probable, that the leading players in
public discussions realize that the language of colonialism, of nation,
and of nation-to-nation in the Canadian context does not carry the
same meaning and consequences in Canada as it did in Algeria or
Kenya. There may be a tacit understanding on both sides of the table
that these terms - colonialism, nation, and nation-to-nation - have a
more limited, restricted meaning than the full sense of the words sug-
gests. Even so, their use adds a potential element of confusion to our
attempts to work out our relations with each other. The increasingly
common description of Canada as a multinational country normally
fails to mention that the Quebec nation is some 7,000 times larger than
the average Aboriginal nation proposed by the RCAP. Further, the
RCAP figures - average nation size of 5,000-7,000 people - are not a
current reality, but a goal that can only be achieved by aggregating
small bands into larger units, a goal certain to generate considerable
resistance. We cannot think clearly if we forget such realities.
Nor can we think clearly if we overlook the constitutional changes
and judicial decisions that have provided indigenous peoples with
constitutional support for their aspirations. The Constitution Act, 1982,
declared that "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aborigi-
nal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed," and "In
this Act 'aboriginal peoples of Canada' includes the Indian, Inuit and
Metis peoples of Canada," (s. 35(1) and (2)). This constitutional affir-
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mation was, in effect, a repudiation of the original British North
America Act, 1867, which in s. 91(24) simply treated Indians as a sub-
ject of federal jurisdiction, indicating that their constitutional
recognition had nothing to do with their rights, but simply with which
government had authority over them. Section 91(24) presupposed
wards who, for their own sake, had to be governed by others. Section
35(1), by contrast, identified the rights of peoples that are to be recog-
nized and affirmed. Section 35(2) created a new constitutional
category, "aboriginal peoples of Canada," which inevitably generated
pressures from the least favoured member of the category - the Metis
- who achieved a constitutional recognition in 1982 they had long
sought - access to state-provided, positive benefits, available to status
Indian peoples. The move from s. 91(24) (1867) to s. 35 (1982), from
wards to rights holders, was the domestic equivalent of the end of
colonialism in the overseas territories of the former European empires.
That domestic equivalent, of course, falls short of independence. The
new status to which it leads is to be "within Canada."
The courts, which historically had played a limited role in affirm-
ing Aboriginal rights, made important contributions in the post-White
Paper decades. Two decisions - Calder (1973) (Calder v. AG BC, [1973]
SCR 313) and Delgamuukw (1997) (Delgamuukw v. BC, [1997] 3 SCR
1010) - underline the judicial contribution, which can be followed in
more detail in any of the standard case books in Canadian constitu-
tional law. In Calder, the Supreme Court dismissed an application by
the Nishga (now Nisga'a) Indians of northwestern British Columbia for
formal recognition of their Aboriginal title based on their immemorial
occupation of the land. Six of the seven judges, however, recognized
the concept of Aboriginal title, three of whom suggested that their
Aboriginal title had not been extinguished. Subsequently, the Trudeau
government announced a land claims policy, which is the origin of the
modern land claims settlements already completed and of the many
negotiations, especially in British Columbia, that are now underway.
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court confirmed that Aboriginal
title existed in British Columbia and that it constitutes a right to the
land itself, not just to traditional uses such as hunting. The Court also
held that oral history should be included in the evidence legitimately
before the Court. Both of these strands of Delgamuukw have pro-
foundly transformed the treaty process in British Columbia by
dramatically enhancing the bargaining resources of First Nations
negotiators.
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The Pervasive Impact of Nationalism
The emergence of Aboriginal nationalism and the response to it are
highlighted in some of the key events of the past decade and a half listed
below. This brief and elementary listing - all that space limitations allow
- is neither exhaustive nor faithful to the complexities behind the events,
but it will serve to underline the temper of the present era.
• The role of Elijah Harper in preventing debate on the Meech
Lake Accord in the Manitoba legislature, just as the three-year
ratification clock was running out in 1990, was a crucial factor
in the defeat of the accord. Harper's role, backed by enthusias-
tic First Nations support, symbolized the willingness of First
Nations - if their own demands were not met - to defeat a major
constitutional effort to bring Quebec back into the constitu-
tional family with, in Prime Minister Mulroney's words,
honour and enthusiasm.
• The Oka crisis of 1990, as well as other, less dramatic, indicators
of frustration and anger expressed in road blocks, occupations,
and demonstrations, underlined the growing tension in
Aboriginal/ non-Aboriginal relations.
• The massive, five-volume report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, released in 1996, its policy recommenda-
tions and its governing nation-to-nation theme, confirmed that
the status quo was not viable. The RCAP Report is a document
of Aboriginal nationalism.
• The establishment of the BC Treaty Commission in 1993, fol-
lowing the century-long denial by British Columbia
governments that Aboriginal title was a continuing reality, sug-
gested that even the most obdurate provincial government
could not prevail against the combination of politicized First
Nations claims and a supportive Supreme Court jurisprudence
of Aboriginal and treaty rights.
• The passage of the Nisga'a treaty in 2000, in spite of a deeply
divisive debate in British Columbia, including a court chal-
lenge, suggested that Aboriginal nationalism could be
accommodated within Canadian federalism.
• The emergence of Nunavut in 1999 as a quasi-province with an
Inuit majority was an even more symbolic indication of the pos-
sibility of finding common ground.
144 Alan C. Cairns
On the other hand, the confrontation between Quebec and
Aboriginal nationalism, particularly of the northern Cree and
Inuit, over the territorial integrity of Quebec should it secede
from Canada, underlined the limits of compromise, and con-
firmed that Aboriginal nationalism would be a major player
and a major complication if Canada was threatened with a split.
• Nationalism, defined as the unwillingness to forget, and the
willingness to pursue claims for redress for past maltreatment
was a supportive factor in the emergence into public attention
of the history of sexual and physical abuse in residential schools
and the pursuit of claims for compensation by thousands of for-
mer students. These claims, which threaten devastating
financial impacts on the major churches involved in what a
recent scholar described as A National Crime in his history of
residential schools (Milloy 1999), only surfaced when yester-
day's paternalism was displaced by assertive nationalism.
The recognition and accommodation of Aboriginal nationalism
within Canada is one of the most difficult, high-priority tasks con-
fronting Canadian policy-makers. "Within Canada" indicates that the
goal is not only to recognize Aboriginal difference but also to generate
a positive identification with, and participation in, the Canadian com-
munity of citizens. Aboriginal nationalism is not enough. It has to be
supplemented by a shared citizenship with other Canadians if our liv-
ing together is to go beyond a wary coexistence.
The Spirit of the Times - Then and Now
Cumulatively, the preceding suggest a profound transformation in the
spirit of the times from the conventional assumptions of forty years
ago; in different language, the self-consciousness of the major players
has been transformed; their very identities differ; non-Aboriginals no
longer assume an unchallenged authority to be in charge, while
Aboriginal peoples sense the possibility that this time historical
momentum may be on their side. Differently phrased, Aboriginal peo-
ples now occupy the moral high ground once occupied by the majority
society that had justified its former leadership role, by virtue of the
superior civilization it was assumed to be spreading. These changes in
mood, in temperament, in identity, in consciousness, in confidence,
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and in taken-for-granted assumptions about who was in charge, and
about what a desirable future would look like, are not easily pinned
down, yet they are fundamental components of where we are.
This profound transformation is best illustrated by the fate of the
rhetoric of assimilation. Formerly the trademark of the non-Aboriginal
liberal / left progressives in the middle of the twentieth century, it
recently re-emerged on the right end of the spectrum in the Reform
party and its successor, the Canadian Alliance, as a reaction against the
policy thrust toward special treatment and a constitutionalized third
order of Aboriginal governments. Now, however, the liberal / left end
of the spectrum passionately opposes the assimilation it formerly sup-
ported; it now sees that assimilation as an unacceptable expression of
cultural arrogance and ethnocentrism.
Assimilation was formerly the policy of the progressives. The
Saskatchewan Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) under
Tommy Douglas and Woodrow Lloyd, 1944-64, was a passionate
advocate of assimilation well before the 1969 White Paper (Pitsula
1994). Some of this was a spillover from Afro-American pressure to
join the mainstream in the United States, a perspective that saw
American blacks seeking to 'get in' as anticipating what Canadian
Indians would seek when their Martin Luther King belatedly
emerged. Assimilation also drew sustenance from the belief that
industrial civilization was the great leveller of cultural difference.
Anthropologists took it for granted that assimilation was both the
inevitable and desirable goal toward which we were heading. (Loram
and Mcllwraith 1943) Against such a powerful tendency, resistance
was seen as futile. More generally, of course, assimilation had been the
historic policy of the Canadian state since Canada was founded.
Support for assimilation has now drifted to the right end of the
political spectrum. Preston Manning (Manning 1992), Stockwell Day -
now succeeded by Stephen Harper - have replaced Tommy Douglas.
Mel Smith (Smith 1995), Tom Flanagan (Flanagan 2000), and others
now defend in a very different political-intellectual climate the ideas
that attracted Trudeau and the team which produced the White Paper
(Canada 1969). The tone of contemporary advocates of assimilation is,
of necessity, different from the tone of its supporters of thirty to fifty
years ago. Yesterday's advocates wrote and spoke with the easy
authority that history was on their side. Contemporary advocates are
not so sure. They frequently assert that they write against an unsym-
pathetic climate of political correctness that challenges their right to
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speak. Other authors have noted the inhibitions which attend speak-
ing out against what they detect as a political consensus behind the
overall thrust toward recognition and implementation of the inherent
right of self-government (Cairns 2000:14-16 for references).1
This is another example of the changing spirit of the times: forty
years ago, in the Hawthorn report of the mid-sixties (Hawthorn
1966-67) and in the 1969 White Paper, treaties were considered of
marginal importance. Trudeau, indeed, found it inconceivable that
one section of society could have a treaty with another part of society,
declaring that "we must all be equal under the laws and we must not
sign treaties amongst ourselves" (Trudeau 1969). Now, the RCAP
report informs the reader that treaties are the key, the fundamental
instrument for regulating relationships between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples (Cairns 2000:134-36 for a discussion).
Observing the erosion of yesterday's conventional wisdom too
easily leads to a complacent arrogance among the supporters of
today's conventional wisdom, convinced that they have arrived at
truth. A much better lesson would be a reminder that we, too, will be
seen, in hindsight, as yesterday's conventional wisdom.
Some Characteristics of the Present Debate
The present dialogue or debate has the following characteristics. First,
there is now a burgeoning literature. Any reasonably-sized bookstore
currently stocks a sizeable collection of books under the rubric of
Native studies. The media now devote considerable attention to
Aboriginal issues. The National Post, which gives extensive coverage to
Aboriginal issues, vigorously and recurrently attacks special status and
espouses assimilation. Aboriginal issues are one of the staples of Jeffrey
Simpson, the leading national affairs columnist for the Globe and Mail
(Simpson 1998; 1999; 2000). Polar positions are now expressed in the
national party system. The Reform and the Canadian Alliance analysis
of the Aboriginal policy area closely mirror the assumptions behind the
1969 White Paper (Reform Party of Canada 1995; Cairns 2000:72).
Second, there are prominent Aboriginal participants in the public
dialogue. They include the major national and provincial Aboriginal
associations whose leaders are often skilled in getting media coverage.
They conduct research and publish major position papers. They are
joined by a small but growing cadre of Aboriginal scholars in law and
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other disciplines. Their work receives practical sustenance from Native
studies departments, Native studies associations, and specialized jour-
nals of Native Studies. They have already made major contributions to
our collective search for improved understanding. Their numbers and
importance will increase with the dramatic increase in number of
Aboriginal graduates of post-secondary institutions.
Third, there is now an extensive university-based community of
scholars whose focus is Aboriginal issues. Research is not monolithic -
contrast, for example, on the non-Aboriginal side the work of Jim Tully
(Tully 1995) and Tom Flanagan (Flanagan 2000), or on the Aboriginal
side John Borrows (Borrows 1999), Taiaiake Alfred (Alfred 1999), and
Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond who now sits on the bench of the Provincial
Court of Saskatchewan (Turpel 1989-90).
Given the above welcome diversity, it remains true that the major
contemporary academic contributions to the debate come from an
influential cadre of university law professors, who have taken on the
task of enlarging the constitutional space for Aboriginal self-govern-
ment. Their goal is to provide a legal rationale for the maximum
jurisdictional autonomy for the Aboriginal governments of the future.
They are unquestionably the major academic contributors to public
discourse. Their importance is magnified by the role of the courts in
the evolution of Aboriginal rights. Their contributions are supple-
mented by political scientists, anthropologists, and historians. Each of
these disciplines brings different strengths and weaknesses to
Aboriginal studies and to Aboriginal policy.
The conclusion is irresistible that the dominant role of legal schol-
ars in defining the issues at stake, in fleshing out a rights-based
discourse, and in contributing to a leading role for the courts has con-
tributed to Aboriginal gains. On the other hand, academic legal
contributors in this policy area show little concern for Canadian citi-
zenship as a uniting bond, or more generally, for what will hold us
together, and show much less interest in the 50 per cent of the
Aboriginal population in urban areas, whose concerns are less
amenable to the language of rights.2
A Plea for Realism
It is perhaps inevitable that Canadians - be they Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal, citizens and scholars - disagree on where we should go.
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We still hear the voices of assimilators and their antithesis - those who
describe our future as coexisting solitudes maintaining a possibly
friendly possibly cool distance from one another. There is another
slightly different divide between advocates of a nation-to-nation rela-
tionship - competing solidarities who engage in a domestic version of
international relations - and others who stress the necessity, at least at
one level of our relationship, of a common citizenship as the contem-
porary source of the empathy that makes us feel responsible for each
other. Each of these divides and the rhetoric that sustains them could
easily consume the remainder of these pages. It would be a worth-
while task to explore the plausibilities, the exaggerations, the kernels
of truth, and the simplifications that attend each side of the above
divides. Each divide, in its own way, is at the very centre of our pre-
sent search for understanding.
I have decided to focus on a different divide, or contrast, in the
remaining pages - one which deserves more attention than it has
received. This discussion will turn on two roads to the future: that of
Aboriginal peoples in landed communities on the path to self-govern-
ment and that of urban Aboriginals. The pressure and temptation
when confronting two roads is to assume the necessity of choosing
one, to set the two roads as rivals, to imply that those who have not
chosen 'our' road can only have done so because of some false con-
sciousness which clouds their reasoning, to suggest that the urban
Aboriginal is somehow betraying Aboriginality by subjecting
him/herself to the perils of cultural contagion that will eat away at
Aboriginal difference that should be cherished and protected, or to
intimate that the travellers on the self-government road overestimate
the possibility of cultural renewal and economic viability for small
nations distanced from urban centres.
I prefer not to take sides, but rather to try to think my way through
both of these routes to the future, on the premise that there are advan-
tages and disadvantages to each. To condemn one or the other I view
as an unhelpful ideological position at this stage of our understanding
and evolution.
Two Roads to the Future
We have more information and analysis now than ever before to
inform our policy decisions. Formerly, non-Aboriginals dominated the
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policy discussions of Aboriginal issues. This was especially true for
status Indians. By definition wards are, after all, objects of policy deter-
mined by paternal authorities, not participants in its making. For the
last thirty years, in contrast, we have had a dialogue with extensive
and growing Aboriginal participation. The scholarly community
studying Aboriginal issues is now dramatically larger than even a
quarter of a century ago. Non-Aboriginals still dominate the field, but
scholarly contributions from Aboriginal academics are on the increase.
Further, non-Aboriginal academics are aware that their scholarly
authority no longer flows automatically from their skin colour. These
are all positive developments. Nevertheless, I argue that our under-
standing is imperfect, that there are immense gaps in our knowledge,
that ideology plays too prominent a role, and that the inevitable politi-
cization of a field in which nationalism and the response to it is the
dominant focus often gets in the way of realism.
Whether we speak of Aboriginal policy writ large to include
Indians, Inuit, and Metis or focus only on the status Indian population
- the largest of the constitutionally recognized "Aboriginal peoples" -
the reality is that there are two roads to the future - the self-govern-
ment road and the urban route. This is obvious from even a casual
acquaintance with elementary demographic data - half of the
Aboriginal people live in urban centres.3
Amazingly, the coexistence of these alternative futures, which
should be thought of as complementary, is consistently, if not almost
systematically, overlooked or deprecated by those who have cast their
votes either for the nation-government route and who see urban life as
a distraction or a threat, or by those who see self-government as slow-
ing down the desirable migration to the job opportunities of the city. I
argue for acceptance of the coexistence of these two roads to the
future, coupled with the belief that each road merits the attention of
policy-makers and analysts.
My reasons are elementary. Both roads exist and, as noted above,
have about the same number of travellers. Of the status Indian popu-
lation 42 per cent live off reserve, and 58 per cent live either on reserve
(54 per cent) or on crown (4 per cent) land (1996 figures, Canada
1997b:xiv). When Metis and Inuit are included, about half of the
Aboriginal population overall is urban. Generally speaking, these two
roads lead to different goals. The self-government option, especially
when it is practised with competence and integrity, can be a valuable
instrument for cultural retention and renewal. The urban option, by its
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very nature, is more attuned to participation in non-Aboriginal society,
with the resultant probability of higher income, less unemployment,
and so on. Neither of these goals deserves to be deprecated as such -
to be defined as unworthy, as representing an irrational choice. To opt
for urban life is not an act of betrayal. To remain in an Aboriginal
community, in part because that is where 'home' is, is not to opt for
the past.
The fact that both routes exist and that they serve different pur-
poses suggests that they should not be judged by the same criteria.
Cultural survival and the modernization of tradition may be the
appropriate and priority criteria for judging self-governing nations.
Economic opportunities and higher incomes and other pursuits con-
genial to urban living are the appropriate criteria for assessing
Aboriginal urban life. When the RCAP Report foresaw a future in
which Aboriginal peoples would be proportionally represented in
such prestigious professions as "doctors ... biotechnologists ... com-
puter specialists ... professors, archaeologists and ... other careers"
(Canada 1996, 3:501) it was not referring to options available in small
rural nations. To compare small rural nations with urban settings in
terms of their respective capacities to sustain such professions would
be to cook the books in favour of urban life. Equally, however, to make
cultural renewal the prime criterion for judging the relative merits of
urban living and self-governing nations is to predetermine the out-
come against the urban setting. Each road to the future should be
judged in terms of criteria appropriate to its virtues. This does not
mean that economic criteria are irrelevant to judging self-government,
nor that cultural criteria have no place in judging the urban situation,
but that their relative significance varies according to the setting.
Clarity is not helped by attaching scare words to one or the other
route. 'Assimilation,' brandished as an aggressive description of the
consequences of urban living - sometimes of course by its non-
Aboriginal supporters - stigmatizes Aboriginals in the city.
Assimilation implies losing oneself in someone else's culture. Further,
since assimilation was the official, historical policy of the Canadian
state, to be accused of having been assimilated suggests succumbing to
a policy initially premised on the inferiority of Indian cultures. Of
course, assimilation rhetoric often presupposes that an Aboriginal
identity can only survive if it manifests itself in vastly different
behaviours and beliefs from those of the non-Aboriginal majority. This
is simply simplistic social psychology. Identity divergence and cul-
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tural convergence are obviously compatible. Is this not what has hap-
pened among the Quebec Francophone majority? Culturally,
convergence of values with Anglophone Canada is well advanced
compared to half a century ago. On the other hand, a nationalist iden-
tity is unquestionably stronger. This, however, is not to suggest that
identity loss never occurs, or to deny that after several generations of
intermarriage in urban settings, individuals may retain only a sliver of
Aboriginal culture and be happy with what and who they have
become. To say that this could never happen is a form of blindness. To
assert that it not be allowed to happen is to deny individual choice.
However, my larger point remains - a modernizing, urban
Aboriginality is perfectly compatible with the retention of a strong
Aboriginal identity.
Equally unhelpful are scare words attached to the separate exis-
tence of Indian communities. In the assimilation era, reserves were
pejoratively referred to as the Gulag Archipelago, as representative of
apartheid, and as equivalent to displaced persons camps. More
recently, given the drive to self-government, they have been criticized
as making "race the constitutive factor of the political order" and as
"based on a closed racial principle" (Flanagan 2000:194). These are all
rhetorical devices to foreclose debate. Indian communities, unlike
provincial communities, will be closed communities in the minimum
sense of controlling their own membership. To describe them as "race
based" (Gibson 2000), however, is not helpful, given the high rate of
intermarriage. Further, at the present time, only about 5 per cent of
Indian bands employ "blood quantum" criteria for membership and
they were reproved by RCAP (Canada 1996, 2 (1):237-40).
The existence of two roads to the future constitutes the funda-
mental reality against which should be judged the adequacy of the
distribution of attention, of research, and in general, of all attempts to
throw light on where we are and might go. From nearly every per-
spective, the urban dimension of Aboriginality is relegated to
secondary importance, when it is not completely ignored. The recur-
rent use of the colonial analogy contributes to the neglect of the urban
situation. The language of nation fits poorly with urban Aboriginals;
the possibilities for self-government are limited. Accordingly, since
neither nation (as the actor to battle colonialism) nor significant pow-
ers of self-government (the purpose of the struggle) make as much
sense in the urban setting, urban Aboriginals remain largely outside
the purview of one of the most potent organizing labels in contempo-
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rary discourse. They are, therefore, naturally overlooked. The leading
role of the academic legal community includes paying scant attention
to the urban situation, which, in truth, does not lend itself as readily to
analysis in terms of Aboriginal rights. Further, the urban setting lacks
a compelling, simplifying focus equal to the appeal of nationalism and
self-government as self-evident good causes for scholars to support.
The urban scene presents a host of discrete practical problems that
resist consolidation under a single rubric.
Indeed, when the heady language of nationalism, of treaties, of
inherent rights to self-government, and of nation-to-nation relations
casts its aura over one route to the future - self-government and cul-
tural renewal - the second, urban route, which can easily be portrayed
negatively in terms of youth gangs, Aboriginal ghettos in the urban
core, language loss, and high rates of intermarriage, can be seen as an
embarrassment. Indeed, it may even be seen as the road that obviously
should not have been taken.
The nation and self-government focus of academics simply dupli-
cates the historical operational bias of the federal department of Indian
Affairs which, in administering the Indian Act, 1985, concentrated
overwhelmingly on reserve-based Indian communities. The focus on
Indian land-based communities is reinforced by the fact that the
strongest and most visible national Aboriginal organization, the
Assembly of First Nations (AFN), rests squarely on the Indian
bands/nations, whose status is governed by the Indian Act, 1985. For
nearly twenty years, the most visible Aboriginal leader has been the
Grand Chief of the AFN.
The favourable bias toward Aboriginal (especially Indian) nations
and their self-government is graphically underlined by the RCAP
Report, that is dominated by the nation-to-nation theme, contrasted
with what it portrays as a "rootless urban existence" (Canada 1996, 2
(2):1023). This negative judgment of the urban situation supports the
focus on nation and on self-government as its servant for the task of
cultural renewal. Alternatively, the nation preference, supported by a
global ethnic revival and by a colonial analysis that sees self-govern-
ment as the culmination of the anti-colonial struggle, requires a
negative view of urban Aboriginal life, seen as getting in the way of
the movement of history.
From these perspectives, urban Aboriginal life is distinctly
unpromising. Urban Aboriginals come from too many diverse nations
to coalesce into a sharing, self-governing group even if they had a
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coherent land base, which they do not. Further, urban Aboriginal life
is, by definition, the setting for increased cultural contact leading both
to cultural erosion and the diminishing use of native languages and
traditional customs. From the cultural perspective, therefore, urban
living is easily viewed as a threat, not as a promise, and those who
choose it are seen by its critics as, in a sense, lost to the cause.
Further, especially in the major cities of western Canada, but not
confined to them, the Aboriginal concentration in urban core areas has
depressing ghetto characteristics. Crime, drug abuse, youth gangs,
violence, and prostitution are widespread (LaPrairie 1995). Recent
reports speak of normlessness; of a fractured social fabric; and "the
emergence of Canada's first US-style slum" in Winnipeg, evident to
even a "casual visitor," and becoming evident in "other Prairie cities"
(Mendelson and Battle 1999:25; National Association of Friendship
Centres and the Law Commission of Canada 1999:63-5).
In the absence of some countervailing evidence, the preceding pas-
sages would constitute an almost unanswerable condemnation of the
urban route. There is, however, another side. The RCAP outlined
numerous positive features of urban life. The employment situation is
superior; incomes are markedly higher; urban Indian people have the
highest life expectancy among Aboriginal peoples; various indicators
of social breakdown are much higher for the on reserve compared to
the non-reserve population (Cairns 2000: chap. 4). As well, preliminary
findings of the Department of Indian Affairs Research and Analysis
Directorate, based on 1991 data, reported a marked advantage for off-
reserve status Indians in terms of life expectancy, educational
attainment, and per capita income. Life expectancy was 4.6 years
longer and per capita income 50 per cent higher (Beavon and Cooke
1998). Evelyn Peters reported "a significant urban Aboriginal popula-
tion earning a good income" of $40,000 or more in 1990 (Peters 1994:
28 and Table 15).
These trends feed on the truly dramatic increase in the number of
Aboriginal post-secondary graduates. In the late 1950s, there were
only a handful of Indian university students. In 1969, there were fewer
than 800 Aboriginal post-secondary graduates. Now, more than
150,000 Aboriginal people have completed or are in post-secondary
education (Borrows 1999:75). There was an increase in the number of
Inuit and Indian students enrolled in post-secondary institutions of
nearly 750 per cent from the numbers in 1977-1978 to the more than
27,000 reported in 1999-2000 (Canada 1997a:36 and 2001:33).
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This dramatic educational expansion, and the urbanization to
which it will contribute, will almost certainly increase the out-marriage
rate (see also Clatworthy and Smith 1992:36). In a recent study employ-
ing five-year data ending in December 1995, the overall out-marriage
rate was 33 per cent, ranging from 22.8 per cent out-marriage on
reserve to 57.4 per cent off-reserve. In general, the smaller the reserve
population, the higher the out-marriage rate (Canada 1997b:21-3).
It is implausible to assume not only that this educational explosion
can be contained but also that most graduates can have satisfying lives
and find meaningful employment in small, self-governing nations
with a weak private sector. This remains largely true even if, by a pro-
cess of consolidation, the average population of self-governing nations
is raised to the viable level of 5,000-7,000, as advocated by the RCAP.
Further, as John Borrows argues, Aboriginal peoples should seek
to influence the overall structure of the larger society through vigorous
participation. For Borrows, to think of Indianness, or more broadly
Aboriginality, as restricted to self-governing, small national communi-
ties is to be condemned to a limited and partial existence. Borrows
argues, in effect, that the expression of a modernizing Aboriginality
should be diffused throughout society in politics, culture, the profes-
sions, and so on. He denies that Aboriginality is a fixed thing; he is
obviously open to a selective incorporation of values and practices of
non-Aboriginal society. As he says "Identity is constantly undergoing
renegotiation. We are traditional, modern, and post-modern people"
(Borrows 1999:77). Accordingly, the self-governing component of
Aboriginal futures, while important, is by itself not enough. Neither,
however, is the urban route.
Hundreds (sixty to eighty if RCAP hopes for consolidation are
realized - more if they are not) of small, self-governing native com-
munities will be scattered across the land, wielding jurisdictions
proportionate to their capacity and desire. They are not about to dis-
appear in any foreseeable future. Aboriginal and treaty rights
"recognized and affirmed" in the Constitution Act, 1982 s. 35(1), cannot
be removed by anything short of a constitutional amendment, the pur-
suit of which would be an unthinkable act of constitutional aggression.
The relocation of communities is not possible. Dispossession of lands
and setting band members adrift is not a policy choice. A ruthless cut-
ting of benefits to encourage exodus is neither humane nor an
available option. Any expeditious attempt to wind down the existence
of small, self-governing nations would arouse an opposition that could
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not be overcome in a democratic society. Such a policy cannot be
implemented; even if it could, to do so would be undesirable. The
result would be a rapid exodus to the city that would add many more
individuals to the dark side of urban life and would exacerbate the
developing Aboriginal urban crisis while adding few success stories.
If we eliminate the pipe dreams of assimilation advocates from the
spectrum of available policies, we are left with about half the
Aboriginal population living in small, self-governing communities:
these communities are not going to go away. They are sustained not
only by inertia and by the fact that they are home, but their survival is
buttressed by Aboriginal and treaty rights. The powerful force of
nationalism can be mobilized on their behalf. Although limited by
small populations, the availability of self-government provides some
leverage for Aboriginal peoples to shape the terms of interaction with
the majority society.
Further, Canadians through their governments are now engaged
in major efforts to respond to Indian land claims where Aboriginal title
still exists - most visibly in British Columbia, but also in Quebec and
Atlantic Canada. Discussions are underway to enlarge the land and
resource base of many First Nations. When the preceding efforts are
coupled with various attempts to increase economic activity on Indian
reserves, the continuing significance and presence of self-governing
Aboriginal communities is one of the taken-for-granteds of the
Canadian future.
Neither the self-government route nor the urban route is an easy
road to an unblemished, positive future for Aboriginal peoples or for
their relations with their non-Aboriginal neighbours. The urban route,
as already indicated, holds out the disturbing possibility in several
metropolitan centres of becoming a Canadian version of those
American cities that have a black middle class coexisting with a black
ghetto. The Canadian parallel of an urban Aboriginal middle class and
an Aboriginal ghetto could undermine the civility and social stability
of a number of Canada's major metropolitan centres.
There is no easy answer to this unhappy prospect. The present
relative inattention to the chequered reality of urban Aboriginal life is,
however, obviously damaging. Since it would be arrogant of me to
make specific recommendations, that would almost inevitably be
either obvious, platitudinous, or superficial, I will restrict myself to the
observation that we have studies and a literature that is helpful. Seen
But Not Heard: Native People in the Inner City, by LaPrairie, is an excel-
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lent analysis, replete with policy suggestions and references to the per-
tinent literature (LaPrairie 1994).
The route of self-governing nations, even if there were no more
outstanding claims and if existing lands and resources were signifi-
cantly supplemented, will not produce across-the-board successes -
healthy, Aboriginal communities, functioning democratically, whose
members have standards of living comparable with neighbouring
non-Aboriginal communities. Most communities are small; many are
isolated; and the politics of which are often dominated by kinship rela-
tions in circumstances where the public sector is large and the private
sector weak. Conditions are therefore often not propitious for victories
over poverty, anomie, and existing inequalities.
The RCAP Report launched a comprehensive package of propos-
als, too detailed to be listed here, to improve the quality of Aboriginal
life in every major dimension. Achievement of these goals, the report
argued, required an extensive reallocation of lands and resources, eco-
nomic opportunity expenditures, major improvements in housing and
community infrastructure, dramatically enhanced educational oppor-
tunities and attainments, including training 10,000 Aboriginal
professionals in health and social services within ten years, and much
more (Canada 1996, 5:213).
The RCAP Report proposed a massive increase in annual public
spending, rising to an additional $1.5 to $2 billion in year five, to be
sustained over a number of years (Canada 1996, 5:56). Elsewhere the
report wrote of an investment of up two billion a year for twenty years
(Canada 1996, 5:60). This was defined as a "good investment for all
Canadians" (Canada 1996, 5:55), as after fifteen to twenty years the
positive benefits of these expenditures would generate a net gain, that
would benefit both Aboriginal people and other Canadians and their
governments (Canada 1996,5:57). This cost-benefit analysis is surely at
best somewhere between an educated guess and a leap of faith. Even
assuming the translation of RCAP proposals into government policy,
many Aboriginal nations will remain impoverished, welfare depen-
dent, and anomie.
Canada does not have a clean slate. The legacy of history cannot
be wished away. The present distribution of Aboriginal peoples in
towns, cities, reserves, in Nunavut, and elsewhere is not going to be
transformed by depopulating the reserves, or Nunavut, or Metis set-
tlements in Alberta by a massive migration to urban settings. But it is
equally the case that the urban Aboriginal presence is not a passing
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phase to be repudiated by a massive return to various homelands.
Many Aboriginals in the city have no homelands or, if they do, have
no desire to return. Both these realities will confront Canadians in any
middle range future we care to visualize. There will always be move-
ments of individuals back and forth for a multitude of reasons. Where
self-government successes occur, those nations may receive a net
inflow, if the would-be returnees are welcomed (Canada 1997b:5).
Conversely, if positive urban Aboriginal role models become more fre-
quent, urban life may become more of a beacon - seen as a plausible
choice to make.
The coexistence of alternative futures should be viewed positively.
Since the two routes do not have the same advantages - cultural
renewal may be more likely in self-governing contexts and economic
gains for individuals more predictable in urban settings - each route
acts as a check against the other. They are complementary rivals, espe-
cially for those who have homelands to which they can return.
In these circumstances, the task of the state is to encourage both
successful adaptation of individuals to urban life and community suc-
cess stories in self-governing nations.
Policy for the Future
Sound future policy requires an evolving understanding of what is
developing in two different contexts. A series of natural experiments
is unfolding at this very moment. There are hundreds of nation-renew-
ing experiments already, or soon to be, underway. What works and
what does not, and why? Multiple experiments are underway in urban
settings too, and their significance will surely deepen and more inno-
vations will occur as more urban governments and politicians are
seized of the complexities, the dangers, and the possibilities created by
the urban Aboriginal population.
If, by constant monitoring, we were made aware of what works
and what does not, we could facilitate the diffusion of successful prac-
tices among both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal governments.
Achievement of this goal will require independent monitoring bodies
to examine and report on both roads to the future. Similar proposals
have surfaced in previous inquiries. The Hawthorn Report of 1966-67
proposed an Indian Progress Agency with the task of "preparing an
annual progress report on the condition of the Indian people of
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Canada" to include, inter alia, educational, legal, economic, and social
data and analysis (Hawthorn 1966, 1:402-3). The purpose was to
improve the quality of policy-making and public discussion and
hence, in general, to act as a constant reminder of what remains to be
done.
Thirty years later, the RCAP proposed an independent Aboriginal
Peoples Review Commission headed by an Aboriginal chief commis-
sioner, with most of the other commissioners and staff also to be
Aboriginal. The Commission's task would be to monitor and report
annually on progress being made "to honour and implement existing
treaties ... in achieving self-government and providing an adequate
lands and resource base for Aboriginal peoples ... in improving the
social and economic well-being of Aboriginal people; and ... in hon-
ouring governments' commitments and implementing" RCAP
recommendations (Canada 1996, 5:19-20). The Commission's focus
would be broad. It would include "the activities of provincial and ter-
ritorial governments within its review" (Canada 1996, 5:19). The
essential task would be to act as a watchdog to see that non-Aboriginal
governments do not slacken in their endeavours. Judging the perfor-
mance of Aboriginal governments does not appear as part of its
mandate, however, though some monitoring might indirectly be
undertaken by RCAP's proposed Aboriginal Government Transition
Centre, which would be assigned various tasks to facilitate successful
transitions to self-government (Canada 1996,5:167-69). The Transition
Centre would presumably have only minimal, if any, interest in
Aboriginal peoples in urban settings.
The proposal offered here is more complex than that proposed in
either Hawthorn or the RCAP. The recommendation is for two moni-
toring agencies. Implicitly they would be providing annual material to
facilitate the comparison between an urban route and a self-govern-
ment route. Explicitly, they will provide ongoing commentary and
analysis - in the one case on the probably hundreds of self-govern-
ment experiments underway and in the other on the developing
indicators of achievements and shortfalls in urban Aboriginal life.
Surely such an ongoing set of monitoring and analyzing reports
would reduce the ideology that dominates contemporary discussion.
How these agencies should be institutionalized and how their analyses
should be disseminated to have maximum effect would have to be
worked out. The proposal may seem threatening, even paternalistic,
especially to self-governing nations. Relatively soon, and possibly
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even immediately, however, the staffs of these agencies will have
Aboriginal majorities. This is not the time for specifics, but rather for
throwing out an idea for public discussion. Those who resist the pro-
posal should suggest alternative means by which we can profitably
learn from the fact that we are in the early stages of major policy experi-
ments in areas where our ignorance is vast. To reduce that ignorance
is to reduce the cost it imposes on Aboriginal peoples. Some will deny
that these are experiments and thus there is nothing to learn, but such
claims are not believable. Others might argue that if self-government
is an inherent right, the manner of its exercise should be immune from
public scrutiny. Such a claim will only survive if evidence of misgov-
ernment is rare or sporadic, which is implausible given the number of
small nations potentially involved and the immense problems and
temptations they will encounter.
Both routes - the self-government and the urban - place the
Aboriginal future directly within Canada. Even the largest unit of self-
government, Nunavut, is clearly fully within Canada and deeply
dependent on external funding. This will be overwhelmingly true for
First Nations. They cannot realistically isolate themselves from the
provincial, territorial, and Canadian contexts in which they live. Only
5 per cent of Indian bands - 30 out of 623 - have on reserve popula-
tions of more than 2,000; 405 of 623 bands have on reserve populations
of less than 500. There are 111 bands with on reserve populations of
less than one hundred (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1997:xvi).
The RC AP reports that a "disproportionate number of Aboriginal peo-
ple live in small, remote, and northern communities" (Canada 1996,
5:39). The RCAP recognized that the jurisdictions they are capable of
wielding are severely limited, so the commissioners recommended
aggregating bands to produce an average size of 5,000 to 7,000 for the
sixty to eighty nations they hoped would emerge. These are still small
populations, with a limited capacity to deliver services. Their popula-
tions, therefore, will be heavily dependent on federal and provincial
governments for many services; the services they will receive from
their own governments can only be provided if their governments are
recipients of large infusions of outside monies. This double depen-
dence makes it imperative that individual members of self-governing
nations be thought of as full Canadian citizens in the psychological
and sociological sense of the term. It is for this reason that the
Hawthorn Report of the mid-1960s coined the phrase "Citizens plus"
as an appropriate description of the place of Indian peoples in
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Canadian society. (Inuit and Metis were outside Hawthorn's terms of
reference.) If Aboriginal individuals and the communities where they
live are seen as strangers proclaiming "we are not you," the danger
arises that the majority will agree that "they are not us." We must con-
stantly work towards a common citizenship to support the "we"
group that sustains our responsibility for each other. This will provide
the secure basis for pursuing the "plus" dimension of Aboriginal
Canadians.
Recognition as members of the Canadian community of citizens is
equally necessary for Aboriginals in the city. Intermingled with non-
Aboriginal neighbours, with at best only limited self-government
possibilities, their links to municipal, provincial, and the federal gov-
ernment will be crucial to their quality of life.
In both cases, therefore, it is essential that Aboriginal people be
thought of as fellow citizens. In contemporary, democratic Western
societies, citizenship provides the bonds of solidarity. Empathy weak-
ens when citizenship erodes. At a certain point in the erosion, we see
each other as strangers, owing little to each other.
If this thesis is accepted, one responsibility of our governors and
of the major Aboriginal organizations will be to work constantly for a
reconciliation between Aboriginal nationalism and Canadian citizen-
ship. This is also an appropriate, indeed urgent, responsibility for
scholars who wish to influence the course of events. The RCAP, the
most elaborate inquiry into indigenous peoples and their relation to
the majority society ever undertaken, failed in this task. The idea and
reality of Aboriginal nations and nationalism crowded out that of
Canadian citizenship. Discussion of the former was fulsome, passion-
ate, and repeated. Discussion of the latter - mention is perhaps more
accurate - was infrequent and typically lukewarm, except when claims
for equality apropos the receipt of services were made. Thus, the
shared rule dimension of Canadian federalism - participation in the
Canadian practice of self-government via elections and Parliament -
was little more than an afterthought. Access of Aboriginal govern-
ments to section 36 equalization payments did not receive the
standard justification that it is a response to our common shared citi-
zenship; instead it was justified on the weak claim that we share an
economy.
In other words, the RCAP, the most exhaustive inquiry ever
undertaken of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations in Canada,
failed to ask the elementary question "What will hold us together?"
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and thus the RCAP failed to answer it. This is a mistake that should
not be repeated.
Conclusion
Realism suggests the following:
• There are two roads to the future: the nation or self-government
road and the urban route; both require the attention of policy-
makers.
• Both roads can be thought of as natural experiments that need
to be carefully monitored so we can learn from success and
avoid the needless repetition of policy errors. Accordingly, two
monitoring, analyzing, reporting agencies should be estab-
lished to reduce the number of gaps in our knowledge.
• Both roads are clearly within Canada. Canada is not just a box
or container, but a political community bound together by a sol-
idarity based on citizenship. Aboriginal peoples must be part
of, not outside, that community. A nation-to-nation description
of who we are is insufficient. Aboriginal nationhood and
Canadian citizenship should not be seen as rivals, but as com-
plementary patterns of belonging to a complex political order.
If we recognize only our diversities, "we" will become an
uncaring aggregation of solitudes.
Notes
1. The politicization of this policy area generates unusually polemical
scholarly debates, as well as exchanges between authors and reviewers
that threaten civility.
2. An important research project remains to be undertaken to 1) identify
the changing relation between Aboriginal peoples and those who study
them, and 2) assess the shifting relative influence of various disciplines.
The hegemony of law is less than a quarter of a century old. Such a
study should also track the emergent, growing role of indigenous schol-
ars in the major disciplines. In doing so, it should also note their
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distribution among the three categories of Aboriginal people - Indian,
Inuit, and Metis.
3. As always, there are exceptions to a simple contrast between self-gov-
erning nations and urban life, where nation has limited salience. There
are urban reserves and urban nations. Further, some, albeit limited
options for self-government can be made available to urban Aboriginals.
Nevertheless, the contrast between self-government for Aboriginal
nations and an urban existence is sufficiently real to focus discussion
around these two alternative visions of the future.
4. Aboriginal students in post-secondary programs are much more likely
than other Canadians to select trade and non-university programmes
than university programs - 76 per cent to 24 per cent for registered
Indians; 70 per cent to 30 per cent for other Aboriginal students, com-
pared to 58 per cent to 42 per cent for other Canadians (1991 figures)
(Santiago 1997:14-16).
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Canadian Business:
'No, Fm from Canada'
W. Michael Wilson*
T HOUGH IT WAS TEMPTING - AND PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN MOREentertaining - to do a parody of the recent very popular beer com-
mercial, this essay will address Canadian distinctiveness in business.
Having said that, however, there are a few business images to reflect
upon:
• It is possible to establish a world class business based upon
the snowmobile.
• Canadians were destined to lead in telecommunications
because it was cold outside. Better to stay inside and talk on
the phone.
• We had to do something with all the rocks, trees, and
beavers.
Instead, because at a tender stage in my professional life I was coun-
seled only to speak about those subjects of which I at least had a
passing knowledge, I am going to talk about the exciting subject of the
financial services industry and consider whether there is a distinct
Canadian view of it. There are a few caveats I would like to make
before beginning.
First, in regard to the use of terms such as 'Canadian' and
'American,' I am aware that, leaving aside matters of race and gender,
there are differences between individuals from Quebec, the East Coast,
Alberta, and the West Coast and that the term 'Canadian' means more
than simply the Torontonian view. I would also like to emphasize,
The views expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed, directly
or indirectly, to his employer, Royal Bank of Canada, or any other organization.
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though it may seem otherwise at times, that there are differences
between people of Atlanta, New York, and Los Angeles. The use of
'American' is for ease of reference only.
I have had the good fortune to work for the last decade for two
extremely large financial institutions. One is based in the United
States, with Canadian operations that were sold a few years ago. The
other one is based in Canada with U.S. operations and aspirations of
expanding them. In the first case, I seemed to spend significant time
explaining that things were different in Canada. Recently, I seem to
have made the same effort to consider whether there are differences
between Americans and Canadians.
This paper has its genesis in two short stories that I should like to
relate. The first one has to do with the negotiation of a potential joint
venture with a South American businessman. He strongly preferred
working with us because, as he put it, "Canadians actually listen." The
second story concerns a friend who had been sent to Europe to run a
somewhat mediocre operation. This friend had been successful in
improving the business over a two-year period, or as he put it, "two
years less a day," and was looking forward to his return to Canada,
notwithstanding the vastly different business culture that he had
learned to function within. When he explained to his successor that the
culture was different and would require adjustments, his successor,
who happened to be from the U.S., explained that my friend would not
have to worry because he would - as he put it - "whip these people
into shape."
What I have learned, though it is impossible to define, is that a dis-
tinct Canadian approach to business can be attributed, I will argue, to the
role of government regulation in business and the need to preserve dis-
tinctiveness in the face of globalization. The subject of financial services
reform over the last five years provides an unusual opportunity to com-
pare American and Canadian approaches to similar issues. The United
States government passed in late 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on
financial privacy and pretexting, also referred to as the Financial Services
Modernization Act. This legislation repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, which
had been in place since the 1930s and had significantly restricted and
compartmentalized financial services in the United States. The new leg-
islation removed almost all barriers contained in the old legislation. In
Canada, after adopting a new regulatory framework in 1992, reviewing
two proposed bank mergers, and holding several inquiries into the state
of the Canadian financial services industry, the Canadian federal gov-
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ernment released, in 1999, the White Paper entitled Reforming Canada's
Financial Services Sector - A Framework for the Future, to serve as the basis
for new legislation that is expected in the near future.
The two documents are noteworthy because they deal with sev-
eral identical matters. For example, they both deal with ownership
restrictions, regulatory approvals, and business powers. In the area of
ownership restrictions, the Canadian White Paper would limit the
ownership to 20 per cent of the voting equity. This would effectively
preclude large institutions from either acquiring or merging with each
other. The U.S. legislation contains no equivalent restrictions. Indeed,
the U.S. legislation encourages ownership of virtually any 'financial'
business, regardless of size, provided no anti-trust matters arise. In
Canada, the approval process for mergers or investments or acquisi-
tions of financial institutions are subject to the prior approval of the
Minister of Finance and a long process of regulatory scrutiny involv-
ing public consultations, the Competition Bureau, and Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions [OSFI]. The regulatory pro-
cess obliges the Minister to consider the public interest and, if
appropriate, impose conditions on the proposed transaction. The U.S.
legislation, on the other hand, effectively contains a deemed approval
requirement. The Canadian proposals will preserve the long standing
restrictions against banks selling insurance in bank branches or partic-
ipating in the auto-leasing business. There are no similar restrictions
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. There are of course many other
components in the two regulatory schemes, but I suggest that the sub-
jects I have noted are sufficient to make the point that the regimes are
different.
The shape of the financial services industry that could emerge in
the two countries has been, and will continue to be, a source of keen
debate. The Canadian proposals are likely to perpetuate the status quo
- that relatively large banks that compete in a relatively small, frag-
mented market will find it increasingly difficult to compete against
much larger competitors. The market capitalization of Royal Bank is
about two times larger than the largest non-bank financial institutions.
On the other hand, the largest U.S. bank is eight times larger, by mar-
ket capitalization, than Royal Bank. Under the U.S. legislation, further
consolidation among financial institutions is likely, with the result that
already large institutions will become larger and more efficient. If one
is concerned about the competitiveness of Canadian institutions com-
pared to international ones, these trends could be disturbing.
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But the point here is not to speculate about the future of the finan-
cial services industry. Instead, the issues worth pursuing are both to
recognize that the Canadian and American regulatory regimes are dra-
matically different and then to consider what these differences suggest
about Canadian attitudes towards business.
According to the Canadian proposals, changes to the financial ser-
vices sector were needed to:
• Enhance competition thus making the sector more vibrant;
• Empower consumers in order to provide an important disci-
pline to competition and make the sector more responsible to
their needs;
• Strengthen the relationship between financial institutions and
the communities they serve in order to make the sector
healthier;
• Increase flexibility so that the regulatory framework would
more effectively balance the need for safety and soundness with
the need to facilitate competition and innovation.
All these changes were driven by, among other things, technological
and demographic changes.
When the Gramm-Leach-BHley Act became law, a number of com-
ments were made by various commentators and politicians:
• "This day we can celebrate as an American day."
• "Eliminating barriers to financial services competition will allow
American companies to better compete in the global economy."
• "The Act will help the American financial services system play
a leading role in propelling our economy into the 21st, continu-
ing the longest peacetime economic expansion in our history."
• "When Glass-Steagall became law, it was believed that stability
and growth came from government overriding the function of
free markets."
• "We are here to repeal Glass-Steagall because we have learned
government is not the answer. We have learned that freedom
and competition are."
• "The world changes and Congress and the laws have to change
with it."
• "Voters believe that reform is vital to America's ability to main-
tain its position as a financial superpower in the global markets."
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The differences between the two approaches are apparent. For
example:
a) In the area of competition:
Canada - competition must be balanced against other needs of
the community
US - competition will benefit all stakeholders
b) In connection with consumers:
Canada - consumers must be 'empowered' to foster competition.
US - consumers will benefit from competition
c) The view of the market:
Canada - community based
US - global
The purpose for describing these differences is to show that the
Canadian regulatory environment, at least in connection with financial
services, has led Canadians to develop a particular skill set in business.
As an aside, I concede that there may well be a 'chicken and egg'
dimension with respect to the causal relationship.
In my experience, at least in financial services, to function in the
Canadian market, several skills and strategies are required:
• a consultative approach to negotiations driven by the need to
function in a regulatory environment characterized by discre-
tion as opposed to explicit rules;
• a focus on business problem-solving;
• a broad approach to issues that reflects the need to address
broader community concerns; and
• a view that business arrangements are an exercise in building
something.
These skills emerge from the necessity of having to work in a
small, relatively closed market that is heavily influenced by govern-
ment intervention and economic trends emerging from outside the
country. The extent of interdependence that arises from these relation-
ships obliges business people to look at issues in a broad sense. It also
limits the scope of initiatives for any individual organization in terms
of solving a business problem.
Within Canada, at least in terms of financial services, these skills
have led to the creation of a strong and vibrant financial services
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industry. And that is a critical element in the Canadian economy. The
pressing question, then, is whether these skills will allow Canadians to
continue to prosper in the context of globalization. For my purposes
here, I can offer these thoughts. If globalization - if it is capable of def-
inition - implies a free, open market, then this will be different from
the Canadian experience. On the other hand, if globalization leads to a
market of interdependent competitors, then the skill set that I
described before will probably be useful. The larger issue is whether
the Canadian economy can generate sufficient wealth, in a timely way,
to retain talented business people.
W HEN PREPARING FOR THIS PRESENTATION, I MENTIONED THISconference to Michael Marzolini, president of Pollara Inc., the
biggest Canadian polling company, who immediately retorted that
"Canada had a culture of envy while the Americans had a culture of
greed." This took me aback, I admit. Although not the terms of my
own view of ourselves in comparison to our neighbours to the south -
how do we know who we are if not in comparison with the Other? -1
suspect that this perception of Canadians has some truth to it. This,
however, is a topic for another conference.
Today's Canadians, at least Canadians of older immigration stock
- Scots, English, Irish - mentally compare themselves constantly with
the United States. As Stephen Graubard wrote in his introduction to a
Daedalus issue on Canada: "Canada, compelled to live cheek by jowl
with a more populous society, itself supremely self-confident and
more than occasionally aggressive, particularly in respect to its eco-
nomic and cultural power, has never found the experience easy. No
Canadian is ever able to ignore or forget the United States."1 And the
Americans do not help them - or do they? - in their search for identity
with the "Blame Canada!" song that figured prominently at the 2000
Oscars ceremony! French Canadians, however, do not participate in
that exercise as much. On the one hand, they are busy opposing 'the
English' i.e. the rest of Canada; on the other hand, they rather like the
Americans and do not feel threatened by them on any level.
But how do recent newcomers to Canada, first from Europe, then
from Asia, South America, or Africa, think and act at that level? Do
they adopt our legendary lack of national self-esteem or do they rather
focus on the immense potential of global connectedness that their pres-
ence among us offers their new country? I would suspect the latter is
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closer to reality. When co-chairing the Ontario Royal Commission on
Learning (1993-1995), I heard repeated demands from parents and
ethnic cultural associations, but more importantly from high school
students themselves, for the inclusion in the curriculum of interna-
tional languages in addition to the standard English and French. Some
were most interested in the cultural benefits of learning another lan-
guage; they argued that learning another language and about the
culture from which it springs helps students appreciate other people,
here and in other countries. Others saw foreign language acquisition
in terms of travel and personal enrichment. Still others emphasized the
importance of knowing other languages in this era of global business.
As a trading nation, being able to speak the language of our trading
partners is an advantage, teenage students told us. Our rich variety of
linguistic abilities resulting from the number and diversity of new
immigrants can make the difference between a deal and no deal, they
added, confident that the sky is the limit.
Actually, Canada is made up of three broad demographic groups:
the Trench/ the 'English/ and the others - the 'ethnic' Canadians.
Adding the Native people, the country is made up of four groups.
Each of these groups, in turn, subdivides into two, three, or more cat-
egories. The French, for instance, meaning the Quebecers, now consist
of the old stock of Francophone Quebecois pure laine, as well as rela-
tively recent Haitian immigrants, Asian Francophones, Jewish,
Christian, and Muslim Francophones from North Africa and the
Middle East, as well as more recent immigrants from all over the
world who have to learn French to settle in la belle province. With them
also lives a decreasing but still important group of Anglophones who
are either these 'newly arrived future citizens' or descendants of ear-
lier settlers. Outside Quebec are the Acadians and the other
Francophone minorities. Each of the other nine provinces and the
three territories show distinctive regional characteristics in their social
make-up, not just in their physical environment. The Aboriginals, seen
by other Canadians as a clearly homogeneous entity, are - and have
been kept - an even more fragmented population. According to the
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1992), they form
forty-five linguistic-cultural groups in Canada, the Crees and the
Ojibways being the largest.
Consequently, any attempt to find a common denominator among
all Canadians in order to define the texture of our society is a very dar-
ing and risky proposal. The elusive concept of 'political culture' may
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help us best to capture some elements of what Canadians are all about,
or think they are all about. The political culture consists of shared
beliefs and values that inform our collective behaviour. This necessar-
ily also includes the perceptions and images we have of ourselves, as
well as the icons with which we identify.
Toward the end of the eighties, writing on this same topic of our
identity for the above-mentioned issue of Daedalus, I identified two
domains of public debate and two domains of public silence that dis-
tinguish us from the Americans and define us as different. The two
great Canadian silences in public life were religion and big business,
while two great debates were the status of women and issues of world
peace and development.
Americans easily define themselves in terms of particular religious
denominations and, as all the past primaries show, bring the issue
upfront in their electoral campaigns; Canadians seem to recognize
instinctively the potential divisiveness of religion in the public sphere.
All public figures consent to a wise silence, despite a voice here and
there expressing the moral values of the New Right. It is not always a
serene silence, but rather a voluntarily imposed one. Not a tormented
one either, but a silence that at times feels like talking. Yet — a silence.
Some may argue that the mid-eighties' acrimonious debate in Ontario
about full public funding of the Catholic school system disproves my
thesis. This was probably not so much a case of open religious bigotry
as an example of barely disguised resistance to the rights of
Francophones. In my eight years in the federal Cabinet, religion was
never discussed. Trudeau, who shaped Canadian public philosophy
for some seventeen years, felt very strongly - as did his predecessors
- that religion and politics, church and state, ought to be and be seen
as, completely separate. Yet, contrary to the American Constitution,
which provides for a clear separation between church and state,
Trudeau did not seek to include such a provision in our 1982 renewed
Constitution.
If big business is also a silence in our public life, except when we
decry it, I think it is because we feel more comfortable thinking of our-
selves as a nation of small entrepreneurs and family businesses.
Canadians like to believe they are a hard-working people who may at
times be daring in business ventures but who have nothing in common
with the risk, abuse, and violence of big business. Peter C. Newman's
The Canadian Establishment seems more appropriate as a coffee table art
book of the rich and the famous than as the rigorous analysis of a
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Canadian reality that it is. Maybe we are, as American social scientist
Francis Fukuyama would say, a "low-trust society," a fertile ground
for family businesses, but one that has difficulty adapting to success-
ful globalization, compared to "high-trust societies" such as Japan,
Germany, or the United States.2 But this view of ourselves may be
undergoing profound transformation with the mastery, by many more
Canadians, of mutual funds and stock markets, the phenomenon of
company mergers, and globalization.
That defining the status of women is a great Canadian debate
should not surprise anyone. For a good thirty years now, Canada has
shared with the Scandinavian countries the remarkable distinction of
being among the few Western nations that have been officially dis-
cussing, and acting on, feminist issues at all levels of government. This
does not mean that Canada is the ideal feminist environment even if
the public debate does include women and women's issues. This
debate is about reforms, not radical changes, and this marks the dif-
ference between Canada and the Nordic countries. Here, the debate
must remain sensible, for only then do all people feel comfortable and
reassured that social change will not take place at their expense.
Modern feminism has truly been a social movement in Canada and
has remained one at least in Quebec, with the anti-poverty march of
the Federation des Femmes du Quebec under Franchise David's lead-
ership, that resulted in the Fall 2000 World March of Women. In 1982,
the equality clause was enshrined in Section 28 of the Constitution and
Charter of Rights. This makes our American neighbours envious, for
its equivalent, the Equal Rights Amendment, was never passed as the
27th amendment to the US Constitution.
The other debate is one that takes place among the citizenry, one
that many politicians and senior officials do not seem to see and hear,
or are ashamed of: world peace and development. As Margaret Catley-
Carlson, former president of the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA) put it: "Whatever our motivation - religious, human-
itarian, ethical, idealistic - it is powerful. It is the bedrock of public
support for an official aid program ... the level of public support [for
aid and development over the decades] has stayed high in Canada, in
the 70 to 85 percent range." And, referring to a 1987 survey, she added
that "nine out of ten [Canadians] wanted Canada to be among the
more generous donors or a world leader in development assistance."3
We have no reason to doubt that this sentiment has changed, even if
many Canadians are sceptical about whether development and aid
From Beer Commercials to Medicare: In Search of Identity 177
actually work. In the same way that Canadians think of themselves as
egalitarian at home, they feel comfortable with a foreign policy based
on an equal partnership among all nations and have never had any
expansionist desires. Being the northern neighbour of the wealthiest
and only superpower, they are very much aware of the interdepen-
dence of nations. Even if their once strong support of American
foreign policy has slipped seriously over the last decade, they remain
loyal partners, while their officials try to impress Canadian viewpoints
and nuances on their Washington counterparts, not always with suc-
cess. Three topics particularly interest them: famine and poverty; the
plight of refugees; and peace and security, including denuclearization
of the world. It is as if the national conversation on these issues pro-
gresses along an informal network that covers the country. But it is not
a national debate, for official Canada wants to dissociate itself from
these 'soft' issues so close to the population.
These Canadian 'silences' and 'debates/ although controversial,
like so many reflections published about ourselves in comparison to our
neighbours to the South - for example, Staines's edition of The Forty-
Ninth and Other Parallels, or Malcolm's The Canadians - do not seem to
meet once and for all our unending quest for identity.4 No discussion of
what kind of a society we are can avoid speaking to who we are.
And discussing who we are in the year 2000 cannot be done with-
out mentioning the stupefying phenomenon of current TV
commercials that choose to do just that: selling goods by asserting, not
their products, but who we are, and who we are in relation to the
Americans. Canadians will remember the Molson beer ads and the
mythical "Joe Canadian."
Hey, I'm not a lumberjack or a fur trader.
I don't live in an igloo, or eat blubber or own a dog sled,
And I don't know Jimmy, Sally or Suzie from Canada, although I'm
certain they're really, really nice.
I have a prime minister, not a president.
I speak English and French, not American, and I pronounce it
'about' not 'a boot'.
I can proudly sew my country's flag on my backpack.
I believe in peace keeping not policing, diversity not assimilation,
and that the beaver is a truly proud and noble animal.
A toque is a hat, a chesterfield is a couch and it is pronounced 'zed',
not 'zee' - 'zed'.
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Canada is the second-largest land mass, the first nation of hockey,
and the best part of North America.
My name is Joe and I am Canadian.
Thank you.5
But another TV commercial also ran concurrently that I saw repeatedly
on the CBC - this time promoting Purex Advanced, a detergent. It
stated that "We, Canadians, we work more [implied: than the
Americans], play more, sweat more and eat more, and our clothes
show it," hence the need for a super powerful detergent. Another ad,
appealing to nationalistic gut feelings, had Burger King saying: "And
we have it your way, Canada!"
CBOT (CBC-TV) Neivsday had a special interview with the creator
of the Molson ad, during which he confirmed it as an unprecedented
success. Everyone wants to use the ad. We know he is not bragging.
Conservative leader Joe Clark paraphrased it at his party's national
convention in Quebec City. Heritage Minister Sheila Copps showed it
in Boston at an official conference. I was at Canada House in London
when our High Commission received a video copy of the ad and
enthusiastically announced that it will be used in their future presen-
tations promoting Canada. We watch it, ranted by the actor, in live
performances at theatres and hockey games. The Ottawa Citizen of
19 April 2000, in its coverage of the Stanley Cup playoffs, reported
that: "After his live recitation before 18,500 fans at the Corel Centre
Monday night [April 17], actor Jeff Douglas, 28, was rewarded with a
standing ovation. The same has happened in arenas from Toronto to
Vancouver." And it seems that there is now a website for "The Rant."
The commercial was written by thirty-five-year-old Glen Hunt of
the Bensimon Byrne D'Arcy agency in Toronto. When interviewed, he
referred to several street interviews of young people, aged nineteen to
twenty-five, during which he had elicited their feelings about a num-
ber of topics, including their views about Canada. "It was really like a
boiling volcano waiting to boil up and erupt," he said, adding that he
composed the 136 words in about fifteen minutes - with some polish-
ing afterwards - for they were things he'd always wanted to say.
The sociologist in me noted the cultural phenomenon, but I will let
the audience draw its own conclusions. Three commercial ads at the
same time - and there may be more - exploiting crude nationalism
'against' the Americans means that market studies have told the
advertising business that it sells. There may be a more profound mean-
From Beer Commercials to Medicare: In Search of Identity 179
ing to it but I do not think so. "The Rant" (Joe Canadian) should be
taken at face value: a collective shout, no more, aimed at people who
do not hear us. More interesting are the recent focus groups conducted
by Environics Research Group for the Bank of Canada that sought to
identify a popular consensus on Canadian icons for our new currency
bank notes. Well, the only icon that met with some degree of agree-
ment was ... the Famous Five, the women who obtained from the
British Privy Council the judgment that women were "persons"! So we
have a problem; we define ourselves by the negative and when the
time comes for positive identification of who we are, we do not easily
recognize heroes and we are weary of icons.
Let us move from images of ourselves to common values to see if
we can find more agreement there. Medicare, our universal health care
system, would appear to meet the test. The most loved government
programme over the decades, all Canadians, including Quebecers, are
quite proud of it, even when they worry about its future as they do
right now. Only thirty years old, Medicare has become deeply
entrenched in the Canadian identity.6 But we are not talking here of
the quality or range of medical care, the way we train our nurses, how
our hospitals are organized, or who pays what to whom and how.
What interests us in a discussion of the texture of our society is the col-
lective belief that our health care system makes us different than
others, especially the Americans, by virtue of some intrinsic moral
superiority that we attach to our Medicare. As a piece of legislation,
the Canada Health Act, 1984, which spells out the five basic conditions
or principles of the system, has now reached icon status - so loaded
with emotions that it is impossible for any politician to risk reopening
the Act, even to improve it.
Public figures like to repeat that while Americans consider health
care as a market commodity, we, Canadians, are proud to see it as a
public good, "a common citizenship right - something that all
Canadians will need at some point in their lives, and something which
is available to them because they share a Canadian identity." 7 In the
words of health economist Bob Evans, "the Canadian health care sys-
tem, precisely because it is different, responds to and reflects
significant, if perhaps subtle, features of 'Canadianness/ It is one of the
most convincing forms of evidence, perhaps the most convincing, that
we are not Americans after all. ... At the most basic level, the public
funding system embodies a view of the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the environment. Nature is, at best, rather hostile and
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difficult to control. With no regard for virtue or vice, illness or injury
can strike anyone. There is no moral reason why the victim should be
exposed to financial insult on top of physical injury. Health care in
Canada is free, because to charge the patient is to tax the sick." 8
Health care systems are the product of specific historical and
socio-economic circumstances; they evolve, rooted in each country's
political culture, in its value system. In that sense, health care systems
are not easily exportable. As far back as post-World War I, we can doc-
ument historically why and how the Canadian health care system
developed as a universal and comprehensive programme, and why
and how the American initiatives to that effect failed miserably, end-
ing up in two restricted and targeted programmes - Medicaid and
Medicare. We can show how European immigrants of a socialist tradi-
tion influenced Canadian political parties and politics, while the same
immigration remained a marginal factor in American politics - a
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, local political culture. We can explain how the
Canadian parliamentary system makes it easier to pass government
legislation in the House of Commons than does the American presi-
dential system in Congress and Senate, It is harder, however, to
explain how an ethic of shared responsibility comes about. As Bob
Rae, one of the rare public figures to speak about values these days,
says in his discussion of Rabbi Hillel's three questions: "Social democ-
racy is about reciprocal rights and responsibilities. It is about what we
owe each other. ... The extension of public, tax-based support for
health care and education are rightly seen as the bedrock of modern
solidarity. ... Public health insurance is a key expression of the princi-
ple of solidarity."9
Some will argue, rightly so, that the principle of solidarity and the
value of sharing do not appear to be very high on the public agenda
these days. For twenty years in the United States, fifteen in Canada,
excessive individualism and self-fulfilment - 'me-ism' - has been the
rule. The Reagan administration, rooted in neo-conservative eco-
nomics and the supremacy of the market, preached public budget
reductions, tax cuts, deregulation, and general economic renewal
through less government, to the detriment of any other public agenda.
This ideology swept across North America and, in general, the
Western world. Questions of fairness and equity were no longer heard.
The "blame the victim" doctrine freed individuals from any collective
responsibility. If I succeed, and if my neighbour, separately, also suc-
ceeds, there will of necessity be a "trickle down" effect for those at the
From Beer Commercials to Medicare: In Search of Identity 181
bottom, the theory goes. Galbraith, talking to America of its political
complacency, ridiculed the situation, saying that "Americans were
being rewarded as they so richly deserved. If some did not participate,
it was because of their inability or by their choice'... [Reagan's] appeal
was widespread; it allowed Americans to escape their consciences and
their social concerns and thus to feel a glow of self-approval." 10 Ten
years earlier, the sociologist Etzioni pleaded with fellow Americans for
the need for renewed "mutuality" on the eve of the new millennium -
for an enhanced commitment to others and to shared concerns.11 How
different from the Americans are we really?
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The Multicultural Wheel: The Texture
of Canadian Society and Literature in
the Twenty-first Century
Maya Dutt*
M ULTICULTURAL QUESTIONS HAVE PERVADED ART, LITERATURE,and sociopolitical and economic studies for several decades
now. The questions reflect the wide spectrum of concerns central to
any discussion of multiculturalism. They critically examine problem-
atic areas like canonization of specific cultures, affirmation of a
mainstream 'we' as distinct from a marginal 'other,' and foreground-
ing of ethnicity and literary response. They point out, curiously
enough, that dual currents coexist - a community consciousness and
an ethnic awareness together with a desire for a supra-ethnic national
identity which will forge national consciousness.
Canada has a rich and varied multicultural population profile.
Ethnically heterogeneous, it has about 36 per cent white British
Canadians, 32 per cent French Canadians, 2 per cent Natives; the
remainder made up of diverse ethnic origins such as Asian, African,
European, and Jewish. Immigrants from all parts of the world have
contributed to its demographic evolution. Whereas at the turn of the
twentieth century the influx of immigrants came from Europe and
Eastern Russia, during the last thirty years, the major source of immi-
grants to Canada has been from the Asia-Pacific region. This ethnic
diversity shows all signs of broadening still further in the twenty-first
century. The evolving global, demographic, and economic trends seem
to suggest that Canada's future immigrants will come from non-tradi-
tional countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Canada 1985:668).
The research on which this article is based was funded with the assistance of the
government of Canada through the Canadian Studies Programme of the Shastri
Indo-Canadian Institute (SICI). Neither the government of Canada nor SICI neces-
sarily endorses the views expressed herein.
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Many programs have been initiated to create an awareness of multi-
culturalism in Canada. The multicultural policy of 1971 as well as
programs implemented to date, however, do not seem to have met the
needs of the minority. "To a large extent multiculturalism has been
treated as a folkloric extravaganza, a social handicap and a political
football" (Passaris 1989:3). Many works of literature reflect the cultural
and political bitterness of immigrant communities. As Passaris
affirms, "it would seem that the federal government's original policy
has run its course and is no longer an adequate foundation for vision-
ary and creative programs and initiatives that will pave the way for a
vibrant, dynamic and harmonious Canadian society by the turn of the
century" (1989:3). A new approach needs to be devised that will
ensure and guarantee the full and equal co-operation of all Canadians
in the various spheres of nation building. The 1987 bill entitled An Act
for the Preservation and Enhancement of Multiculturalism in Canada has
laid a legislative foundation for a new vision of multiculturalism. This
bill may well become the springboard for a positive and creative mul-
ticulturalism, where the priceless asset of multiracial human resources
in Canada can be used to its full potential to evolve a great nation.
Literature reflects the times, and immigrant literary texts serve as
major points of reference for the dual purpose of exploring and evalu-
ating the different racial, cultural, religious, and value orientations
that are in the process of evolving and merging with one another and
with the mainstream culture. The texts are in fact authoritative cultural
studies that "cut across diverse social and political interests and
address many of the struggles within the current scene" (Grossberg et
al. 1992:1-3). They are politically engaged since they question inequal-
ities within power structures and seek to restructure relationships
among dominant and subordinated cultures. They examine the entire
range of a society's belief and institutions, the means of production of
texts and other paraliterary questions such as publication, distribution,
and marketing. Much of the immigrant and Native Canadian litera-
tures produced in the recent past deals with multicultural issues that
either posit unity in diversity or seek a merger of the various racial and
cultural groups in Canada. The texts seem to suggest that both of these
are myths where the core symbols are distance and difference. The lit-
erary construction of such myths can explain, justify, or even
undermine an existing reality. Just as British colonizers justified their
presence in the colonies on the basis of the myth of the racial inferior-
ity of the colonized peoples, so runs a counter myth of a heroic past
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and a rich cultural heritage. It then becomes a celebration of difference
rather than of unity.
Native and immigrant literary texts often seem to support the idea
of a genuine aspiration to recognize and appreciate diversities, despite
the differences among tens of thousands of Asians, Latin Americans,
Mexicans, West Indians, not to mention the Native Canadians them-
selves. Newly empowered voices ask for their narratives to be heard.
A few selected texts by some representative writers of both minority
cultures are examined here with a view to prove that "the culture of
the next century will put a premium on people's ability to deal pro-
ductively with conflict and cultural differences," as Graff and Phelan
observe, for "learning by controversy is sound training for citizenship
in that future" (Graff and Phelan 1995:v). Works of fiction by writers
such as M.G. Vassanji and Bharati Mukherjee are evaluated as exam-
ples of the South Asian diaspora in Canada, while selected works of
the Native Canadian writers Jeannette Armstrong and Basil Johnston
provide the basis for studying the cultural differences inherent in yet
another cog in the Canadian multicultural wheel. These cogs, as their
works reveal, are engaged in the process of learning to participate
meaningfully in all the issues critically important to society, culture,
and government. This empowerment of the so-called marginal groups
- retaining rather than submerging their distinctive identities - effects
itself through the utilization of language as strategy and weapon. The
problematic of cultural difference is linguistically embedded in the
texts produced by immigrant writers in their attempts to vocalize the
anxiety provoked by the hybridization of lifestyle and of language
itself. As Bhabha asks: "Where do you draw the line between lan-
guages? Between cultures? Between disciplines? Between peoples?"
(1994:59). The immigrant as well as Native Canadian writers have cho-
sen to give voice to their psychic, cultural, and territorial anguish in an
alien language that they have made as much a part of themselves as
their mother tongues.
The term 'South Asia' has acquired numerous imaginative identi-
ties for Europeans and others - in its various guises as the
Subcontinent and its association with the isle of Serendip and the glo-
ries of the Raj. It has been both the cradle of Gandhism and a tourist's
dream of uncountable riches and/or nightmares of teeming poverty.
Although many Canadian writers have participated in this sort of con-
ceptualization (from Sara Jeannette Duncan to Sharon Pollock), the
literature written by the South Asians themselves has been less widely
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appreciated. At the outset, it must be admitted that an inherent weak-
ness in the literature by South Asians in Canada is these authors'
excessive concern with their countries of origin and not enough with
Canada, their new land by adoption. Except for one slender novel, No
New Land, the majority of Vassanji's novels are set in Tanzania, his
country of origin, Rohinton Mistry's novels are set in India, and all
except the latest of Michael Ondaatje's offerings are placed anywhere
but in Canada. This leads to a certain degree of decontextualization or
rather dual contextualization. An answer to this may perhaps be
sought in the fact that so many South Asian Canadians are caught
between two cultural worlds, and any understanding of their actions
presupposes this type of dual contextualization. Immigrants carry with
them the cultural baggage of old traditions, familiar forms of ritual
practices, and aspects of culture such as dress, lifestyle, songs, stories,
and folklore. Their immigration constrains their ability to live a tradi-
tion-based lifestyle, but not their overwhelming need. Encountering the
challenges of the new traditions in their new homeland, they become
part of the challenge merely by their presence in the environment.
South Asian immigrants belong to different racial, cultural, religious,
and value orientations and have found it difficult to adjust to the new
and complex mix of peoples and cultures in their changed environ-
ment. This is obvious from the wide variety of South Asian Canadian
writing that cannot be treated as one cohesive unit. The term "South
Asian writing" includes more than it excludes. It implies not only
immigrants who have come to Canada directly from Sri Lanka, India,
Pakistan, or Bangladesh, but also those generations of Caribbeans and
Africans whose roots can be traced to India. Many first-generation
writers communicate the tensions of psyches that have been doubly
displaced, portraying not only the physical and economic deprivations
that drove them from their native lands, but also the hostility, racism,
and neglect they had to face in their new homeland. There is evidence,
among most South Asian Canadian writers, of a consistent pattern of
dealing with the countries of origin in their earlier works, and then
moving on to Canadian subjects and themes.
Vassanji's No New Land (1991) is an example of the writing of a
South Asian Canadian writer taking on Canadian subjects in his work
as he develops a greater affinity with his new homeland. Yet his latest
work, The Book of Secrets (1994), goes back to his racial past, as did his
earlier works, The Gunny Sack (1989) and Uhuru Street (1992). This
evinces a felt need on the part of the immigrant writer to rediscover
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the shared communal/cultural past that will function as a frame of ref-
erence for the uprooted community to know who it is in relation to
what it was and thereby acquire self-knowledge and self-pride.
Vassanji, in his writings, endeavours to provide such a map for his
people. So great was his urge to assume the role of transmitter and
preserver of his cultural inheritance that he took to fiction writing as a
full-time job. He says: "I write about my own people because we are a
people without any sense of history and place ... We know the name
of the place we stay, we know our immediate surroundings, but we
tend to look towards a future - of a better future maybe. But where is
our past? Where are our roots?" (Quoted in Gill.)
Salim Kala's quest for his roots, for his self, for the traces of his past
in The Gunny Sack becomes writer Vassanji's quest as well. Where The
Gunny Sack is an assertion of the historical presence of African Indians
in Africa, The Book of Secrets is part generational history, part social
chronicle, part detective story, a living tapestry joining the past to the
present. Sandwiched between these novels is No New Land - a novel
which Vassanji says he wrote "purely for fun" (Nasta 1991:21). No New
Land illustrates the writer's continuing preoccupation to write his com-
munity into existence in Toronto; it centres on the lives of some of the
Asians who emigrated from Dar-es-Salaam to Canada, and how they
re-defined themselves in an alien land. He gives a voice and a being to
his people who are silent and, by the same token, "absent from or invis-
ible" in the dominant discourse in Canada. Vassanji re-presents
Toronto with its superstores, high-rises, and CN Tower blinking a mes-
sage that these Asian immigrants cannot decode. It is a Toronto seen
through the eyes of an 'othered' Asian - a world of wonders and con-
cealed booby-traps where every step is a mystery "fraught with
belittling embarrassments, and people waiting to show you up" (No
New Land:32). These Asians had left Africa - their home for several gen-
erations - and come to Canada "with a deep sense that they had to try
to determine [their future], meet it part-way and wrest a respectable
niche in this new society" (No New LandA3). To their dismay they find
that the new society is not so eager to open its doors to them. Jobs are
scarcer to come by than hen's teeth. Nurdin Lalani realizes that subtle
racial prejudices work against him in the arena of job-hunting -
"Canadian experience" being the trump card they always call:
The first few rejected job applications he took in stride: a few disap-
pointments only to enhance the sweetness of eventual success. But
the pattern persisted, and slowly in his mind the barest shadow
became discernible, of impending despair, the merest possibility of a
jobless vista ahead, but nonetheless frightening (No New Land-ASA).
This is Canada. The Lalanis uncover a new meaning of this oft-
repeated phrase - one altogether different from that obtaining in white
Canadian discourse. Vassanji's concern is to show how Asian immi-
grants adjust to the new reality. The past in which the immigrants are
firmly rooted becomes a deadly quicksand in a changed environment.
They have to come to terms with their past: not escape from it but
acknowledge it in order to face the present reality and move toward
the future. "Before, the past tried to fix you from a distance, and you
looked away ... Now it was all over you. And with this past before
you, all around you, you take on the future more evenly matched" (No
New Land:207).
Jamal, as well as Fatima, shows the pragmatism that is essential
for survival. Jamal emerges as the most vibrant of all the personages in
the novel. There is no doubt that No New Land is more clearly identifi-
able as Canadian, dealing as it does with the harsh realities of the
immigrants' experiences, and of the angst of the human spirit caught
between two worlds. However, it is ironic that this novel, which is
about exile, does not have the scope, grandeur, or significance of
Vassanji's earlier works, such as The Gunny Sack, Uhuru Street, or The
Book of Secrets, which seem to be works of exile. As another immigrant
writer, A.H. Itwaru, claims, "To be in exile is considerably more than
being in another country. It is to live with myself knowing my
estrangement" (1989:202). No New Land is all about this sense of alien-
ation experienced by a displaced community as its life intersects with
the larger population. It is paradoxical that this more ostensibly
Canadian work takes second place to The Gunny Sack. Texts such as No
New Land fit more precisely into the debate about multiculturalism
while not representing immigrant writing in Canada.
The most impressive novels of the South Asian fiction writers are
set outside Canada, have nothing to do with "Canadian experience" or
the Canadian landscape, and cause a Frank Davey to marginalize them
by offering the excuse that they "contain few if any significations of
Canada or of Canadian polity" (Davey 1993:97). Such an exclusion is
paradoxical, considering the claim inherent in the title of Davey's
book, Post-national Arguments, and the ideals enshrined in the Canadian
Multiculturalism Act, 1985, that seek to dismantle the danger of any one
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group asserting its influence and hegemony over another. The bottom-
line is that writers perceived as 'ethnic' are offered, at best, the promise
of inclusion without assimilation in the much-publicized trope of the
'mosaic.' The divisiveness within the term 'South Asian' is itself too
vast and entrenched, allowing the danger of not finding a common
ground for discussion. The concepts of colour, ethnicity, and race can-
not be subsumed within the comforting pieties of an inclusivist
theorizing. The notions of pluralism and multiculturalism offer vari-
ous options. While pluralism maintains that human beings should be
viewed as unique persons, race being their least important attribute,
multiculturalism holds that people should be seen first and foremost
as representatives of their groups, race being crucial to the argument.
Such simplifications cannot do justice to the cause of the immigrant
writer in Canada. Although many have been published by leading
publishers, they are not received in the same manner as white writers.
An immigrant woman writer perhaps is doubly marginalized as is
evident from an examination of Bharati Mukherjee's work. Her writ-
ings tend to be treated as part of South Asian Canadiana despite her
having changed her country of domicile - they deal with specifically
Canadian experiences. Some satirize the federal Department of
Citizenship and Immigration, some encapsulate the insularity of
Indians in Canada, some reveal the abyss between the races despite
good intentions. Mukherjee is a controversial writer in that she has
managed to alienate the Indian audience while endearing herself to
non-Indian readers and critics. Perhaps this is attributable to the
"Indian-bashing" evident in such novels as The Tiger's Daughter, Wife,
or Jasmine, which is a trivialization of the Khalistan issue interspersed
with shallow delineations of stereotyped characters. However, her
short stories, collected in Darkness (1985) as well as The Middleman and
Other Stories (1988), draw on her immigrant experience in Canada.
Perhaps one can detect shades of paranoia or a persecution complex
when Mukherjee says:
In the years that I spent in Canada - 1966 to 1980 - I discovered that
the country is hostile to its citizens who had been born in hot, moist
continents like Asia; that the country proudly boasts of its opposition
to the whole concept of cultural assimilation ... in Canada I was fre-
quently taken for a prostitute or a shoplifter, frequently assumed to
be a domestic, praised by astonished auditors that I didn't have a
"sing-song" accent. The society itself, or important elements in that
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society, routinely made crippling assumptions about me, and about
my 'kind' (Darkness:1!).
If a well-educated, even Westernized Asian, can be traumatized by such
experiences, one need not wonder about the shattering agony and grow-
ing insecurity experienced by others less fortunately circumstanced.
Many of the Indo-Canadian protagonists of Mukherjee's stories
are innocents abroad, lost souls in an alien environment, trapped by
forces they cannot hope to control. Their quest for love, friendship,
communion, security, and identity are systemically blocked by overt
as well as covert racism. Their transplantation on alien soil has gener-
ated ills that cannot be cursed by old-world mores. Mukherjee's
"uneasy stories about expatriation" in Canada (Darkness:l985:2-3) as
well as her more exuberant and confident stories about slow-but-sure
assimilation into the melting pot of the US - effectually underscore the
helplessness of the immigrant in the no-man's land between two cul-
tures - the one they have left behind and the other they have yet to
gain. Mukherjee clothes the travails of her disenchanted characters in
the garb of self-conscious parody that assumes an ironical dimension:
Like V.S. Naipaul ... I tried to explore state-of-the-art expatriation.
Like Naipaul, I used a mordant and self-protective irony in describ-
ing my character's pain. Irony promised both detachment from, and
superiority over, those well-bred post-colonials much like myself,
adrift in the new world, wondering if they would ever belong
(Darkness:!).
The question to be pondered is whether old-world beliefs can offer
some measure of relief in the climate of "new-world reasonableness"
(Darkness:64). Learning by controversy is sound training for the citizen
of the future. Learning to participate meaningfully in all the issues per-
tinent to the new society's culture and government seems to be an
uphill task for the average immigrant. Yet it must be done. The two
distinctive cultures between which the immigrants and their progeny
find themselves need not necessarily be in conflict if one is seen as a
support to the other. No Asian can hope to ignore his roots - the 'vis-
ible' nature of his ethnicity disallows it. Old World tradition and
culture, like religion, are best seen in the nature of moral and spiritual
support. The writer's cultural-cum-spiritual contribution to the pro-
cess of nation building takes shape in empowerment through
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language, utilization of the word as strategy and weapon. As Cyril
Dabydeen remarks, "The collective Canadian spirit is enhanced and
enriched by the varied cultural streams and in the fusion of old and
new traditions towards a vital celebration of the oneness of the evolv-
ing Canadian consciousness" (1987:10).
The situation in Canada is rendered more complex because of the
presence of Native Canadian writing that is always about Canada,
unlike South Asian Canadian writing which sometimes occupies a
slightly different spatiotemporal region. There is no more a homoge-
neous identity to Native Canadian writing than there is to South Asian
immigrant writing. The differences in culture and tradition, and even
more so in language, are equally vast and apparently insurmountable.
There are fundamental rifts between the Native peoples of Canada
and those who colonized them centuries ago. An ongoing internal
colonialism affects the multiple layers of their relations in Canada,
including art and literature. The rifts are manifest in the inequality of
economic, social, and cultural power between the two groups, rifts
that can perhaps be traced to the ambivalent attitude toward Natives
that has prevailed since the white man first set foot on Canadian soil.
Native Canadians were long imprisoned within the twin stereotypical
formulations of 'noble savage' and 'implacable foe.' Today, the image
encountered is more often one of poor victims of circumstances
beyond their control.
Contrary to expectations, Canada's Natives have not become
extinct, although much of their religions, languages, and entire tribal
cultures have been submerged in the attempt to 'civilize' them
through Western education and the Christian religion. History has
proved the falsehood of the doomed culture theory. Far from disap-
pearing, Canada's Native population is now increasing at a faster rate
than the general population. There is also a strong indication that an
erstwhile oral tradition is emerging into a highly articulate and formal
literature. "We have not faded into the earth like snow before the
summer sun of 'progress' nor have we stagnated in some sort of ret-
rograde time capsule. We have survived and will continue to survive
because of, and in spite of, the changes," asserts Kateri Damm, Native
Canadian critic and poet (Armstrong 1993:16).
Critics and writers like Maria Campbell and Lee Maracle strongly
affirm that indigenous cultures and languages have survived because
of Native peoples' strong links to the land, the 'Mother' despite the
onslaught of Euro-Canadian culture on their resources and their lands.
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Deep-seated resentment exists among many Native Canadian writers
towards the paternalistic, colonial policies that were initiated suppos-
edly to civilize and Christianize indigenous peoples, towards the
residential schools and missionaries who conspired to remove the
gynocratic influence from the spiritual, political, economic, and social
realms of the indigenous peoples' lives. Nonetheless, these peoples'
very numerous and distinct cultures have continued to be transmitted
from one generation to another through language, song, dance, tradi-
tional economic practice, and governing structure. These specific
indigenous ways continue to provide a spiritual, social, political, and
economic context that distinguishes Native peoples from non-Native
peoples and contributes to the formulation of self.
The issue of identity seems to affect all layers of existence of the
indigenous peoples. In the past, their 'Nativeness' had so often been
defined by others, and to such an extent, that at times their awareness
and knowledge of themselves had been obliterated. A multiplicity of
definitions - status, non-status, treaty, urban, on reserve, off-reserve,
mixed bloods, enfranchised, and the like - has forced Native Canadian
writers to reconsider some of the assumptions underpinning their own
literature. During the past two decades - despite cynical and skeptical
reactions from the domain of mainstream literature - more and more
Native Canadians have found their voice and have recorded the mul-
titude of problems that have affected them. Their common aim seems
to be "to distinguish once and for all, right from wrong, truth from fic-
tion - to set the record straight ... Understanding themselves in this
challenging social context is their task" (Petrone 1990:139). Many of
these writers are already able to deal with the culture clash and their
own identity, with perception, detachment, and control, moving
beyond the worst excesses of emotion and diction that marred earlier
protest literature.
One of the reasons why Native literature is so interesting is that
while it enshrines very old traditions, as a literature it is very young,
and so are most of its writers. These writers have learned to draw on
their ancient traditions - renewing their bonds with a biospheric world
where all manner of things participate in a dynamic cosmic relation-
ship. Many of the recent works of literature incorporate the
significance of ancient ceremonies and rituals, the special role of elders
as wise counsellors and custodians of cultural and spiritual beliefs, the
importance of community life, the bonding between the young and the
elderly, the voice of vision and prophecy. This, then, is their answer to
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the deadening, strangling effects of a modern civilization that denies
the societal instincts of man. The so-called mainstream culture has
much to imbibe from these traditional influences, instead of relegating
Native literature to the margins as a ghettoized literature and a histor-
ical curiosity. As Daniel David Moses comments: "My image of that
mainstream is that it is pretty wide but it's spiritually shallow. I don't
think we are worried about being 'subsumed.' If we become part of
that mainstream, we're going to be the deep currents" (Moses and
Goldie 1992:xiv).
If literature provides an avenue into the perceptions of reality by
other people across cultures and generations, then it behoves non-
Natives to stop and listen, to try to understand what it means to be
Native. For Natives have access to cultural traditions that have
enabled them to survive under extreme conditions; they have ways of
perceiving and dealing with life and literature that derive from an
ecosystemic, non-anthropomorphic perspective on the world which
we are all in dire need of.
If Jeannette Armstrong has dealt with the brutal themes of colo-
nialism, cultural and physical deprivation, and racial genocide, she
has ameliorated these by attempting to find a way out through spiri-
tual reaffirmation and active political struggle. The protagonist of
Slash realizes that he has to rebuild the life of his people:
I had to find out what things were left of the old ways in my own
Tribe and make it usable in our modern Indian lives ... Like our lan-
guage. We couldn't preserve it by having a linguist come and record
it ... We could only preserve it by using it. It was the same with our
values and our rights (S/fls/z:210-ll).
Issues of assimilation and integration have continued to remain
problematic for Native Canadians, as much as for the South Asian
immigrants. A fresh answer to the question, "What does it mean to be
Canadian?" has to be sought; the basic philosophies inherent in this
discussion have to be re-examined in the interests of nation building.
Most Native Canadians unequivocally feel that adjustments must be
made on both sides. As Basil Johnston explains in his foreword to
Rupert Ross's book, Dancing with a Ghost:
as long as the governments and the agencies of this country fail to
recognize that many original peoples of this country still cling to their
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different values and institutions, and so long as they insist that the
original peoples abandon their ancestral heritage and embrace
European culture, so long will penalties be unconsciously imposed
upon the Natives and injustices and injuries be committed. And so
long as the government and the officials of this country continue to
act as if the original peoples are the only ones in need of instruction
and improvement, so long will suspicion and distrust persist
(1992:ix).
Native Canadian literature has in recent years given the lie to the
criticism that it is all about the agony of a segregated and marginalized
existence. The horror stories are offset by works, such as Johnston's
Moose Meat and Wild Rice, that bear testimony to the fact that a rollick-
ing sense of humour underpins the Native temperament. The
exhilarating stories in this collection depict present-day Indians and
Indian-white relations, with the gentle satire cutting both ways. Light,
but nevertheless realistic, narrated as fiction but based on fact, the
escapades undertaken by the populace of Moose Meat Reserve encom-
pass havoc and hilarity, prejudice and pretense. The impression these
stories leave behind is that all is not lost - that bridges of understand-
ing can be built between two worlds (red and white) that exist now as
separate realities. The predicament of the Native Canadian is one of
non-existent choices: to assimilate or not to assimilate. It seems, ironi-
cally enough, that they are damned if they do, damned if they don't.
But there is a glow of optimism here in these stories - the spirit of
indomitable courage and resourcefulness in the face of a multitude of
social and psychological problems that seem grim to an outsider. As
Edward Said remarks, "narratives of emancipation and enlightenment
in their strongest form were also narratives of integration not separa-
tion, the stories of people who had been excluded from the main group
but who were now fighting for a place in it" (1993:xxx). The main-
stream culture has to be flexible enough to admit new groups since
basically all cultures are involved in one another and no single culture
is pure.
I would like to conclude with a quote from one of the most pow-
erful voices among Native Canadians - that of Jeannette Armstrong:
In my quest for empowerment of my people through writing, there
are two things of which I must steadfastly remind myself. The first is
that ... although severe ... damage has been wrought, healing can
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take place through cultural affirmation ... The second ... is that the
dominating culture's reality is that it seeks to affirm itself continu-
ously and must be taught that numbers are not the basis of
democracy, people are ... It must be pushed, in Canada, to understand
and accept that this country is multi-racial and multi-cultural now ...
It is this promotion of an ideal which will ... make possible the re-
learning of co-operation and sharing in place of domination
(Armstrong 1992:209-10).
References
Armstrong, J., ed. 1993. Looking at the Words of Our People: First Nations
Analysis of Literature. Penticton, BC: Theytus.
. 1992. "The Disempowerment of First North American Peoples and
Empowerment Through Their Writing." In An Anthropology of Canadian
Native Literature in English, ed. D.D. Moses and T. Goldie, 207-11.
Toronto: Oxford University Press.
. Slash. 1985. Penticton, BC: Theytus.
Begum, J. and M. Dutt, eds. 1996, South Asian Canadiana. Madras: Anu
Chithra.
Bhabha, H.K. 1994. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge.
Canada. Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development
Prospects for Canada. 1985. Report.
Dabydeen, C, ed. 1987. A Shapely Fire: Changing the Literary Landscape.
Oakville, ON: Mosaic Press.
Davey, F. 1993. Post-national Arguments: The Politics of the Anglophone
Canadian Novel since 1967. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Gill, H.K. 1992. "Discovering the Past in Uhuru Street." Sunday Observer.
29 February.
Graff, G. and J. Phelan, eds. 1995. Adventures of Huckleberry Finn: A Case Study
In Critical Controversy. Boston: St. Martins Press.
Grossberg, Lawrence, et al., eds. 1992. Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge.
Guerin, W.L. et al. 1992. A Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature, 4th ed.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Itwaru, A.H. 1989. "Exile and Commemoration." In Indenture and Exile: The
Indo-Caribbean Experience, ed. F. Birbalsingh. Toronto: TSAR Publications.
Moses, D.D. and T. Goldie, eds. 1992. An Anthology of Canadian Native
Literature in English. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Mukherjee, B. 1985. Darkness. Markham, ON: Penguin Canada.
196 Maya Dutt
Nasta, S. 1991. "Interview with Moyez Vassanji." Wasafiri (16): 19-21.
Passaris, C. 1989. "Canadian Multiculturalism: The Wealth of a Nation." In
Multicultural and Intercultural Education: Building Canada. Calgary, AB:
Detselig.
Petrone, P. 1990. Native Literature in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University
Press.
Ross, R. 1992. Dancing with a Ghost: Exploring Indian Reality. Markham, ON:
Reed Books.
Said, E.W. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. London: Chatto & Windus.
Vassanji, M.G. 1991. No New Land. Toronto: McClelland Stewart.
. The Gunny Sack. 1989. New Delhi: Viking-Penguin India.
CULTURE, IDENTITY, AND THE MARKET
CULTURE, IDENTITE ET MARCHE
This page intentionally left blank 
Packaging Canada/Packaging Places:
Tourism, Culture, and Identity
in the Twenty-first Century
C. Michael Hall
T HE LANDSCAPE - WHICH INCLUDES THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT ANDits material and social practices, as well as their symbolic repre-
sentation (Zukin 1991:16) - may be read as a text (McBride 1999).
Based on the premise that "landscapes are communicative devices that
encode and transmit information" (Duncan 1990:4), researchers exam-
ine both the 'tropes' that communicate this information and how they
are read by those who come into contact with them. Tropes are signs
and symbols into which various meanings are condensed. They
include items in, and of, the built and physical environment - such as
buildings, monuments, public spaces, trees, and parks - and also
signs, slogans, relationships, brands, and even language(s) associated
with the landscape under study. This last includes the languages of
consumption associated with specific places and spaces (Jackson and
Taylor 1996; Hall 1997). As a 'text', therefore, landscape is multidi-
mensional, lending itself to many interpretations. As a conceptual tool,
reading the landscape not only illustrates the ideology of the land-
scape (Cosgrove 1984:15), but it can also illuminate the way it may
"reproduce social and political practices" (Duncan 1990:18). For exam-
ple, King (1990:53-4) explained how the ideological context of the
garden-city movement is "expressive of an implicit environmental
determinism." Similarly, Kearns, and Philo (1993) identified the many
ways in which the identity of the city can be constructed and reveal its
different associations to space in the contemporary city. More recently,
attention has also focused on the way in which places may be imaged
in order to attract and retain people and capital.
Issues of ideology, identity, and representation have become cen-
tral to many of the analyses of the manner in which places have come
to be packaged as a product to be sold (e.g., Kearns and Philo 1993).
200 C. Michael Hall
Contemporary imaging strategies are typically policy responses to the
social and economic problems associated with (^industrialization and
globalization, and associated economic restructuring, urban renewal,
multiculturalism, social integration, and control (Roche 1992, 1994).
The principal aims of imaging strategies are to:
• attract tourism expenditure;
• generate employment in the tourist and related industries;
• foster positive images for potential investors in the region, often
by 'reimaging' previous negative perceptions;
• provide an environment that will attract and retain the interest of
professionals and white-collar workers, particularly in so-called
clean service industries such as tourism and communications;
• increase public spirit by making communities feel good about
themselves (Hall 1992).
In the urban sphere, imaging processes are characterized by some or
all of the following:
• development of a critical mass of visitor attractions and facili-
ties, including new buildings, prestige, flagship centres (e.g.,
shopping centres, stadia, sports complexes, indoor arenas, con-
vention centres, and casino development);
• hosting hallmark events (e.g., Olympic Games, Commonwealth
Games, and the Grand Prix) and/or major league sports teams;
• development of urban tourism strategies and policies often
associated with new or renewed organization and development
of city marketing (e.g., city promotional campaigns such as St.
John's "The City of Legends" [Stewart 1991]);
• development of leisure and cultural services and projects to
support marketing and tourism efforts (e.g., the creation and
renewal of museums and art galleries and the hosting of art fes-
tivals, often as part of a comprehensive cultural tourism
strategy for a region or city).
Imaging strategies are therefore conscious attempts by places to
seduce. In particular, they seek not only to develop something which
is attractive but also to package specific representations of a particular
way of life or lifestyle for consumption. Therefore, representations of
culture are intimately connected to place marketing. Whether we use
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culture in the sense of being indicative of a "particular way of life,
whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general" or "as
a reference to the works or practices of intellectual and especially artis-
tic activity" (Williams 1983:90), culture is becoming commodified and
bought and sold in the global marketplace. Cultural policies are used
to generate artistic and 'high' cultural activity in order to attract visi-
tors and to make the city an attractive place to live for the middle-class,
white collar workers, and businesses, while wider notions of cultural
identity are also being used to attract investment, visitor, and employ-
ment ventures. The use of cultural images to attract visitors is not new.
It has been around for as long as tourism itself. The effects of place
marketing, however, may be pervasive within specific places targeted
for consumption; indeed the notion of selling places implies not only
trying to affect demand through the representation of cultural images,
but also the manipulation and management of the supply-side - those
things that make up a community's life - in a package that can be
'sold.' Such actions clearly have implications not only for how the
external consumer sees a place but also for how the people who con-
stitute the place are able to participate in making both the collective
and individual identity and the structures that sell place (Hall and
Hodges 1997).
Imaging and place marketing began to be recognized as signifi-
cant urban phenomena from the early 1980s, at a time when
globalization started to be seen as a significant economic and social
phenomenon, and when substantial changes in the nature of con-
sumption and production also occurred. Indeed, it is no coincidence
that in this time of dramatic shifts in the character of contemporary
capitalism that the 1980s were characterized as the decade in which
consumers were taught "how to desire" (Bocock 1993; York and
Jennings 1995:44; Pawson 1997:17). For producers, an essential means
of achieving this has been by "romancing the product" through the
use of brands (Pawson 1997). Branding is a way of seeking to add
value to commodities including services and places. A successful
brand creates distinctiveness in the marketplace. As Pawson notes: "It
is an investment in product quality at the same time as seeking to cre-
ate more illusory associations to appeal to specific groups of
consumers in the local spaces of globalized capitalism. Both branding
and advertizing are inherently spatial practices, used by producers in
the expansion and differentiation of markets" (1997:17). In the case of
urban reimaging, marketing practices, such as branding, rely upon the
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commodification of particular aspects of place, exploiting, reinventing,
or creating place images in order to sell the place as a destination prod-
uct for tourists or investment. Through this process, the ways of living
particular to a place may become commodified in order to transform
them into a commercial product or a specific dimension of place pro-
motion that can be experienced by the consumer.
Given the shifts in the nature of production noted above, it should
not be surprising that in the same way that the nature of production is
regarded as having changed, so has the nature of consumption
(Glennie and Thrift 1992). For example, Hall reported "greater frag-
mentation and pluralism, the weakening of older collective solidarities
and block identities and the emergence of new identities associated
with greater work flexibility [and] the maximization of individual
choice through personal consumption" (1988:24). In this context, it
therefore became apparent to those who were seeking to reimage the
city that the desires of those who consume have to be accorded far
greater prominence. Such desires must be actively catered to when
urban places and spaces are created for them to consume (e.g., see
Kotler et al. 1993). Hence, production has moved towards even greater
degrees of flexibility. But in a world of consumers differentiated by
social segments and lifestyle niches, it is the symbolic meanings of
products that matter as well as their inherent qualities (Pawson 1997).
These attributes are encapsulated in successful brands "which,
through careful management, skillful promotion and wide use, come
in the minds of consumers, to embrace a particular and appealing set
of values ... both tangible and intangible" (Interbrand 1990:6). Brand
therefore demonstrate the falseness of trying to separate production
from consumption (Bell and Valentine 1997). As Laurier observed: "To
build binary opposites is to make one dependent on the other, and so
there cannot be consumption without production ... it is apparent that
they merge in many places and that each process certainly does have
effects on the other ... even if they are causal or may never ever be
explicable" (1993:272). We therefore come full circle: places are
increasingly trying to seduce; if the argument regarding the relation-
ship between consumption and production is correct, people also want
to be seduced when they consider their destination options.
The following discussion examines some aspects of the processes
of urban imaging in Canada. It attempts to uncover some of the ideo-
logical messages and forces encoded in the landscape and to examine
how they are read by those who inhabit and visit Canada (Duncan
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1990; Duncan and Duncan 1988). Such a position is also idiosyncratic.
As Daniels and Lee observed, "the geographies we inhabit are multi-
centred; there is no grand central place or single, privileged vantage
point" (1996:12). The position is thus my own.
Cultural Settings: Cities Do Not Just Exist in the
Present. They Are Products of the Accumulated Past(s)
As noted above, throughout the Western world, cities which were
affected by deindustrialization in the 1970s and early 1980s have
responded with the development of imaging strategies in an attempt
to attract new investment and create employment. Canadian cities
have also adopted these strategies in order to position themselves as
'world class' or 'international' sites. Tourism, and cultural tourism in
particular, has been an integral component of the imaging strategies of
Canadian cities. Yet the success of cultural tourism strategies that
focus on arts and heritage attractions is somewhat problematic. As
Ekos Research Associates reported in a review of urban cultural
tourism projects in Canada, "high culture does not appear to be a
major magnet for tourists. ... [but] there is recurring and consistent
evidence that shows that once tourists reach major Canadian destina-
tions (for whatever motivating factors) many will consume large
amounts of culture. This is true even for those who did not consider
culture in their original travel destinations." Therefore, they continue,
"there may be a more profound payoff in considering how to encour-
age tourists to consume more arts and culture once they make a travel
decision rather than trying to attract tourists with arts and culture"
(Ekos Research Associates Inc. 1988:25).
Despite the evidence surrounding the relatively poor direct attrac-
tiveness of arts and culture to tourists, cities have persisted in using art
galleries, museums, and festivals as tools for urban redevelopment
and for changing the image of destinations. Unfortunately, most urban
regimes have failed to recognize that "very few tourists perceive these
cultural domains as isolated entities. Culture, as the symbolic environ-
ment of the destination, is often viewed as a meaningful whole" (Ekos
Research Associates Inc. 1988:22). Greater attention should therefore
be given to integrating all of the various aspects of cultural life in a
destination in a manner which benefits the community, rather than the
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commodification of certain elements for the perceived satisfaction and
conspicuous consumption of the visitor.
Tourism can stimulate culture through the development of urban
imaging strategies. However, such stimulation is limited, as the cultural
policies developed to support such strategies focus only on cultural ele-
ments that can be commodified through the creation of a cultural
industry for the consumer of culture. Furthermore, the economic impli-
cations of developing a tourist economy may be somewhat problematic
given that the shift from a goods- to a service-producing economy does
not occur evenly. For example, Pollock (1991) noted that the benefits of
tourism growth in Greater Vancouver and Victoria are poorly dis-
tributed throughout the economy. Nevertheless, despite concerns over
the real benefits of pursuing the tourist dollar and the real long-term
returns of place marketing, Canadian cities continue to attempt to
image themselves as international cultural tourism destinations.
"Influencing travellers to visit a particular city destination comes
through conveying the essence or image of that city as well as the
specifics of what there is to see and do" (David-Peterson Associates Inc.
1992:15). That said, "product specific advertising is more effective than
advertising which attempts to modify images concerning a particular
destination" (Ekos Research Associates Inc. 1988:32). Even with the
development of new tourism attractions and corresponding alterations
to marketing strategies, changing the image of a destination is an
extremely difficult exercise given the weight of previous perceptions.
Rather than market a distinct product to the consumer through a
combination of appropriate advertising, attractive pricing, and the
opportunity for unique visitor experience, urban imaging strategies
are creating a stage of "serial monotony" whereby different cities look
the same (Boyer 1988; Harvey 1993). As Block commented with respect
to the redevelopment of the port of Montreal for the 350th anniversary
celebrations: "For Nancy L'Estrange, the Old Port is cleaner and pret-
tier than in her hometown of Toronto. 1 think it's beautiful - and it
doesn't smell/ she said. There isn't that organic stuff we've got in
Toronto. I don't see any ducks, bird faeces, or seaweed and other
things floating in the water like we see in our harbour'" (1993:A3). In
the competitive new environment surrounding city promotion, many
of the imaging strategies designed to gain competitive advantage are
sanitizing and commodifying representations of local culture.
Moreover, they often fail to be inclusive of the public they are meant
to serve.
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Summer Olympic Games: 'The Biggest and Most
Costly Mega-project in the History of Toronto/'
Toronto made a bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games.
Toronto's bid, much like its previous, unsuccessful bid for the 1996
Games, was built on a waterfront redevelopment strategy that sought
to revitalize the harbour area through the development of an inte-
grated sports, leisure, retail, and housing complex. However, as in the
case of the Sydney Games, or in any other mega-event with substan-
tial infrastructure requirements, important questions should be asked
about both the event's development process and who would actually
benefit from hosting the event.
One of the most striking features of this Toronto bid was the extent
to which information on the bid was either unavailable or provided
only limited detail on the costs associated with hosting the event.
However, unlike the Sydney Olympic bid, Toronto was fortunate to
have a non-profit public interest coalition, Bread Not Circuses (BNC),
actively campaigning for more information on the bid proposal and
for government to address social concerns.
BNC argued that given the cost of both bidding for and hosting
the Olympics, the bidding process must be subject to public scrutiny.
"Any Olympic bid worth its salt will not only withstand public
scrutiny, but will be improved by a rigorous and open public process"
the organization contended. It went on to assert that Toronto City
Council support for an Olympic bid must be conditional on:
• the development and execution of a suitable process to address
financial, social, and environmental concerns, ensure an effec-
tive public participation process (including intervenor
funding), and include a commitment to the development of a
detailed series of Olympic standards. A time-frame of one year
from the date of the vote to support the bid should be set to
ensure that the plans for the participation process are taken
seriously;
• full, open, and independent accounting of the financial costs of
bidding and staging the Games;
• full, open, and independent social impact assessment of the
Games (Bread Not Circuses 1998a).
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Other key elements of a public participation process should include:
• full, fair, and democratic processes to involve all of the people
of Toronto in the development and review of the Olympic bid;
• an Olympic Intervenor Fund, similar to the fund established by
the City of Toronto in 1989, to allow interested groups to par-
ticipate effectively in the public scrutiny of the Toronto bid;
• development of an independent environmental assessment of
the 2008 Games, and strategies to resolve specific concerns;
• development of a series of financial, social, and environmental
standards governing the 2008 Games, similar to the Toronto
Olympic Commitment adopted by City Council in September
of 1989 (Bread Not Circuses 1998a).
In addition to the factors identified by BNC, the city's previous expe-
riences with stadia and events raise substantial questions about the
public liability for any development. For example, in 1982, then
Metropolitan Toronto Chairman, Paul Godfrey, promised that
Toronto's Sky Dome, a multipurpose sports complex used for baseball
and Canadian football, could be built for 75 million CAD, with no pub-
lic debt. However, the final price of the development was over 600
million CAD, with taxpayers having to pay more than half. BNC also
noted that the previous Toronto bid costs were 60 per cent over bud-
get, "with a great deal of spending coming in the final, overheated
days of the bidding war leading up to the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) Congress. There was no public control, and little
public accountability, over the '96 bid," while "there was virtually no
assessment of the social, environmental, and financial impact of the
Games until Bread Not Circuses began to raise critical questions. By
then, it was too late to influence the bid" (Bread Not Circuses 1998c).
BNC lobbied various city councillors to influence their decision
whether or not to support a bid. Only one councillor out of fifty-five
voted against the Olympic bid proposal however, even though the
only information the councillors had to rely on was a 20-page back-
ground document to the proposal. When city councillors voted on the
project, they did not have:
• an estimate of the cost of bidding for the Games;
• a list of the names of the backers of 'BidCo,' the private corpo-
ration heading up the Olympic bid;
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• a reliable estimate of the cost of staging the Games;
• a plan for the public participation process, the environmental
review process, or the social impact assessment process;
• a detailed financial strategy for the Games.
Such a situation clearly had public interest organizations, such as
BNC, very worried about the economic, environmental, and social
costs of a successful bid. Clearly, the history of mega-events such as
the Olympic Games indicated that such a situation was not new (Olds
1998). The International Olympic Committee (IOC) already sought to
ensure that the Games be environmentally friendly. Perhaps it was
now time to see that they be socially and economically friendly and
build wider assessment of the social impacts of the Games into the
planning process as a mandatory component of bidding. BNC, in a let-
ter to the IOC President, requested "that the IOC, which sets the rules
for the bidding process, take an active responsibility in ensuring that
the local processes in the bidding stage are effective and democratic"
and specifically address concerns regarding the "financial and social
costs of the Olympic Games" and proposed that:
• an international network be created to include the Centre for
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), the Human and Land
Rights Network (HIC) Housing Rights Subcommittee, aca-
demics, and non-governmental organizations (including local
groups in cities that have bid for and/or hosted the Games);
• a set of standards regarding forced evictions, be developed and
adopted by the network;
• a plan be developed and implemented to build international
support for the standards, including identification of sympa-
thetic IOC, National Olympic Committee (NOC), and other
sports officials;
• the IOC be approached with the request that the standards be
incorporated into the Olympic Charter, Host City Contracts,
and other documents of the IOC (Bread Not Circuses 1998b).
Such a social charter for the Olympics would undoubtedly greatly
assist in making the Games more place friendly and perhaps even
improve the image of the IOC. However, at the time this paper was
written, the books of the Toronto bid had still not been opened for
public scrutiny. Nor has there been adequate response to the proposal
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to create of a set of social standards for the Olympics. The revitaliza-
tion of place requires more than just the development of product and
image. The re-creation of a sense of place is a process that involves the
formulation of urban design strategies based on conceptual models of
the city that are, in turn, founded on notions of civic life, the public
realm, and the idea of planning as debate and argument (Bianchini
and Schwengel 1991). As Smyth recognized: "This needs to be under-
taken in a frank way and in a forum where different understandings
can be shared, inducing mutual respect, leading to developing trust,
and finally conceiving a development which meets mutual needs as
well as stewarding resources for future generations ... This proposes a
serious challenge to the public sector as well as to the private sector,
for authorities have undermined the well-being of their local popula-
tions by transferring money away from services to pay for flagship
developments" (1994:254).
Unfortunately, such ideas have only limited visibility within the
place marketing and imaging realms. Tourism and place planning are
often poorly conceptualized with respect to participatory procedures,
and the institutional arrangements for many of the so-called partnerships
for urban redevelopment actually exclude community participation in
decision-making procedures.
Canadian Cities: Commodities for Consumption?
Today, everything seems to be a commodity available for consump-
tion. Of course, it is not. In fact, the commodity has to be a commodity
of a certain type with a given symbolic value which reinforces pre-
ferred lifestyles and representations of identity. These commodities
are not evenly distributed in urban space. They are presently located
disproportionately in the inner city areas, with many of the outer sub-
urbs forgotten by those seeking to reimage the city, even though that
is where the majority of residents live. Nevertheless, these commodi-
ties still seduce. They are produced and/or packaged to seduce the
visitor; to attract international capital, albeit for increasingly shorter
periods of time; and to seduce the locals. At a time when restructuring
and change seems to be the norm and when employment becomes
increasingly casual in nature and insecure, political elites need to be
seen to be doing something. New brands, new developments, the host-
ing of events, and the creation of new leisure and retail spaces are all
Packaging Canada/Packaging Places: Tourism, Culture, and Identity 209
a sign that something has been done. However, those who visit cities
on a regular basis see that, even though they are trying to reimage
themselves as places that are different, they still look the same.
Harvey's (1989) concern over the "serial monotony" of the redevel-
oped and reimaged city is reinforced. As Zukin observed, the city is a
site of spectacle, a "dreamscape of visual consumption" (1991:221). It
is, therefore, perhaps not so surprising that at a time when little com-
petitive edge can be gained among cities in terms of the reconstruction
of their physical space, then emphasis is placed on the lifestyle oppor-
tunities they offer to those who can afford them.
If there are no lasting benefits and no identifiable economic oppor-
tunity costs associated with selling the city, then we are left with the
Bourdieu proposition that "the most successful ideological effects are
those which have no words" (quoted in Harvey 1989:78). If the func-
tion of a flagship development such as hosting an Olympic Games, a
Commonwealth Games, a Grand Prix, or a major waterfront redevel-
opment scheme is then "reduced to inducing social stability, assuming
the generated experience is sustainable for enough people over a long
period and is targeted towards those who are potentially the
harbingers of disruption ... what is the purpose of marketing the
city?" then asks Smyth (1994:7).
Murphy and Watson (1997) described Sydney as a "city of sur-
faces." Such a comment may also apply to many Canadian cities and,
perhaps, to attempts to image Canada itself. While the spaces are the
same, however, the places are different. Place has a distinct location
which it defines; place is fixed. Space, in contrast, is composed of inter-
sections of mobile elements with shifting, often indeterminate borders
(de Certeau 1984; Larbalestier 1994). Daniels and Lee suggest that
"reading human geography ... is a complex and critical act of interpre-
tation and as readers, we are engaged in interpreting writers'
interpretations ... of worlds which are already construed, or miscon-
strued, by meaning or imagery" (1996:5). Fortunately, city places and
spaces are continually read "in various ways, by a variety of people
pursuing a variety of endeavours, in walking, in working, in reading,
in speaking, in all or any of our everyday practices" (Larbalestier
1994:187). While space is being constructed by urban growth coalitions
in the desire to reimage the city, places remain open to negotiation and
interpretation.
Despite the conscious development of space in a manner that aims
to seduce the visitor and the investor, places can still resist commodi-
210 C Michael Hall
fication. Indeed, the very complexity of place - with its dense net-
works of social networks - ultimately makes it interesting, though not
always easily accessible for the visitor. Hewison observed that "the
time has come to argue that commerce is not culture, whether we
define culture as the pursuit of music, literature or the fine arts, or
whether we adopt Raymond Williams's definition of culture as 'a
whole way of life'. You cannot get a whole way of life into a Tesco's
trolley or a V & A Enterprises shopping bag" (1991:175). Such argu-
ments are important because they run counter to the notions of
commodification of place and culture as product which are intrinsic to
place marketing.
In experiencing places I don't want to be seduced in a contrived
space, rather I want to be surprised. Despite the efforts of successive
provincial and municipal governments, cities still have the capacity to
surprise. However, such surprises tend not to occur in the planned
spaces of the redeveloped waterfront, but rather in the back streets and
the suburbs. These, though, are the 'messy' spaces - the ones that real
estate speculators and developers have not yet reached and where suc-
cessive politicians' grandiose monuments have not yet been realized.
In promoting the city to the wider community, including those who
live in the suburbs, those who cannot afford inner city living, and
those who are seeking more than the casino and the riverside restau-
rant, it is to be hoped that those places will continue to thrive.
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Canadian Distinctiveness and Cultural
Policy as We Enter the Twenty-first
Century
Shirley L. Thomson
I N THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, CANADA CAME TO OCCUPY A SIGNIFICANTplace in the world. Our reputation continues to grow: in terms of our
technology, our government policy, and, I will argue, our culture. The
forces of continentalization continue to increase, yet Canadian culture
remains - and, I believe, will remain - distinct and distinctive, the
reflection of our unique sensibilities. Canada's cultural agencies play an
important role in fostering the expression of this sensibility. We must
ensure that they have the resources to continue doing so.
In the past half-century, Canada has accomplished a great deal in
the cultural arena. We have built an admirable arts infrastructure
within the country and we have produced a significant number of
artists and writers whose work is appreciated worldwide. A number
of factors have contributed to the success of Canada's artists and to the
quality - and qualities - of artistic and cultural endeavour in this coun-
try. These rest very largely in the Canadian sense of community and
the institutions that stem from it. Canadian art, taken as a whole,
reflects a medley of many community voices.
North-South integration is, however, changing the face of Canada.
It is important in these circumstances that we have a clear idea of the
differences between Canadian and American sensibilities. Equally
important to note is the importance of the Crown agencies that sustain
our Canadian distinctiveness and the authentic voices of our artists.
Our International Stars
Over the past several decades, Canadian culture has gained an increas-
ingly important profile on the international scene. We have only to
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think of writers and playwrights such as Michael Ondaatje, Margaret
Atwood, and Michel Tremblay; musicians such as Ben Heppner and
Diana Krall; filmmakers Atom Egoyan, David Cronenberg, and
Francois Girard; of such popular entertainers as Celine Dion and
Shania Twain. In attracting a wide following in many countries,
Canada's artists have, each in his/her own way and media, touched
on and explored universal human themes. There are Canadian Studies
programmes in many countries. Canadian literature is studied in uni-
versities all over the world.
Factors in our Success
The success of our artists can to some extent be attributed to ease of
travel and the multiplication and speed of communications - another
area in which Canada is a leader. I would also attribute it to govern-
ment cultural policies of the last fifty years, policies that are facing new
challenges as we move into the twenty-first century. These, however,
are subsidiary factors. The 'Canadian sensibility/ more than anything
else, accounts for the international success of our artists. I want, there-
fore, to begin by looking at the quality of artistic and cultural
endeavour in this country and what it reveals about the Canadian sen-
sibility.
One aspect of that sensibility is the acceptance of a plurality of
groups. Our culture is a medley of many community voices. Northrop
Frye in The Bush Garden pointed out that "unity and identity are quite
different things ... and ... in Canada they are perhaps more different
than they are anywhere else." He went on to explain, "Identity is local
and regional, rooted in the imagination and in works of culture; unity
is national in reference, international in perspective, and rooted in a
political feeling."1 "Real unity," he continued, "tolerates dissent and
rejoices in variety of outlook and tradition" (Frye 1971: ii, vi).
One of the oldest paintings in the Canadian collection of the
National Gallery of Canada illustrates this point: that Canada is made
up of many communities, pursuing their own cultural expression
while sharing the support of a unified political system. I am thinking
of the 1807 portrait of Joseph Brant by William Berczy. The subject of
the painting, Joseph Brant, was a hereditary chief of the Mohawks. He
led the Six Nations in support of the British during the American
Revolution and afterwards brought them to Ontario to settle. The Six
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Nations have produced an impressive number of outstanding artists.\
Pauline Johnson, daughter of a Mohawk chief, was the first Aboriginal
poet to achieve an international reputation. Last fall, Six Nations pho-
tographer Greg Staats won the Council's Duke and Duchess of York
Prize in Photography.
William Berczy, the painter, was also an immigrant to the young
province of Ontario. Born in Bavaria, in present-day Germany, he led
a group of German settlers to New York state in 1792. Finding arrange-
ments there uncongenial, he brought his group to Markham (just north
of Toronto), where they settled in 1795. Berczy had received extensive
training as a painter in Europe. Once established in Canada, he turned
to art again as the source of his livelihood. Both these men represent
communities moving into Canada and sharing their cultural heritage.
Over the past two centuries, this pattern of a diverse artistic tradi-
tion nurtured by the unceasing contribution of immigrant
communities has repeated itself thousands of times. Finding a home
and some degree of economic security in Canada, artists have worked
comfortably with a foot in each of two cultures - that of their origins
and that of their point of settlement. The nineteenth-century Dutch-
born artist, Cornelius Krieghoff, was the subject of an exhibition at the
National Gallery of Canada (October 2000 to January 2001). He
painted what many people see as quintessential scenes of French-
Canadian life. Yet, however well the paintings achieve this objective,
they also show clearly an indebtedness to the Dutch tradition of win-
ter scenes. From the prairies, in the mid-twentieth century, we have a
manifestation of this very pattern of nourishment from immigrant tra-
ditions: the deeply Orthodox work of the Ukranian-born artist William
Kurelek.
In recent years, Canadian culture has been greatly enriched by the
work of artists Asian born or of Asian descent. I think of writers
Rohinton Mistry, M.G. Vassanji, and Michael Ondaatje; of filmmakers
Paul Wong and Mina Shum; of musicians Adyita Verma and Jon
Kimura Parker; and of painter Takao Tanabe. The work of Canada's
outstanding artists reflects the qualities of dozens of contributing com-
munities that make up the Canadian cultural landscape. In addition to
those just mentioned, we are indebted to the Armenian community
(Atom Egoyan), the African community (Djanet Sears), and the Italian
community (Nino Ricci).
In French Canada, the cultural tradition is so long and rich, and
the names legion, that it is difficult to know where to begin. Keeping
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to artists widely recognized at the closing of this century, a perusal of
the European cultural press will turn up in short order the names of
Anne Hebert, Robert Lepage, Francois Girard, and Michel Tremblay.
No other country, proportionate to its population, produces such
a wealth and variety of art as Canada.
North-South Integration
Is the pool of Canadian artistic talent, or the environment that forms
that talent, threatened by globalization and international market
forces? I am cautiously optimistic. Currently, we have a large pool of
talented artists, and our environment of internal and international
mobility is a great stimulus to the creative imagination. Canada is also
relatively prosperous and there is a significant art audience. To this
extent, we can feel quite confident about the vitality of Canadian cul-
ture and its expression through the work of practising artists in the
immediate future.
The area where I have deep concerns, however, is in the long-term
future of the distinctively Canadian cultural institutions that support
that talent and market. International stars do not spring forth sui
generis. All artists require some kind of incubation period, during
which they depend for support and encouragement on their families,
communities, and countries while they learn their trades and develop
their distinctive styles.
This kind of support, even at the simplest family level, is depen-
dent on two major factors: the economy and political will. For Canada,
the terms globalization and international market forces really mean conti-
nentalization. In the last two decades we have witnessed the gradual
integration of the Canadian economy into the American. The recently
proposed merger of Canadian National with the giant U.S. railway,
Burlington North Santa" Fe, is symbolic of the north-south trade axes
that are replacing the traditional east-west axes that had their origins
in earlier European patterns of exploration and colonization.
One indirect effect of this realignment has been the movement of
head offices to the United States. With these head offices go both cor-
porate and private resources: potential sponsorship money, expertise
in the voluntary sector of the arts, active community contributors, and
audiences. It is clear, furthermore, that for the United States, culture is
business. Americans do not take kindly to any country that might try,
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forcefully or even very tentatively, to protect its own culture or limit
the spread of American culture. Although cultural products were
exempted from the North American Free Trade Agreement, pressure
on the cultural front will not let up, as was evident in the controversy
over split-run magazine publications.
In any case, we all know that physical or regulatory barriers, in
this age of Internet, satellite dishes, and electronic commerce, will not
in themselves be enough to sustain Canadian cultural distinctiveness.
Canadian artists and arts organizations need direct, broad-based, insti-
tutional support.
American versus Canadian Sensibility
Let me now make a couple of broad generalizations about what it is we
are trying to preserve. First, the Canadian sensibility has traditionally
shown a greater deference to authority and a greater respect for com-
munity than the American. The American sensibility is more
individualistic and more prone to view social relations in contractual
terms, as agreements between equals that can be broken off at any time.
Seymour Martin Lipset has been a leader in documenting the dif-
ferences between American and Canadian sensibilities. In Continental
Divide, he describes the difference between America's classical libertar-
ian sensibilities that emphasize distrust of the state, egalitarianism, and
populism, and the conservative British and European sensibilities of
Canada, that are "accepting of the need for a strong state, for respect for
authority, for deference" (Lipset 1990:2). The divide between Canada
and the United States is dwindling, he says, as both sides move toward
the middle. The contrast is of degree, not of absolutes. But in its tradi-
tion of social and health services, government ownership, and what
Lipset calls "constitutional rights to ethnocultural survival," the
Canadian sensibility is still very different from that of the American
(Lipset 1990:3). In his list of differences Lipset mentions as well the abil-
ity of Canadians to maintain healthy, liveable inner cities. This is a
factor of some importance in fostering a vibrant cultural life.
The rest of the world is intrigued by the difference in sensibility
that shows up in Canada's cultural products. We are North Americans
but we have not shed our roots in other parts of the world. In Marshall
McLuhan's words, Canada is a "borderline" case. It is borderline in the
literal sense of being a population spread out in a thin band along the
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U.S. border. It is also borderline in the historic sense of always having
been at the periphery of much larger imperial entities: French, British,
or American. It is borderline in the sense of being vulnerable: its con-
tinuing existence is precarious. McLuhan saw this borderline
characteristic as an asset: "Canadians," he wrote, "are the people who
learned how to live without the bold accents of the national ego-trip-
pers of other lands" (McLuhan 1977:227). He added a fourth
interpretation: in this sense, borders are not barriers so much as open-
ings that create a sense of perspective, making it possible to interpret
events and to mediate among diverse groups. Canada's many internal
borders - political, religious, ethnic, psychic - act as intervals that
make what we say and do resonate for others.
This more thoughtful and attentive attitude toward the world in all
its cultural variety is the specific quality informing the Canadian sensi-
bility. As Margaret Atwood put it in "Nationalism, Limbo and the
Canadian Club," Americans see themselves as "a huge healthy apple
pie, with other countries and cultures sprinkled around the outside,
like raisins." We see ourselves, she argues, as a raisin, and the other
parts of the universe as "invariably larger and more interesting"
(Atwood 1982:87-8).
The Need for Crown Agencies
I have argued that, to preserve the variety of outlook that is a distin-
guishing feature of the Canadian sensibility, Canadian artists and arts
organizations need direct, broad-based institutional support. That
support has traditionally been provided through our cultural Crown
agencies. Our Crown agencies embody Canada's more thoughtful and
respectful attitude towards the wider world. They arose from the
recognition that, given a small population spread over a vast area,
there would be gaps that society itself could not fill, where the state
would have to step in without interfering.
The sensibility that produced our Crown agencies recognized the
wisdom of having a political regime that clearly distinguishes between
the head of state and the leader of the government. It recognized that
there are many important questions that the government leader and
his or her elected party colleagues must tend to; but that there are also
others that must be dealt with in the public realm, while being kept at
arm's length from politicians. For that reason, we now have over thirty
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major Crown agencies in this country. Among them are some of our
most important cultural institutions, including the National Gallery of
Canada and the Canada Council for the Arts.
Peter Newman and Angus Reid, among others, have pointed out
how Canadians are losing their distinctiveness (Newman 1995). That
respectful openness to the world is disappearing. Our turning inward,
as Lipset points out, entails some loss of awareness. In making us more
American, it may also, however, yield benefits through increased self-
confidence, self-reliance, and individualism. The full implications of
this transformation of the Canadian psyche will be apparent in the
coming decades; we can, however, point out some early effects. The
economic integration of Canada with the United States is far more
complete than the cultural integration. It has entailed the loss of a large
number of Crown agencies operating in the economic sphere: CN,
Canada Post, Air Canada, and PetroCanada. These agencies were pri-
vatized because of international market forces.
In cultural terms, however, Canadians tend more than ever to
define themselves in terms of their difference from the United States;
our cultural Crown agencies continue to support those differences. For
half a century or more, these agencies have been the sustaining force
behind the voices that make up a distinctive Canadian artistic ethos. It
is my belief that they will continue to provide the best bulwark against
the loss of that distinctiveness.
As Charles Taylor pointed out, art is "a crucial terrain for the ideal
of authenticity." Support for Canadian distinctiveness implies support
for what is authentic in the work of our artists; and this ideal of
authenticity "requires that we discover and articulate our own iden-
tity" (Taylor 1991:81-2.). Authenticity may be self-referential in manner
but the matter must serve to articulate something beyond the self. 7 d
things my way but not / do my thing. What we do must be a response to
the larger claims of nature and our world, but the artist, in responding,
must do so in his or her own authentic voice. Our cultural agencies
give artists an opportunity to develop authentic voices. They give res-
onance to those voices; they support what is best and most authentic
in the work of our writers and artists; they sustain our Canadian dis-
tinctiveness, our specific sensibility, and our way of apprehending and
evaluating the world. In the United States, the National Endowment
for the Arts, for example, is not empowered to make grants to indi-
vidual artists. Individuals, in the libertarian tradition, are on their
own. The Canada Council for the Arts, on the other hand, reserves 20
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per cent of its grants budget for grants to individual artists.
Individuals in Canada have a place in a civil network.
As the forces of continentalization grow stronger, Canada
urgently needs a reaffirmation of the policies that support Crown
agencies in the cultural sector, among them the Canada Council for the
Arts, the CBC, the National Film Board, the National Gallery, the
Canadian Museum of Civilization, and the National Arts Centre.
Artists themselves overwhelmingly recognize the importance of these
agencies. As Inuit filmmaker Zacharias Kunuk explained: "With
Council financing and video as our tool, we have been able to record
and save our culture" (Kunuk, in conversation with Canada Council,
1999 August). And as Acadian writer Antonine Maillet wrote: "Sans
doute aurais-je ecrit, avec ou sans le Conseil des Arts. Mais aurais-je pu le
faire au meme rythme, et avec la meme liberte ? Le peuple acadien n'avail pas
d'antecedents d'ecriture avant ma generation. II avail besoin d'un encourage-
ment inconditionnel et ferme pour croire a son etoile, pour realiser
I'impensable de faire franchir a une culture le passage de I'oral a I'ecrit."
(Maillet, correspondence with the Canada Council, 1999).
In concluding, let me be clear that I do not think there is anything
wrong or morally inferior about the U.S.-style libertarian sensibility.
We should realize, however, that for Canadians to embrace that sensi-
bility would leave us without the real ground of our distinctiveness
and the raison d'etre of our sovereignty. It is not the fact that an artist
or a producer of art was born in Canada or is a Canadian citizen that
is going to interest others. It is the distinctiveness and authenticity of
that artist's sensibility, of his or her way of perceiving and evaluating
the world.
My final note is one of optimism. Whatever the political and eco-
nomic changes we face, I think that Canada will remain distinct. An
irreducible factor making for Canadian cultural distinctiveness is our
land. Canadian culture, whatever forms it may take, will always have
to shape itself to our demanding geography and landscape. Ontario
poet Al Purdy recognized this:
during the fall plowing a man
might stop and stand in a brown valley of the furrows
and shade his eyes to watch for the same
red patch mixed with gold
that appears on the same
spot on the hills
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year after year
and grow old
plowing and plowing a ten-acre field until
the convolutions run parallel with his own brain -
(Purdy 1972:119).
I sincerely hope that Canada's cultural agencies will be empow-
ered to continue fostering this creative tension in our artists' voices
between the places that we come from and the place where we are
throughout the twenty-first century.
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Pour une convention multilateral
sur la culture
Jean-Louis Roy
E N DEUX COURTES DECENNIES, NOUS SOMMES PASSES « DE LA FIN DE1'histoire » posee comme consequence ineluctable de la victoire de
1'economic de marche aux exigences plus durables « de la recomposi-
tion » de la communaute internationale. Nous sommes passes de
« 1'euphorie conquerante » des vainqueurs de la grande bataille
ideologique du siecle precedent aux requetes multiples visant a
assurer la securite et le developpement de la famille humaine. Nous
sommes passes de 1'enonce d'un credo de certitudes concernant les
finalites a la realite de la deliberation concernant ces finalites.
Considerables, ces bouleversements constituent des revelateurs
precieux. Us prouvent hors de tout doute que nous vivons une periode
exceptionnelle et font apparaitre a nouveau les deux dimensions consti-
tutives de la famille humaine : d'une part, son aspiration a 1'unite, cette
tres ancienne quete toujours degue; d'autre part, 1'evidence de sa diver-
site constitutive, positionnement toujours remis en cause.
Pour les uns, 1'installation de 1'economie de marche comme unique
fiduciaire du developpement fournit enfin le cadre unique de reference
et des principes susceptibles d'ordonnancer le monde selon un modele
unique. Pour les autres, ce qui est advenu dans la derniere decennie du
vingtieme siecle, c'est d'abord la mise a jour de tout ce qui a ete recou-
vert, dissimule, empeche par les sedimentations ideologiques
dominantes au siecle dernier, une sorte de liberation ou d'irruption des
aspirations, des identites, des cultures, des disparites aussi, si triste-
ment pregnantes dans notre monde.
Ceux-la ne remettent pas necessairement en cause 1'economie de
marche. Ce qu'ils mettent en cause, c'est sa revendication d'autonomie
absolue, sa prevention a animer seule le developpement, sa negation
de 1'espace public, sa prevention a poser comme « naturelles » des
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normes construites par des operations privees et a les presenter
comme des regies, valeurs et objectifs susceptibles de structurer les
societes, toutes les societes; les activites humaines, toutes les activites
humaines. Leur argumentaire occupe desormais une place centrale
dans les discussions et negociations en cours visant 1'amenagement de
la communaute internationale.
Qu'il s'agisse de la reforme des institutions multilaterales, de la
negociation du millenaire, de la mise en marche de nouveaux produits
decoulant de 1'application de la science genetique aux especes vege-
tales et animates, de la mise a jour des politiques sociales, des reformes
de 1'aide publique au developpement, 1'economie de marche est
soumise a la question recurrente suivante : « Que lui faut-il devenir
pour etre une voie diversified d'organisation du monde, pour prendre
en compte le vaste domaine du desir et des besoins humains ? »
En 1993 et 1994 ce sont les producteurs de culture qui, les pre-
miers, ont soumis la logique de 1'economie de marche a cette question
fondamentale, reclame et obtenu une premiere « exception » a son
implacable logique. Utile, voire indispensable en son temps, cette poli-
tique defensive apparait obsolete dans la phase actuelle de la
mondialisation. Elle a eu cependant 1'immense merite de rehabiliter la
deliberation et d'imposer la permanence de 1'espace public.
Dans la phase actuelle de la mondialisation, il apparait raison-
nable de penser le developpement culturel de la famille humaine a
partir des quatre assises suivantes :
1. Les conditions de la libre circulation des idees et des ceuvres de
1'esprit au plan international n'ont jamais ete aussi favorables,
et ces dernieres disposent de moyens technologiques nouveaux
de grande portee pour la diffusion, la connaissance et 1'appre-
ciation des cultures du monde;
2. La culture est devenue matiere de 1'industrie, de 1'economie
nationale et internationale, et les industries de la culture font
desormais partie de 1'economie de marche;
3. L'identification des espaces de creation avec les espaces cultu-
rels convenus tend a se distancier comme reflet de la mutation
des societes, de 1'acceleration de leur recomposition, et de la
presence des cultures du monde partout dans celui-ci grace aux
reseaux mondiaux de communication dont Internet;
4. Les evolutions technologiques annulent en partie les contenus
de 1'exception culturelle. Ces derniers pourraient etre reduits a
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une constellation symbolique dans 1'avenir previsible. Les
tenants de 1'exception culturelle ont justement evalue cette
mutation en abandonnant cette appellation en faveur de celle
plus juste, plus dynamique aussi, de diversite culturelle, ce
grand territoire de 1'imprevisible.
Dans un tel contexte, il ne s'agit pas de recomposer autrement les
politiques culturelles anciennes, d'en renover la facade et, d'un secteur
a 1'autre, d'eteindre les feux. Une autre synthese, complexe, difficile et
indispensable, doit etre trouvee. Cette synthese appelle une veritable
revolution copernicienne dans notre apprehension, comprehension et
appreciation de la diversite culturelle du monde. Cette recomposition
n'est pas evidente, ni les formes susceptibles de 1'exprimer et de la
traduire en termes operationnels. Pour ma part, j'estime qu'elle doit se
deployer dans une convention multilaterale specifique exprimant les
realites du monde tel qu'il est en train de se reconstituer.
Aucun texte cependant, aucune perspective de renouvellement ne
fera 1'economie d'une recomposition radicale qui est d'abord celle de
nos esprits habitues a penser le monde a partir des prismes nationaux
et occidentaux. Sommes-nous capables d'une hospitalite plus uni-
verselle, d'une interpretation de 1'histoire des sciences, des arts et du
droit qui soit inclusive et non exclusive? Sommes-nous capables de
comprendre les eres de civilisation et les cultures du monde comme
des fragments susceptibles de complementarite bien davantage que
des totalites qui s'affrontent ? Sommes-nous desireux de prendre en
compte et de privilegier la fecondation reciproque des cultures dans la
longue duree, plutot que leur appropriation a des fins d'apologie
nationale, de puissance ou de domination ?
Je travaille presentement a la preparation d'un dictionnaire inter-
culturel. Les enfants qui le consulteront apprendront que le lointain
ancetre de 1'ordinateur est un mathematicien chinois dont les inven-
tions ont transite par Flnde avant d'etre assimilees par les Arabes qui
les ont transporters en Europe voila six siecles, puis, deux siecles plus
tard, acclimatees a 1'Amerique qui en a fait notamment le reseau des
reseaux. Us y apprendront aussi que Matisse disait de 1'art contempo-
rain qu'il s'appuie sur les creations de la Renaissance et les images du
Moyen-Age, et plus loin dans le passe, vers 1'art hindou et persan. II
existe comme une mondialisation verticale et les metissages sont plus
anciens que 1'actuelle mondialisation horizontale. « La riviere », disent
nos amis africains, « est plus vieille que la route ».
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Vous connaissez les travaux magistraux de Joseph Needham,
travaux consacres a la Chine, et les deux questions qui les eclairent:
1. La question de ses amis chinois : « Comment pouvez-vous
soutenir que la science moderne origine seulement de
1'Europe? »
2. Et sa propre question : « How could it be that the Chinese civiliza-
tion had been much more effective than the European in finding out
about nature and using natural knowledge for the benefit of mankind
for fourteen centuries or so before the scientific revolution ? »
La synthese evoquee plus haut doit bien evidemment deborder les
perspectives des lobbies culturels occidentaux et celles des politiques
qui leur donnent un prolongement du cote du pouvoir. Elle trouve
sens et direction dans cette recomposition radicale de nos esprits et
dans nos esprits.
Si les cultures du monde sont diverses, et elles le sont, si cette
diversite constitue une valeur radicale, alors il faut en tirer les conse-
quences et lancer le grand chantier de 1'inclusion des cultures dans les
programmes scolaires, les ceuvres en reference, nos programmes de
soutien a la creation, la direction prise par les industries de la culture,
celles aussi des grandes manifestations culturelles nationales et mon-
diales actuelles et a venir. Cette approche doit inclure aussi la
recherche des convergences ethiques a 1'ceuvre dans notre monde.
Bref, ce qui nous est demande par 1'exceptionnelle mutation politique
et technique actuelle et par 1'explosion de nos capacites de communi-
cation et d'interactivite, c'est de degager les fondements communs des
« identites en flux » evoques par Charles Taylor, dans un monde ou la
reconnaissance devient un enjeu de premier plan, dans un temps
aussi, pour citer a nouveau le grand philosophe, ou il apparait
« deplorable et injustifie de tracer des frontieres trop etroites qui
n'incluraient pas tout le genre humain. »
Nous plaidons ici pour un changement de nature des conceptions
des identites et des cultures comme prealable a I'amenagement de
1'espace culturel mondial et des politiques culturelles nationales.
Traduites dans des regies communes, ces conceptions doivent, a
terme, etre consignees dans une convention multilaterale specifique et
traduire notamment les imperatifs suivants :
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1. Reconnaissance de la singularite et de la centralite du domaine
culturel dans 1'ensemble de la production humaine;
2. Attachement au pluralisme, 1'indispensable adhesion a sa
propre culture et & 1'existence de toutes les cultures, et engage-
ment de traduire cet attachement dans des politiques
inclusives;
3. Consentement & la libre circulation des biens et ceuvres culturels
ne pouvant etre reduits a la production du divertissement;
4. Maintien des conditions de la concurrence et rejet de toute situ-
ation de monopole dans la production et la diffusion des
ceuvres culturelles. Autrement, dans un grand nombre de pays,
les entreprises culturelles locales seront balayees et la produc-
tion propre reduite a 1'insignifiance. Dans cet esprit, la
recherche d'un niveau equitable de reciprocite assurant « la
presence sur un territoire d'ceuvres culturelles etrangeres et la
diffusion a 1'etranger d'ceuvres culturelles nationales » doit etre
initiee et conduite a son terme;
5. Possibilite d'un soutien public a la creation et aux infrastruc-
tures de production, de distribution et de diffusion des ceuvres
culturelles;
6. Enrichissement substantiel du volet d'appui aux cultures du
monde dans la politique de cooperation internationale.
Cette synthese inedite s'impose. Ni le statu quo des politiques clas-
siques, ni la reconduction de « 1'exception » ne sont susceptibles de
produire la securite culturelle indispensable a la securite spirituelle,
sociale et materielle de la famille humaine dans le siecle qui vient.
Cette synthese s'impose. Cependant elle a peu de chance de reussir si
1'exclusion des benefices de la mondialisation devait se perpetuer,
exclusion qui, selon la Banque mondiale, touche une bonne moitie de
1'humanite, ces pays « non-membres de 1'economie mondiale » selon
la triste expression de 1'Organisation de Cooperation et de
Developpement Economiques (1'OCDE).
Telles sont les finalites d'une convention multilaterale specifique
en matiere de culture. Certes une telle convention n'est pas susceptible
a elle seule d'eponger les inquietudes et les affrontements actuels.
Mais elle y contribuera indiscutablement et substantiellement en les
inserant dans un pacte de confiance conjuguant les realites du monde
telles qu'elles deviennent et la volonte des hommes et des societes
rassemblees, en renouvelant la notion meme d'identite et en faisant
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apparaitre la part determinante et commune qu'elle recele. II nous
reste a placer au centre de notre reflexion et de nos travaux la realite
du lien entre les cultures en nous rappelant ce court poeme de
Shinoyasu Anzuki : « J'ai appris quelque chose d'interessant aujour-
d'hui, la lumiere sans objet reflecteur n'eclaire pas. »
Identity and Otherness in Canadian
Foreign Policy
Maria Teresa Gutierrez-Haces
I N ANALYSES OF CANADA FOR OVER FIVE DECADES, CERTAIN ISSUES ARErecognized as mandatory for any work or research carried out in
Canada or abroad. Canadian foreign policy is one of the political topics
considered to have become a mandatory issue, competing in impor-
tance with the analysis of Canadian federalism. An analogous situation
has occurred throughout the cultural and social studies fields, where
projects on multiculturalism and Canadian identity have also been the
subject of important essays, not only in Canada, but also abroad.
For years, these issues have been particularly attractive to many
political scientists from outside Canada who explore the singularity of
Canadian foreign policy in relation to their own fields of study.
Therefore, analyses related to the self-definition of Canada as a middle
power, and the implications of the Third Option as part of Canadian
foreign policy under the Trudeau government, has been one of the
most recurrent topics in academic activity at the international level.
The same applies to multilateralism and internationalism, distinctive
features of Canadian international policy.
More recently, the establishment of a foreign policy based on
United Nations (UN) proposals that promote the principles of Human
Security has also inspired numerous analyses. Such topics are among
the most visible examples of interest in Canadian Studies in relation to
their political and international aspects, but not to the exclusion of
interest, as in the fields of literature and political philosophy, where
writers such as Margaret Atwood, George Grant, Charles Taylor,
Margaret Lawrence, Northrop Frye, and James Tully have become
genuine international Canadian icons.
In spite of the intellectual success of Canadian foreign policy as an
object of survey, there are areas for analysis that have not been deeply
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explored, perhaps because the approach of a foreign writer is not nec-
essarily aimed at answering the same questions of interest to a
Canadian scholar. One of the short-term effects resulting from the
study of Canadian foreign policy internationally has been the appear-
ance of projects that differ from those carried out in Canada. In many
cases, such projects stand out both for their innovative methodology
and their use of non-traditional analytical tools from fields such as
psychology, literature, and social and cultural studies among others
(Badie and Smouts 1999:23-27,38-64). This digression from traditional
approaches prevailing in international studies has diversified and
enriched the study of Canada in the field of international relations.
Discourse on 'otherness/ obviously related to identity analysis,
both of which have served as tools for the specific analysis of Canadian
foreign policy, fits in this perspective. In this essay, discourse on oth-
erness is an analytical resource, expressed on three levels in Canadian
foreign policy. On the first level, 'alterity' emerges as a substantial part
of a strategy that the Canadian government has often used, since the
Second World War, to legitimize several government policies
designed to reinforce internally the discourse on Canadian identity.
Similarly, at a second level of analysis, discourse on alterity in
Canadian foreign policy has been incorporated for twenty-five years,
in one of the international strategies used by the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade. This department's promotion
of Canadian Studies programmes and culture systematically con-
tributes to the Canadian identity studied and promoted abroad, thus
reinforcing from the outside, the image and identity existing in
Canada.
A third level of analysis provides an additional variant to the use
of alterity within the discourse on Canadian foreign policy. This third
path shows that the discourse on alterity also influences the analyses
carried out by some foreign writers. This third use consists of examin-
ing and using Canadian foreign policy as an explicative resource to
study specific aspects of foreign policy of another country. This ten-
dency, though based on the tradition of comparative studies, goes
beyond this field in a certain way, as its originality resides much more
in the use of the discourse on alterity than in the comparison of politi-
cal processes.
Plainly speaking, it could be said that analyses by foreign writers
display a marked tendency to examine Canadian foreign policy as a
means of analyzing a reality that has nothing to do with Canada, thus
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overstepping the geographic, political, and intellectual boundaries of
the initial analysis of Canada.
Thus the analysis of democracy in Canada, the study of multicul-
turalism, the promotion of human rights, Canada's experience as the
United States's neighbour, and its participation in free trade, have all
become resources for explaining situations often opposed, such as
antidemocratic policy practices, commercial protectionism, violation
of human rights, the lack of a sustainable environmental strategy, and
the absence of a comprehensive policy on the ethnic minorities in other
countries.
This essay has two purposes. On the one hand, it aims to analyse
the link between the formulation of Canadian foreign policy and the
Canadian government's repeated efforts to build a pan-Canadian
identity based mainly on the international promotion of certain uni-
versal values. On the other hand, it aims to analyse, based on elements
that make up a substantial part of the official discourse on Canadian
foreign policy, a discourse on otherness and identity in Canada.
In this sense, three important distinctions that are implicitly but
not necessarily exhaustively, analysed in this study, should be made
clear from the outset:
• The formulation of a discourse on the Canadian identity, within
its own discourse on foreign policy of this country, has been a
federal political strategy toward international policy since the
forties.
• The province of Quebec has also formulated its own identitaria
discourse on international policy, especially from the sixties on,
as a result of changes brought about by the Quiet Revolution.
This discourse shares, to a great extent, federal postulates
around the international promotion of Canadian values but has,
at the same time, issued other postulates to gain acknowledge-
ment of Quebec as a political speaker in the international arena.
The reflections of Louis Belanger on the subject widely illustrate
the way in which the international policy of Quebec formulates
the Quebecois identity:
En raison a la fois de son statut et de ses objectifs, I'Etat du Quebec doit
faire face de faqon evidente au deft de se faire reconnaitre comme inter-
locuteur politique a I'etranger. Cette quete d'identite n'est pas aussi
singuliere qu'il le semble puisque, au-dela de la reconnaissance formelle,
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chaque Etat cherche dans ses relations avec I'exterieur la reconnaissance
d'une experience historique particuliere (Belanger 1995:71).
• This means both that foreign policy traditionally formulated by
the federal government and that deriving from Quebec, express
a clear political will to use international policy as a mechanism
of identitaria affirmation.
• The use of otherness in this strategy is closer to the federal gov-
ernment's attempt to formulate a pan-Canadian identity.
This essay approaches an analysis of Canadian foreign policy
mainly from the perspective of identity and otherness, but it does not
mean to downplay the validity and importance of the international
policy of Quebec in examining identity.
The legitimation of postulates inherent in a certain foreign policy
depends directly on how closely the interests and values of the society
relate to the proposals put forward by the state through its foreign
policy. In view of all this, the state needs to build an 'Imaginary/
which any individual could identify with. This Imaginary must be
made up of symbols, whether individuals, ideas, principles, or rituals,
to transmit a feeling of common identity (Edelman 1983; Elder and
Cobb 1983).
National feeling is unquestionably an elusive concept. It evokes
both the sense of belonging to a certain territory and of loyalty to cer-
tain values and national institutions, which doubtless represent the
most useful cohesion resource for any state. It is also a prerequisite for
foreign policy to be considered legitimate. Our analysis of Canadian
foreign policy and, through it, the formulation of a pan-Canadian
identity, has been theoretically enriched by William Bloom's work on
identification theory. This theory "is concerned precisely with the
deep psychological relationship between an individual and his/her
social environment," and the internationalization of these "social atti-
tudes", thus providing "an analytical tool which clarifies the attitudes
and the motivation of both the individual and the mass citizenry in
relation to their state and their state's international relations" (Bloom
1990:4). In his analysis, Bloom mentions that the connection between
internationalization and identification may occur if "(1) symbols of the
state present an appropriate attitude in situations of perceived threat,
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or (2) symbols of the state behave beneficently towards the individual"
(1990:61).
Though a specific case survey on Canadian foreign policy is not
presented in Bloom's works, his analysis of the need for a state to pro-
duce symbols that strengthen the feeling of a national identity and a
foreign policy that strengthens such identity through its international
actions, offers important lessons for our research.1 And he adds:
"From a power political perspective of internal political control it is
advantageous, therefore (a) to evoke a common identification and then
(b) to possess a monopoly of power in terms of manipulating the sym-
bols of that identity" (1990:51).
Further on, Bloom insists in his analysis that "the national identity
dynamic, therefore, describes the social-psychological dynamic by
which a mass national public may be mobilized in relation to its inter-
national environment ... the mass national public will mobilize when
it perceives either that [its] national identity is threatened, or that there
is the opportunity of enhancing national identity" (1990:79).
One of the most interesting characteristics of the Canadian case is
precisely the virtual absence of symbols traditionally sought by other
states to create or reinforce the national identity. The decision of Prime
Minister Lester B. Pearson in 1964 that Canadian society needed its
own flag to distinguish it from the United Kingdom is an example of
an attempt to build a more tangible identity in Canada. As Pearson
stated: "On the evening of Sunday, 17 May 1963, I addressed the
National Convention of the Royal Canadian Legion in Winnipeg.
Under the steely eyes of a hostile audience, I announced to the assem-
bled war veterans and to the country at large that we were going to
have a distinctive Canadian flag. For me, the flag was part of a delib-
erate design to strengthen national unity" (Pearson 1975, 3:270).
In his works, Bloom insists on the need for the state to be able to
create symbols and rituals with which it clearly identifies.
Nevertheless, we think that symbols and rituals also tend to reinvent
themselves, the way a specific society does. In this sense, the process
of globalization has obviously influenced the speed to which tradi-
tional symbols and rituals have weakened or disappeared.
Considering all of the above, we think that Canadian foreign pol-
icy, formulated on a universal axiological base and not on rituals and
symbols, has escaped, to a certain extent, the decay related to certain
principles, heroes, deeds, and sagas that nourished the foreign policy
of certain countries. An example of this argument would be the inter-
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national strategy that, in recent years, has been implemented in
Canada. This strategy of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade was based on a series of principles known as
Human Security and was the main objective of international negotia-
tions undertaken by then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy.2 It served
as a justification for Canada's presence on the international scene.
Within Canadian foreign policy, the international promotion of
what is commonly known as human values has traditionally occupied
an important place. Practically every Prime Minister, and everyone
else responsible for Canadian foreign policy, from W.L. Mackenzie
King (1921-1926, 1926-1930 and 1935-1948), Louis Saint-Laurent
(1948-1957), Lester B. Pearson (1963-1968) or Pierre Elliott Trudeau
(1968-1980), to former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Lloyd Axworthy (1993-2000), and current Prime Minister Jean
Chretien (1993-) have always mentioned these values as a key element
to explain and justify Canada's position in the world (Pearson 1975;
Melakopides 1998; Granatstein and Hillmer 1999).
Since the 1940s, it has often been said, in both national and inter-
national forums, that Canadian foreign policy implies responsibility
for as well as an answer to the needs of humanity. Louis Saint-Laurent
as foreign minister, for one, stated it clearly in 1947: "No foreign pol-
icy is consistent nor coherent over a period of years unless it is based
upon some conception of human values" (as quoted in Melakopides
1998:3). The inclusion of certain human values in Canadian foreign
policy directly reflects the main ideas of the prevailing political culture
of the country, which has traditionally favoured moderation, interces-
sion, and cooperation as well as sharing and looking after those less
fortunate. In other words, "concern for the welfare of others is one of
the central values" (Canada, External Affairs 1970, fascicule
"International Development":9.)
Suffice it to say that this political culture, as well as Canadian
international policy, has been deeply influenced by religious princi-
ples from both Catholicism and Protestantism, mainly through a great
number of politicians who have been responsible for formulating and
implementing Canadian foreign policy. According to writers such as
Costas Melakopides and Denis Stairs, the circle created by the ideas
and actions of Pearson on Canadian internationalism, in the
Department of External Affairs at the end of the 1940s, and more
strongly between 1963 and 1968, was closely related to ethical and reli-
gious principles. Like other public officers involved in Canadian
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diplomacy such as Arnold Heeney and Scott Reid, Pearson was the
child of a protestant minister; Walter Ridell was a Methodist minister;
Hugh Keenleyside also came from a Methodist background (Stairs
1994; Melakopides 1998:85).
According to this line of analysis, it is important to mention that
the main idea behind Pearsonian internationalism was definitely the
interdependence of all creatures. Melakopides mentions that the moral
values that sustained this discourse were connected to the Canadian
and British Protestant tradition. This reflection has also been thor-
oughly analysed by other writers such as John English who stated that
Pearson, throughout his public life: "never spoke of God or called
upon him to explain or justify his ways ... Nevertheless, Pearson's
thought, language, and ethics bear heavily the weight of the tradition
[of British Protestantism]" (as quoted in Melakopides 1998:85).
As of 1945, the values traditionally sustained by Canadian foreign
policy were transformed into what is commonly known as 'Canadian
Internationalism.' This translated into certain specific international
actions by the Canadian government, such as the creation of peace-
keepers, promotion of human rights, support for democratization,
disarmament and weapons control, and aid to development in eco-
nomically weak countries. We must not forget that such objectives
were promoted by Canadian diplomacy in the midst of the East-West
conflict arising from the Cold War.
This internationalism was based on what Pearson considered to be
one of Canada's principal defenses: being a mid-power historically
inclined towards multilateral style actions (Cooper 1997; Nossal
1985:52-84,138-164). As Pearson stated in 1948: "modesty or timidity
should not be confused with isolationism ... this timidity is a sensible
recognition of the fact that middle powers ... can now merely expand
their responsibilities and their worries." That meant "a recognition of
the internationalist view that countries must come closer together
inside a United Nations rather than take over areas and responsibili-
ties outside it" (Pearson 1970:68-69).
In hindsight, Pearson was doubtless one of the prime ministers
who most contributed to the creation of the 'Canadian international
identity' and to the idea, widely spread over the years, that Canada,
speaking politically and internationally, possesses an 'exceptional' and
'different' character. His main worry - amply documented in his
memoirs and by his biographers - was not only the need to imprint a
clear, pragmatic idealism on his internationalism, but also to create the
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internal conditions for consolidation of a national identity that would
unite Canadians.
Such worry was obvious in the third volume of his autobiography,
where he often repeats it in passages such as:
My passionate interest when I was in government, apart from the
ultimate question of peace and war, was in the national unity of our
country. In some respects this was the most important issue of my
career. National unity is a problem of many facets embracing, among
other factors, the constitution, federal provincial relations and the
bread and butter issues of tax sharing and equalization grants. But, in
the long run, I am convinced that the problems of culture and lan-
guage are pre-eminent; and I would like to think that our
government made a permanent contribution to their solution"
(Pearson 1975, 3:236).
At the time, foreign policy was greatly influenced by the findings of
the Royal Commission on Bilinguism and Biculturalism (1963), created
at his initiative as prime minister, out of determination to have the
French language officially recognized in political matters, including
diplomacy: "I was convinced from the beginning, as I remain con-
vinced now, that a prime element is the recognition of the French
language. Nothing could be more important in my mind than an effort
to make our French-speaking people feel that their language is an
equal language in Canada." And again: "I was convinced that if
Canada were to be strong, independent, and distinct state on this con-
tinent, we had to do everything in our power to extend French culture
and the French language throughout Canada" (Pearson 1975,
3:236-37).
From the 1970s, during the Trudeau era, the language issues and
human values promoted by Canadian foreign policy changed. They
came to be identified and mentioned officially as 'Canadian values'
within the context of the foreign policy of the country. Canada's
emphatic and steady defence and promotion of these values interna-
tionally has given rise to a kind of 'international identity.'
Paradoxically, this identity has been better accepted and supported
domestically than official proposals offered to consolidate a national
identity internally. In this regard, Melakopides affirms that,
"Canadian foreign policy may, therefore, provide an indirect but com-
pelling answer to the perennial question of Canada's 'identity.' For if
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Canada is perceived by non-Canadians as one of the most honourable,
enlightened, and civilized international actors which comes mainly
from the record and the motives of Canadian foreign policy"
(Melakopides 1998:4).
We may therefore deduce that Canadian foreign policy applies its
actions and initiatives internationally as a spearhead to promote cer-
tain values and principles that are internally reworked and recycled to
promote a Canadian identity. In other words, otherness turns into a
privileged resource for Canadian foreign policy. As stated by
Melakopides, "this is especially paradoxical because, for a country that
appears perennially sensitive about its identity, Canadian foreign pol-
icy seems, in fact, to contain the most promising answer. If a country's
identity hinges on the perceptions of others, Canada's identity could
best be captured by the way it is seen, and the reasons it is so seen, by
the world" (1998:14). This strategy has worked, to a certain extent, as
a permanent 'contrivance' to consolidate 'from the outside/ the set of
values, ideals, and principles that constitute the heart of the Canadian
identity. This identity, perceived from outside, pretends to recreate an
internal identity that will underpin from 'inside' the unfinished project
of pan-Canadian unity.
This attempt to create an exogenous identitaria, based on Canada's
international actions, would not have been possible if an 'imaginary'
had not previously been built internally around what would ideally
comprise a Canadian identity and Canadian values. Without this
imaginary, the creation of exceptionalism in 'Canada's foreign policy
(distinction-distinctiveness-unique) would be very hard to maintain.
At this point of our analysis certain questions should be addressed:
• How and who creates an 'imaginary' in foreign policy?
• Is it possible to speak about institutions and minds that feed a
specific 'imaginary'?
• What have been and are the perceptions and experiences of
Canadians of yesterday and today regarding the construction of
a Canadian identity?
• What are the perceptions of foreigners who study Canada and
who also build their own 'imaginary' about Canadian 'distinc-
tion / distincti veness' ?
Historically, the construction of the imaginary identitaria in
Canada has faced two great challenges: cultural diversity and the
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antagonism caused by a politically complex linguistic diversity. How
have these two aspects affected foreign policy? Regarding these ques-
tions, certain dates offer important clues to the way in which the
Canadian imaginary identitaria is built:
• Until 1936, every document in the business and financial world
was issued in English, even papers to conduct small trade oper-
ations.
• In 1938, a reform to the Civil Service Act required government
officials to "speak the language spoken by most of the people
they served."
• In 1947, the Canadian Citizenship Act legally acknowledged the
people who lived in Canada as Canadians.
• Only after the First World War (1914-1918) was it decided to
professionalize the Canadian Army and to take into considera-
tion that most of the troops spoke French while the high-ranking
leaders ordered in English.
• In 1947, Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King appointed an ad
hoc commission to investigate the absence of bilingual public
services, after discovering that not even police reports acknowl-
edged this situation.
• In 1958, the National Capital was established.
• In 1965, Canada obtained its own flag and stopped using the
Union Jack, symbol of the United Kingdom.
• In 1969, the federal government was officially established as
bilingual (Francis 1997).
These dates offer a very accurate idea of the facts, experiences, and
perceptions on which the inhabitants of Canada were building their
imaginary identitaria,
It is quite obvious that these aspects must all have influenced
Canadian foreign policy, that in turn faced its own identity problems.
One of these problems was the unanswerable influence of England on
the institutional and bureaucratic order within the operations of
Canadian foreign policy (Morton 1962:32-57).
This analysis does not intend to repeat the well-based explana-
tions on the origins of Canadian foreign policy before and after the
Statute of Westminster, 1931, or the way it marked it, or its functional
link to British international policy. However, we can doubtless say that
the years after 1930 were especially difficult for a country such as
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Canada which began constructing its own diplomacy quite late, while
on the same continent, Latin American countries and, of course, the
United States had been diplomatically autonomous for over a century
(Story 1993; Hilliker 1990). Indeed, prior to the Second World War,
every Canadian international relationship, as well as its commercial
diplomacy and its safety and espionage systems had to pass through
British High Commissioners abroad before arriving in Ottawa.
Obviously, the institutional order established following the
Second World War offered Canadians the opportunity to open their
own embassies and conduct a foreign policy that was more their own
than before 1945.
In the aforementioned paragraphs, I dealt with the postulates that
Canadian foreign policy depends on the extent to which the interests
and values of society are reflected in the proposals put forward by the
Canadian state. With this idea as a guideline, I will now consider cer-
tain reflections arising from an analysis of official documents
published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (DFAIT).
Firstly, I will analyze how foreign policy objectives have evolved
in the debate over Canadian identity, based on documents published
by the department responsible for foreign affairs between 1970 and
1990. In these documents, I will examine the kind of Canadian identity
that is reflected in Canadian foreign policy, which, as I have already
mentioned, promotes values that do not have as a conceptual referent
either a language or a predominant culture. These values essentially
reflect universal interests and worries. This is wherein lies its internal
consensus and international success.
From these documents, it can be inferred that the Canadian iden-
tity promoted specifically by foreign policy tries to reconcile its
relationship with the United States on two levels. On one level,
Canadian foreign policy emphasizes its identity and differentiation
through internationalism and Canadian values. On another level
Canadian foreign policy, more recently, has promoted Canadian iden-
tity based on a concept of American-ness or North American-ness,
which relates back to a space called North America.
'Americanity' is then the antithesis of an Americanized identity
and the answer to the accusations concerning the continentalization of
Canadian foreign policy. As Fox explains,
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Canada's search for identity led Canadians to stress their North-
American-ness when they sought to differentiate themselves and
their policy from the British and Britain's policy, while North-
American-ness got in the way when differentiation from the United
States and American policy was sought ... Australians demonstrate
their sense of identity ... by calling the English Pommies; Canadian
have no comparable word for demonstrating that they are not
Americans; but they too make use of symbols of counteridentifica-
tion, particularly in foreign policy. 'Independent' for them means not
just foreign policies that are freely chosen; it may also mean made-in-
Canada policies and even policies deliberately different from those
the United States has chosen" (Fox 1985:64, 76).3
Canadian values, mostly after 1990, have been promoted within a
strategic thrust of Canadian foreign policy which has been called
'Public Diplomacy/ The intended outcome of this strategy was "to cre-
ate interest and confidence in Canada abroad and an international
public environment favourable to Canada's political and economic
interests and Canadian values" (Canada, DFAIT, 1999:32). In other
words, among the stated objectives of Public Diplomacy is the promo-
tion of Canadian identity abroad and the enhancement of Canadians'
attachment to Canada by means of a greater awareness of the interna-
tional role of this country.
The White Paper entitled Foreign Policy for Canadians was issued in
1970 and discussed six diplomatic areas in which Canadian foreign
policy intended to concentrate its strategies: economic growth;
sovereignty and independence; peace and safety; social justice;
improvement of quality of life; and conservation of harmony in the
environment. This document has been quoted and analysed to such an
extent that thirty-one years after its publication, it remains an 'icon' of
Canadian foreign policy (Canada, External Affairs 1970).4 I will limit
comment on it to aspects that reinforce an analysis of the promotion of
values and Canadian identity in the international sphere.
One aspect that attracts attention is the idea of Canada as a 'men-
tor-state/ Melakopides mentions the perception of Trudeau when this
document was published: "Trudeau perceived Canada as a 'mentor
state' capable of being a model to the world. He repeatedly referred to
the need for a 'global ethic'" (Melakopides 1998:9). Clearly, the mech-
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anism of promoting Canadian values through Canadian international
policy forms part of a much wider process in which Canadian foreign
policy seeks to teach, share, and guide other countries in relation to
Canadian values, and even to promote the acceptance of global ethics.
This strategy, as already mentioned, combines the ethical-religious tra-
dition of Judeo-Christian ideals, conveyed in such famous phrases by
Trudeau as "We are all brothers," or "We are one on this earth" (as
quoted in Melakopides 1998:9).
From this point of view, Canadian values must prevail, and what
better way than to use established diplomatic channels: "A society able
to ignore poverty abroad will find it much easier to ignore it at home;
a society concerned with poverty and development abroad will be
concerned about poverty and development at home" (Canada,
External Affairs 1970, fascicule "International Development":9). On
analysis, the document also argues that Canadians, as well as their
government, would not be able to create a really fair society, inside
Canada "if [they] were not prepared to play [their] part in the creation
of a more just world society" (1970:9).
One point that deserves to be mentioned: all of the documents
under discussion contain evidence of a deepening economic character
of Canadian foreign policy, under two courses of action - commercial
diplomacy and aid to development. These two courses complement
the strategies used to promote universal values that Canada has
adopted as its own. In this sense, it must not be forgotten that the eco-
nomic historian Donald Creighton defined Canada as a "commercial
state;" thus the economic component was always present in the strate-
gies linked to Canadian foreign policy.
The second document on Canadian foreign policy, produced by
the Special Joint Committee on International Relations of the Senate
and the House of Commons, called Independence and Internationalism,
was issued as a Green Paper and meant to be a base document to elicit
the opinion of Canadians on the new directions of Canadian foreign
policy (Canada, Special Joint Committee 1986). These directions had
been made public a year earlier by Brian Mulroney's government
under the title Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's
International Relations (Canada, Foreign Affairs 1985). Several observa-
tions derive from the Green Paper. The first recognizes that the
government established a new precedent: public consultations on for-
eign policy that gave a more democratic character to the development
of Canadian foreign policy. Secondly, it was the first time that
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Canadian foreign policy was analysed by a parliamentary ad hoc com-
mittee and debated both in the House of Commons and in the Senate.
A third observation from reading the Green Paper is that the first of
the six objectives proposed in it was national unity; the other five
objectives were practically the same as those already proposed in
Foreign Policy for Canadians, published in 1970 by the Liberal govern-
ment of Trudeau.
A significant observation arising from the Green Paper was the
need to create an international image of Canada, based on the values
that identify it and make it highly reputable (Canada, Special Joint
Committee 1986:27). This proposal is all the more relevant given that
it contained the opinion of many Canadians: about 700 individuals,
300 witnesses and 287 organisms appeared before the committee in a
first stage of hearings in the summer of 1985. Later, in May 1986, 245
organizations took part in a second round; these citizens agreed that
national unity and strengthening the Canadian identity should be the
top aim of Canadian foreign policy: "National unity has a grip on the
souls of Canadians ... It stands at the head of Canada's objectives as
the sine qua non for all the other collective goals that Canadians may
decide to pursue." This subject is noteworthy for the document clearly
mentions that Canadians have "recently been directing foreign policy
to the achievement of national unity" (1986:32).
An aspect that stands out in Independence and Internationalism is the
discourse on 'otherness' constructed around the concept that "the
world acts as a mirror for Canadians." Another important point along
the same line is the mention of Canada's bicultural and bilingual char-
acter followed by a statement that "Canada has to be able to present an
image abroad that Canadians recognize as their own" (1986:32).
In contrast to the conciliatory tone of most of the other documents
mentioned herein, Independence and Internationalism is quite direct
about the position Canada is to play in its attempt to promote national
unity through the promotion of global ethics: "Canada must be wary
of foreign governments that may be tempted for one reason or another
to take steps that could damage Canada's national cohesion" (1986:34).
Incidentally, it should be noted that Lloyd Axworthy, Liberal member
of Parliament for Winnipeg and Jean Chretien, as Liberal MP for Saint
Maurice, both current architects of Canada's foreign policy, were part
of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations.
Though national unity occupied first place among the new goals,
generally speaking it was linked to "the consequences of its vicinity to
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the United States/' a subject ostensibly avoided in the White Paper of
1970. An article by Canada's then Foreign Affairs Minister Mitchel
Sharp, entitled "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future" later
corrected this omission (Sharp 1972).
The section more directly related to the objectives of this analysis
is undoubtedly the one entitled "Influence Based on the Image and
Reputation" in which it is argued that the way Canadians have been
viewed abroad often works to their advantage (Canada, Special Joint
Committee 1986:27-34).
The Green Paper also offers interesting clues on certain features of
Canadian foreign policy, such as "its participation in peacekeeping
forces, its advocacy of human rights, its unflagging support of the UN
system" and states that "they have favourably influenced how the coun-
try is regarded abroad" and have added to its reputation (1986:27).
Lastly, with the 1995 publication of a document entitled Canada in
the World, Canadian foreign policy clearly assumes the role of promot-
ing the Canadian identity (Canada, DFAIT1995). In different ways, the
three pillars of Canadian foreign policy mentioned in this document
support this identity, characterized by a regional identity, but always
Canadian. Published under the current Liberal government of Prime
Minister Jean Chretien, this document represents the first time that a
new group of Canadian values is openly defined, in addition to the
existing ones. Among the economic values of Canada, the promotion
of free trade emerges as an integral part of the new strategy of the
Liberal government.
Yet economic as well as commercial concerns have occupied a rel-
evant place in the Canadian international strategy since the 1970s
when Trudeau introduced them into the institutional structure of the
government. However, in the documents issued under his leadership,
such as Foreign Policy for Canadians, economic values were never offen-
sively defined as central to the axiomatic group that had traditionally
promoted Canadian foreign policy. Perhaps the aim was to counter-
balance the economic component with the importance and pertinence
of such traditional Canadian values as democracy and human rights,
not to mention the promotion of culture or Canadian Studies abroad.
Since 1990, promotion of the Canadian identity through its foreign pol-
icy has occupied an important place in the financial statements of
DFAIT, in the name of Public Diplomacy, described and justified as
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follows: "The international perception of Canada is often dated and
out of step with economic and other realities in Canada. In addressing
this issue, the Department is pursuing public diplomacy activities to
promote Canada's international academic and cultural relations"
(Canada, DFAIT 1999:7).
Until the year 2000, DFAIT published detailed information about
contributions to different international institutions and programs in its
estimates and reports on plans and priorities. Thus, thanks to a
detailed table on transfer payments by business line, we can analyse
with certain adequacy the priorities of the federal government con-
cerning foreign policy.
According to the public data published by DFAIT at the beginning
of 2000 in 2000-2001 Estimates, the Department's forecasted expendi-
ture on budgetary policy for the years 1999-2000 was about $1,719.5
million, from which $94.7 million was earmarked for Public
Diplomacy. This amount is less than that for "International Security
and Cooperation": $479.1 million, "Corporate Services": $308.3 mil-
lion, "International Business Development": $286.5 million and $215.7
million for "Trade and Economic Policy" (Canada, DFAIT 2000:8).
The Department's 1999-2000 Estimates, published a year before,
contained more detailed and disaggregated information which allows
us to compare some important issues. In Forecast Spending 1998-99,
grants allocated to "Aid to Academic Relations" amounted to
$13,290,000 and those allocated to "Aid and Cultural Relations,"
$4,997,000, while under the column "Contributions," international
institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS)
secured from DFAIT a budget of $12,775,000 in the same period. This
is also observed in the case of the UN: $45,359,000 and the Peace
Corps: $53,823,000 (Canada, DFAIT 1999:52-54).
These amounts indicate that the financial strategy of DFAIT
reflects a prevailing interest in securing a space for negotiations at an
international level that naturally allows the projection of a specific
image of Canadian values and therefore affirms an identity con-
structed around the vision of the federal government. This strategy
also presumes greater confidence in promoting Canadian identity
through multilateral bodies such as the UN, the OAS, or the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization than in financing more widely the cul-
tural and academic relations that correspond to the budget line called
Public Diplomacy. Clearly, though Canadian identity is promoted
through the Public Diplomacy strategy, the definition of Canadian
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identity and values centres on the business line called "International
Security and Cooperation/' which considers the following: "Canada is
a cosmopolitan country, with economic, security and cultural interests
that span the globe. Canada is equally a compassionate country, with
a values based foreign policy, backed by diplomatic skills and defense
forces, by development assistance and civil society" (Canada, DFAIT
2000:19).
There are six strategic lines associated with Public Diplomacy:
1. Project Canada's image and values abroad.
2. Communicate to Canadians the importance of Canada's role in
the world, the international dimensions of the government's
priorities as well as the Department's role and the services it
provides to Canadians.
3. Promote international, academic, and educational linkages.
4. Promote national unity.
5. Promote identity and attachment to Canada among Canadians
through increased awareness of Canada's role abroad.
6. Ensure that foreign governments are aware of the flexibility and
evolution of Canadian federalism, as well as the importance of
the ongoing international role played by a strong and united
Canada (Canada DFAIT 1999:33).
Finally, among the results that DFAIT is expected to accomplish
through Public Diplomacy, I quote:
1. Greater public understanding in Canada and abroad of
Canadian policies and positions.
2. International public awareness of Canada's characteristics and
accomplishments through cultural, scholarly or comparable
events.
3. Increased exports of cultural and educational products and ser-
vices, including choice of Canada as a destination for foreign
tourists and students (1999:35).
These strategic lines widely reflect the discourse on otherness that
Canadian foreign policy has been developing through Public
Diplomacy.
The Public Diplomacy and Human Security strategies are without
doubt, the most ambitious and focused projects of Canadian foreign
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policy at the beginning of the millennium. Its strength lies in the syn-
ergy it has been able to establish between its international interests and
the new focus of its foreign policy: civil society. Public Diplomacy con-
fers a new status on Canada as a 'facilitator' in the processes of
democratic transition and as a mediator in the pacification processes.
As we read through the Public Diplomacy document, one of the
most common phrases is: "Canada can make the difference in the
region." Contrary to other periods prior to 1990, Public Diplomacy has
meant an important investment in the financial and human capital,
requiring public officers abroad to change the usual procedures for
raising awareness about Canada internationally. The promotion of
democracy, defence of human rights, protection of the environment,
support of the Canadian culture industry, and strengthening a critical
mass of foreigners interested in the study of Canada, support the main
objectives of Public Diplomacy.
This sort of diplomacy takes risks because its role as 'facilitator'
introduces it to a political field where the national sovereignty of 'the
others' is in the way. The political boundary between mediation and
intervention is fragile. Such diplomacy fuels a double discourse based
on otherness. On one hand, the aim of the above-mentioned objectives
is to widen and strengthen the identity of Canada outside the country
and in which most of its inhabitants take pride. This is why political
mistakes made outside of Canada, such as Canadian intervention in
Somalia through the peacekeepers, are more deeply regretted within.
At the same time, the presence of Canada through Public Diplomacy
is unquestionably useful to explain abroad, through an analysis on
Canada, the problems of 'the others.'
This means that analyses of free trade, Aboriginal rights, multicul-
turalism, or Canadian federalism are often a starting point for
explaining other political, economic, and social realities. In this sense,
the discourse on otherness fulfills its task.
Notes
1. Bloom analyses the cases of United States foreign policy and the Cold
War; the Falklands-Malvinas conflict; unilateral disarmament and
American bases in the United Kingdom; the conflict between Greece and
Turkey regarding Cyprus, and the Third World foreign policy (Bloom
1990:90-104).
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2. According to Miriam Villanueva Ayon, the concept of Human Security
was first mentioned in some of the documents published by the General
Secretariat of the United Nations Organization as of 1992 and more
specifically in the publications of the United Nations Programme for
Development in 1993 and 1994 (Villanueva Ayon 2000).
3. Another point of view on the concept of American-ness and North-
American-ness may be found in Lachapelle and Balthazar 1999.
4. The name White Paper is usually given to a document officially pub-
lished by some country that reflects the official position on a certain
issue of national concern, in this case, Canadian foreign policy during
the 1970s.
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THE PLACE OF CANADA IN THE WORLD OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
LE ROLE DU CANADA SUR LA SCENE INTER-
NATIONALE AU VINGT ET UNIEME SIECLE
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The Canadian Military in the Security
Environment of the Twenty-first
Century
Donna Winslow*
A T THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, people predicted an eraof peace and prosperity for the coming one hundred years.
Nevertheless we found ourselves engaged in vast, blood-letting con-
flicts that no one could have imagined at that time. It is difficult to
guess what the future holds, but we can be certain that the faces of war
and peace will change dramatically. New challenges will put greater
demands on military personnel than ever before.
Certainly, we will have to place more emphasis on international
military cooperation as we did during the Kosovo crisis. We can also
anticipate an increase in the number of peace support operations and
a broadening of the range of these missions. This carries the risk that
the soldier's traditional combat role will change to one of "global street
worker."1 At the same time, military forces are subject to local (i.e.
national) pressures. The budget for the military and the number of
forces are likely to continue shrinking as the organization becomes
more oriented to war deterrence rather than war readiness as in the
past. Another local pressure will come from the demand that the mili-
tary be more accountable to and representative of the Canadian
population.
In the following pages, we will examine a variety of issues. We
will begin by exploring the changing nature of international conflicts.
We will then examine the peace-keeping niche that Canada seems to
Funding for this research was received from the Defence and Civil Institute of
Environmental Medicine [DCIEM], Canadian Department of Defence, and US
Army Research Institute Contract No. DASW01-98-M-1868, "Army Culture". I
wish to thank my research assistants Jason Dunn and Glenn Gilmour for their good
humour and hard work on this project.
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have carved out for itself and how that relates to Canada's security
interests and its role as a middle power in the international arena, in
particular, the interest in "soft power." Throughout this discussion, we
will consider the impact of these policies on the Canadian Forces. The
final section of the paper deals with national issues such as representa-
tiveness and how these impact upon the Canadian Forces.
The Broadening Range of Conflict
The Cold War was a time of relative stability for the armed forces.
Today, the rather straightforward, bi-polar conflict has given way to a
much messier world. Conflicts are a result of internal state disintegra-
tion or civil war rather than the interstate confrontations of the past.
One paradox of future conflict is that it will be simultaneously
both extremely high tech and low tech. It will entail the management
of highly sophisticated weaponry (such as smart bombs) while fight-
ing is more likely to occur in urban and built-up areas with relatively
large numbers of soldiers on foot. This is a particularly messy, dan-
gerous, and time-consuming affair, as the recent fighting in Chechnya
has shown.
The battlefield of the future will be bewildering, complex, and
fluid. Although some of the technology will be ultra modern; the psy-
chological stresses on soldiers will remain as terrible and lonely as any
in the history of warfare.2 And this will all occur at a time when casu-
alties, both civilian and military, are less politically tolerable. This is a
paradox of modern conflicts: asking soldiers to kill without taking any
casualties themselves. In terms of civilian casualties, the Kosovo
bombing campaign has highlighted the importance of unacceptable
civilian casualties. This will continue to be a leadership challenge for
the Air Force in the future.
The humanitarian approach to the prevention of harm to non-
combatants represents a significant shift in the use of military force in
an air campaign. Target selection during the Kosovo campaign was
based upon careful consideration of the military importance of the
objective, the level of proposed force, the level of anticipated collateral
damage and, of course, the anticipated risk to air crews. What would
happen if a plane was shot down and aircrew taken prisoner since this
was not a mission sanctioned by the United Nations (UN)? In a simi-
lar vein, there was the hard choice between using high-level bombing
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and other risk-avoidance strategies or using lower-level bombing. The
first meant greater safety for air crews and higher risk for civilian casu-
alties compared with the second which allowed air crews to abort an
attack if the potential for civilian casualties was present.
For the first time in Canadian operations, legal counsel was exten-
sively consulted in target selection during the Kosovo air campaign.
Until this point, legalities had little impact on mission planning, but as
time went on lawyers had a significant influence on operations.
Lawyers often met and briefed pilots prior to missions, and pilots were
encouraged to consult with legal counsel on returning from missions.
We can see not only that decision-making can be influenced by a larger
variety of (non) military actors, but that the influence of these actors,
as it relates to ongoing operations, will likely increase.
Another aspect to the high-tech side of war is the threat of cyber
attack as economies become increasingly vulnerable to Internet terror-
ism. The recent spread of the 'love virus' (a computer virus originating
in the Philippines which crippled part of the world's electronic mail traf-
fic) illustrates just how fragile the present networked world is. Anyone
with a computer and an Internet connection, no matter where, can
release an electronic plague with global implications. The Internet has
become a powerful tool in the information war. Now, Chechen guerillas
have their own websites and are able to communicate in real time.
In the twenty-first century, the face of the enemy is also changing.
Some suggest that future militaries will no longer face another soldier
but "an unconstrained warrior who has morally run wild."3 For exam-
ple, in Sierra Leone, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front,
Foday Sankoh, was convicted of war crimes ranging from rape to tor-
ture and murder. The events in Sierra Leone have also highlighted the
weaknesses of UN peacekeeping that pulls together troops from dis-
parate nations who are ill-equipped and untrained to face a rapid
escalation of violence. They also raise the question of whether the
Canadian Forces are psychologically prepared to deal with the atroci-
ties found in these forms of violence. Situations like those in Sierra
Leone are likely to increase as will asymmetrical warfare such as guer-
rilla warfare and terrorism.
In the past, Canadians have mostly depended on our southern
neighbours to assure our territorial defence. We may continue to sup-
port these efforts by becoming partners in a continental missile
defence system. Yet the new forms of (cyber) war make us more vul-
nerable and if terrorists attack the United States, some most certainly
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will try to come through Canada in order to do so. What role will the
military play in combating these threats?
Warriors or Global Street Workers?
As the nature of warfare is changing, Canada seems unclear as to
whether it wants its forces to remain interoperable warriors, which
implies heavy investments in hardware in order to conduct joint oper-
ations with the Americans and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies, or occupy a niche role as peacekeepers. And while the
Canadian military has argued that it is still primarily a combat force,
peace operations have become, over the years, its primary business.
This ambiguity is reflected in official documents. "Combat capable,
multipurpose forces" as described in the 1994 Defence White Paper are
still being presented as a realistic future. In A Strategy for 2020, future
forces are described as "high quality, combat-capable, interoperable
and rapidly deployable task-tailored."4 Yet, Defence Performance and
Outlook 2000 tells us that the military is also supposed to advance
Canada's human security agenda. This includes, "the ability to fight to
protect the fundamental human rights and values that Canadians and
the international community espouse ... [and] ... keep the peace once
it is achieved."5 How exactly does an armed force protect values?
Certainly, the peacekeeping image appeals to popular Canadian
self-images, to sentiments of altruism and generosity, to helping oth-
ers who are suffering, and so on. In many ways, peacekeeping
contributed to the formation of a Canadian identity in the international
arena. Peacekeeping represented Canadian multiculturalism, toler-
ance, and respect for the rule of law. In the words of Sens,
"Peacekeeping had become a mirror, reflecting the finest qualities
Canadians ascribed to their own society and national character."6
There are, however, other more self-motivated reasons for partici-
pating in peace operations. During the Cold War, there were Canadian
security matters to consider. As Sens points out, during the Cold War,
international security and national security became intertwined:
Canada's paramount strategic concern during the Cold War was an
escalation of superpower hostilities in Europe or elsewhere into a
global confrontation which would threaten Canadian territory. As it
became evident that the United States and the Soviet Union could
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clash in various regional conflicts, Canada acquired an interest in the
prevention, control, or containment of hostilities in areas of tension
around the world.7
This theme appears in Canada's Defence White Papers of that
period. Indeed, in 1986, a Special Joint Committee of the Canadian
Senate and House of Commons stated that "the threat to Canada is one
and the same with the threat to international stability and peace."8 In
the 1990s, then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney talked about the neces-
sity of "rethinking the limits of national sovereignty" in a world of
intrastate and transnational problems. This coincided with a surge in
peace operations by Canadians.9
Peacekeeping also meshes well with Canadian foreign policy con-
ceptions of Canada as a "middle power." Contributions to peace
operations are expressions of Canada's commitment to the UN.
According to Sens, the desire to be both represented and consulted on
international affairs is an important driving force behind Canadian
foreign policy, and peacekeeping has helped maintain Canada's pro-
file and influence as an independent sovereign actor in the world.10
Participation in peace operations also gave Canada some leverage in
international forums. According to Wiseman, peacekeeping
"enhanced Canada's reputation as a middle power [and contributed]
to Canada's stature and influence in the UN."11 According to Sens: "By
contributing contingents to ventures such as peacekeeping Canada
hoped to gain a seat at the table, a voice, and therefore some input into
decision-making forums."12 As an example, participation in the oper-
ations in the Balkans was an expression of Canada's ongoing
commitment to European security and to NATO.
However, as important as participation might be, the question
remains as to whether we have the resources and capabilities to hon-
our all our commitments. Canadians have not seen the military as an
important national institution and traditionally have not supported
defence spending. As Shadwick has stated, "many Canadians seem to
aspire to a global security and human security role for their country
and their armed forces, but are prone to terminal writer's cramp when
it comes to signing the cheques for a credible defence establishment."
He indicated that - despite an overwhelming belief that "a strong mil-
itary is important to Canada's international standing" (88 per cent),
"peacekeeping requires combat-ready forces" (94 per cent) and
"Canada needs a modern, combat-capable military" (95 per cent -
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when it came to a zero-sum choice, defence spending rated last of all
choices, with Canadians choosing to allocate an additional tax dollar
to propping up the Canadian film industry rather than improving the
state of defence.13
Dwindling force capacity will affect Canada's ability to sustain
prolonged substantial commitments abroad. The ability to work with
political objectives in spite of force limitations is not always easy, par-
ticularly in a resource-poor environment such as that of the Canadian
Forces. In the future, we may have to accept involvement in alliances,
not as an ongoing commitment but for specific purposes only. We may
still be able to contribute to coalitions but only in a subordinate role
with little autonomy of action. This may also have an effect on
Canada's standing and ability to exert influence. According to Daryl
Copeland, executive director of the Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, "Our rhetoric will start to ring hollow unless it is backed up by
resources."14 There was already an indication of this in 1994 when
Canada was excluded from the Contact Group, which became the pri-
mary mechanism for policy on the Balkans. According to Sens,
"Canada's allies were dissatisfied with Canada's contribution to
IFOR."15 In short, we were marginalized for not anteing-up at the
international security table.
Soft Power with No Hard Power to Back it Up
Another important trend in Canadian foreign policy has been towards
"soft power;"16 that is, the belief that "knowledge and information
confer international influence."17 The former Canadian Foreign Affairs
Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, has described soft power as "punching
above your weight. In Canada's case ... ideas, values, persuasion, skill,
[and] technique."18 What this essentially means "is affecting and influ-
encing behaviour by information, by values and by forms of
non-intrusive intervention."19 Besides the fact that 'non-intrusive
intervention' may be an oxymoron, we remain somewhat ambiguous
about what role hard power plays in support of soft power - if any at
all.20 Yet recent events in the Balkans indicate that peace management
is only achievable through military intervention and ongoing military
presence. However, in Canada, the emphasis on soft power has coin-
cided with considerable reductions in the defence budget21 and a
resulting loss of hard power capabilities. The new buzzword is "peace
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building" (efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into con-
flict22). This has led to support for "human security," a concept also
championed by Lloyd Axworthy:
The concept of human security recognizes that human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable
development and social equality are as important to global peace as
are arms control and disarmament. It follows from this that, to
restore and sustain peace in countries affected by conflict, human
security must be guaranteed just as military security must. This is
where peace building comes in: as a package of measures to
strengthen and solidify peace by building a sustainable infrastructure
of human security. Peace building aims to put in place the minimal
conditions under which a country can take charge of its destiny, and
social, political, and economic development become possible.23
The concept of human security underlines a fundamental change
in the twenty-first century security environment. As the Kosovo
bombing campaign shows, territorial integrity and sovereignty can be
subordinated to issues of human rights. During the Cold War, territo-
rial integrity superseded human rights. Now the tide seems to have
turned in favour of human rights. The Kosovo campaign also shows,
however, that human rights have to be robustly defended. What,
therefore, is the role for Canada's military in advancing human secu-
rity interests?
As noted by many, we have a good network of memberships in
powerful and comparatively exclusive clubs - G7, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), G-20, and the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These member-
ships, combined with being in the more universal clubs such as the
UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), and the Organization of American States (OAS) for example,
give us forums for advancing our human security interests. However,
we also have to remember that, in contrast to other countries such as
the US, the UK, or France, our military instrument is weak, being pro-
portionately smaller, and more poorly funded and equipped.
Canada's military continues to innovate in order to use most effec-
tively what little military assets they have. Future governments will
have to balance the military's capacity to participate in human security
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efforts and collective security operations. In order to do so, we will
have to tailor our commitments to our resources, instead of always
expecting the opposite - i.e. committing the military to an operation
and expecting them to come up with the human and material resources
to realize it.
If Canada is going to support this package of measures to solidify
peace, then interagency co-operation and civil - military co-operation
will be an even more important component of peace operations in the
future. Non governmental organizations (NGOs) are emerging as
important social actors in peace efforts. These actors have become
very skillful in adapting to the circumstances and have gained in
international influence. The recent NGO protests in Seattle and
Washington during the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank meetings are an example of this. Non governmental organiza-
tions, humanitarian agencies, local representatives, and the military
will all have to collaborate closely in future efforts to restore and
maintain global peace.24
The National Context
The attitudes of society towards its military are subject to various
influences depending on the climate within society or the viewpoints
of the members of society on questions of war and peace.25 In
Canadian society, social, cultural, and legal changes provide a less
robust supporting framework for the core values of military culture.
We can say that Canada is not a militaristic society and it is unlikely to
become one in the future. Neither can we say that patriotism as it
might be expressed in "proud service to one's country" is widespread.
Indeed, the new generations of prospective recruits will likely be less
accepting of some of the traditional demands of a military way of life.
The military is going to have to adapt to a society that is becoming
more individualistic (for example, people wish to be actively involved
in how their working lives are structured and expect employers to
respect their private and family commitments), egalitarian, and liti-
gious. A higher value is now placed upon social equality and citizens
are more disposed to enforce their rights in the courts. Thus, the
Canadian Forces have been subject to a number of important legisla-
tive acts that have forced change upon the organization. For example,
the Canadian Forces were among the first to be fully bilingual and
The Canadian Military in the Security Environment 261
have done away with barriers to homosexual and female participation
in all job qualifications, including combat.26
Deference to authority figures - especially in institutional organiza-
tions - has waned: authority has to be earned and not taken for granted.
This trend poses challenges for the armed forces with their highly struc-
tured authority relations. Should Service personnel have the right to air
and represent their grievances in forums that are outside the formal
chain of command? One response has been to set up the Office of the
Ombudsman for National Defence and the Canadian Forces that stands
outside the military chain of command.
In Canada, the number of people with direct experience of military
affairs has dwindled. Along with the long-term decline in the size of the
military establishment has come a corresponding diminution in the
number of military and ex-military personnel in society. In addition,
with base closures and rationalization, the 'footprint' made by the mil-
itary on society has diminished. The number of people - especially
opinion formulaters - who can speak knowledgeably about the Services
has declined in recent decades. In Canada, Members of Parliament
(MPs) have little direct experience with the military.27 According to a
survey conducted by Dr. Douglas Bland of the Centre for Defence
Management Studies at Queen's University, the Canadian MPs respon-
sible for approving $CDN9.5 billion in annual military spending often
know little about Canada's defence needs or objectives. Bland com-
mented about the results of his study: "Defence is the only government
policy where the government is prepared to deliberately spend the lives
of people to accomplish policy ends. You would think if they're going
to send people out to get killed, they should think about it." 28
The families of military members are changing as well.
Increasingly, both parents work, placing increased demands on
employers for career breaks and more flexible working practices.
Demands of the growing number of single parent families must be
taken into account. Much work is still to be done in the Canadian
Forces to provide more flexible working conditions and to recognize
that women are no longer prepared to place their own career second
to that of their military partners. Women, of course, are pursuing
careers in the military. Career paths will have to take into account the
female life cycle, allowing breaks for pregnancy, and ensure career
development after women return to work.
While the wider employment of women is still an ongoing pro-
cess, focus on equal opportunities in the armed services has shifted to
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address race and ethnicity. Society is also more ethnically heteroge-
neous than it was twenty years ago, raising issues of equal
opportunities for all employing organizations and the need to ensure
that the Services are broadly representative of the society they are sup-
posed to defend. A good deal of discussion has centered on the need for
the armed services to be broadly 'representative' of Canadian society.
The key question is whether representativeness is achievable. The
idea of representativeness can be given at least two rather different
interpretations. First, one can refer to a socio-demographic match
between the military and society. In this context, representativeness
would require the military to match the statistical profile of the wider
population - a goal achieved through planned targets if not quotas. As
Sir Michael Howard has pointed out, this is very much an American
value.29 Second, one might argue that the armed services should sub-
scribe to core societal values such as equality of opportunity, decency,
fairness, careers open to all, and merit-based advancement in the
organization. Thus, the Services could feel relatively comfortable
about explaining the mismatch between their profile and that of soci-
ety with but one proviso. The gap would need to be explained, not by
the failure to have an effective equality of opportunity programme,
but rather by the propensity of particular groups to select certain kinds
of occupations, military or civilian.30 Given this differential propensity
rate amongst groups in society, it is most unlikely that the services
would be able to achieve the goals of representation in the first sense
of that concept. Reaching such a goal would require programmes of
affirmative action that are illegal in Canada. One possible result might
be that service in the Canadian Forces would become a niche employ-
ment for Canadians of British and French ancestry.
Other commentators have identified a number of reasons why
meeting equal opportunity objectives is a desirable goal from the point
of view of the operational effectiveness of the armed services.31 First,
it provides improved access to a wider recruitment pool as the armed
services compete with civilian companies for scarce labour, both in
terms of quantity and quality. In Canada, though currently there are
twice as many people under fifteen years old as there are over sixty-
five, by 2030 the dependent elderly (aged over sixty-five) will
outnumber dependants. This trend, combined with declining fertility
rates, means that immigration is the only way to maintain or increase
the population.32 Immigrants may come to outnumber those born in
Canada and in the future might constitute the major source of recruits
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- a very different picture from the predominantly European origin,
white force of today. Future forces may become multilingual.
If a force representative of social diversity is achieved, the
demands of individual rights, and member-defined fair treatment will
become more and more of a challenge. Thus, the supportive links
between armed forces and society must be cultivated. Doing so can
actually strengthen the Services. In a healthy democracy, it is vital that
the armed forces not remain too distant from the society they are
charged to defend. After all, society funds them and bestows on them
their legitimacy; and it is society from which they recruit and to which
their personnel return to continue their lives as civilians.
Conclusions
It is impossible to know for certain what security threats Canada will
face in the twenty-first century. We have, however, noted a few sig-
nificant trends related to international and national developments. In
terms of conflict we have noted the increasing importance of technol-
ogy and the high costs associated with keeping up with high tech
weaponry and defence systems. Will Canadians be willing to invest in
these costly projects? How can we afford not to? Globalization means
not only increased opportunity for investment, but also increased
security risks since the stability of Canada's economy can be affected
by events in far away places.
What will Canada's defence and security policy be in the twenty-
first century? Will we be part of a 'fortress North America' protected
by a US defence system? Or will we choose to be an international
leader of human rights and security? This entails many elements, from
peace operations to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, foreign
aid, election monitoring, democracy building, post-conflict reconstruc-
tion of infrastructure and social institutions, and preventative
diplomacy. It also means a shift from peace operations with a pre-
dominantly military focus to a form of new coalitions with NGOs,
civilian peacekeepers, human rights monitors, and so on. This makes
the task of determining what role the armed forces should play in the
future all the more difficult. Not only will decisions have to be made
about appropriate equipment, debate is needed on appropriate skill
sets and training for future missions. But who can carry out the
debate? If Canadian MPs are becoming less familiar with the military,
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how can they take appropriate decisions? These are some of the chal-
lenges facing not only the Canadian military but also the Canadian
political leadership.
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The Role of Canada in the
International Context
of the Twenty-first Century
Huguette Labelle
I T IS MOST FITTING THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CANADIANStudies and the University of Ottawa's Institute of Canadian
Studies be the convenors of this conference. They bring strong histori-
cal and visionary perspectives to the discussion.
I shall begin by identifying some of the aspects of our international
situation that are already setting the scene for the twenty-first century
and the role of Canada in our common future.
On the negative side of the ledger, I would give top rating to
endemic poverty and to the increasing gap that exists between the rich
and the poor of our planet. This gap exists within countries as well as
between countries. Expressed in concrete terms, half of the world's
population, 3 billion people, live on less than two dollars per day. This
figure in itself is startling - yet it masks the fact that, of those, many
live on less than two dollars per week. The poorest fifth of the world's
population receives 1.4 per cent of the total world income and the rich-
est fifth receives 85 per cent. So if poverty prevails, it is not because of
the absence of wealth. Consider how much is spent on arms, recre-
ation, cosmetics, and so on.
In human terms and in terms of social world stability, I would
venture to say that ending poverty is the single greatest challenge fac-
ing the world as it enters the twenty-first century. It is also the
twentieth century's worst legacy.
A close second on the ledger would be the state of the environ-
ment. The attention of the world on the state of water, air, and soil
degradation has been cyclical, with insufficient sustained attention to
the conduct of necessary research and to the application of current
knowledge and existing technology. The juxtaposition of the impor-
tance of the return on investment for enterprises, of the decline in
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government budgets, of new industrialization, and of the concentra-
tion of people in megacities is leaving an increasing environmental
deficit. Each year, for example, human activities, primarily the burn-
ing of fossil fuels (80 per cent) and deforestation (20 per cent), release
6 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Although not the
sole factor, environmental degradation has been a contributor to nat-
ural disasters. Hurricane Mitch in Central America and the Yangtse
floods in China are two significant examples.
To this top group I would also add population growth and its
increasing burden on the planet. We need to remind ourselves that 80
per cent of the world's population lives in developing countries and
that 95 per cent of the projected growth will take place in these coun-
tries. The world population is predicted to increase by about 700
million over the next eight years. The eventual levelling will depend
greatly on tackling poverty and illiteracy, especially for women. From
a world perspective, this has implications for immigration. It is also
interesting to note that Canada and a number of other western coun-
tries have ageing populations, whereas in developing countries,
anywhere from 48 to 65 per cent of their populations are below the age
of twenty-five.
These top three - poverty, environmental degradation, and popu-
lation growth - have a profound impact on our food and water
security. As we meet here today, twenty-six nations are water defi-
cient. By the year 2025, it is estimated that this number will grow to
sixty-six countries - home to about two-thirds of the world's popula-
tion. Similarly, we are losing arable land in a world where we already
have more than 800 million who do not have access to enough food.
Of a different order is the increase in civil conflicts. The human
costs are high, and the damage to social and physical infrastructures
leaves a heavy burden on the world. It also leaves untold and immea-
surable human suffering in terms of loss of life, maiming, and loss of
property, as well as families torn apart and forced to live in refugee
camps for years on end. In 1997, the number of refugees stood at 27.4
million, compared to 2.5 million in 1970. Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone,
and Bosnia all serve to remind us of the gruesome reality of these
wars. It is not by accident that the majority of these conflicts occur in
poorer countries.
Illiteracy and poor health are also contributors to, and the results
of, poverty. Pandemics such as AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are
ravaging parts of the world. In parts of Africa, 40 per cent of the pop-
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ulation is afflicted with HIV/AIDS and life expectancy has dropped
dramatically to the early thirties. A new generation of children is with-
out parents, with children of seven or eight years of age having to care
for their younger siblings.
Local issues are global issues. The people of Sierra Leone are our
neighbours. When something goes wrong somewhere in the world,
global human security is threatened.
But there is a positive side to the ledger, leaving us room to be
hopeful. The world has made tremendous progress in the struggle
toward literacy, health status, and life expectancy. A number of coun-
tries have emerged from decades of conflict to achieve new
accommodations and peace. Central America and Mozambique come
to mind. Investments have increased around the world, although they
are still minimal in the poorest countries.
Measures are being taken to alleviate the debt of the poorest coun-
tries. A number of less endowed countries have seen steady growth in
their gross domestic product. Freedom of speech, free and fair elections,
and greater gender equity are increasingly apparent. Scientific break-
throughs are announced daily. So there is room to rejoice. And more
could be said. Today more than ever before, we have the means to end
poverty and to have a more prosperous, equitable, and inclusive world.
At a conference such as this, much will be said about a phe-
nomenon of our time - that is, the impact of the combination of
globalization, knowledge build-up, and information technology on
societies. This combination has the capacity to contribute further to the
increasing gap between the rich and the poor and to marginalize
groups of people and countries. Those who hold resources and power
have the means to access, to exploit, and to use these to their benefit,
thereby expanding their own assets and affording themselves even
greater resources and even greater power.
On the other hand, this combination of globalization, knowledge,
and information technology has the potential to bridge gaps between
the rich and the poor, to connect people to knowledge, and to have the
wider world community working together toward common benefits
and common goals. Information technology, if placed at the service of
communities, can bring them access to educational health services, e-
commerce, and knowledge related to many aspects of their daily
management.
Keeping this context in mind, I would now like to turn to the role
that Canada can play as a helpful member of this world community.
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Sharing our experience with multicultural democracy
Our multicultural democracy and our sustained peace is of great inter-
est to many countries as a learning model. One could postulate that this
constant accommodation of shared differences has taught Canadians to
live with ambiguity, with complexity, and with a certain empathy for
differences. Dealing with cultural and linguistic diversity is critical for
many countries as we enter this twenty-first century. China, India,
Indonesia, and Nigeria, for example, are each comprised of an array of
different cultures. In addition, several countries have been affected by
population movement for economic or humanitarian reasons, changing
the mix of cultures within their borders. Canada can use its multicul-
tural and multilingual capacity to build bridges between nations, to
prevent conflicts, to facilitate conflict resolution, and to support coun-
tries in the need to become more inclusive societies.
Supporting countries in transition toward new
governance models
Currently, many countries are moving from a centralized economy to
a market economy. As these governments plan this transition, they
must ensure that they have a social system in place to protect their
people as they develop new legal, financial, banking, and investment
regimes, or as they privatize state-owned enterprises. These countries
have outstanding training and retraining requirements and they want
to learn from the experiences of others. They recognize that Canada
has a reasonable blend of social protection and market approaches and
are interested in benefiting from our experience.
Other countries wish to strengthen certain specific aspects of their
administration, such as their justice system, their environmental regu-
latory frameworks and programmes, and their public sector
management. Over the past years, there have been many exchanges
between Canadians and representatives of these countries. These
exchanges should be enhanced to foster mutual benefits.
Finally, our brand of distributive governance is of special interest
to a number of countries trying to determine what approach is best
suited to their own situation. As South Africa was establishing its new
system of governance, it was interested in learning about the fed-
eral/provincial balance of responsibilities that has been a key element
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of Canadian governance for more than a hundred years. And while
Ghana was preparing for local elections, it discovered that Canada's
municipal governments were elected democratically, without a multi-
party approach, an arrangement that seemed more closely suited to its
situation.
Pursuing sustainable development through technology
transfer and exchange
Because of its size, geography, climate, and population dispersion,
Canada has had to invest in advanced technology and in infrastructure
building. For example, investment in transportation, energy, water,
telecommunications, clean production, agriculture, and waste dis-
posal has been key to Canada's development. The World Bank has
estimated that developing countries would require at least $US250 bil-
lion per year for the foreseeable future to achieve the infrastructure
required to bring equitable prosperity to their people.
Canada can enhance its support to developing countries by shar-
ing its technology in a spirit of mutual learning. Our experience in
telehealth and distance education can help other countries provide
large segments of their population with access to these essential ser-
vices. Canada's engineering and telecommunications expertise can be
of extra benefit to these countries.
Contributing to the advancement of science and its
application
With information technology, it is now easier for universities and
research institutions to combine their efforts through virtual alliances
in order to deal with the mega-issues of our time. Discovering a vac-
cine for AIDS or malaria; developing new water-conservation
approaches; finding economically viable applications for known
sources of alternative energy, including, for example, Canadian fuel
cell technology - all these require alliances from a variety of research
centres. Canada's universities and research institutions already have a
head start in working with scientists from around the world. We need
to pursue this partnership approach aggressively in order to influence
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and contribute to the international research agenda, with its constant
evolution, and to ensure that humanity benefits from its results.
Participating in global governance and influencing its
adaptation to new imperatives
All countries face an increasing number of situations that cannot be
resolved from within their borders. In addition, there are a number of
significant global issues that require our attention as we enter this new
century. It has been agreed, for example, that we need a global finan-
cial architecture better able to deal with the prevention of future
financial crises and early management of them when they occur; that
we need to have in place a rapid response capacity when conflicts
erupt in order to contain them; and that new co-operative mechanisms
need to be established in order to correct major environmental prob-
lems and conserve our biodiversity.
Canada has been an active participant in all of the global and
regional multilateral institutions, from the United Nations (UN) and
international financial institutions, to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-oper-
ation forum (APEC), the Organization of American States (OAS), and
so on. As a mid-power, Canada's effectiveness at the multilateral level
will be determined by what it brings to the table. Knowledge, facilita-
tion skills, wisdom, a balanced approach, support for those in need,
and financial contributions are all essential. These, however, will be of
little impact multilaterally if Canada does not maintain strong bilateral
and mutually supportive relations.
As we embrace this twenty-first century, we need to place people
and quality of life at the centre of our development. And this quality
will be better for all to the extent that we learn to develop new forms
of partnerships and concerted alliances between the key players of our
societies, nationally and internationally.
A Communications, Technology, and
Societal Memory: A Distinct Canadian
Archival Voice in the Global Village
Terry Cook*
T O HAVE AN ARCHIVAL TOPIC SOLICITED AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONALsymposium on the nature of Canadian distinctiveness in the
twenty-first century is a pleasant surprise. Archives are important to
Canadian Studies in two ways: in the familiar sense as the primary
source documents that underpin research about Canada in many dis-
ciplines and, in a less appreciated sense, as a focus of study themselves
that can shed light on the Canadian character and ideal.
This essay analyses the second aspect of the archival voice, and
thus will not emphasize archives as essential sources for Canadian
Studies. But as this year 2000 is the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
release of the two-volume Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies,
we should at least recall that Tom Symons therein devoted a chapter
to archives, where he declared archival records to be the foundation of
Canadian Studies.1 By that report, Symons became the inspirational
godfather, if not founder, of Canadian Studies as a recognized univer-
sity discipline here in Canada. He also served as a kindly uncle to the
legitimization of archives as a professional activity for, in the year of
his report, the Association of Canadian Archivists was established.2
For Symons, the underlying purpose of Canadian Studies was
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference of the
International Council for Canadian Studies, held 18 to 20 May 2000 at the
University of Ottawa. The conference theme of "Canadian Distinctiveness into the
twenty-first Century" shaped the following remarks about Canadian archives. The
paper intentionally retains the conversational tone of the original presentation,
though some limited reference notes have been added to introduce non-archival
readers to the discipline of archival studies. I thank Jean-Pierre Wallot and Chad
Gaffield for their kindnesses that made this paper possible.
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reflected in the title he gave his report: To Know Ourselves. It was - and
remains - not a bad raison d'etre for archives as well.
There can be no distinctiveness for Canada and Canadians if we
do not know ourselves, if we do not have the capacity to explore our
origins, evolution, and characteristics as individuals, groups, commu-
nities, and nation. As Symons noted, archives are the underlying
bedrock of such self-knowledge, the documentary evidence of past
actions and ideas, and the primary sources for research in many disci-
plines relating to Canada and its peoples.
Without archives, Harold Innis and Donald Creighton could not
have written about the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) as they did, in
ways that fundamentally changed academic perceptions of our past.
Without Innis and Creighton, and yet more archives, Pierre Berton
could not have written as he did about the CPR that in turn changed
popular perceptions of that same past. And without Berton, the vari-
ous documentaries and docudramas, the high school textbooks and
other learning media, the numerous coffee-table books, the novels and
stories, the plays and poems, about the great railway itself or reflect-
ing its role as part of other Canadian narratives, simply would not
have been the same. Archives are not just the foundation of Canadian
Studies and other academic disciplines, they are - by this trickle-down
and popularizing process - the roots of our various identities, the
fount of our memories, the core reference points by which we come to
know ourselves. John Ralston Saul, in his address to the conference,
focused on two archival documents fundamental to his analysis of
Canada, one of which he says he uses in every speech he gives, to add
authority, legitimacy, proof, and evidence for his assertions about
Canadianism. Such is the power of archives!
In 1924, National (then Dominion) Archivist Sir Arthur Doughty
said, in a phrase that appears on posters and mugs found in many
archivists' offices - it is also carved into the base of the only statue ever
officially raised in Ottawa to honour a civil servant - that, "of all
national assets, archives are the most precious. They are the gift of one
generation to another, and the extent of our care of them marks the
extent of our civilization."3 In this essay, I want to focus less on
Doughty's archival 'assets' - the actual records that form the founda-
tion of Symons's Canadian Studies or the trickle-down impact on
Canadian identity - and more on Doughty's notion of 'care' and his
concept of archives as a 'gift.' What is the nature of this 'care' of records
by archivists? What do archivists actually do to 'care' for records and,
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perhaps most importantly, how do they choose the archives in the first
place to place under such 'care?' And what is the collective nature of
this 'gift' of memory that is communicated across generations with var-
ious technologies? How does the present choose the past by which the
future will 'know itself?' And in so doing, has Canada developed
approaches that are distinctive? And are these, in turn, likely to have an
impact internationally in the twenty-first century? Here, then, the issue
is not the archives as a warehouse of documents that scholars use to
interpret the past, but archives as an active agent in constructing soci-
ety's memory, deciding who is to be remembered and celebrated and
who is to be marginalized and forgotten.
Another National Archivist, and now past president of the
International Council of Archives, Jean-Pierre Wallot, has set the
inspiring goal for archivists of "building a living memory for the his-
tory of our present." In his words, the resulting "houses of memory,"
will contain "the keys to the collective memory" that the world's citi-
zens can use to open doors to the personal and societal well-being that
comes from experiencing continuity with the past, from a sense of
roots, of belonging, of forming their various identities.4 In the root-
lessness of the wired global community, where the speed of life makes
yesterday recede quickly into the distant past and tomorrow approach
with so much uncertainty, French historian Pierre Nora has asserted
that "modern memory is, above all, archival. It relies entirely on the
materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility
of the image."5 Here there are resonances to pioneering Canadian
work on communications and technology by Marshall McLuhan and
especially Harold Innis. Control of recording media and the technolo-
gies of communication have formed powerful empires in the past,
based on monopolies of knowledge, and the consequent conquest of
space or time. All such media have a built-in bias of communication,
Innis noted, leading to McLuhan's famous aphorism that the "medium
is the message." Archives are the material traces of just such media,
the concrete fragments that form our memories, the way we conquer
time across generations - as Doughty said, the way our society legit-
imizes and memorializes itself. What then, in Innis's phrase, are the
"biases" of archives as a collective communication medium between
the past and the future?6
Perhaps readers are now convinced, in theory at least, that
archives as institutions and activities should be a subject of Canadian
Studies, quite aside from archives as records being the research foun-
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dation for Canadian Studies. At this point I want to explore the dis-
tinctive Canadian archival voice and its broader ramifications for
international affairs, but first I have to set forth, as a background, the
traditional thinking about archives, both by archivists and by their tra-
ditional major clients, academic historians - and, I dare say, by most
other users of archives were they to think consciously about the
archival institutions in which they are researching. I then want to look
at radically new formulations about archives - what for shorthand
might be called "the postmodern archive" - and, with a couple of
examples, suggest why Canada has taken the lead in its articulation on
a world-wide basis. I will then briefly conclude by suggesting that
Canadian distinctiveness in this area has global significance in our
new century of networked communications, where the realization of
McLuhan's "global village" threatens to homogenize all distinctive-
ness into a universal blandness.
Archival theory and professional practice was first articulated in
nineteenth-century Europe, after centuries of informal development,
and then was exported around the world, including to Canada.7 This
development parallelled the emergence of history as a university-
based discipline and profession. Most of the early professional
archivists were trained as historians at such universities.
Just as much of the early professional history focused on the polit-
ical, legal, and economic character of the nation state, so too were the
first articulations of archival principles strongly biased in favour of the
state. Almost all the classic tomes about archival methodology were
written by staff members of national archives. Most, not surprisingly,
focused on government, public, or state records and their orderly
transfer to archival repositories to preserve their original order and
classification; and most likewise relegated private and personal
archives to the purview of libraries and librarians. Indeed, to this day,
archives in Europe, the United States, and Australia generally look
after only the official records of their sponsoring governments;
national, regional, or university libraries take custody of personal
manuscripts. Moreover, these early archival authors lived in an era of
document scarcity, where their experience was based on dealing with
limited numbers of medieval documents susceptible to careful diplo-
matic analysis of each page or form, or with records found in
well-organized departmental file-registry systems within stable, cen-
tralized administrations that exhibited classic Weberian hierarchical
structures. Most ignored the appraisal and selection of modern
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archives as these terms are now understood, where a small percentage
alone (typically 5 per cent, and approaching in some jurisdictions, 1
per cent) is preserved as archives from a much larger information uni-
verse. Indeed, to the early pioneers of archival thinking, such appraisal
and selection activity by archivists was strongly discouraged as nonar-
chival.
Clearly influenced by Darwinian thinking and metaphors, the pio-
neers believed that records coming to archives from state departments
were simply the natural, organic residue from administrative pro-
cesses which the archivist then kept in pristine order - archivists in
Britain are still called 'keepers' reflecting that earlier mindset. State
officials rather than archivists would thus decide which records were
to survive. The records themselves were viewed as value-free vessels
reflecting the acts and facts that caused them to be created. The
archivist kept the records "without prejudice or afterthought," in the
words of one influential pioneer writer, and was thus seen (and self-
defined) as an impartial, neutral, objective custodian: this same writer
asserted that the archivist is "the most selfless devotee of Truth the
modern world produces."8 Such notions of the objective archive were
reinforced by historians of the time undertaking what they assumed
(in the von Rankean tradition) to be objective, scientific history. On the
objectivity question, one archival commentator has suggested that
archivists and historians shared "a peculiar form of disciplinary repres-
sion or blindness," one that was mutually reinforcing.9
Traditional approaches to archives, as just outlined, sanction the
already strong predilection of archives and archivists to support main-
stream culture and powerful records creators. It privileges the official
narratives of the state over the documented stories of individuals and
groups in society. Its rules for evidence and authenticity favour textual
documents from which such rules were derived, at the expense of
other media for experiencing the present, and thus of viewing the past.
Its positivist and 'scientific' values inhibit archivists from adopting
and then documenting multiple ways of seeing and knowing. An orig-
inal order is sought or re-imposed, rather than allowing for several
orders or even disorders to exist among records in archives, and thus
in descriptions of them presented to researchers. And so, as a result,
researchers see a rationalized, monolithic view of a record collection
that may never have existed in reality. And this traditional view seri-
ously hobbles archivists trying to cope with the new technology of
electronic records, where active intervention by archivists 'up front' in
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the creation process of records, rather than passive receipt of records
long afterwards, is the only hope that today's computer-based history
will be able to be written tomorrow. Moreover, the massive volumes of
modern paper records, and the electronic record, require the archivist
to appraise records in order to choose the typically 1 to 5 per cent that
will be designated as archival; this active construction of the past is of
course completely at odds with the notion of a passive (and objective!)
keeper of an entire body of records handed over by the records creator.
An even greater absence of order or system is present in the record-
keeping habits of private individuals and voluntary associations, upon
which archivists impose their various orders, rules, and standards.
In addition to these changes in recording technologies, there has
been in recent decades a marked change in the very reason why
archival institutions exist - or at least in public and publicly funded
archives; admittedly, private business archives do not share fully in
these changes. There has been a collective shift during the past century
from a juridical-administrative justification for archives grounded in
concepts of the state, to a socio-cultural justification for archives
grounded in wider public policy and public use. Simply stated, it is no
longer acceptable to limit the definition of society's memory solely to
the documentary residue left over (or chosen) by powerful record cre-
ators, whether Richard Nixon or George Bush, state police in South
Africa or Olympic Games officials in Tokyo, Canadian military officers
posted in Somalia or doctors working with tainted blood products for
Health Canada. Public and historical accountability demands more of
archives, and of archivists.10
As a result, some archivists have begun to think in terms of docu-
menting the process of governance, not just of governments
governing.11 'Governance' includes cognizance of the dialogue and
interaction of citizens and groups with the state, the impact of the state
on society, and the functions or activities of society itself, as much as it
does the inner workings of government structures. In this newer
approach, the archivist, in appraisal and all subsequent actions, should
focus on appraising and 'caring' for the records of governance, not just
government, when dealing with institutional records. This perspective
also better complements the work of archivists dealing with personal
papers or private 'manuscript' archives.
All these changes make the archivist an active mediator in shaping
the collective memory through archives. Because of the need to
research and understand the nature of function, structure, process, and
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context of institutions and citizen interaction with them, and to inter-
pret the relative importance of these (and other) factors as the basis for
modern archival appraisal and description, as well as for making
choices for preservation, exhibitions, and website construction, the tra-
ditional notion of the impartial archivist is no longer acceptable - if ever
it was. Archivists will inevitably inject their own values into all such
activities: thus they will need to examine very consciously their choices
in the archive-creating and memory-formation process; they will need
to leave very clear records explaining their choices to posterity.
In this rethinking of the traditional, state-centred, and positivist
framework for archives, and substituting for it, in ways just suggested,
a distinctively postmodern alternative, Canadians have led the way
internationally. I would estimate that at least 75 per cent of the world's
published writing in English, by archivists on the new postmodern
archive, has been by Canadians, and much of the remaining 25 per
cent has spun off or been inspired by, initially at least, such Canadian
writing.12 These Canadians have repeatedly challenged the five central
principles of the archival profession: 1) that archivists are neutral,
impartial custodians of Truth'; 2) that archives as documents and as
institutions are disinterested or 'natural' by-products of actions and
administrations; 3) that the origin or provenance of records may be
found in a single office rather than situated in the complex processes
and discourses of creation; 4) that the 'order' and language imposed
on records through archival arrangement and description are value-
free re-creations of some prior reality; and especially 5) that archives of
government are the passively inherited metanarrative of the state.
Some of these generalizations about the postmodern archive are
supported by a growing literature on the history of archives, as well as
by the wave of multidisciplinary writing that has appeared in aca-
demic journals over the past couple of years in the wake of French
philosopher Jacques Derrida's recent Archive Fever. All show the
archive to be extremely problematic as loci for memory.13 Historian
Jacques Le Goff, for example, notes that "the document is not objec-
tive, innocent raw material but expresses past society's power over
memory and over the future: the document is what remains." What is
true of each document is true of archives collectively. By no coinci-
dence, the first archives were the royal ones of Mesopotamia, Egypt,
China, and pre-Columbian America. The capital city in these and later
civilizations becomes, in Le Goff's words, "the center of a politics of
memory" where "the king himself deploys, on the whole terrain over
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which he holds sway, a program of remembering of which he is the
center." First the creation, and then the control of memory, leads to the
control of history, thus mythology, and ultimately power.14 Feminist
scholar Gerda Lerner convincingly demonstrates that such power
behind the very first documents, archives, and societal memory, was
remorselessly and intentionally patriarchal: women were 'de-legit-
imized' by the archival process in the ancient world, a process that has
continued well into this century.15 Many examples are coming to light
of archives collected - and later weeded, reconstructed, even
destroyed - not to keep the best juridical evidence of legal and busi-
ness transactions, as traditionally supposed, but to serve historical and
sacral/symbolic purposes, but only for those figures and events
judged worthy of celebrating, or memorializing, within the context of
their time.16 But who is worthy? And who determines worthiness?
According to what values? Historical examples, in summary, suggest
that there is nothing neutral, objective, organic or 'natural' about this
process of remembering and forgetting.
Why have Canadian archivists taken this distinctive lead? I think
the influence of McLuhan and Innis cannot be discounted: their con-
cern with non-print media, communications technologies, and the bias
these carried in shaping past civilizations (and our own) were impor-
tant insights that were consciously transported to the world of
archives and that stimulated thinking by archivists about how records
and media shape the past.17 In their studies of the history of records
and the contemporary (and historical) French and English dualism of
Canada with its multicultural and First Nations layers, the current
generation of senior archivists - trained as historians and who are
doing most of this new theoretical writing - perceived the existence of
different stories, mixed narratives, and varying interpretations about
similar past events, even the same past's texts, that generated doubts
about Truth' and objectivity in recorded memory.18 Not just history,
but the recording of it, was filled with dissonance and ambiguity, as
Jocelyn Letourneau said at this conference. If John Ralston Saul is
right, that Canada invented long ago the first postmodern nation, one
respecting diversity, complexity, and a culture of minorities rather
than insisting on a monolithic national myth, then perhaps it is appro-
priate that Canada has also invented the postmodern archive.
This Canadian approach to archives has manifestations in work-
ing reality; it is not just an academic exercise in definition. Three broad
manifestations may be mentioned briefly. The first is appraisal - the
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most controversial archival activity that determines the tiny trace of all
recorded documentation that will survive as society's memory. A
decade ago, the National Archives of Canada developed the concept
and practice of 'macroappraisal.'19 Macroappraisal finds sanction for
the archival 'value' of determining what to keep and what to destroy
- not in the dictates of the state as was traditionally the case, nor in the
latest trends of historical research as is more recently so but in the
reflection of society's values through a functional analysis of the inter-
action of citizen with the state. It focuses on the functions of
governance rather than the structures of government; emphasizes the
citizen and group as much as the state; encompasses all media rather
than privileging text; searches for multiple narratives and hot spots of
contested discourse rather than accepting the party line; and deliber-
ately seeks to give voice to the marginalized, to the 'other/ to losers as
well as winners, through new ways of looking at case files and elec-
tronic data. Moreover, macroappraisal is increasingly seen as essential
to appraising successfully the electronic record of the automated
office. This distinctive Canadian approach to appraisal has caught fire
and has already been adopted internationally by several countries and
their internal states.
As a second dimension, Canada, alone of first-world nations, for-
mally developed the 'total archives' approach, where virtually all public
archives in the country - provincial, territorial, city and town, university,
and regional - acquire as part of their mandate, within one archival insti-
tution, a 'total' archive of a roughly equal proportion of both the public
or sponsoring institution's records and related private-sector records; and
take into their archives the 'total' record in every recording medium
(including film, television, paintings, and sound recordings which in
many countries are divided among several other repositories).20 In effect,
the separated public archives and historical manuscript maintenance tra-
ditions of Europe and the United States are combined in one institution.
While there are many reasons why the 'total archives' concept evolved in
Canada from the nineteenth century and is now exported to some other
countries, and admired in more, this integration of the public and private
reflects a wider vision of archives, one sanctioned in and reflective of
society at large, of the total historical experience, rather than one limited
to being custodians of official state records.
A final example is the Canadian Archival System, a national net-
work of archives that is unique, and the envy of every nation that
knows about it. First called for by Tom Symons in 1975, and made
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actual by the leadership of Jean-Pierre Wallot in the mid-1980s, the
system is a means of co-ordinating archival activity, standards, and
funding by determining local and community archival priorities, and
of ensuring that the always too-limited funds go to those projects that
reflect a local consensus hammered out in the provincial and territorial
councils into a national system. These local perspectives are brought to
the national Canadian Council of Archives where such national prior-
ities are then set. Over its first decade, the Council has spearheaded
collective lobbying efforts with politicians and the media on behalf of
archival issues. More concretely, it has disbursed millions in new-
money grant funds to support processing projects of accumulated
backlogs in scores of archives across the country, to establish a
national conservation initiative, and to develop bilingual, descriptive
standards as the backbone of a national, on-line, always-updated
inventory of the nation's archives that will allow access to the collec-
tive memory of Canada as never before. Creating a national network
of archival institutions and soon archival sources adds another dimen-
sion to 'total' archives - that of having the total country involved in
archives in a co-ordinated, but not monolithic, way. This approach is
emphatically not about using standards to impose an Ottawa-based
view, but about developing standards to allow our localities and many
diversities to be shared more widely. This national system is the
archival equivalent of the Canadian tradition of building national
canals, railways, airlines, and broadcasting facilities - building, in
short, communications technologies and networks for national cohe-
sion across our regions and geography. Perhaps in the archival
instance, it is to encourage better communication between our present
and future with the past.
Can this Canadian archival distinctiveness contribute internation-
ally in the twenty-first century? I believe the quick answer is yes, and
on several levels. A generation ago, Marshall McLuhan wrote opti-
mistically about communication technology creating a global village
uniting humanity; at the same time, George Grant lamented the
homogenization and eventual destruction of local cultures under the
impact of the same technology and its connected American way of
life.21 Those twin attitudes survive as perceptions about the Internet -
and the increasingly wired and global village we now inhabit. Some
see the Web as a means to think locally and act globally, as a powerful
means to rally interests against those very homogenizing forces of
global market capitalism, as a flattening of hierarchy and a return to
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genuine democracy. Others see in the Web the "twilight of
sovereignty." Its undermining of the nation state that has protected
distinctive cultures and traditions, combined with its Big Brother vio-
lations of personal privacy, and, once the global corporations take
control of this medium, the emergence of a bland universal commodi-
fication and commercialism from its present youthful exuberance - all
portend an electronic version of bread and circuses for the masses.22
If this conference seems to have developed over these first two
days a consensus about the benefits of the Canadian way of diversity,
ambiguity, tolerance, and multiple identities as embodied by Saul's
postmodern state, then the Canadian parallel way of remembering - of
approaching the creation and preservation of memory in archives, will
speak strongly to this century's citizens who are concerned about the
homogenizing and globalizing 'bias' of the new media and record-cre-
ating technologies. Those who desire to construct memory based on
celebrating difference rather than monoliths, multiple rather than
mainstream narratives, the personal and local as much as the corpo-
rate and official, may find in Canada's distinct approach to archives
useful tools for their task. William J. Mitchell, media and information
technology guru at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has
observed about photography that "we make our tools and our tools
make us: by taking up particular tools we accede to desires and we
manifest intentions," an observation that is applicable to all archival
media of memory.23
But what intentions and desires do we archivists have? What is the
nature of Doughty's 'gift' to subsequent generations? That question
itself is essentially cultural. Steven Lubar, a specialist in the culture of
information technology for the Smithsonian National Museum of
American History, reminds us, and indeed all heritage professionals,
that "we must think of archives as active, not passive, as sites of
power, not as recorders of power. Archives don't simply record the
work of culture; they do the work of culture."24 Archives are not just
the foundation of Canadian Studies; they reflect and create, by their
very choices and activities, the culture and character of Canada.
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Canada One Hundred Years from
Now: A Federation of Nations?
Jean Laponce
I N THE FIELD OF HUMAN AFFAIRS, PREDICTING MAY WELL BE THEoccupation of fools. Yet, the social sciences are obligated to take that
risk, a risk I shall stretch to extremes by addressing my remarks not
only to those engaged in the discourse today, but also to those who
will be engaged a hundred years from now. Conscious of the danger
of appearing foolish in the year 2100, if not before, I am comforted by
the thought that a prediction that turns out to be wrong may never-
theless be of help, eventually, in identifying and weighing the role of
factors that were either absent, hidden, or simply forgotten when the
prediction was made.
If the year 2000 had been the finish line of history, we would have
declared the winners to be democracy over authoritarianism, free
enterprise over economic statism, the welfare state over YEtat gen-
darme, nationalism over imperialism, and temperate nationalism over
its aggressive kin.
In the first three of these competitions, Canada would be counted
on the winning side; in the last, on the national question, it is still
searching, perhaps with insufficient dispassionate vigor, for solutions
to the cohabitation of its national communities. Will Canada of the
year 2100 have resolved its national questions, and how?
Let us consider the most likely course of events and, when in
doubt, let us point to the future with the help of a double rather than
a single pointer. But first, let us take stock of the present.
National vs. Ethnic Cleavages
Canada is variously described as multicultural, multilingual, multi-
ethnic, and multinational. Today, all countries of immigration are
292 Jean Laponce
bound to be multi-ethnic and multicultural; they are not bound to be
multinational. Canada's distinctiveness rests not in its multi-ethnic
and multicultural composition but in its enduring national cleavages
and confrontations. That distinctiveness is the cause of a problem yet
unresolved: how to adjust a federalism of regions to manage a feder-
alism of nations?1
Three nations are facing one another (three to simplify the plural
into which the First Nations are incarnated): the Canadian, the
Quebecois and the Aboriginal.2 Note that for reasons to be spelled out
in the next section, I did not say 'English Canadian/ nor 'Anglophone/
but simply 'Canadian/
What long-term political future awaits these three communities,
all engaged in nation building in the same state?
Two Stepping Stones to the Future
At the additional risk of being outrageously economical of the factors
involved, I shall set foot on only two stepping stones for a peek at the
future: Canadian nation building and demographic evolution.
Nation Building
Considering the obstacles in its way - some inherited from its colonial
past (the French fact), others erected by a dysfunctional mix of inte-
gration-segregation policies (the Aboriginal fact) - the Canadian
nation building enterprise can, at the end of the twentieth century,
claim some notable successes. Its major success is in integrating and
assimilating its immigrants. To measure this properly, we must set
aside the picture of our ancestors given us by a census and turn to the
picture of today's collective identities obtained by survey research.
The Canadian Census, like any census, is not simply a statistical
tool; it is also a political instrument that may mislead at the same time
as it informs. In the case of ethnicity and nationality, its questions -
notwithstanding recent improvements (Ornstein 2000) - have become
misleading because they have not evolved enough since 1871. The
modern census magnifies the multi-ethnic character of the country,
while hiding its multinational composition.
The 1871 Census told us that, measured by origin, the population
of Canada was roughly 61 per cent British, 31 per cent French, 7 per
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cent other Europeans, and 1 per cent other non-Europeans. If that
same 1871 Census had asked a question about a sense of national
belonging, it would very likely have obtained figures similar to those
describing the confrontation between the two nations of Lord Durham
(1839) and Siegfried (1906): roughly 60 per cent English and 30 per cent
French. If we turn to the 1991 Census, we find that the British segment
has dropped from 60 per cent to less than 30 per cent, the French from
30 per cent to little more than 20 per cent, while the 'others' have risen
to nearly 50 per cent (Tepper 1994). Contemporary censuses show
Canada to be a country of 'ethnics.' But what does ethnic origin sig-
nify? How often do we think of our origins and in what context? Is the
'ethnic' sense of self embedded within a Canadian identity or is it sep-
arate? And, if it is separate, what is its relative importance? To answer
these questions we must turn to survey research.
Among surveys treating the subject of group identity, let us con-
sider that of Berry and Kalin, which was conducted the very year of
the 1991 Census. One of the questions read (Berry and Kalin 1993):
People may describe themselves in a variety of ways. If you had to
make a choice, do you think of yourself as:
a) Canadian,
b) English-Canadian, Scottish-Canadian, etc. summarized by the
code British-Canadian,
c) French-Canadian,
d) Other hyphenated-Canadian (the respondent was given exam-
ples such as German-Canadian, lewish-Canadian, but could
initiate any term of his or her choice),
e) province (such as Quebec, Quebecois, British Columbian,
Ontario, etc.),
f) any foreign country or nationality, such as German or Germany.
If we ignore the entries scoring less than 5 per cent nationwide, we
are left with only three identifications: Canadian which scored 65 per
cent, Quebec or Quebecois which scored 14 per cent, and other-
hyphenated (other than French or British) which scored 7 per cent.
Note the contrast: the hyphenated-Canadians drop from the nearly 50
per cent recorded by the census to little more than 5 per cent.3 They
appear to be a group on their way to absorption, at least in the public
sphere. Like Durham almost two centuries ago and Siegfried almost a
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century later, we note the juxtaposition of two major communities. But
between these two communities, the line of cleavage has changed: no
longer is it based on religious differences or the state of origin; it is
based on identification with a political institution, state or province -
an identification that is typically national in character.
As for Aboriginals who were not represented in sufficient number
in the Berry-Kalin survey to warrant a separate analysis, from a survey
done by Statistics Canada in 1989 we can infer the transfer of identity
to the present status and away from ethnic origins. That survey
reported a 3.2 per cent Aboriginal identification compared to the 5 per
cent Aboriginal origin reported by the census.4
In the case of Francophones, as for Aboriginals, the majority did
not give Canadian as a priority identification, though a significant
minority did not identify first with a Quebec or French-Canadian
nation either. Whereas the 1991 Census recorded 24.3 per cent mother
tongue French, the Berry-Kalin survey showed a 14 per cent Quebec
and a 4 per cent French-Canadian identification. Even if we were to
add these last two statistics (that would exaggerate the non-Canadian
identification of Francophones) we would still have a significant gap,
indicating that, for about 25 per cent of mother tongue French, the
dominant identification is neither French-Canadian nor Quebecois. In
Quebec itself, the same statistics indicated that 20 to 25 per cent of
mother tongue French did not give their first collective identity as
either Quebec or French-Canadian.
In short, Canada appears to have been extremely successful in
integrating or assimilating its newcomers within the Canadian nation.
While less successful with Aboriginals and Francophones, it has
drawn a sizeable percentage of each group away from an ethnic or
national identity that would have priority over that of Canadian. In
terms of 'Canadian content' as defined here by a respondent's domi-
nant collective identity, one cup is nearly full (that of immigrants) and
the other two cups (those of Aboriginals and Francophones) are about
30 per cent and 20 per cent full, respectively.
Demography
One hundred years ago, Canada had approximately five million
inhabitants. Now, it numbers about six times more. Projecting that
trend would give us 180 million inhabitants by the year 2100. If that
seems very many, 180 million people would still leave plenty of empty
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space, even if we do not subscribe to Baade's way of measuring living
space (quoted in Neurath 1994). Baade, having noted that the fourteen
million people living in the greater New York area spend most of their
lives there and seem to like it, took New York's density as his world
standard. He then calculated the amount of land needed to feed a
world of as many New Yorks as possible and concluded that the earth
could accommodate sixty-five billion people. A mere 180 million for
Canada would not even come close to satisfying Baade's projections.5
But, even as 'low' a figure as 180 million is most unlikely to be
reached unless Canada loses relinquishes complete control of its bor-
ders. If, over the past hundred years, population grew by an average
factor of 1.5 per year, that growth was not due so much to the positive
balance of in-migrations over out-migrations as it was to Canada's high
birth rate. Now that the birth rate is negative (there are exceptions,
notably among Aboriginals) and expected to remain negative (a low
birth rate being associated with low infant mortality, high life
expectancy, prosperity, education, and urban living), immigration will
soon be the sole measure keeping the population stable, let alone grow-
ing. It is estimated that by mid-century, barring major changes in life
expectancy, retirement age, or productivity, immigration levels of more
than 200,000 people per year will be needed to maintain the size of the
labour force. When the cradle fails, the immigration officer and the
smuggler are bound to take over. A National Health projection done in
1989 estimates that, without immigration, the Canadian population
would drop to roughly half its present size in a hundred years; the last
Canadian would die in the year 2786 (Canada 1989).
So, unless present trends reverse - barring any major reversal - the
future population of Canada, even if not of a size markedly different
from that of the present, will be markedly different in its composition. It
will reflect, better than now, the changing balance of populations in the
world. Canada will have become more globalized, including many
more from Asian, Caribbean, Latin-American, and African communities
than it does at present. This population renewal will have more pro-
found effects on Quebec than on the rest of Canada. Anglophone
Canada is already 'mixed wool' - Newfoundland being an exception -
while Quebec still has, by and large, a 'pure laine' texture. Quebec should
continue to approach the Canadian norm of a population increasingly
made up of recent immigrants of neither French nor English origin.
Furthermore, since the French language has, in North America, a power
of attraction much weaker than that of English, the increased proportion
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of recent immigrants in the population should work to the advantage of
Anglophone provinces; they will benefit from the immigrants' willing-
ness, nay eagerness, to learn and to speak English.
Will the changing racial and ethnic composition of the Canadian
population be a source of increased social and political tensions?
Toronto, Vancouver, and other major cities give us the answer. In 1971,
Toronto was about 10 per cent non-white; now the proportion has
risen to more than 30 per cent. In 1971, Vancouver was 5 per cent
Asian; now it stands at about 30 per cent. These changes occurred
remarkably smoothly. The more likely effect of increased racial diver-
sity will be to blur the importance of race, much as national origin has
become blurred over the years. While not increasing social and politi-
cal tensions markedly, however, the new immigration is likely to have
a significant effect on the three-nation confrontation, notably on that
between Canada and Quebec. We shall consider this effect when deal-
ing with the second nation.
The First Nation
The study of First Nations is outside my area of competence. Wisdom
would dictate that I refer readers to contributions by my colleagues,
notably Alan Cairns (2000).6 I will proceed, nevertheless, carried by
the momentum of my propensity for risk-taking futurology, since
there is apparently some virtue to seeing problems from a distance.
Judging by several significant and relatively recent events - the
Charlottetown Accords and the types of powers that the federal and
provincial governments were prepared to transfer to Aboriginal com-
munities or to Aboriginal representatives in the federal Parliament, the
creation of Nunavut, and the outcome of recent negotiations such as
those concerning the Nisga'a - one can predict that major land claims
will be settled before the end of the century. There will be also likely
be wide variety in the forms taken by Aboriginal self-government
(depending upon size, location, and resources). The lowest common
denominator of local self-government will consist of control over lan-
guage7, culture, community membership, some local social services,
and property rights associated with the land; the upper limit will
likely be the administration of some aspects of criminal justice, though
one cannot exclude the possibility that, with the help of a high birth
rate, some Native people may obtain territorial and eventually provin-
cial status - in the Northern Cree settlements, for example.
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One can thus envisage a future Canada with Aboriginal, self-
governing communities, ranging in size from a village to a province
and ranging in type from that of a Hutterite settlement turned almost
exclusively inward, to a kind of Channel Islands, if not Monaco or San
Marino, which look both inward and outward, albeit increasingly out-
ward. Some of those self-governing units will be valued for economic
reasons; others, mostly if not solely, for their offering of what Elide
calls a "world axis," a "sacred" location which, under community
guardianship, links the self to the past and origins, thus providing
psychological anchoring and historical comfort.
At the national level, institutions representing the First Nations
are likely to be established, though as yet it is too early to tell which
form, if any, that representation will take. Will it be along the lines of
Courchene's non-territorial Indian province (Courchene 1994), along
the lines of the Charlottetown proposal of guaranteed representation
in Parliament - a scheme rejected by the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples (Royal Commission 1996) - or along the lines of a
separate house of Parliament, as proposed by that same Royal
Commission? A Charlottetown-type of representation, embedded in
existing structures, seems more likely, but I cannot see a way through
that complex problem. It may be too early even to try since it is still
unknown how much power the newly-empowered Aboriginal com-
munities will be prepared to delegate and to whom.
The linkage between Aboriginal and Canadian institutions will
pose problems outside the areas of Aboriginal self-government,
notably in the large urban centers of mixed populations. The obstacles
could be overcome by some form of 'personal federalism/ either on
the model of the French school boards elected by self-defined popula-
tions of interest or on the more formal model of Estonia's minority
governments of the 1920s.
Pre-war Estonia had made it possible for its minority groups
(Jews, Germans, Russians, and Swedes) to set up non-territorial insti-
tutions of self-government with powers limited to language and
culture. Jews and Germans took advantage of that possibility and reg-
istered on minority rolls (a minimum number of people was required
and there was a right to deregister). From registration flowed specific
rights and duties: the right to elect a minority government with access
to minority schools and the duty to pay the taxes levied by the minor-
ity community (Laponce 1960, 1993; Coakley 1994). If such personal
federalism appears, it is unlikely to extend beyond cultural and some
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social services; it is unlikely to succeed if the number of registrants is
too low to maintain a quality of service comparable to that offered by
the competing institutions of cities and provinces.
Will the multiplication of self-governing Aboriginal communities
fracture Canadian citizenship? In the legal sense of citizenship - no,
but in the sociological sense of citizenship - yes; probably, at least in
the short term. It is normal that building a multination state can lead
to reinforcing attachment to the national segments. It is thus to be
expected that the overarching citizenship will be affectively 'thinner'
than the national solidarities - thinner at least for the minority nations
- since the dominant nation often merges, as it does in Canada, the two
attributes of citizenship, the legal and the sociological and typically
uses only one name for the two. Over time, however, if the national
segments do not feel threatened by one another, one could expect that
the minority segments would add affective and sociological flesh to
their core legal citizenship.
Before the end of the century, the transfer of self-governing power
to Aboriginal communities and institutions should have appeased
resentments and, judging by present trends (high exogamy and migra-
tion to cities), may well have facilitated both integration and
assimilation to the Canadian or Quebecois nations at the same time as
it secures Aboriginal cultures in their enclave communities. Feeling
secure should facilitate an Aboriginal evolution into whatever moder-
nity means in 2100.
The Second and Third Nations
Will Quebec secede? If so, under what conditions? If not, what will be
the alternative? Canadians and Quebecois are peaceful and tolerant -
having said that, there is no question in my mind that if enough
Quebecois wanted to secede strongly enough they could do so, that
the secession would be of the non-violent, Norwegian type, and that
Quebec would be a very good member of the family of democratic
nations. But, the will for independence is not there. The election
returns, the polls, the qualitative evidence gathered from conversa-
tions and mood sampling over the years, all of these indicate that the
large majority of Quebecois want a restructuring of the Canadian fed-
eration, not a separation from it.
V Over the years, two processes of nation building have competed
on Quebec's territory. Throughout, language flags have been raised.
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Other flags, too, appear on the flagpole - the religious in particular -
but only the linguistic one has continued to be flown high; it will con-
tinue to dominate the confrontation because language cannot, as easily
as religion, retreat from the public into the private domain. The denser
public communication systems become, the more language will be an
issue. We can pray once a day, or go to church once a month, or once
a year, or never; we cannot be so economical of our reading, listening,
and speaking time.
The sense of nationhood is not, of course, restricted to a single
social function. It is not rooted exclusively in culture. It involves a
sense of belonging to a global community. It produces an expansion of
self in all kinds of directions: cultural, social, economic, and political.
It enlarges our sense of achievement in time and space. It takes us on
a significant journey from real or imaginary beginnings to a future that
we would like to contribute to making secure. Notwithstanding its
wholeness, however, there is usually a core, a significant marker, an
anchor to the sense of belonging to a nation. It may be a set of shared
memories or simply a passport. In the case of Quebec, as time passed
and as religion and history ceased to be in the daily or even weekly
thoughts of its citizens, language gained prominence as 'the' national
unifier. It is not frustration with federal economic policies nor is it the
memories of the Plains of Abraham that sustain the separatist move-
ment. A random reading of Quebec's French newspapers for the past
generation will show that rare are the days when concern about lan-
guage is not in the news or commentaries. The sovereignty movement
is sustained by a sense of collective self that vanishes, unlike in Ireland
or even in the Basque country, once language is removed as the trig-
ger of identity. Any real or perceived threat to French is perceived by
Quebecois as a threat to a vital environment. We may thus center our
predictions of the future of Quebecois-Canadian relations on the lan-
guage question.
The Canadian Language System
In Canada, two major world languages, by some measures the two
major world languages, confront each other within the same state.8 Of
the two, English is by far the more powerful. It is the most powerful
language the world has ever known, whether we measure power by
geographical spread, military capabilities, scientific production, rate of
diffusion as a second language, or rate of destruction of other Ian-
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guages (Mackey 1973; Laponce 1987; Van Parijs 2000). The other major
language, French, ranks far behind but, having a recent history as the
world language and having retained very good assets, it does not eas-
ily cede that position to English; hence its wanting to have its own
playground. French is not prepared to give up and is unlikely to do so
within the next hundred years.9 English can rely on its own power as
a language to subdue the other languages in its path. French, by con-
trast, relies for its protection on territorial concentration and restrictive
government legislation. English means English, French means politics.
There are major factors working in favour of French in Quebec as
well as those working against it. The following lists some:
Factors in Favor:
• Sizable population mass: Quebec has more Francophones
than either Switzerland or Belgium; French is spoken at
home by over 80 per cent of its population.
• Very high level of endogamy (95 per cent of mother
tongue French marry mother tongue French).
• All major functions of the polity - cultural, religious, eco-
nomic, social, and political, can operate in French.
• New migrants must attend French schools with the result
that while before 1971 only 27 per cent of Allophones had
shifted to French, the post 1971 percentage is 66 per cent
(Beland 1999).
• Quebec's Anglophones are increasingly bilingual
although, in the Montreal metropolitan area, over 60 per
cent use English "almost exclusively" in the public
domain.
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Factors Against:
• Globalization of the economy, popular culture, and sci-
ence in favour of English.
• Replacement of a significant proportion of the Franco-
phone de souche population with one of varied origins, less
rooted to the language and the 'old' culture: more geo-
graphically and linguistically mobile.
• Advantage of English in attracting new speakers. The
index of language maintenance, relating mother tongue to
language spoken at home still favours English: 1.24 com-
pared to 1.02 for French (Cote 1999:22).
• Changing ethnic, linguistic, and political composition of
the Island of Montreal in favour of Allophones weakens
French in a strategic location in economic, cultural, and
geopolitical terms. Outside the Montreal region, French is
used in public "mostly or nearly exclusively" 96 per cent
of the time. On the Island of Montreal, the figure drops to
71 per cent. On the Island, 80 per cent of immigrants with
a Latin origin speak predominantly French in public, 78
per cent of immigrants of other origins speak mostly
English (Monnier 1993; Beland 1999). Having lost the bat-
tle of the cradle, Quebecois may well lose the battle of
Montreal.
• Decline of Quebec's electoral weight within Canada due
to the uneven distribution of new migrants continuously
more attracted to the West and Ontario. In 2100, Quebec
should have dropped to less than 20 per cent of the
Canadian population compared to 24 per cent now, and
29 per cent in 1960.
• Further decline of Quebec's electoral weight even if the
electoral system, and the party system, were to be
changed by introducing proportional representation.
Quebec would no longer have the same possibility of
affecting the outcome of an election by concentrating its
vote on a single party, as it often did in the past.10
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I am unable to quantify the relative weight of these factors, hence
I am unable to summarize them into a positive or negative total score.
On balance, I think they work to the advantage of French in the short
run but against French in the long run. While the Quebecois popula-
tion is reassured by the remarkable progress French has made in the
last generation, its political and intellectual elites are aware of the
fragility of these gains. If I am right, then it follows that the Quebecois
will not achieve independence: too many feel too secure to want it now
and they will be too weak to have it - or even want it - later. It also fol-
lows that any major revision of the Constitution would have to be
obtained in the short term.
At this point, let us consider a few scenarios that involve changing
the relations between Quebec and Canada so as to lead to some form
of federation of nations. We will examine three scenarios, starting with
the simplest to implement.
Scenario 1:
From Adversarial to Consensual Government
The Canadian mode of democratic government was inherited from
Britain. It is rational in the sense that it satisfies Riker's rule of govern-
ment by means of minimum winning coalitions (Riker 1962). Since the
party winning a Canadian federal election obtains, on average, about
40 per cent of the votes, the minimum size principle is well served. But
the system is irrational in that it is not adapted to the governance of a
multinational state. If Switzerland had had colonies and if Canada had
been one, Canada would have inherited a different mode of govern-
ment: one based on decision by consensus or at least by very large
ruling coalitions. The Swiss government (a coalition of all major par-
ties) does so at a level of about 70 to 80 per cent of the electorate and
ensures that its three major national segments - the German, the
French, and the Italian - are not subject to a minority position on issues
that are essential to any one of them.
Canada has adopted some of the minor features of consensualism
(McRae 1997): the federal system puts the French segment in limited
control in one province; the Inuit are in control of a territory that could,
at some point, become a province; the Supreme Court, the Cabinet,
and the chairs of royal commissions have given to Francophones
greater weight than that which they could claim on the basis of a strict
Canada One Hundred Years from Now. A Federation of Nations? 303
representation by population. But the dominant mode of decision-mak-
ing remains majoritarian and the dominant mode of parliamentary
government remains adversarial. The constitutional revision of 1982,
which was obtained by what looked like a large majority (more than
the number of provinces required by the Supreme Court ruling), was in
fact the imposition of the will of one national segment (the Canadian)
over another (the Quebecois). Such a majoritarian and adversarial
mode of government is ill-adapted to a multinational polity.
Will the present system evolve into government by co-operation
among its national segments? That would be a claim to distinction for
a polity that says it does not want to be a melting pot. There has been,
in the last decade, a noticeable movement in that direction in the nego-
tiations between First Nations and provincial and federal governments
on the the other; but there are no signs of a significant evolution in the
relations between the second and the third nations. The result of the
Quebec referendum of 1995 was viewed, in the words of Prime
Minister Chretien, like that of a hockey game: "Never mind the score,
what matters is the win." The appropriate 'consensual' reaction would
have been to say: "Never mind the win, let's consider the score. When
such a large number of citizens of such an important province - never
mind whether it is 50 per cent, 40 per cent, or 30 per cent - is prepared
to vote for some form of separation, there must be something funda-
mentally wrong with the status quo; let's negotiate." I realize the
strength of the forces, both federal and provincial, opposing such
negotiation, which is why I doubt that the Quebecois-Canadian debate
will shift from a majoritarian to a consensual mode of operation.
Scenario 2:
Provincial Sovereignty over Language and Culture
A revised Constitution could give Quebec (and other provinces want-
ing them) increased powers11 and, notably, full sovereign rights in
matters of language, education, culture, and related fields. In other
words, Quebec could be given rights similar to those of a Swiss canton.
Unrestricted language sovereignty would enable Quebec, at its discre-
tion, to adopt either the unilingualism of Geneva, the bilingualism of
Fribourg (which juxtaposes two unilingual areas separated by a lan-
guage border running through its capital city), or the multilingualism
of The Grisons that mixes languages territorially at the level of the
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municipalities. Under such a constitutional arrangement, the decision
either to protect or to assimilate linguistic minorities would be left to
the discretion of the provinces. Such a solution might be supported by
some Anglophone provinces, provinces where the use of French is so
minimal that its privileges offend many electors.
Belgium, which had tried the Canadian policy of protection of
language rights on an individual basis, has shifted to the Swiss solu-
tion of the juxtaposition of unilingual territories (except in Brussels) in
order to moderate its language conflicts (McRae 1986; Laponce 1992,
1997). The likelihood of Canada doing the same is not very high. The
Quebec Anglophone community is large enough and has enough
leverage, outside as well as inside Quebec, to block such a change.12
Scenario 3:
A Multination Federal Structure
A federal structure joining two or three (or more) nations could be
combined with the present federation of regions. A structure of that
type had been envisaged some hundred years ago by Bauer (1907,
trans. 2000) who proposed reforming Austria by separating economic
from national issues. To that effect, he proposed a set of parallel fed-
eral structures giving the nationalities their own parliament. His
proposal was not implemented but, interestingly, contemporary
Belgium adopted a system resembling that proposed by Bauer when it
evolved from a unitary into a federal system in the 1990s and created,
in addition to the federal parliament, separate parliaments for regions
and language communities (Karmis and Gagnon 1996; Delperee 1996;
Laponce 1997).
The questions concerning structure, however, are many. Does
Switzerland offer a model that could be adapted to the Canadian scene
(Laponce 1984, 1997)? Should the model be Belgium (Karmis and
Gagnon 1996; Laponce 1997)? Should it be a federation between a uni-
tary Quebec (why not a federal Quebec?) and a federal Canada as
proposed by Resnick (1991)? Should it be an adaptation of the
European Union model as proposed by Quebec intellectuals and
politicians? Should it be some other scheme to enable the creation of a
public space (Taylor 1992) wherein nations could negotiate matters of
common interest and regulate separately their own and specific inter-
ests? Whatever the structure envisaged, a major political restructuring
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would be needed. A reformed Constitution that would structure polit-
ically a multination federation within the present federal system, by
territorializing the three nations as much as feasible - and giving them
the powers over language, culture, and citizenship needed to maintain
themselves as nations - would give Canada a distinctive model of gov-
ernment adapted to a time when nations seek protection from the
effects of globalization.13 Will such a restructuring take place? It is pos-
sible but unlikely. In the absence of strong political leadership (such
leadership is in the domain of the unpredictable), a major reform of the
Constitution would probably require a crisis following a referendum
favourable to Quebec. A referendum outcome we thought was
unlikely.
The Challenge Ahead
I have two conclusions, one drawn on the side of caution, the other on
the side of hope.
Conclusion One
If Jesus Christ had been born sixty to seventy years earlier and the mil-
lennium and the new century had arrived sooner, would we still be as
optimistic about the strength of the democratic system, as optimistic
about the economy, and as concerned about the language problem as
we are today? Would the First Nations, if not the second nation, not to
mention multiculturalism, have been given the same prominence in
our futurology? Predicting is, indeed, the occupation of fools. The pre-
sent casts auras and large shadows on a future composed wrongly of
too much past.14
Conclusion Two
Here, however, is a summary of our predictions and hopes given the
auras and shadows of the present. We predict that Canada's popula-
tion will change fundamentally in looks and origins: it will be much
less white, much less French, and much more English-speaking. We
think that the structures of integration and assimilation will be strong
enough, especially in English Canada, to make Aboriginals - at least a
large segment - Asians, Latin Americans, Caribbeans, and Africans
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become simply Canadians or Quebecois, more easily the former than
the latter. We predict that the First Nations will settle their land claims
and obtain varied forms of territorial self-government; having thus
regained their security and dignity, they will more easily converge,
economically and socially, with the rest of society. We believe that the
French language and Francophones will lose influence but will remain
major political actors, thus continuing to pose major problems.
We wish that the governing structures could be changed to make
room for a collaboration of nations. We are doubtful that this transfor-
mation will occur, thereby redefining the relations between Canada
and Quebec; our doubts arise from the rigidities of the present struc-
tures and modes of government as well as from the very success of the
Canadian nation building enterprise. However, I hope that I am wrong
in seeing too many obstacles for Canada to resolve its old, two-nations
problem with models adapted from Switzerland, Belgium, or the
European Union.
The challenge is to bring nations together, as provinces were
brought together in the nineteenth century, and avoid this time too
symmetrical a federalism. The challenge is to bring harmony out of a
great deal of asymmetry.
Notes
1. For this lack of fit, see among others: Cairns (1993), Resnick (1991),
Taylor (1992), Laponce (1997), and Houle (1999).
2. The term 'ethnic' has become so loaded with myth and politics that it
should probably be abandoned. A return to the term 'community'
would at least distinguish between a 'system' and that which is merely a
'set.' For the confusion concerning the term ethnic, see Riggs (1985). For
a brief history of the use of the term since de la Pouge proposed to dis-
tinguish "ethnicity" from "race" in 1896, see Laponce (1992). For a
survey of research on ethnicity in Canada see Berry and Laponce (1994).
The term 'nation' is also stuck in ideological glue. I use ethnic to mean
an historical community perceived as such by its members. The concept
would be better rendered by the French communaute de la longue duree; I
take a nation to be a communaute de la longue duree if it governs itself, or
wishes to govern itself, politically, at the level of a state, a region, or a
locality. Note that the sources I use led me to identify only three nations
- Canadians, Quebecois, and Aboriginals - where Alan Cairns (1995)
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identifies four, by splitting Canadians into "TransCanada Canadians"
and "Canadians outside Quebec."
3. Note that shifting our attention from census to survey makes the cate-
gories of British and French practically disappear. They have been
succeeded by Canadians and Quebecois. On the one hand we have 65 per
cent Canadians, to whom we should add, as related identifiers and politi-
cal allies, the 3 per cent British-Canadians, many of the 4 per cent
French-Canadians, the 7 per cent other hyphenated-Canadians and the
1 per cent identifiers with provinces other than Quebec, for a total of
roughly 80 per cent. On the other hand we have a Quebecois segment of
about 15 per cent and an Aboriginal segment of about 3 per cent (see n. 4).
4. The Statistics Canada survey (cat. 89/357) gives the following break-
down: Indians on reserves 1.06 per cent, Indians outside reserves 1.49
per cent, Metis 0.5, and Inuit 0.10 - for a total of 862,485 people or 3.2
per cent of the total population.
5. An immediate reaction to this number of 180 million may well be: where
would they fit? They can't be settled in the freezing North. But we
should remember the eighteenth century prediction of Buffon, who, hav-
ing been commissioned to report on prospects for North America, told
the king of France: "Sire, in those parts, the climate is so severe that civi-
lization cannot take roots" (author's recollection).
6. Alan Cairns favours giving to Aboriginals special rights in addition to
those flowing from their Canadian citizenship but short of the nation-to-
nation relationship (Aboriginals vs. non-Aboriginals) advocated by the
commissioners in the report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples (1996). For an argument against special rights, see Flanagan
(2000).
7. Few Aboriginal languages have a chance of survival. The ones that are
better placed in the survival competition are those that are isolated and
relatively numerous - notably Cree with about 90,000 speakers, Ojibway
with about 25,000, and the Inuktitut family of languages with about
30,000. But even those are unlikely to survive unless it be in a diglossic
association with English.
8. In only two other states is that the case: Cameroon and Vanuatu.
9. I realize that I reify languages and that I seem to give them a will of
their own; I do so for the convenience of shorthand, the kind of short-
hand that is used more frequently in describing religions or nations. If
languages do not have a government, they have at least a governance.
10. The introduction of proportional representation would satisfy
Schattschneider's rule of suffrage expansion (1975) which states that, in
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a democratic system, suffrage keeps expanding: first, because it is in the
logic of democracy to become more inclusive and second, because it is in
the logic of party competition that one of the competing parties will seek
to gain new voters by offering the vote to categories of people disfran-
chised until then. When the age of political maturity cannot be pushed
much lower, proportional representation offers an alternative. It would
not expand the electorate, but would expand representation in
Parliament and, very likely, in the government as well.
11. For a recent proposal, one among a long series which deal with the
transfer of powers to Quebec, see Lisee (1999), who suggests a referen-
dum on the transfer of powers over language, culture, communication,
immigration, health, social programmes, and research.
12. Few are the Allophones educated in English who would support a sin-
gle, universal, French school education. The pro-federalist Greater
Quebec Movement is an exception (Lachance 1999). Paradoxically, the
present Parti Quebecois government, having set its aims higher than lin-
guistic and cultural sovereignty, quite unreasonably continues to hope
to bring to its side the Anglophone and Allophone vote; hence its down-
playing of the language issue.
13. Three or more nations, but at least two; the reason being that the
Quebecois-Canadian cleavage is the more enduring as it is based on lan-
guage.
14. Assuming Canada's national question is solved, what other problem
would come to the fore? The logic of a democratic system would favour
a problem that raises questions of inequality, but the aura or shadow of
the present, as the case may be, prevents us from seeing the problem
that will replace the one that remains unsolved.
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Metaphors and Maps: Imagining
Canada into the Twenty-first Century
Lorna Irvine
I N THEIR INTRODUCTION TO PAINTING THE MAPLE - A 1998 COLLECTIONof essays that, as the metaphor in the title suggests, investigates
some of the ways that race and gender influence our perceptions of
Canada - Strong-Boag, Grace, Eisenberg, and Anderson (1998), warn
that Canada is disintegrating. In illustration, they point to the free
trade agreements which, they tell us, facilitate "postmodern corporate
capitalism and the related, though less understood, phenomenon of
globalization" (1998:3). Such millennial theorizing is not uncommon.
For example, in Millennial Dreams, the cultural studies theorist, Paul
Smith (1997:61), argues that, with the demise of the Soviet Union, cap-
ital in the north dominates both time and space, inevitably presenting
a "different description of reality." Addressing the cultural, civic, and
political life of the United States, he metaphorically personifies the
country as "lurching" toward the millennium, "insanely anguished
about its future and at the same time wracked by memories of its
childhood" (1997:189). While the search for national redefinition goes
on, globalization, according to Smith, "has begun to dominate the dis-
cursive arena of our time" (1997:262).
Indeed, Smith's insistence that the "millennial dream of capital-
ism" draws upon "fantasies of domination and exploitation"
(1997:262) underlies the conviction of the editors of Painting the Maple
that globalization is a threat to Canada's distinctiveness because it
encourages a uniform, rather than a multivarious, approach to
national identity. Deep cultural divisions revolve around issues of
diversity, they argue, as the debates about education demonstrate.
"The current period, roughly 1980 to the present, has seen a dramatic
split in intellectual thought between those who call for a return to the
'core curriculum' and to the questions of universal, national or funda-
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mental importance, and those who argue that the actual problems fac-
ing society at the end of the twentieth century cannot be solved by
specialized knowledge or homogenous, monological methodologies.
For this latter group, interdisciplinarity is a praxis that brings together
scholars within the university and groups outside the university to
work on complex common problems and to produce ... transformative
knowledge" (Strong-Boag et al. 1998:7). Such knowledge, they go on to
argue, recognizes that "the power of words, images, and concepts can-
not be underestimated in the construction of Canada. The images of
'Canada First', the 'true North strong and free', and the 'two solitudes',
or such terms as 'bilingualism', 'multiculturalism', 'anti-racism', 'First
Nations', and 'academic freedom' name realities in order to insert
them into the imagining of community. They map the ongoing strug-
gle to construct the nation" (1998:14).
Painting the Maple, indirectly connected to other studies of nation-
formation such as Homi Bhabha's (1990) Nation and Narration, Benedict
Anderson's (1983) Imagined Communities, and Nestor Canclini's (1995)
Hybrid Cultures advocates scrutinizing "the discursive formation of
nation to see where, how, and why some discursive practices (stories,
texts, voices) install themselves in a narrative of nation and others do
not" (Strong-Boag et al. 1998:8). They are just these certain "discursive
practices" that William New (1998) questions in his recent Borderlands,
an essay about how its citizens (mainly its Anglophone citizens) talk
about Canada. Because national boundaries, New suggests, are insub-
stantial and fragile, they allow for numerous metaphoric possibilities,
functioning both as "descriptions of concrete agreements and as
metaphors of relationship and organization" (1998:5). According to
New, metaphors conceptualize our world, socially, even ethically
compartmentalizing place and space. He points to the familial
metaphor of imperialism - mother country, daughter colony - as an
illustration of colonial dependency. It is also gendered, reminding us
of an earlier conceptualization of Canada by the historian William
Kilbourn (1970), who writes that "in a masculine world of the assertive
will and the cutting edge of intellect, a certain Canadian tendency to
the amorphous permissive feminine principle of openness and tolera-
tion and acceptance offers the possibility of healing" (1970:53). Here,
Canada is imaged as female, set against a rough assertive male world,
and often connected with the United States.
New is interested in more nuanced metaphors; like the editors of
Painting the Maple, he believes that the borderland works well as an
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image for contemporary Canada because it implies a "condition of
'interstitiality', in-between-ness, an experiential territory of intervention
and revision" (1998, 27). A dramatic example of borderland imagery
appears in Michael Ondaatje's (1992) The English Patient. The Italian
villa in which the characters play out the drama is presented as a lim-
inal space, a borderland, which is open to many different kinds of
negotiation, all of which oblige readers to question the stability and
even the legitimacy of boundaries. At one point, the English patient,
speaking of living in the desert, says: "We were German, English,
Hungarian, African - all of us insignificant to them [the Bedouin].
Gradually we became nationless. I came to hate nations. We are
deformed by nation-states" (1992:138). While not denying the signifi-
cance of nation, New emphasizes the importance of the uncertainty of
in-between-ness: "Inside Canada, a boundary discourse often func-
tions both inclusively and exclusively, as the metaphoric plane on
which differing versions of nationhood and nationalism - some with a
misconceived faith in the power of definition - declare themselves"
(1998:29). Indeed, New thinks of uncertainty as really a "matrix of cre-
ation" (1998:30) and quotes the playwright John Gray who, in a sort of
excess of metaphors, calls Canada an "internally generated vision, a
collective work of art... an existential fable, a poem packed with per-
sonal questions" (1998:68). New quotes Gray, I presume, because he
wants all of us to resist certain older nationalist cliches so that we can
"imagine our way past the stereotypes of affordability and snowy
boredom. And without losing sight of the larger world in which we
live ... embrace the local spirit, the creative energy." Canadian Studies
will, he hopes, become the "text of our lives" (1998:102).
That's probably what Jonathan Kertzer (1998) also hopes in
Worrying the Nation, his analysis of Anglophone literature. He, too,
investigates the tension between politics and culture and argues, as the
others have, that without a stable centre, Canada, as a nation, can be
imaged only by "permeable" boundaries (1998:136). While he under-
stands that many post-nationalists interpret nations as "tribal
remnants" (1998:163), he nonetheless believes that contemporary
human beings need, both historically and discursively, the concept of
nation, protean as it necessarily is. He writes: "We must continue
studying how the nation is imagined: how it defines a body of writing
as national; how it informs and validates that literature; how its clash-
ing loyalties impassion citizens for good or ill; how it convokes and
disperses communities; how it invokes and subverts the ideal of hero-
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ism; how it foresees a fusion of personal and social satisfactions (joy
and justice); and how it gives a mission to literary criticism, including
the mission to denounce nationalism in its vicious forms" (1998:195).
For Kertzer, Canada is a riddle.
Not everyone will agree that Canada should remain a nation in
order to give literary critics a mission. Peter Newman (1993), in The
Canadian Revolution: From Deference to Defiance, might be arguing for
Canada's nationhood as a mission for journalists. Situating himself, as
he tells his readers in the conclusion, as "the guy in the tunnel. Trying to
illuminate the path we've taken and even flash ahead a bit to light our
uncertain future" (1993:400), Newman gives us a quantity of numerous
potentially guiding metaphors. Former editor-in-chief of Maclean's and
The Toronto Star, he writes with a journalist's panache, a sort of bravura
that encourages extravagance. As an analysis of Canadian politics
mainly between 1985 and 1995, his book begins with that now cliched
metaphor of Canada as a "Clark Kent" who, Newman argues, may
finally be transforming into Superman. While he admits that changes in
the political identity of Canada tend to be "glacial" (a not surprising
metaphor for such a northern country), he suggests that something
happened between 1985 and 1995, when there occurred "a sudden
bursting like buds in springtime" (1993:xvi). While this is not an un-
Canadian metaphor - buds do, finally, burst even in Canada - the
attachment of the metaphor to a renewed connection between thought
and emotion is somewhat less Canadian; that is, with the bursting bud
metaphor, Newman implies that, at last, Canadians could escape from
their lengthy indenture to authority and their northern stoicism, replac-
ing it with individualism and a sort of southern recklessness. In case we
miss the point, he underlines it: "the time had come to stop pretending
that being Canadian was some kind of inside joke dreamed up by a
bored God with a highly-developed sense of the absurd" (1993:xix).
Such a God is surely good enough for prime time - a Canadian humorist
who might have appeared on SCTV or This Hour Has 22 Minutes.
Newman's metaphors are certainly rhetorical. They enliven his
writing. But they also tell us a good deal about his desires for Canada,
most notably that Canada (the peaceable kingdom) is capable of revo-
lution. "Once or twice a century," Newman tells us, "like a hurricane
that eludes the meteorologists' charts, the breezes of history unexpect-
edly accelerate and blow away the touchstones by which people live"
(1995:3). While winds are a part of nature, Newman believes that
Canadians have always suffered from having an identity so connected
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with nature; he wants to shift his images in line with the "Darwinian
ethic of the 1980s" (1995:65) although surely Darwin has informed
Canadian nature imagery all along. For example, Northrop Frye's gar-
risons image depicts Canada as a series of protective camps
surrounded by an often antagonistic nature, a wilderness where, as
one of the characters in Margaret Atwood's Wilderness Tips imagines:
there are trees that are "hardly trees; they are currents of energy,
charged with violent colour" (1991:129). Such metaphors describe
Canada in terms of a struggle.
Newman's desire to encourage us to see a Canada raw in tooth and
claw even affects the now prevalent images of borders that Canadian
writers have recently been using. When he tells us that Canada is "del-
icately poised on the edge of perpetual collapse" (1995:11), unlike the
optimistic borders of New's Borderlands, this edge is presented as
potential disaster. It affects, too, his attention to gender. Newman
quotes from his favorite writer, Morley Callaghan: "Canada ... is like a
woman waiting in the window of an old house at a crossroads. She is
an ageless, wild and hard beauty. Men riding by come to her in the
night. They use her but never really possess her. They leave her and
ride on, afraid of her fierce domination over them, knowing they can't
handle her; she leaves them feeling small." By pointedly setting what
he calls Margaret Atwood's "literary ruminations" against, for exam-
ple, southern Saskatchewan's "folk wisdom born of winters so severe
that they couldn't see their own feet in snowstorms and land so tough
that it yielded more rock than crop" (1995:35-6), Newman not surpris-
ingly prefers Callaghan's familiar metaphor of male/female struggle in
which Canada is perceived as a wild, hard and, of course, used beauty
not at all like, for example, the unnamed narrator of Atwood's (1972)
Surfacing, whose complexity confuses such gendered absolutes.
Newman's particular vision of Canada's future makes it no easier
for him to find effective encompassing metaphors than it is for any one
else. Earlier, writers such as E.J. Pratt could use the unifying image of
a railroad that linked the provinces and emphasized an east-west axis.
Now, though, the axes have shifted, more often moving from north to
south, or else with further disregard of borders, from North America
to Europe and Asia. As Newman notes, "with the demise of national-
ism and the CBC that had once been the house organ, Canada would
have to find a different set of sustaining mythologies" (1995:103).
During a period of economic decline - the decade being discussed in
The Canadian Revolution - the mythologies are not, on the whole, sus-
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tainable. Newman describes a country sharply divided; suffering an
identity crisis; overwhelmed by the mass media of the United States;
unable to work out its dual cultural, political, and linguistic traditions.
He describes Prime Minister Mulroney's policies as calamitous and
calls him an "an obsessive beekeeper, walking around the buzzing api-
ary of Canada punching holes into every hive he could find"
(1995:247), succeeding, finally, in dramatically polarizing Canada. In
another metaphor (probably owing something to the American poet,
Robert Frost), Newman portrays Mulroney as a "lighted match"
(1995:261), and the opposition leader, John Turner, as an " iceberg"
(1995:265). This fire-and-ice image underlines the bifurcation of
Canada that Newman emphasizes.
The images that he repeats from other writers support his vision of
a certain Canadian machismo. For example, he quotes the expatriate
writer Scott Symons, who, angered by what he believes to be excessive
dependence on government money, calls Canada a "creche, a perma-
nent daycare" (1995:294). Newman objects to the historically dominant
metaphor of the Canadian mosaic. Having arrived in Canada in 1940,
an "exiled Jew from a Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia" (1995:329), he
recalls feeling very much an outsider, overwhelmed by WASP [White
Anglo-Saxon Protestant] ascendancy; he approves of its waning, and
supports a revolutionary spirit that might speed its demise. Not sur-
prisingly, then, he interprets the election of 1993 as a revolution during
which "Canadians figuratively stormed the walls of Parliament and
razed its chambers clean of all but a few traces of the politics they had
come to hate" (1995:390). But he is fearful. His conclusion, tellingly enti-
tled "Slouching Toward the Millennium," challenges his country not to
abandon the revolutionary spirit as it moves into the twenty-first cen-
tury. He wants Canadians to jettison the heavy images of the past, as he
suggests they did between 1985 and 1995 when "instead of feeling as if
they were carrying the Precambrian Shield on their shoulders,
Canadians took a break from lugging around the cumbersome baggage
of their national virtues and became most untypically Latin" (1995:395).
For the "condition" of being a Canadian in the new millennium, he
wants Canadians to abandon "deference and blind loyalty" (1995:396)
and to begin to look after "their own spirits in the absence of a national
soul" (1995:397). The word "soul" introduces, among other things, the
jazz metaphors that he loves.
Newman's metaphors are relatively flamboyant. In Misconceiving
Canada (published two years after Newman's 1995 book), Kenneth
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McRoberts (1997) brings us back to a historian's more mundane expo-
sition. Written in a plain style, this book avoids metaphors, except for
those overarching images popular with historians that link organicism
and nationalism: images of growth, particularly of trees that root,
branch, blossom, and so on. Images of war are also used, so naturally
that one hardly marks them as metaphors: struggle, mobilization, bat-
tle. Occasionally, McRoberts personifies Canada, commenting, for
example, on the country's modesty and is inclined to structure space in
terms of centres and margins. Arguing against what he calls the "cen-
tre-piece" (1997:xv) of Trudeau's policy, that of official bilingualism,
with its concomitant rejection of biculturalism in favour of multicultur-
alism, McRoberts uncharacteristically insists that "cultures may not be
water-tight compartments" (1997:118). He also reiterates the metaphor
of the struggle for national identity as a "dialogue of the deaf"
(1997:188), an image that Atwood (1978) used in Two-Headed Poems:
"This is not a debate / but a duet / with two deaf singers" (1978:75).
McRoberts' analysis, while quite compelling, is of less help in the
pursuit of sustaining metaphors for Canadian nationalism than is
Keohane's (1997) Symptoms of Canada, an essay on the Canadian iden-
tity. Keohane uses metaphors in a whole gamut of ways - to irritate,
tease, shock, embolden, and so on. His focus is on language, telling his
readers that he is searching for one "that may be employed persua-
sively in the public sphere" (1997:15). A little like the now notorious
David Noble of York University, who has set himself in opposition to
the contemporary embrace of technology, Keohane uses the image of
the Terminator "a metaphor for a rapacious transnational New World
Order" (1997:10), a figure who seeks to end inferior life forms. But
Keohane is no Noble. His more positive metaphor of the cyborg, I am
sure, would distress the York professor, who particularly opposes the
computer's takeover of contemporary life. What is a cyborg?
According to Keohane - he picks up the term from cultural theorist
Donna Haraway, cyborgs are "fabricated hybrids," who "populate
worlds ambiguously natural and crafted," and a "dialectical antithesis"
of the Terminator (1997:11). As "the spectral figure haunting post-
modernity", the cyborg's particular metaphoric value as an image for
Canada lies, for Keohane, once again in its ability to confuse bound-
aries (1997:11). Belonging to no particular race, class, or gender, the
cyborg, writes Keohane, is committed to "partiality, irony, intimacy,
and perversity" (1997:11). This fragmented, hybrid image which occu-
pies "a multiplicity of often contradictory subject positions," offers
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Keohane an image not of rebirth, but of regeneration; it allows him to
play with the idea of transgressing various boundaries as a positive
development in imagining contemporary Canada (1997:11). By using
the image, he can create what he calls a "nomadic imaginary" that
includes among all Canadians "First Nations, Founding Nations, trav-
elling cultures," and so on (1997:13). Thus equipped, he can do battle
with images of the Terminator.
Not everyone will agree with all of Keohane's somewhat outra-
geous generalizations, but if his work is read as a kind of play, it at least
reminds Canadians of the desirability of enjoyment. His metaphors
include that of Canada as a house party, with conversation sometimes
discordant but always engaged. For Keohane, the Canadian carnival is
alive. Witness our comedians, pop singers, mass media, and television
(Kids in the Hall, for example), moments where the "symbolic order of
civilized Canadian society is lifted" (1997:131). Or what about Canada
as a restaurant, an image he uses and that can certainly be connected
with the sounds that Glenn Gould recorded in his "The Idea of North."
Or, Keohane suggests, Canada can be imaged as a Tilley hat, unpreten-
tious and durable. Such playful metaphors remind us of Newman's
desire to jettison the Precambrian Shield on our backs.
I conclude with Atwood's Wilderness Tips, a collection of stories
filled with WASP cages just as restricting as Newman's burden of the
Canadian Shield. One of these stories, "The Age of Lead," addresses
the decline of the twentieth century (as most of the stories in the col-
lection do). In this story, however, Jane, the ecologically-minded main
character, becomes a kind of barometer. She describes her battle
against the refuse that nightly collects on the sidewalk outside her
house. This is what she says about the objects she finds: "She picks
them up, clears them away, but they appear again overnight, like a
trail left by an army on the march or by the fleeing residents of a city
under bombardment, discarding the objects that were once thought
essential but are now too heavy to carry" (1991:175).
Each of the writers I've discussed seems to be trying to discard cer-
tain outmoded metaphors that are, as Jane says, "too heavy to carry."
Most of them are searching for new metaphors, more appropriate to
the global, technologically-connected world in which we now live.
Indeed, as Atwood writes in the introduction to The New Oxford Book
of Canadian Short Stories in English: "we gave up a long time ago trying
to isolate the gene for Canadianness" (1995:xiii). Well, yes - but no one
seems to have given up the search for encompassing mythologies and
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the metaphors that populate them. It is this search that can be main-
tained in a number of ways, through the mapping of the sometimes
outrageous and sometimes merely descriptive ideas, images, and sym-
bols that illustrate Canadian hopes and fears as we move into the new
century.
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Poete, romanciere et critique litteraire, Margaret Atwood est 1'auteure de plus
de vingt-cinq ouvrages dont les plus connus sont sans doute ses divers
romans, notamment La femme comestible, La Servante ecarlate, La Voleuse
d'hommes, Captive (prix Ciller 1996), Le Tueur aveugle (prix Booker 2000) et son
tout dernier, Oryx and Crake (2003). De nombreux prix et plusieurs grades hon-
orifiques lui ont ete decernes, notamment par les universites Queen's et
McMaster et par celles de Cambridge, d'Oxford, de Toronto et de Montreal.
Membre de la Societe royale du Canada depuis 1987, elle a ete nommee
Compagnon de 1'Ordre du Canada en 1981 et Chevalier de 1'Ordre des Arts et
des Lettres de la France en 1994. En 2001, une etoile a ete ajoutee pour
Margaret Atwood a 1'Allee des celebrites canadiennes.
L'honorable Monique Begin, O.C.
Monique Begin est professeure emerite de 1'Universite d'Ottawa. Secretaire
generate de la Commission royale d'enquete sur la situation de la femme au
Canada (1967-1970), elle s'est consacree pendant deux ans en recherche au
CRTC, puis est devenue la premiere Quebecoise elue a la Chambre des com-
munes (Liberale, 1972). Ministre du Revenu national (1976-1977) et Ministre de
la Sante nationale et du Bien-etre social (1977-1984) dans le gouvernement de
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, son nom restera identifie a la Loi canadienne sur la sante
(1984). Elle est membre de la Societe royale du Canada et a ete reque Officier
de 1'Ordre du Canada en 1998. Doyenne de la Faculte des sciences de la sante
a 1'Universite d'Ottawa de 1990 a 1997, elle enseigne actuellement comme pro-
fesseure invitee au Programme de maitrise en administration de la sante.
Alan C. Cairns, O.C.
Alan Cairns est professeur auxiliaire au Departement de sciences politiques de
la University of Waterloo et professeur emerite de la University of British
Columbia, ou il a enseigne les sciences politiques de 1960 a 1995. Des grades
honorifiques lui ont ete decernes par la Carleton University, la University of
Toronto et la University of British Columbia. Officier de 1'Ordre du Canada et
membre de la Societe royale du Canada, il est 1'auteur et 1'editeur de plusieurs
ouvrages et articles portant sur la politique canadienne, 1'evolution du federal-
isme au Canada, la Constitution, la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes et les
relations entre les Autochtones et les non-Autochtones. Sa plus recente publi-
cation s'intitule Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (2000).
Terry Cook
Terry Cook est professeur invite au programme de maitrise en etudes archivis-
tiques du departement d'histoire de la University of Manitoba, en plus d'etre
redacteur independant, ecrivain et expert-conseil de renommee internationale
dans le domaine des archives. II a travaille pour les Archives nationales du
Canada de 1975 a 1998 et a contribue a elaborer plusieurs politiques et strate-
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Margaret Atwood, C.C.
Margaret Atwood is the author of more than twenty-five volumes of poetry,
fiction, and nonfiction and is perhaps best known for her novels, which
include The Edible Woman, The Handmaid's Tale, The Robber Bride, Alias Grace
(Ciller Prize 1996), The Blind Assassin (Booker Prize 2000), and her latest, Oryx
and Crake (2003). She is the recipient of numerous awards and several hon-
orary degrees, including those conferred by Cambridge, Oxford, Toronto,
Queen's, Montreal, and McMaster, and has been a Fellow of the Royal Society
of Canada since 1987. She was named Companion of the Order of Canada in
1981 and Chevalier of the Ordre des Arts et des Lettres of France in 1994. In 2001,
Margaret Atwood was inducted into Canada's Walk of Fame.
Hon. Monique Begin, O.C.
Monique Begin is Professor Emeritus, University of Ottawa. She served as
Executive Secretary of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in
Canada (1967-1970), followed by two years in research at the Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), before becoming
the first woman from Quebec elected to the House of Commons (Liberal,
1972). She held the office of Minister of National Revenue from 1976 to 1977
and Minister of National Health and Welfare from 1977 to 1984 in the Trudeau
Government. The Canada Health Act, 1984, is her political legacy. She is a
Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and was invested as Officer of the Order
of Canada in 1998. She served as Dean of the Faculty of Health Sciences,
University of Ottawa from 1990-1997, and currently teaches in the Master's
Health Administration Programme.
Alan C. Cairns, O.C.
Alan Cairns is Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of
Waterloo and Professor Emeritus, University of British Columbia where he
taught Political Science from 1960 to 1995. He has received honorary degrees
from Carleton University, University of Toronto, and the University of British
Columbia. Officer of the Order of Canada and Fellow of the Royal Society of
Canada, he is the author and editor of books and articles on Canadian politics,
historical development of Canadian federalism, the Constitution, the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Aboriginal/non Aboriginal
relations. His most recent publication is Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the
Canadian State (2000).
Terry Cook
Terry Cook is Visiting Professor in the Master's Programme in Archival
Studies, Department of History, University of Manitoba, as well as an interna-
tional archival consultant, freelance editor, and writer. He worked at the
National Archives of Canada from 1975 to 1998 and was involved in initiating
several influential national archives policies and strategies on regional
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gies rationales importantes sur les dossiers regionaux, 1'evaluation, 1'echantil-
lonnage et les documents informatiques. Au moment de son depart, il etait
directeur de 1'evaluation et de 1'elimination des documents gouvernementaux
(tous supports). Ancien redacteur en chef d'Archivaria (1982-1984), ses ecrits
portent sur la theorie archivistique en general, 1'evolution historique des doc-
uments sur 1'Ouest et le Nord canadiens, 1'histoire des concepts archivistiques
et les documents informatiques.
Maya Dutt
Maya Dutt est professeure d'anglais a 1'Universite de Kerala a
Thiruvananthapuram, en Inde, et codirectrice du centre d'etudes canadiennes
de la meme universite depuis 1991. Elle est associee aux etudes canadiennes
de plusieurs fac,ons : en presentant des exposes a des conferences, en publiant
des articles dans des revues de recherche et en dirigeant des dissertations de
maitrise ou de doctorat en etudes canadiennes.
Chad Gaffield
Chad Gaffield est directeur de 1'Institut d'etudes canadiennes de 1'Universite
d'Ottawa. II a etudie a 1'Universite McGill, ou il a obtenu un baccalaureat es
arts en 1973 et une maitrise es arts en 1974 et a la University of Toronto, ou il
a fait son doctorat (1978). II a enseigne a la University of Victoria de 1979 a
1985 avant d'entrer a 1'Universite d'Ottawa ou il est titulaire d'une chaire de
recherche en histoire canadienne. Son enseignement et ses activites de
recherche sont centres sur 1'histoire sociale du Canada aux dix-neuvieme et
vingtieme siecles. Parmi les distinctions qui lui ont ete decernees figurent le
Prix d'excellence en recherche de 1'Universite d'Ottawa pour 1'annee 1995 et
celui du Professeur de 1'annee en 2002. President de la Societe historique du
Canada en 2000-2001, il est actuellement chef d'equipe pour le projet de
1'Infrastructure de recherche sur le Canada au XXe siecle.
Karen L. Gould
Karen L. Gould est doyenne du McMicken College of Arts and Sciences de la
University of Cincinnati. Elle est 1'auteure et la coeditrice de cinq ouvrages,
dont Writing in the Feminine: Feminism and Experimental Writing in Quebec
(1990) et de plus de 40 articles et essais sur 1'ecriture et la culture des femmes
au Quebec et sur le nouveau roman francais. Elle est presidente sortante du
Conseil international des etudes canadiennes, ancienne presidente de
1'Association des etudes canadiennes aux Etats-Unis et ancienne redactrice en
chef du journal interdisciplinaire Quebec Studies.
Maria Teresa Gutierrez-Hates
Maria Teresa Gutierrez-Haces est professeure chargee de recherche a
1'Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas de 1'Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) et professeure au Departement de sciences
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records, appraisal, sampling, and electronic records. At the time of his depar-
ture, he was director responsible for the appraisal and disposal of government
records in all media formats. A former general editor of Archivaria (1982-84),
his writings have focused on archival theory in general, the historical evolu-
tion of records relating to the Canadian West and North, the history of archival
ideas, and electronic records.
Maya Dutt
Maya Dutt is Professor of English at the Institute of English, University of
Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram, India and co-director of the Centre for
Canadian Studies at the University of Kerala since 1991. She has been associ-
ated with Canadian Studies in manifold ways, presenting papers at
conferences, publishing articles in research journals, and guiding MPhil and
PhD theses in Canadian Studies.
Chad Gaffield
Chad Gaffield is Director of the Institute of Canadian Studies at the University
of Ottawa. He was educated at McGill University (BA 1973; MA 1974) and at
the University of Toronto (PhD 1978). He taught at the University of Victoria
(1979-1985) before coming to the University of Ottawa where he holds a
University Research Chair in Canadian History. His teaching and research
activities focus on Canadian social history during the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. He was selected the University's Researcher of the Year for 1995
and Professor of the Year in 2002. In 2000-2001, he was President of the
Canadian Historical Association. He is currently team leader of the Canadian
Century Research Infrastructure Project.
Karen L. Gould
Karen L. Gould is Dean of the McMicken College of Arts and Sciences at the
University of Cincinnati. She is the author or co-editor of five books, including
Writing in the Feminine: Feminism and Experimental Writing in Quebec (1990), and
over 40 articles and essays dealing with women's writing and culture in
Quebec and the French nouveau roman. She is Past President of the
International Council for Canadian Studies, former President of the
Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, and former editor of the
interdisciplinary journal Quebec Studies.
Maria Teresa Gutierrez-Haces
As Research Professor at the Institute de Investigaciones Economicas of the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), and Professor in the
Faculty of Political Sciences, she is a member of the National Research System
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politiques. Elle est egalement membre du Systeme national de recherche du
Conseil national des sciences et de la technologie (CONACYT). En 1992, elle a
contribue a fonder 1'Association mexicaine d'etudes canadiennes (AMEC),
dont elle a assure la presidence de 1993 a 1996. Elle a egalement siege au
Comite executif du Conseil international d'etudes canadiennes. Depuis 1986,
elle participe activement au debat entourant le libre-echange et en 1990, elle a
ete invitee a temoigner devant un comite de la Chambre des communes. Sa
plus recente publication s'intitule : Canada: A Postmodern State ( 2000).
C Michael Hall
C. Michael Hall est professeur au Centre for Tourism de la University of Otago
en Nouvelle-Zelande. II detient des grades de la University of Western Australia
et de la University of Waterloo au Canada. II est membre de 1'Association d'e-
tudes canadiennes de 1'Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zelande (AECAN-Z) depuis
1988 et president sortant de cette meme association. Son enseignement et ses
travaux de recherche portent sur des sujets varies comme le tourisme, le patri-
moine, le developpement regional et 1'histoire de 1'environnement. II a
egalement ecrit ou edite de nombreux ouvrages, articles et chapitres de livres.
Ses interets en etudes canadiennes se concentrent surtout sur les questions de
developpement regional urbain et rural lie au tourisme, a la promotion des lieux
et aux etudes comparatives du developpement des pares nationaux.
Lorna Irvine
Lorna Irvine est professeure d'anglais, d'etudes culturelles et d'etudes des
femmes a la George Mason University de Fairfax en Virginie. Ses publications
comprennent Sub/Version: Canadian Fictions By Women Collecting Clues:
Margaret Atwood's « Bodily Harm », Critical Spaces: Margaret Laurence and Janet
Frame, ainsi que de nombreux articles et chapitres de livres consacres aux oeu-
vres d'ecrivains canadiens. Elle a siege au comite de direction de 1'Association
d'etudes canadiennes aux Etats-Unis (ACSUS), aux comites de redaction des
revues Quebec Studies et American Review of Canadian Studies. A 1'heure actuelle,
elle etudie les ecrits de 1'auteure canadienne Carol Shields.
Hugette Labelle, C.C.
Huguette Labelle est chanceliere de 1'Universite d'Ottawa. Titulaire d'un doc-
torat en education de 1'Universite d'Ottawa, Huguette Labelle s'est vu
decerner des doctorats honorifiques par dix universites canadiennes. Elle a ete
presidente de 1'Agence canadienne de developpement international de 1993 a
1999, administratrice generate du Bureau du Canada pour le millenaire en
1998, sous-ministre des Transports de 1990 a 1993, presidente de la
Commission de la fonction publique de 1985 a 1990 et sous-secretaire d'Etat de
1980 a 1985. Elle a egalement ete secretaire associee du Cabinet et sous-greffi-
er du Conseil prive. Compagnon de 1'Ordre du Canada, elle a recu la Medaille
Vanier de 1'Institut d'administration publique du Canada, le Prix pour ser-
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of the National Council of Sciences and Technology (CONACYT). In 1992, she
was the founder of the Mexican Association for Canadian Studies (AMEC) and
served as its president from 1993 until 1996. She served as a member of the
executive committee of the International Council for Canadian Studies. Since
1986 she has been very active in the debate about Free Trade and in 1990 was
invited to testify at a House of Commons committee. Her most recent publi-
cation is Canada:A Postmodern State (2000).
C Michael Hall
C. Michael Hall is a Professor at the Centre for Tourism at the University of
Ota go, New Zealand. He holds degrees from the University of Western
Australia and the University of Waterloo in Canada. He has been a member of
the Association for Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand since 1988
and is a Past President of the Association. He has wide-ranging teaching and
research interests in tourism, heritage, regional development, and environ-
mental history and has authored or edited numerous books, articles, and book
chapters. His Canadian interests have primarily focused on issues of urban
and rural regional development associated with tourism, place promotion,
and comparative studies of national park development.
Lorna Irvine
Lorna Irvine is Professor of English, Cultural Studies, and Women's Studies at
George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. Her publications include
Sub/Version: Canadian Fictions By Women; Collecting Clues: Margaret Atwood's
Bodily Harm; Critical Spaces: Margaret Laurence and Janet Frame, as well as many
articles and book chapters devoted to the work of Canadian writers. She has
been a member of the executive committee of ACSUS, the editorial boards of
Quebec Studies and the American Review of Canadian Studies. Her current
research investigates the writing of Canadian author Carol Shields.
Hugette Labelle, C.C.
Huguette Labelle is Chancellor of the University of Ottawa. She holds a PhD
(Education) from the University of Ottawa and has received honorary doctor-
ates from ten Canadian universities. She was President of the Canadian
International Development Agency from 1993 to 1999, Deputy Head of the
Millennium Bureau of Canada in 1998, Deputy Minister of Transport Canada
from 1990 to 1993, Chair of the Public Service Commission from 1985 to 1990,
and Under Secretary of State from 1980 to 1985. She was also Associate
Secretary to the Cabinet and Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council. She is a
Companion of the Order of Canada and has been awarded the Vanier Medal
of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, the Outstanding
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vices insignes de la Fonction publique du Canada et 1'Ordre de la Pleiade de
1'Assemblee parlementaire de la Francophonie.
Denis Lacorne
Denis Lacorne est agrege superieur de recherche au Centre d'etudes et de
recherches internationales (CERI) de la Fondation nationale des sciences poli-
tiques. II est diplome de 1'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris et detient un
doctoral en sciences politiques de la Yale University. II a enseigne les sciences
politiques aux Etats-Unis, en Suisse, au Mexique et a 1'Universite du Quebec a
Montreal. A Paris, il donne des cours a 1'Institut d'Etudes Politiques, a
1'Universite Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne et au campus parisien de la Stanford
University. Ses plus recents livres sont La politique de Babel. Du monologuisme
d'Etat au pluralisme des peuples, avec Toni Judt (2002) et La Crise de I'identite
americaine. Du melting-pot au multiculturalisme (1997).
Jean Laponce
Jean Laponce est professeur emerite a la University of British Columbia ou il a
enseigne les sciences politiques. II est diplome de 1'Institut de Sciences
Politiques de Paris et a obtenu son doctoral a la University of California, a Los
Angeles. II a ete directeur de 1'Institut des relations interethniques de
1'Universite d'Ottawa de 1992 a 2001 et professeur invite au Departement de
sciences politiques durant cette meme periode. Ancien president des associa-
tions canadiennes et internationales de sciences politiques; il est depuis 1974
membre de la Societe royale du Canada. II est 1'auteur de nombreux articles et
ouvrages, notamment The Protection of Minorities (1961) et Langues et territoires
(1984). Ses recherches portent presentement sur 1'etude comparee des etats
multiethniques et multinationaux.
Jocelyn Letourneau
Jocelyn Letourneau est professeur titulaire au Departement d'histoire de
1'Universite Laval et chercheur au Centre interuniversitaire d'etudes sur les
lettres, les arts et les traditions (CELAT). Au cours des dernieres annees, il a
publie un grand nombre d'articles savants dans des revues scientifiques inter-
nationales et canadiennes, ainsi que plusieurs livres, dont Les annees sans guide.
Le Canada a I'ere de I'economie migrante (1996) et Passer a I'avenir : Histoire,
memoire, identite dans le Quebec d'aujourd'hui (2000). II est maintenant titulaire
de la chaire de recherche du Canada en histoire et en economie politique du
Quebec contemporain, a 1'Universite Laval.
Gilles Paquet, C.M.
Gilles Paquet est directeur fondateur du Centre d'etudes en gouvernance de
1'Universite d'Ottawa. II est presentement chercheur superieur du Programme
de recherche sur la gouvernance et 1'intendance et professeur emerite a 1'Ecole
de gestion de 1'Universite d'Ottawa. II a etudie la philosophie, les sciences
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Achievement Award of the Public Service of Canada, and the Ordre de la
Pleiade of the Assemblee Parlementaire de la Francophonie.
Denis Lacorne
Denis Lacorne is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre d'etudes et de recherch-
es internationales (CERI) of the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques.
He studied at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris and received his PhD in
political science from Yale University. He has taught political science in the
United States, Switzerland, Mexico, and Canada at 1'Universite du Quebec a
Montreal. In Paris, he teaches at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, at the
Universite Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne and at the Paris campus of Stanford
University. His most recent books are La Politique de Babel. Du monologuisime
d'Etat au pluralisme des peuples with Toni Judt (2002) and La Crise de I'identite
americaine. Du melting-pot au multiculturalisme (1997).
Jean Laponce
Jean Laponce is Professor Emeritus, University of British Columbia, where he
taught political science. He graduated from the Paris Institute of Political
Science and obtained his PhD at the University of California, Los Angeles. He
was Director of the Institute of Interethnic Relations of the University of
Ottawa from 1992 to 2001 and Visiting Professor at the University's
Department of Political Science during that period. He is a former president of
the Canadian and International Political Science Associations and has been a
Fellow of The Royal Society of Canada since 1974. He has published numer-
ous articles and books, among them The Protection of Minorities (1961) and
Languages and their Territories (1987). His present research interest is in the
comparative study of multi-ethnic and multinational states.
Jocelyn Letourneau
Jocelyn Letourneau is Professor of History in the History Department at
Universite Laval and a researcher at the Centre interuniversitaire d'etudes sur
les lettres, les arts et les traditions (CELAT). He has published scholarly arti-
cles in Canadian and foreign journals and books such as Les Annees sans guide.
Le Canada a I'ere de I'economie migrante (1996), and Passer a I'avenir: Histoire,
memoire, identite dans le Quebec d'aujourdhui (2000). He now holds the Canada
Research Chair in Contemporary Political History and Economy in Quebec, at
1'Universite Laval.
Gilles Paquet, C.M.
Gilles Paquet was the founding Director of the Centre on Governance,
University of Ottawa and is presently Senior Research Fellow with the
Program of Research on Governance and Stewardship, and Professor
Emeritus of the School of Management at the University of Ottawa. He stud-
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sociales et 1'economie a 1'Universite Laval, a la Queen's University et a la
University of California, ou il a regu une bourse de perfectionnement post-
doctoral en economic. II a ete doyen de la faculte des etudes superieures et de
la recherche a la Carleton University au cours des annees 1970 et de la faculte
d'administration de 1'Universite d'Ottawa durant les annees 1980. II est presi-
dent elu de la Societe royale du Canada pour la periode de 2003 a 2005 et
Membre de la Royal Society of Arts of London. II a ete nomme Membre de
1'Ordre du Canada en 1992. Actif en radiodiffusion, il a ecrit un grand nombre
d'articles et des livres traitant de 1'histoire de 1'economie canadienne, des poli-
tiques publiques et des questions de gouvernance.
Susan D. Phillips
Susan D. Phillips est professeure agregee d'administration publique a la
Carleton University, ou elle donne des cours sur le gouvernement urbain, la
recherche strategique et le secteur benevole. Elle a ete redactrice en chef du
rapport d'examen annuel How Ottawa Spends et redactrice associee de la revue
Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de politiques. De 1997 a 1999, elle a ete directrice
de recherche du Groupe d'experts sur la saine gestion et la transparence dans
le secteur benevole. Elle est Fellow au Centre canadien de gestion et conseillere
en politique aupres de 1'Initiative sur le secteur benevole et communautaire, un
regroupement des organisations nationales benevoles et de plusieurs min-
isteres. Parmi ses nombreuses autres fonctions, mentionnons celle de directrice
du Centre for Voluntary Sector Research and Development a la Carleton
University.
Jean-Louis Roy
Jean-Louis Roy est Chancelier de 1'Universite Sainte-Anne en Nouvelle-
Ecosse. II a ete secretaire general (1990-1998) de 1'Agence de la Francophonie,
Paris, delegue general du Quebec a Paris (1986-1990) et directeur du quotidi-
en montrealais Le Devoir (1981-1986). En aout 2002, il a ete nomme president
du Droits et Democratic/Centre international des droits de la personne et du
developpement democratique (Montreal). II est presentement chercheur invite
a 1'Universite de Moncton, professeur invite a la University of Toronto et a 1'E-
cole polytechnique de Montreal. II a public de nombreux ouvrages consacres
a la politique internationale et a 1'histoire ainsi que des essais et des oeuvres
litteraires.
John Ralston Saul, C.C.
Romancier et essayiste, John Ralston Saul est reconnu pour ses etudes et ses
romans contemporains aux multiples intrigues politiques et morales. Sa trilo-
gie philosophique Les Batards de Voltaire: la dictature de la raison en Occident, Le
compagnon du doute et La Civilisation inconsciente a inspire de nombreux
debats, tout comme son ouvrage sur le Canada au vingtieme siecle, Reflexions
d'un frere siamois: le Canada a la fin du XXe siecle (1997) et son livre le plus recent
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led philosophy, social sciences, and economics at Laval, Queen's, and at the
University of California where he was a Postdoctoral Fellow in Economics. He
was Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research at Carleton
University in the 1970s and of the Faculty of Administration at the University
of Ottawa in the 1980s. He is a President-elect of the Royal Society of Canada
(2003-2005), a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts of London, and was named
Member of the Order of Canada in 1992. He has been active in broadcasting
and has written numerous books and articles on Canadian economic history,
public policy, and governance issues.
Susan D. Phillips
Susan D. Phillips is Associate Professor of Public Administration, Carleton
University, where she teaches courses in urban government, policy research,
and the voluntary sector. She is past editor of both the annual review, How
Ottawa Spends and of the journal Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de politiques.
From 1997-99, she was the Research Director of the Broadbent Panel on
Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector. She is a Fellow with
the Canadian Centre for Management Development and acts as Policy
Advisor to the Voluntary Sector Initiative, a coalition of national voluntary
organizations and several government departments. Among her many other
functions, she is also the current Director of the Centre for Voluntary Sector
Research and Development at Carleton University.
Jean-Louis Roy
Jean-Louis Roy is Chancellor of 1'Universite Sainte-Anne in Nova Scotia. He
served as Secretary General of the international Agence de la Francophonie
(1990-1998), Paris. He was Quebec's Delegate General to Paris (1986-1990) and
editor of the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir (1981-1986). In August 2002 he
was appointed President of Rights & Democracy/International Centre for
Human Rights and Democratic Development, (Montreal). He is currently a
visiting researcher at the Universite de Moncton, visiting professor at the
University of Toronto, and visiting professor at the Ecole polytechnique de
Montreal. He has published many books on international politics and history,
along with essays and literary works.
John Ralston Saul, C.C.
Novelist and essayist, John Ralston Saul has earned recognition as the author
of studies and densely plotted novels on contemporary political issues and
moral intrigue. His philosophical trilogy - Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship
of Reason in the West, The Doubter's Companion: A Dictionary of Aggressive
Common Sense, and The Unconscious Civilization - has generated much debate
in Canada and abroad, as has its sequel, On Equilibrium, published in 2001 and
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On Equilibrium (2001). II a ete nomme Chevalier de 1'Ordre des Arts et des
Lettres de la France en 1996 et Compagnon de 1'Ordre du Canada en 1999. II
a obtenu son doctoral du King's College de la University of London
(Angleterre), delient aussi des doctorats honorifiques des universiles McGill,
Victoria, Simon Fraser, McMaster, Quebec a Montreal, Manitoba et Western
Ontario et a ete nomme Senior Fellow du Massey College de la University of
Toronto.
Shirley Thomson, C.C.
Shirley L. Thomson a ete directrice du Conseil des Arts du Canada (1998-
2002). Auparavant, elle a ete directrice du Musee des beaux-arts du Canada
(1987-1997), secretaire generate de la Commission canadienne pour 1'UNESCO
(1985-1987) et directrice du Musee McCord, a Montreal (1982 a 1985). Elle
detient un doctoral en histoire de 1'art de 1'Universite McGill, une mailrise es
arts de la University of Maryland et un baccalaureat es arts de la University of
Western Ontario. Elle a rec.u en outre plusieurs doctorats honorifiques et a ete
nominee Chevalier de 1'Ordre des Arts et des Lettres par la France et Officier
de 1'Ordre du Canada en 1994, puis Compagnon en 2001.
W. Michael Wilson
W. Michael Wilson est detenteur du poste de vice-president principal des ini-
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